


COLONIAL HERITAGE, MEMORY and SUSTAINABILITY in AFRICA

CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECT

EDITED BY

Munyaradzi Mawere and
Tapuwa R. Mubaya



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Colonial Heritage, Memory, and Sustainability in Dialogue: An Introduction

Munyaradzi Mawere

The continent of Africa is judiciously and richly endowed with diverse resources; natural, human, religious, and cultural. While cultural heritage in Africa, as elsewhere, is increasingly employed both as a stimulus and vehicle for development and sustainability, some forms of heritage remain untapped, at least, to harp and propel the loci of development and sustainability on the continent. Many decades after the end of liberation struggles and the demise of Western colonial administration and imperialism in the corridors of African soils, liberation war heritage, for example, remains a tantalising possibility as a prospective launch pad to foster and propagate the continent's sustainable development efforts. The potential wherewithal and contribution of many historic-cultural landscapes, battle sites, detention centres/war prisons, assembly points, narratives, nationalist biographies, transit bases, among other important aspects of what broadly constitutes colonial heritage in Africa, thus, remain trapped in the pufferies of inscrutability that they are yet to be fully explored, comprehended, and realised. This has been a result of compound factors that include, but not limited to, the gory effects and unpardonable sufferings that the process of colonialism inflicted on the masses of the indigenous Africans and the uncertainties that processes like westernisation and globalisation – processes that are directly linked with the former European colonists – have sown on the African soils. Globalisation, for example, is attractive and sometimes beautiful. It is, however, no proof against imperialism. It is no proof against foreign domination. It is no proof against cultural atrophy. It is no proof against technological tantrums and epistemic violence. This is in sync with my earlier observation that globalisation is a bitter pill that one takes with a crinkle face

(Mawere 2013). A bitter pill has a double effect: It may (or may not) heal the ailing body but at the same time pains the body that takes it. Better if the body is pained but healed at the same time! All these factors and observations when juxtaposed with colonial heritage beg not only the formerly colonised (or the sub-altern societies) to tread with caution but also importunate questions that boggle the mind and hard to provide satisfactory answers: ‘What legacy and lessons did colonialism bequeath to Africa? Is the desire to make heritage rewarding palpable in Africa? How can the African youths be furnished with cultural epistemological lenses and arsenals – spiritual, moral and functional education? Is there a nexus between heritage, development and sustainability? If yes, how can Africa use its premium cultural heritage to shape, leapfrog its development, and secure a sustainable future?’

As the continent of Africa continues to attempt to chime and forge burgeoning economies in the twenty-first century, reflections on these beseeching questions and the potential role of cultural heritage to instigate transformation and categorically promote sustainable development are not only mandatory but more urgent now than ever. Documentaries, collections, conservation and commemoration efforts to capture and enliven Africa’s fading history and underexploited heritage resources accumulated immediate before, during, and after the struggles for independence, remain a priority in the broader context of cultural heritage milieu. The Greeks, for example, have preserved and gone a step further to digitalise the works of their renowned geniuses like Homer, Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Shakespeare. The English have also preserved and still study their Elizabethan, Jacobean, Augustan, Romantic, Victorian, Reformist, Imagist, and Modernist, among other traditions that are historically and legitimately theirs. Now, isn’t it the onus of Africa to challenge and explore the nexus between its past, presence, and future in the preservation, conservation, and exploitation of its heritage for sustainability of the continent? No wonder, in 1988, the former Chief Justice Enoch Dumbutschena’s graveside eulogy attacked the Zimbabwean nation for failing to honour its accomplished and prolific writers like Professor

Stanelake Samkange, charging: “It is the citizens of each country who pick up and expose the achievements of those achievers who have distinguished themselves [...] A nation that ignores the achievements of its people is a sick nation” (see Mushava 2013). This was on his realisation that Samkange’s historical and creative works, though were being enjoyed abroad, were not only overlooked but excluded to hollow hovels on the school curriculum and generally out of circulation in Zimbabwe, where they should have impacted positively then and in the future, as part and parcel of cultural heritage (and intellectual/literary heritage) to move the country forward. Such was, for sure, a failure to promote literary heritage; a failure to account for Zimbabwe’s best historical and creative works and; a withdrawal of Zimbabwe’s charted legacy and heritage into oblivion and obscurity. One would, therefore, ask: Isn’t it that our past is still with us for we see our present and future by looking back to our past? Isn’t it that we go forward by looking back and around for there is no way we can evaluate how far we have moved forward without looking back where we started?

On thinking through the discourse and inexorable questions highlighted above, one may begin to wonder whether African scholars should continue being stark in fruitless befuddled postures, merely doing nothing to salvage and halt further deterioration of their cultural heritage and revitalise their various dimensions of natural-cultural heritage. Indeed, there is need for African scholars to drink deep, soberly, and solicitously in the past and present, for little learning is always dangerous and unsustaining. In fact, the people of Africa should not afford to remain undecided and uncertain of their position in this fast changing world; they must reawaken their intellectual proclivity and dig deep into their existential experiences and cause of existence the *Sankofa* way.

Mindful of the highlighted obtaining reality and complexities around the African cause, this diverse, ingeniously impeccable collection strives to render nuanced insights that contribute to the trajectories of colonial heritage (especially liberation war heritage), memory, socio-economic development and politics associated with heritage discourses.

Drawing on his wealth experience of teaching and research in Zimbabwe, Duri's chapter 2, grapples with contested narratives in Zimbabwe's liberation war heritage. Making reference to Joyce Mujuru's case, Duri advances the argument that the dramatic shift in Zimbabwe's liberation war narratives of Joyce Mujuru is clear testimony that history and heritage can be manipulated according to political dictates and power dynamics of the moment. Basing on this observation, Duri takes his argument further to stress that the possible manipulation of history and heritage sometimes makes it difficult to judge and distinguish between genuine heroes and heroines among those that are proclaimed or exalted by the dynamics of power of the moment. Duri, thus, consolidates his chapter by concluding that some of the critical challenges associated with history and heritage management in the contemporary world in general and Zimbabwe in particular are largely shaped by prevailing political dispensations and struggles for power of the moment.

Mindful of both the gains and losses resulted from colonialism in Africa, Ògunlola's chapter 3 examines cultural heritage in view of the past, present and future. He makes reference to the Yorùbá of Southwestern Nigeria, while dissecting and peeping into pre-colonial cultural heritage to imagine and make a case for the future of Africa's cultural heritage. To yield answers on the situation obtaining in Nigeria as a result of the perceivable negative consequences of colonialism and adopted Western life styles, Ògunlola raises critical questions: 'Is African culture maintaining its old status in terms of recognition and observation? If it has changed, what factors are responsible for the bastardisation of the cultural values using the Yorùbá of Southwestern Nigeria as a case study?' Basing on his responses to these questions and a critical examination of the causes of marginalisation of African cultural norms and values in the current global trends, Ògunlola proffers the argument that colonialism has adversely affected African cultural heritage and the social fabric of the people of Africa as a whole resulting in downward degeneration of African culture. On that note, Ògunlola suggests a number of ways through which African cultural values could be brought back to limelight. He, for instance, suggests that all stakeholders including literary writers

should have a role to play in revamping the African cultural heritage which has been badly bastardised and almost devastated by colonialism and its attendant force of westernisation.

In chapter 4, Mawere and Mubaya tussle head on with the often neglected type of cultural heritage namely, colonial heritage and in particular historic buildings (also known as colonial buildings). To make their case, Mawere and Mubaya start by acknowledging that while many cultural heritage scholars have studied ‘many of the various dimensions of cultural heritage, insignificant attention especially in the context of Zimbabwe, has been paid to the potential of historical buildings as drivers for urban community development and sustainability.’ Basing on this observation, Mawere and Mubaya adopt six historic buildings in Masvingo City as their case studies namely; Italian Chapel, Thomas Meikles building, Charles Austin Theatre, Old Fort Victoria Hotel, Bell and Curfews Towers, critically questioning their perceived socio-economic potential in promoting and sustaining urban livelihoods and sustainable development of communities in which they are located. Drawing on their observations and findings, Mawere and Mubaya advance a critical argument that the aforementioned historic buildings’ striking architecture, historical, and aesthetic values could be harnessed for purposes of fostering socio-economic and sustainable development in Masvingo City and Zimbabwe as a whole.

Nkwazi Mhango, in his seemingly provocative but thought provoking chapter 5, interrogates the continued use of colonial labels (i.e. names) and statues – which he calls ‘colonial debris’. Concentrating his efforts and analysis on the statue of Cecil John Rhodes that was bulldozed and fallen down during the time which he was writing his chapter, Mhango argues that the larger part of the African continent is still suffering from colonial hangover. Basing on his observation that while most of the African urban streets and buildings are named after Europeans (former African colonists), the latter’s edifices and streets are never named after Africans even those who through slavery offered their unique expertise and valuable services to develop Europe and take it up to

where it is today, Mhango warns Africans against mimicry and *zombification*.

The discourses on memorial heritage and its contribution to peace and justice delivery especially in inter- and intra-personal relationships has often been mistakenly conceived as disparate and incongruent. However, mindful of the symmetrical relationships that might be cultivated by memorial heritage, Tẹwógboyè's chapter 6 demonstrates how the aforementioned heritage type could foster both peace and justice in human society. To make his case even stronger, Tẹwógboyè adopts Nigeria's Yorùbá intangible heritage, particularly the *Ifa* to demonstrate how this is used in dispensation of justice in traditional judicial institutions in the Yorùbáland. Tẹwógboyè's historic chapter concludes that 'there has been a formidable, reliable and dependable traditional memorial judicial system of peace and justice among the Yorùbá' such that if the same is deployed and relied on in contemporary Nigeria, the result is most likely to be positive.

Marongwe and Magadzike's luminary chapter 7 makes an important contribution to the discourse of cultural heritage especially in patriarchal societies where most of the decisions are passed in favour of the male counterparts. While making reference to Zimbabwe and offering a loud feministic voice, the duet carefully concedes that 'it is not only some women who played prominent roles during and after the Second Chimurenga who have been denied interment at the National Heroes' Acre'. Yet they probe into the challenges often encountered by both living heroines and African governments in honouring *departed* female war liberation icons. Marongwe and Magadzike seem to be influenced into imagining some potential discourses for the omission of women at the National Heroes' Acre by the often under-representation of women in many sectors across the board, including political struggles, and politics of recognition in national affairs. They conclude their intrepid but incisive chapter by contending that 'the omission of women from the national shrine, leads to the exclusion of women from the country's liberation heritage' and the politics of recognition.

In chapter 8, Okyere's innovative chapter invokes African and Biblical dialogue on women leadership in liberation war heritage. While acknowledging, as Marongwe and Magadzike do, that 'in some traditional African societies, women are well positioned within the public arena,' Okyere observes that many of them remain weighed down and inhibited by androcentric customs and traditions in their societies'. He focuses on Yaa Asantewaa of Ghana by exploring her personality and contribution in the war against the British to demonstrate the heroic experiences that some women have passed through before and during Africa's struggle for liberation from European colonists. From thence, Okyere shifts his attention to the personality of the Biblical Deborah and the role she played in the liberation of her people. Basing on his analysis of these feminine heroic figures, Okyere argues for the need for active inclusion of African women in leadership position and in the promotion of a 'sustainable world in areas such as education, politics, justice, and socio-economic empowerment.'

Chapter 9 by Mubaya, Mawere, and Mandima deliberately draws on the authors' international experiences, diverse epistemological orientations as well as empirical narratives from various countries in the South African region, to provide a meticulously nuanced, thought provoking account of memorialisation of liberation war heritage in Africa but with a focus on four Zimbabwean landscapes of cultural memory in the region, particularly in Mozambique and Zambia. While acknowledging the pivotal role that memory assumes in building national identity, providing indelible moral examples, and reconstructing the past, they show how it can be politicised by politically dominant groups to reflect their inane whims and will. In Zimbabwe, for example, the politicisation of memory is accentuated and aggravated by lack of proper legal instruments that adequately capacitate the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ) to adequately provide for the wholesome protection and conservation of all heritage sites associated with the liberation war for independence. The consequences are the hijacking and abusing of memory by self-aggrandising politicians. Yet, Mubaya, Mawere and Mandima are quick to note that besides the vulnerability of memory to

politicisation, memory remains a fundamental source of inspiration, hope, and encouragement for the present and future generations.

In chapter 10, Anderson Jnr tries to imagine ways through which sustainable development and true African liberation in Africa could be achieved. Making AkanAsafo Company of Ghana as his case study and practical model for sustainable development and true African liberation, Anderson Jnr examines the roles the company played in the Akan societies. From the company's roles, which Anderson Jnr argues were culturally linked and geared towards sustainable development and total liberation of the African people, he deduces lessons, which he thinks if applied to Africa, can result in true African liberation and sustainable development in the contemporary milieu.

Bvocho and Chabata's chapter 11 explores Zimbabwe's liberation heritage and in particular Protected Villages as a potentially significant heritage typology. While acknowledging that Zimbabwe's liberation heritage is diverse in nature and in terms of typologies, Bvocho and Chabata observe that conservation efforts have largely concentrated on both sites and burials without paying special attention to 'protected villages' (also known as Keeps). As such, the duo claims that there 'is a conspicuous dearth of literature on issues concerning identification, documentation, conservation, and presentation of the material remains, spatial landmarks as well as oral testimonies of the liberation struggle.' On this note Bvocho and Chabata argue for 'the recognition of Protected Villages as a significant typology, and not just a mere historical phenomenon, through systematic recording and documentation of the various Protected Villages that lie idle across the country and or/region.' To prove the feasibility of such categorisation and theorisation, the duet makes special references to the Protected Villages in Mashonaland East and Mashonaland Central Provinces, sites where they carried out fieldwork for their chapter.

In chapter 12, Asante cross-examines cultural heritage in Ghana in view of its potential to act as a vehicle for sustainable development. He observes that Ghana is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious society with rich and diverse heritage resources such as historic monuments and sites inscribed on the

World Heritage List of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). While acknowledging other heritage critics who contend that cultural heritage is a barrier to socio-economic development, Asante is of the view that the aforementioned heritage is an important tool for development. While examining the constraints, opportunities, and challenges for using cultural heritage to promote sustainable development in Ghana, Asante, thus, advances his central argument that although cultural heritage in Ghana has not been mainstreamed into Ghana's development agenda it represents an important vehicle for promoting sustainable development.

Issues associated with heroism and recognition are inexorably complex to address, yet they are worthy further interrogation particularly in historically fragile and culturally diverse contexts as those of Zimbabwe. In chapter 13, Duri takes up the issue of history and heritage but problematizing heroism and Zimbabwe's National Heroes' Acre. While Duri acknowledges that Zimbabwe's 'National Heroes' Acre was primarily established to represent and articulate the history and heritage of Zimbabwe's liberation war,' he observes and laments that the 'monument has been the subject of fierce controversy among various stakeholders, many of who argue that it does not adequately represent Zimbabwe's anti-colonial struggle because of, among other things, the selectively partisan nature in the conferment of national heroes' status, the omission of some prominent personalities, the inclusion of some controversial and 'underserving' characters, and various distortions in the liberation war narratives, among other reasons.' On the basis of these observations Duri argues categorically that the politicisation of heroism in Zimbabwe is narrow, partisan, and flawed: it stifles and fails to acknowledge the contribution of opponents while eulogising those of the political allies, some of whom did not play central political roles during Zimbabwe's liberation struggle for independence. Duri's historic contribution, thus, concludes with a critical recommendation that if the National Heroes' Acre is to maintain a good image, it should not only honour politicians, 'especially people from one political party, leaving out geniuses and

philanthropists of national credence,' but all deserving citizens without favour or partisanship.

Lastly, Traoré's chapter 14 examines memory and trauma in literary works but in view of spates of genocide in Africa. Making reference to the recent past's specific meddles of genocide and political instabilities in Rwanda, Liberia, Togo, and Sierra Leone, and juxtaposing these with the use of political rhetoric in three of these works: Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's memoir *Coming Back from the Brink in Sierra Leone* (2010), Ismael Beah's *A Long Way Gone: The True Story of a Child Soldier* (2007) and Véronique Tadjo's *The shadow of Imana: Travels in the Heart of Rwanda* (2002), Traoré theorises language, trauma and memory. He explores how the three selected works use language to unpack the rhetoric of genocide and theorise trauma and memory in 'their accounts to expose the horrendous conflicts that mine the African continent and their socio-political bearing on sustainable development.' Basing on his findings and analysis, Traoré concludes his remarkable chapter by suggesting ways in which aspects of cultural heritage like 'language can be used to create and preserve a pacific and flourishing Africa, devoid of the sorrowful stereotypes which are latent seeds of civil strife.'

With its trenchant but painstaking and nuanced academic excursion on colonial heritage (especially the liberation war heritage), memory, and sustainability discourse in Africa, this book is a must read for heritage scholars, curators, cognoscenti, and policy makers in Africa. Enjoy your reading!

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Presentism, Contested Narratives and Dissonances in Zimbabwe's Liberation War Heritage: The Case of Joyce Mujuru

Fidelis P. T. Duri

Introduction

Zimbabwe's liberation war heritage remains obscure, at times misleading and confusing, and largely unclear as a result of contested narratives, some of which were fabricated to fulfil socio-economic and political agendas of certain individuals. In Zimbabwe, liberation war narratives, heritage and legacies were often invented and reformulated at strategic political moments. Liberation war narratives, and consequently the heritage, became an integral aspect of Zimbabwe's political landscape as those who monopolised power often sought to maintain their hegemony by silencing and vilifying dissenting voices. This is evident in discourses of heroism pertaining to Joyce Mujuru, a combatant of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle until independence in 1980.

Joyce Mujuru was born Runaida Mugari on 15 April 1955 in the Dotito Rural Area in the Mount Darwin District in north-eastern Zimbabwe. She only did two years of secondary education and left for Zambia in 1973 at the age of 18 to join the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which was fighting for the independence of Zimbabwe from the Rhodesian colonial regime (Afro-American Network 2004; Pindula 2014-2015). During the liberation struggle, she took up the war name Joyce *Teurai-ropa* (spill blood) (Baffour 2005; Wolff 2004). In 1977 while in Mozambique, where ZANU had relocated to from Zambia, she married Solomon Mujuru, a senior ZANLA Commander, whose war name was Rex Nhongo (Pindula 2014-2015). She is believed to have undergone military training and went on to occupy various

positions of responsibility in the structures of the liberation movement. After independence in 1980, she occupied several senior positions in government and later rose to become the Vice-President of Zimbabwe and the ruling ZANU-PF party, formerly ZANU, between 2004 and 2014 (Baffour 2005; Pindula 2014-2015). During the ruling party's annual congress of December 2014, she was deposed on allegations that included the plotting to overthrow President Robert Mugabe (Pindula 2014-2015; Thornycroft 2014).

Before her ouster, ZANU-PF regarded Mujuru as a heroine of Zimbabwe's struggle for independence, an image that some senior officials in the very ruling party itself dramatically reversed and obliterated after she was fired by President Mugabe and his Politburo. Joyce Mujuru's liberation war credentials can therefore be classified into pre-2014 and post-2014 ZANU-PF congress versions which are fascinatingly at odds and largely shaped by prevailing political dispensations and struggles for power. This chapter articulates the dramatic shift in the liberation war narratives of Joyce Mujuru and argues that history and heritage can be manipulated according to political dictates and power dynamics of the moment. It further argues that the possible manipulation of history and heritage sometimes makes it difficult to judge who is genuinely a hero or heroine among those that are proclaimed or exalted by the dynamics of power of the moment. This illuminates some of the critical challenges associated with heritage management in the contemporary world in general and Zimbabwe in particular.

Narratives of Joyce Mujuru as a heroine up to 2014

The image of Joyce Mujuru as a heroine of the liberation struggle from 1973 to 1980 and the post-independence era up to 2014 is derived from her own testimonies, the narratives of ZANLA and ZANU-PF officials and media reports which largely informed scholarly works. At the age of 18 in 1973, and having done only two years of secondary education, she left her home village in north-eastern Zimbabwe and crossed the border to join ZANLA in Zambia where she took up the war name Joyce *Teurai-ropa* (Afro-American Network 2004; Wolff 2004).

She underwent military training in Zambia for a few months before being deployed to the war front in the Murewa District in north-eastern Zimbabwe. At the age of 19 on 7 February 1974, after only 12 months of military training, she shot down a Rhodesian army helicopter using an AK47 rifle (Baffour 2005; Wolff 2004). “A helicopter saw me”, recalled Joyce Mujuru during an interview, “I lay on my back, aimed and fired. Bullets hit the machine and it fell out of the sky. There was black smoke everywhere as it hit the ground. A big bang followed...” (Wolff 2004: 1). She stated that five out of the 12 ZANLA combatants who engaged in this encounter with Rhodesian forces died. During an interview on 11 October 2005, she narrated how she managed to shoot down the military aircraft: “I am sure it was just God’s plan, so I wouldn’t say I was incredibly brave. You know what is ordained to happen, will happen. As such, a person you might not think capable of shooting down a helicopter with a semi-automatic rifle, will be the one to do it in the end” (Baffour 2005: 1). Having got wind that a woman was among the combatants who had been engaged in the battle, Rhodesian soldiers organised intensive efforts to capture her. This made ZANLA authorities to take her to safety in Zambia where she underwent further training in first aid, politics, combat duties and various war tactics. She was not redeployed to the bush but was assigned to train recruits and look after young fighters (Baffour 2005).

It was largely due to her military achievements that Joyce Mujuru was promoted within ZANU and ZANLA ranks. She was promoted into the ZANLA General Staff in 1974 and was mainly involved in the political and military training of liberation war recruits (Baffour 2005; Pindula 2014-2015). She continued to hold positions of responsibility after ZANU shifted its military bases from Zambia to Mozambique in 1975. In Mozambique, she was firstly stationed at Zhunla camp in Vila Pery where Edgar Tekere, a senior ZANU official, and Robert Mugabe, the party’s leader from 1977, later arrived to join the combatants (Afro-American Network 2004). From Zhunla, she went to Nyadzonya camp and lastly to Chimoio camp where she was in charge as the commander (Baffour 2005; Pindula 2014-2015). Even though female commanders like

Joyce Mujuru coordinated with men, they exercised authority over the operations of their own female departments such as intelligence and ferrying arms and ammunition to the war zones (Chung 2006; Mudeka 2014). From 1977 to 1979, she was the Secretary of Women's Affairs in ZANU's Central Committee (Baffour 2005; Pindula 2014-2015). From 1979 Sally Mugabe, Robert Mugabe's wife, was her deputy and Julia Zvobgo was the secretary for administration in the Department of Women's Affairs (Afro-American Network 2004; Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000).

This evidence supports the narratives that Joyce Mujuru was indeed a prominent figure during the liberation struggle. Nhongo-Simbanegavi (2000) observed that there were very few female guerrillas in Zimbabwe's armed struggle before 1979. In addition, women were grossly underrepresented in the decision-making structures of the liberation movement. Joyce Mujuru was one of the very few women who operated as a combatant and an administrator. In 1979, Sheba Tavarwisa, the Vice-Secretary for Education, was the only woman in the 28-member High Command, ZANU's highest decision-making body. Below the High Command was the Central Committee, in which Joyce Mujuru, as Secretary for Women's Affairs, sat together with Tavarwisa from 1977. In 1977, as Tanya Lyons (2002: 323) noted, Mujuru became "the most publicised woman guerrilla fighter" when she was promoted to head the Women's Affairs Department of ZANU. This explains why ZANU, the general public, academics and various quarters viewed her as possessing "enduringly impeccable political credentials" (Afro-American Network 2004: 1). Thus, in praising the role of women during the liberation struggle, Robert Mugabe stated in 1978: "We have women like Teurai Ropa...in the High Command. Sheba Tavarwisa is also Deputy Secretary for Education and Culture in the Central Committee... In the army, thousands of female cadres gallantly serve..." (Mudeka 2014: 21). During the same year, ZANLA's Information Department (January 1978: 21) also acknowledged the efforts of female guerrillas including Mujuru and asserted that "these women symbolise the level of ideology and revolutionary development that we want and that is taking place in the party's history."

After independence in 1980, Joyce Mujuru's image as a heroine of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was enhanced and consolidated by her various appointments to positions of responsibility in the new government and the ruling party, complemented by hagiographies from ZANU-PF officials and supporters. Mujuru was appointed to Mugabe's first cabinet at independence in 1980 at the age of 25 (*Daily News*, 21 September 2014). In 1980 she was also the Member of Parliament for Mount Darwin Constituency. From 1980 to 1985, she was the Minister of Youth, Sport and Recreation. During the period 1985 to 1988, she was the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office. She was the Minister of Community Development, Cooperatives and Women's Affairs from 1988 to 1992. From 1992 to 1996, she was the Governor of Mashonaland Central Province. During the period 1996 to 1997, she was appointed the Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications after which she became Minister of Rural Resources and Water Development from 1997 to 2004. At the age of 49 in December 2004 she was appointed Vice-President of the ruling ZANU-PF party and the Republic of Zimbabwe to replace the late Simon Muzenda, a post she held until 2014 (Baffour 2005; Pindula 2014-2015; Wolff 2004).

Among ZANU-PF officials, supporters and apologists during the post-colonial era, Joyce Mujuru virtually became a legend due to her involvement in the liberation struggle and her preoccupation with government and ruling party business from independence. In 2003, for example, Simon Muzenda, one of Zimbabwe's Vice-Presidents, told British journalists in the capital, Harare: "Spill-blood is one of our most wonderful women" (Wolff 2004: 1). In a eulogy of Zimbabwe's former freedom fighters, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, a state-owned broadcaster and ZANU-PF mouthpiece, quoted by Chingeya and Foto (2012: 1), stated on 3 April 2012:

The likes of comrades Joyce Mujuru, Oppah Muchinguri, Maud Muzenda, Angeline Masuku and the late comrades Sally Mugabe, Mama Mafuyana Nkomo, Tenjiwe Lesabe, Ruth Chinamano and many others alive and late, all took up arms to liberate the country alongside their male counterparts. The same bravery that was

shown by men was also shown by women. For example, Comrade Joyce Teurai Ropa Mujuru was the first woman to shoot down a helicopter belonging to the Rhodesian army- an act that was considered unattainable by a woman.

What also made her to be held in high esteem was that she pursued studies to further her education despite her commitments in the politics and administration of the ruling ZANU-PF party and the Republic of Zimbabwe. She earned Bachelors and Masters Degrees in Management and Entrepreneurial Studies from the Zimbabwe Women's University in Africa. On 12 September 2014, she graduated with a PhD from the University of Zimbabwe (Pindula 2014-2015). In congratulating Joyce Mujuru for attaining a PhD, Ignatius Chombo, a senior ZANU-PF official and Minister of Local Government, mentioned what he regarded as her impeccable liberation war military credentials: "Your military prowess that you exhibited as a guerrilla fighter set you in good stead for ascendancy to the position of Vice-Presidency of the Republic of Zimbabwe and your academic achievements will further widen your knowledge base for the benefit of the people you serve" (*Daily News*, 21 September 2014: 1).

Up to 2014, ZANU-PF narratives presented Joyce Mujuru as a living heroine; a brave and dedicated cadre of the liberation struggle who went on to faithfully serve the ruling party and the nation in various capacities after independence. She could have had her own weaknesses, but they were not mentioned in the public domain because of the need to safeguard her powerful position. Brumann and Cox (2010: 2-4) rightly noted that historical narratives and heritage have often been utilised as a "political vehicle." As succession struggles and factionalism became rife within ZANU-PF during the course of 2014 ahead of the party's annual congress in December where President Mugabe was expected to retire, power dynamics began to shift against Joyce Mujuru's favour resulting in her liberation war record being revised and tarnished.

The demonization of Joyce Mujuru from 2014

During 2014, as the ZANU-PF annual congress in December drew closer, factionalism over succession became rife in the party as speculation heightened that the then 90-year old President Mugabe would cede power. Joyce Mujuru was alleged to lead one faction with the support of senior party officials such as Didymus Mutasa, the Senior Minister in the President's Office; Rugare Gumbo, the party's National Spokesperson; Jabulani Sibanda, the National War Veterans' Leader; and Ray Kaukonde, the party's Chairman for Mashonaland East Province. The other faction was reportedly led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, the party's Secretary for Legal Affairs and the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (Pindula 2014-2015). Joyce Mujuru found herself on the losing end of these power dynamics.

In an interview with the state-owned *Herald* newspaper in mid-August 2014, Christopher Mutsvangwa, a war veteran and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs believed to be aligned to the Mnangagwa Camp, claimed that reports of Mujuru shooting down a helicopter during the liberation struggle were lies that had been peddled by Webster Shamu, a member of ZANLA's Propaganda Committee during the war (New Zimbabwe, 19 August 2014). "...Let me finish by putting down the lies about downing an enemy helicopter which were developed by Webster Shamu in a bid to shore up Mujuru's war credentials and elevate her above fellow comrades," stated Mutsvangwa, "Let's be careful not to be misled by ordinary people and war cowards we only started working with after the liberation war" (New Zimbabwe, 19 August 2014: 1). Rugare Gumbo, the ZANU-PF National Spokesperson and an ally of Mujuru, reacted on state television that Mutsvangwa would face disciplinary action for, among other things, claiming that Vice-President Joyce Mujuru had not shot down a helicopter during the armed struggle (New Zimbabwe, 19 August 2014).

Grace Mugabe, the First Lady, entered the faction fight-ring on the side of Mnangagwa reportedly on grounds that the Mujuru Camp was against her moves to become the National Chairperson for the ZANU-PF Women's League (Pindula 2014-2015). "There

are plenty of people who can run this country, not Mujuru...” said Grace Mugabe while addressing war veterans at Mazowe in late October 2014, “We cannot go back to where we were before independence...Mujuru must resign. All war veterans know what they did, not those who claim that they have downed a chopper. Let people say it than praise yourself only to be disapproved by others” (*Newsday*, 23 October 2014: 1).

Linda Mangwende, a war veteran whose liberation war name was Sarudzai Nehanda, claimed that Mujuru had lied that she had shot down a helicopter during the war because she was nowhere near Murewa when the incident happened. Mangwende charged that Mujuru had stolen her photo taken in 1978 and claimed that it was hers in order to prove that she had shot down a helicopter (Gumbo, 2 December 2014). She told the state-owned *Herald* newspaper on 1 December 2014:

VP Mujuru has been using my picture claiming it is her after shooting down a helicopter, but the truth of the matter is that that is my picture that was taken in 1978 when I was coming from Takawira Sector entering Tongogara Sector in Gaza Province [...] The people who were responsible for shooting down the helicopter are comrades Dick Joboringo, Kambanje paD-Level, Brian, Long Chase, Dangarembizi, Masweets, Gabarinocheka, Norest, Shungu and the late Bazvoka Chidemo. These are the people who brought down the helicopter not these lies about Joyce Mujuru because at the time she was at Osibisa Nehanda (a resting camp for female combatants) (Gumbo, 2 December 2014: 1).

Nehoreka, a traditional leader from Murewa District, concurred with Mangwende: “We don’t understand why she wants to lie because she was not there when we brought down that helicopter. The picture that she is claiming to be hers is of Comrade Mangwende when she had just left us. Mujuru was not part of the team that downed the helicopter” (Gumbo, 2 December 2014: 1). What boggles the mind is why Mangwende and Nehoreka took decades to set the record straight. This makes one to suspect that they could have been hired by Mujuru’s opponents to deliberately tarnish her heroine status.

Between September and December 2014, Grace Mugabe and some ZANU-PF officials also attacked Mujuru accusing her of corruption among other things. In her meet-the-people tour around Zimbabwe during this period, she urged Mujuru to resign as Vice-President or risk being forced out (*Financial Gazette*, 20 November 2014). The corruption charges levelled against Mujuru included extorting shareholding in companies by demanding bribes, extorting foreign investors and illicit gold and diamond deals (*Chronicle*, 24 December 2014). On 30 October 2014, a rented crowd in support of Grace Mugabe denounced Mujuru outside the ZANU-PF headquarters in Harare chanting: “Witch, old woman from Dotito, witch!” (*Newsday*, 3 March 2015: 1).

The elimination of ZANU-PF officials allegedly sympathetic to Mujuru was undertaken through votes-of-no-confidence by various committee members within their constituencies. Provincial chairpersons who were booted out included Themba Mliswa (Mashonaland West), Amos Midzi (Harare), Calisto Gwanetsa (Masvingo), Andrew Langa (Matebeleland South); John Mvundura (Manicaland); and Callistus Ndlovu (Bulawayo). From November to December 2014, other senior party officials reportedly aligned to Mujuru were also booted out, demoted or suspended. These included Jabulani Sibanda, the national war veterans’ leader; Rugare Gumbo, the party’s spokesperson; and cabinet ministers such as Olivia Muchena, Francis Nhema, Webster Shamu, Didymus Mutasa and Nicholas Goche (Pindula 2014-2015).

From mid-November 2014, treason charges were also raised against Joyce Mujuru and her allies (Thornycroft 2014). On 6 December 2014, for example, President Robert Mugabe told about 12 000 ZANU-PF supporters in Harare that Mujuru and the United States embassy had previously held meetings where they plotted to assassinate him. He also accused Mujuru of hiring foreign witches to assist her to remove him from power (Mukwazhi and Mutsaka, 6 December 2014). Soon after the congress, President Mugabe fired Vice-President Mujuru and demoted her to an ordinary ZANU-PF member on 8 December 2014 (*Newsday*, 3 March 2015).

Having been stripped of all political powers that she used to have, Joyce Mujuru became more vulnerable to further vilification

and humiliation by her former counterparts. Her liberation war legacy was soiled by new narratives that when she went to war in the early 1970s, she was actually in the company of a husband who was killed when she allegedly shot down a helicopter before marrying Solomon Mujuru (Mazire, 25 January 2015); the version that she had not shot down a Rhodesian military helicopter was emphasised, and fresh allegations that she had abused young girls during the struggle were made. In late January 2015, Oppah Muchinguri, a ZANU-PF politburo member and an alleged affiliate of the faction headed by Mnangagwa and supported by Grace Mugabe, rubbished Mujuru's heroine status and claimed that she was never engaged in real combat during the liberation struggle. Addressing ZANU-PF supporters at Vengere Hall in the town of Rusape, Muchinguri alleged that Mujuru was actually notorious for coercing young girls to sleep with male combatants during the struggle. She reiterated that Mujuru never shot down a Rhodesian helicopter:

Let me tell you: We were together during our days in Mozambique. Joyce came to the war front accompanied by her husband (before she married General Solomon Mujuru). The man is the one who died during an incursion and then she claimed and lied that she had shot down the helicopter. Those who aided in peddling those falsehoods of downing a helicopter were comrade (Webster) Shamu and comrade (Didymus) Mutasa. Their agenda was to prop Mujuru's war credentials. When Joyce came back from Zambia, in fact she did not undergo any form of training. A few days after she joined us in Mozambique, Joyce physically assaulted me. I, comrade Duri and comrade Chitsotso, resisted sleeping with the likes of comrade (Didymus) Mutasa, comrade Bhombandiani; and I was whipped for that. Imagine, Joyce was there! We want you to understand how other young females suffered as Joyce engineered all these abuses (Mazire, 25 January 2015: 1).

Christopher Mutsvangwa, the Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans Association who had recently been

appointed Minister of War Veterans, added weight to Muchinguri's sentiments. Addressing war veterans in the city of Gweru on 15 February 2015, Mutsvangwa described Mujuru as a dishonest woman who had lied to the nation about shooting a helicopter during the liberation struggle (Chitumba, 16 February 2015). In addition, he alleged that Mujuru was a very corrupt and insensitive leader during the post-colonial period. He claimed that she had abused her office as Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications during the period 1996-1997 to loot millions of dollars meant for the Zimbabwe Ex-combatants Company (Zexcom) to set up a telecommunications enterprise and gave part of the amount to some private businessmen to start a telecommunications company and a bank thereby prejudicing the wellbeing of war veterans (Chitumba, 16 February 2015). It is not being denied that Mujuru could have abused her office but one wonders why it took Mutsvangwa almost a decade to raise these allegations. One possible reason is that Mujuru was a powerful figure within ZANU-PF when the alleged offence was committed and Mutsvangwa could have jeopardised his chances of rising through the ranks of ZANU-PF if he had exposed his seniors at this moment in time. Another probability is that his narrative was a mere fabrication intended to further tarnish Mujuru's reputation considering the fact that the balance of power within the ruling party had tilted against her by the end of 2014. Whatever the case could have been, both probabilities illustrate that politics can be a critical determinant in the management of historical narratives and heritage.

President Mugabe buttressed the vilification of Mujuru by raising treason and witchcraft allegations. While in Victoria Falls on 28 February 2015 he claimed that Mujuru had attempted to use witchcraft to kill top ZANU-PF officials. At one time, he alleged, Mujuru hired two Nigerian witches in an attempt to use magic that would facilitate her ascendancy to the Presidency of Zimbabwe. "Recently, she invited two Nigerian *sangomas* (witches)," said Mugabe, "We heard that they were specialists in the field of witchcraft" (Mugabe, 1 March 2015: 1). He further alleged that the ritual involved the killing of 10 chickens with each one of them

representing a ZANU-PF official who was to be assassinated including the President, First Lady and ministers, Emmerson Mnangagwa and Ignatius Chombo. Mugabe added that Mujuru performed the ritual while semi-nude; “topless with breasts hanging” (*Newsday*, 3 March 2015: 1). In March 2015, Chief Fortune Charumbira, the head of the Chiefs’ Council and ZANU-PF apologist, also added weight to the witchcraft allegations by claiming that former Vice-President Joyce Mujuru allegedly used witchcraft to cause drought in Zimbabwe in order to derail President Mugabe’s Land Reform Programme (Darahwa 7 June 2015). On 2 April 2015, Mujuru’s fate was sealed by her expulsion from ZANU-PF (Pindula 2014-2015).

Contradictory narratives and their implications on Zimbabwe’s liberation war heritage

It is now apparent that power politics is at the centre of contested historical narratives and heritage of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Terence Ranger (2004: 234) seems to have said it all when he noted: “History is at the centre of politics in Zimbabwe far more than any other Southern African country.” This chapter has identified the nexus between historical narratives and heritage on one hand, and contemporary politics on the other. A case in point pertains to the liberation war history of Joyce Mujuru which has been presented in two contrasting and contradictory versions by the ruling ZANU-PF party to suit the political dictates of the moment.

With specific reference to the period stretching from the early 1970s to mid-2014, discourses of heroism within ZANU-PF portrayed Joyce Mujuru as a brave, innocent and selfless cadre who sacrificed her educational and other pursuits to join the liberation struggle at a young age. Her bravery, according to the narratives, included the gunning down of a Rhodesian military helicopter. This version sounds plausible considering that she quickly rose through ZANU ranks initially as a base commander and ultimately as a member of the Central Committee in charge of the Department of Women’s Affairs where, as noted earlier on in this chapter, more

educated women such as Sally Mugabe and Julia Zvobgo worked under her.

From independence, many in the public and other domains hardly doubted ZANU-PF's positive narratives concerning Mujuru's role during the liberation struggle. In fact, these narratives were somehow reinforced by her being appointed as the youngest cabinet minister, at the age of 25, at independence in 1980. She went on to occupy various posts in the national government and the ruling party until her ascendancy to the Vice-Presidency, a portfolio she held for a whole decade from 2004 to 2014. Mujuru could have had her own weaknesses from the past but what this chapter has unpacked is that ZANU-PF officials may have deliberately concealed them because she was politically powerful then, and her image had to be protected and upheld until she lost out in the power dynamics that unfolded during the course of 2014. It therefore becomes quite apparent that historical narratives and heritage can be formulated and reformulated, upheld at particular times, and deliberately flawed in order to suit prevailing dispensations. Both historical narratives and heritage, as Raphael Samuel observed, are derived "not only ... (from) real-life experience but also memory and myth, fantasy and desire" (Samuel 1994: x).

Political determinism in the management of Zimbabwe's liberation war heritage became evident during the course of 2014 as factionalism and power struggles became rife in ZANU-PF ahead of the December congress where President Mugabe was expected to retire. During the succession struggle, the faction allegedly led by Mnangagwa, with the support of First Lady Grace Mugabe and other ZANU-PF officials made an about turn on Mujuru's liberation war narratives and deconstructed them in an attempt to discredit her. Oppah Muchinguri, for example, alleged that Joyce Mujuru went to war in the early 1970s together with a husband well before marrying Solomon Mujuru (Nyakazeya, 9 April 2015). This, however, sounds improbable considering that Joyce left for the war while doing secondary education at the age of 18.

Mujuru's war credentials were also questioned by her opponents, the very people who had portrayed her as a heroine for

decades. As noted earlier on in this chapter, Muchinguri also claimed that Mujuru had not undergone any military training during the liberation struggle. This version again is not convincing in view of the fact that she would not have been promoted to the rank of commander without any military background. One may also question why Muchinguri in particular was now privy to all the negative activities of Mujuru during the war such as the abuse of young girls yet she did not hold any senior position at that time which could have enabled her to receive most reports of what was going on within ZANLA. Every analyst would also question why it took Mujuru's critics in ZANU-PF so many years to inform the nation that she was a villain. Again, why was the issue that she had not shot down a helicopter brought to the centre stage in determining her heroine status? It is also surprising to note that Mujuru was also accused of lying that she had shot down a Rhodesian military helicopter by her foes, including First Lady Grace Mugabe who was not part of the armed struggle. The analysis by Margaret Dongo, a war veteran, in an interview with the *Daily News* is apt:

You cannot blame someone today when he has been in power for 30 years. Why ask for the (liberation war) credentials of someone who has been holding a post for 20 years, but 30 years ago you never questioned. That is PHD (pull-him-down) politics...Shooting (a helicopter) or no shooting is not an issue, but she played her role in the liberation of this country. She is a freedom fighter; even if you are to ask who shot what, Mugabe didn't shoot anyone... (Kwaramba, 8 September 2014: 2).

These sentiments call for a rethinking of the conceptualisation of heroism in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle by fully acknowledging the non-military roles played by various participants. They underscore the need to appreciate the contributions of non-combatants who participated honestly and earnestly in the liberation struggle.

When Joyce Mujuru was fired from the Vice-Presidency and ZANU-PF, she became more vulnerable and her demonization was

accelerated. What makes an observer to suspect that all these anti-Mujuru tirades constituted political grandstanding is the fact that ZANU-PF officials were not in agreement among themselves that she was, and had always been, a villain. It has been noted earlier on in this chapter that while Mujuru was being vilified, some senior ZANU-PF officials such as Didymus Mutasa, Rugare Gumbo and Ignatius Chombo expressed different sentiments. In addition, she was never brought before a court of law to answer charges of treason and corruption, among several allegations that were levelled against her. Paul Nyakazeya (9 April 2015: 5) eloquently articulated the politicking that surrounded Mujuru's ouster which brought about a great deal of confusion in Zimbabwe's liberation war narratives and heritage:

Until the lions tell their own stories, tales of the hunt shall always glorify the hunter [...]. Unless the lion who is the disadvantaged hunted, starts writing down its own stories, the hunters will always be the heroes. In lived realities in the African jungle, hunters are powerful and respected personalities in their communities who often have great stories to tell that emphasise their achievements and their hunting skills. But even though people celebrate their stories, there is also an awareness among the discerning that they will never know all that goes on in the forest...For as long as hunters get press coverage and the lions are sequestered in zoos away from the spotlight, their version will be at best eclipsed, and at worst disputed and disregarded. But what happens when the identity and standing of the hunter varies and shifts? What do you make of it when fellow hunters present contesting views? What do you get when hunters start disputing other hunters?

What can be discerned from this analysis is that historical narratives and heritage should not be taken at face value. It shows that discourses on Zimbabwe's liberation war history and heritage have sometimes been linked to prevailing power relations thereby illustrating the dynamics of post-modernism which Jan Vansina (1994: 235) termed "this-time literary theory." As the post-

modernist school of thought argues, historical narratives and heritage management are largely ideological products of the present and they can be invented, reformulated or deconstructed at strategic moments in time (Vansina 1994). This has been exemplified by the case of Joyce Mujuru. Heritage, as Johnson (1999: 187) reiterated, sometimes involves “framing the past” and can turn out to be “as little more than bogus history.” Eldred Masunungure, a political scientist, also noted in 2014:

History is (sometimes) written and told according to the version of the winners and victors. Naturally, there are different versions of the truth. The truth of the time depends on who has the levers of power at that time. That...Mujuru had shot down an aircraft was never questioned until she lost state power. Then we started hearing a different version. We are now hearing versions of the ‘truth’ by those who are now in power, more power than Mujuru herself. And this is not the last version we will hear. As the struggles for power continue, so too will the different versions (Nyakazeya 9 April 2015: 5).

In several instances, as Ronstrom (2005: 7) asserted, heritage production “reinforces the commodification of memories, through...anesthetisation and historicisation; sets up markets where such commodified memories can be displayed, bought and sold...In short, it is not so much that heritage is about power, or has a power-aspect; heritage production is a way to exercise power [...]” Under such circumstances, as David Lowenthal (1996: 120-121) noted, heritage may not be concerned with “checkable fact but credulous allegiance.” This clearly demonstrates that history and heritage can be fashioned and refashioned by some stakeholders in order to out-compete others in prevailing socio-economic and political contests. The past can therefore be a terrain of struggle as heritage-mongers seek relevance and hegemony in the present. The shifting power dynamics therefore explain the changing narratives on the heroine status of Joyce Mujuru. This argument was aptly captured by Jacob Mafume, a lawyer and opposition politician:

This is about people airbrushing history, a patriotic history that is written by actors who mercilessly edit it according to current events. This is dangerous and can have the effect of undermining the whole liberation struggle...We ignored when they (the political elite) undermined other players of the liberation struggle and positioned ZANU-PF as the only player...And these distortions continued. Now they have become cannibalistic. They can manipulate anything and everything to suit their whims and stroke their over-inflated egos (Nyakazeya 9 April 2015: 5).

These views articulate how historical narratives and heritage management can be manipulated for political expediency. When the balance of power within ZANU-PF tilted against Mujuru's favour during the course of 2014, so did the narratives about her role during the liberation struggle. Her political opponents laboured to undo and pejoratively deconstruct her image as a heroine, an image which they (the opponents) had sustained for some four decades from 1974 to 2014, and vilified her in various ways in order to eliminate her from the race to succeed President Mugabe. The manipulation of history and heritage, as the case of Joyce Mujuru demonstrated, can be an important political instrument. A similar scenario also prevails in discourses of national heroism and the National Heroes' Acre in Zimbabwe as opposition parties, civil organisations and various stakeholders argue that the ruling ZANU-PF party privatises and monopolises the selection of national heroes (Brickhill 1995; Chitando 2005; Kriger 1995; Melber 2002; Muwati et al 2010; Tekere 2007).

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated that Zimbabwe's liberation war narratives and heritage are critical resources that can be manipulated and commodified by certain individuals and institutions in order to negotiate political space. It has illuminated how Joyce Mujuru's heroine status was upheld and deconstructed according to the political dictates of the moment. As the contradictory narratives on

Joyce Mujuru have shown, some aspects of Zimbabwe's liberation war history and heritage can remain largely obscure, misleading and confusing. Lamentably, political interference denies present and future generations an accurate record of Zimbabwe's history and heritage. It becomes prudent to constitute an inclusive platform where national historical narratives and heritage are managed and articulated in a non-partisan manner. It is only then that historical narratives and heritage will begin to broaden their focus and capture the activities and experiences of various sections of the society in terms of the strengths and shortcomings of the winners and the losers as well as the elite and the subaltern.

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Africa and the Future of Colonial Past

Layo Ògunlola

Introduction

There is no gainsaying, the fact that every society the world over has its own philosophy and cultural heritage (the universal unconscious), African nations inclusive. This philosophy though may be unscripted, does a lot to determine the circumstances of their lives. It is supposed to guide the behaviour of members of each society. This chapter examines the pre-colonial cultural heritage of African nations using the Yorùbá of Southwestern Nigeria as a case study. It examines causes of marginalization and the way forward to bring African cultural values back to limelight.

Looking at the African cultural heritage from the perspective of post-colonial discourse, it is evident that colonialism has adversely affected African cultural heritage as a whole. For instance, looking at it from the Yorùbá cultural heritage perspective, there are disturbing evidences of serious cultural proliferation in the contemporary African society. There has been a negative attitude towards the observation and preservation of African cultural values which has precipitated a downward degeneration of the cultural values hitherto esteemed.

A lot of changes were brought into the lives of the African people as a result of the emergence of colonialism and the attendant civilization. For instance, the Yorùbá political philosophy stipulates that the head of each community (the King or the *Baálè*, as the case may be), should be respected by all. In addition to his religious functions, he is regarded as the law-giver, the chief executive, the 'supreme' judge, the commander-in-chief of the army of his community Ògúnṣínà (1995: 297). This principle, no doubt, controls and determines how people behave to their community leader. Anyone who acts contrary is seen as a saboteur and such

action is seen as immoral. The title of the King, *Kábíyèsí*, expressed in full as *ká bí ọ̀ ò sá* which literally means “no one dares to query you or your authority”, puts the *ọ̀ba* (King) or *Baálè* (the village head where there is no *Ọ̀ba*), in the highest position in his domain. He is the number one citizen of his community. The morality of the society is always jealously guarded by the king who is answerable to the cult of the Ancestors.

Today, however, the situation has changed. For instance, the neglect of the importance of the *Ọ̀ba* (King) or traditional heads of communities by the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which people are now clamouring for its entrenchment is a confirmation of this claim. In Nigeria today, the governor appoints and disposes a king at will.

Ògúnsínà (1995:299), using Ládélé's *Ìgbàlódé*, explains how the introduction of the colonial rule had eroded the powers of the king. He writes that:

The colonial masters have seized power from him and he lived in morbid fear of the “Ajélè” (High Commissioner). He is often filled with a deep sense of uncertainty and insecurity. Whenever the “Ajélè” visits “Ògbojò”, there is always one problem or the other (*Ògbojò* is used hyperbolically to represent a town in Yorùbáland).

Adéyemí (2008:118) also agrees that there has been a conspicuous drift from moral accountability to moral degeneration in the Yorùbá society traceable to colonialism, modernization, Westernization and life-style.

Similarly, Akinjóbín, (2009) asserts that the influx of foreigners from different parts of the world to Yorùbá land punctured her ethical principles. New religions, new systems of education and politics, new trade and professions different from those of the pre-colonial era have emerged. This implies that the advent of European Colonialists marks the beginning of a new orientation not only in politics, economic and social life, but also in the ethical principles of the people. These experiences and the reasons that

emanate from them have made the resuscitation of the classic social life of African people imperative.

The negative incursion of colonialism has thrown the entire African traditional politics into disrepute. Experiences have revealed that African cultural heritage in general has been relegated to the periphery. Political appointments are based on how big your 'kola' (money or material bribe) is. The choice of a king or baálè is no more based on the voice of the oracle but on the size of the candidate's "kola" or the extent of his influence in the society. These account for why the position of the king (*oba*) is no more 'relevant'. Today, people distort history to get whatever they want. The result is the emergence of more than one *Oba*(Kings) in a village or town. This is because they are selected and not elected. This is not peculiar to Yorùbá society but is more pronounced among them.

The objective of the chapter is to determine the extent to which colonialism has adversely affected the political, economic, religious and socio-cultural philosophies of the people. The chapter examines the past and the present of African cultural heritage with a view to determining the extent of damage the introduction of colonial rule has done to the continued existence of African cultural heritage using the Yorùbá society as a case study.

The chapter also grapple with the following questions, among others: How is it faring? Is African culture maintaining its old status in terms of recognition and observation? If it has changed, what factors are responsible for the bastardization of the cultural values using the Yorùbá of Southwestern Nigeria as a case study?

More over the chapter discusses the extent and effects of such bastardization and to suggest ways of improving the position of the values of African cultural heritage in the global worldview. In view of the above, the chapter examines the past, the present and suggests the future of African cultural heritage.

African Cultural Heritage

Ìsòlá (2009) opines that existing historical records confirm that African societies of old were endowed with a civilized cultural

heritage. He opines that the Yorùbá society, for instance, uses its language and literature to preserve their cultural heritage. It is literature that teaches the mother to calm the crying child; it re-tells stories, teaches the best farming methods and makes the process of socialization easy and effective. Literature, therefore, is one of the most important components of the African cultural heritage. He gives the example of the Yorùbá society. According to him:

The various academic studies on Yorùbá civilization point to an elaborate sophisticated political organization, a strong tradition of technically advanced arts and crafts in artistic excellence, that give birth to the Ifè bronze and terracotta heads, the technology and skill of the one piece talking drum (Ìṣòlá 2009:90).

This attests to the fact that great African empires were not only politically and economically developed but also culturally developed. Available evidence from indigenous technologies proved that their development did make progress over time. The socio-cultural communities thrived and survived by meeting their daily needs and, most especially by guaranteeing continuity through an effective process of socialization which ensured that the ideas, norms, values and symbols of the society were internalized by the younger generation.

Colonialism brought literature in European languages to Africa. The negligence on the part of African leaders in general accounts for why many African countries have not been able to attain sustainable development. Speaking on Africa imperialism, Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2004) asserts that the biggest weapon used by the Imperialists is what he describes as 'cultural bomb'. According to him:

The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves (p. 3).

This is the exact situation in Africa even up till today. This situation according to Ngugi makes Africans see their past as one wasteland of no achievement and it makes them want to distant themselves from that wasteland. This assertion can be buttressed from the fact that in most African societies today, things have turned upside down culturally, things have fallen apart and the centre cannot hold. This is evident from the fact that Africans of today prefer to identify with other people's languages rather than their own. Their maintenance of cultural heritage is at zero level, while indiscipline of the highest order becomes the order of the day. Ngugi postulates that such situation "even plants serious doubts about the moral rightness of struggle".

Not only this, colonialism has also brainwashed the African mind most especially through an unsuitable education policy. In Nigeria for example, the Yorùbá children are totally discouraged from using their native language (the mother-tongue), instead, they are encouraged to learn foreign poems and lullabies. In schools, English becomes the sole language used as a medium for communication. This negates the assertion that a child learns better in his or her mother or indigenous language.

Between 1977 and 1980, Professor Babatúndé Fáfúnwá, then Nigeria's Minister for Education conducted a research at the Obafémi Awolówò, University, Ilé-Ifè Staff School, where the Junior Secondary Two Students were grouped into two. One of the groups were taught all their subjects in English Language while the other group were instructed in Yorùb'a Language. At the end of the exercise, they were examined in the language of instruction and it was discovered that those taught in their native language (Yorùbá) performed better than the other group who were instructed in English Language.

Despite the recommendation in the Nigeria National Policy on Education that the mother-tongue should be the medium of instruction in schools from pre-primary to primary level, English language is still emphasized. In Nigeria today, a credit pass in English language is a compulsory requirement for gaining admission into tertiary institutions.

This is not benefiting to the people. It will certainly prevent individuals from reaching the peak of their potentials in personal development and thus contributing to societal development. It amounts to the lion archetype and certainly, it cannot bring peace. There is need to revamp it. One of the veritable tools for such exercise is through the peoples' literature.

Anda (2000) opines that during colonialism in Africa, Europeans possessed attitudes of superiority and a sense of mission. The French were able to accept an African as French if that person gave up their African culture and adopted French ways. In like manner, knowledge of the Portuguese language and culture and abandonment of traditional African ways defined one as civilized.

One thing worthy of note is the fact that African culture provides them with an ethos they must honour in both thought and practice. It provides people's self-understanding as well as self-presentation in the world through its thought and practice. For instance, African folklore and religion represents a variety of social facets of the various cultures in Africa. Folktales also play an important role in many African cultures especially in the Yorùbá society. Stories reflect a group cultural identity, therefore, preserving the stories of Africa will help preserve its entire culture. Storytelling affirms pride and identity in a culture.

In Africa, stories are created by and for the ethnic group telling them. Different ethnic groups in Africa have different rituals or ceremonies for storytelling, which creates a sense of belonging to a cultural group. To outsiders hearing an ethnic group's stories, it provides an insight into the community's beliefs, views, and customs. For people within the community, it allows them to encompass their group's uniqueness. They show the human desires and fears of a group, such as love, marriage, and death.

According to Anda, folktales are also seen as a tool for education and entertainment. They provide a way for children to understand the material and social environment. Every story has a moral value to teach people, such as *good will* prevails over evil, respect for the elders, humility, faithfulness and the likes.

For entertainment, stories are set in fantastic, non-human worlds. Often, the main character of the story would be a talking animal or something unnatural would happen to a human character. Even though folktales are for entertainment, they bring a sense of belonging and pride to communities in Africa. Yorùbá would say: “*iró, ló nǹjé àlọ*”, literally meaning “folk stories are lies”. This is because folk stories are full of fallacy. This is true; however, the message or purpose of telling such stories (teaching good moral values) is the concern of the Yorùbá.

African stories all have a certain structure to them. For instance, among the Yorùbá, villagers would gather around a common meeting place at the end of the day’s work to listen and tell their stories. Storytellers had certain commands to start and end the stories in order to get the audience's attention and begin the story, and also to signal the end of a tale.

The storyteller starts by calling the attention of his or her audience to the story. He or she says:

Storyteller: À ààlọ, o (Folkstory) **Audience:** À ààlò,
(Folkstory)


This is followed by naming the characters in the story. This can be human or non-human. This is followed by the story. The audience listens while the story is being told. At intervals the storyteller may introduce an interlude where the audience participated by singing a chorus which also gave an insight into the incident or events of the story and the probable punishment for the culprit. It is worthy to mention here that in folk stories, villain do not go unpunished. At the end, the storyteller allows the audience to say out the moral lessons they learn from the stories after which the storyteller is applauded by all.

Each scene of a story is depicted with two characters at a time, so the audience does not get overwhelmed. In each story, victims are able to overcome their predators and take justice out on the culprit.

In the area of politics, the Yorùbá society like any other African traditional society, had their own political system commonly

referred to as *Oḃalómi'lẹ̀* meaning “the king owns the land”. Under this system, the king, (the head of the village or community) was the number one citizen of his community. He was held in high esteem. He presided over executive, judiciary, and legislative matters. He had the power of “life and death”. The meaning of his title “*Kábǵyèsúskeká bí ọ̀ ò sí*” which literally means “who dare queries your authority.” Other officers were under his authority. The following figure 1, is a simple organogram showing the flow of authority starting with the highest authority.

Figure 1: Showing hierarchy in Yorùbá traditional leadership



The traditional judicial system was purely based on the truth on the part of the aggrieved parties, their witnesses and the adjudicators. As a result of this, most of the times, disputes are settled not to declare winner but to allow peace reign. This is the view of Bámgbóṣe (2006:134) who states that “... the maintenance of social equilibrium is the primary objective of the Yorùbá legal system.”

In the same vein, Àlàbí (2002:76) argues that “Justice was administered by the king, his chiefs, elders, spiritual leaders, secret societies, clan/family heads, age grades, and so on, depending on the nature of the offence.” Fálolá and Ògúntómisìn (1984:19) state that there were three different courts in the Yorùbá traditional judicial system. They are: *iléjọ́ bale* (court of the compound head), *iléjọ́ iyòyè* (court of the ward chiefs) and *iléjọ́ Oba* (court of the king), each of them having its roles and limitations. This system enhanced peaceful co-existence among the Yorùbá and paved way for people to contribute their quota to the development of their respective communities.

This is unlike what operates in contemporary Yorùbá society in Nigeria or even in Africa as a whole where racism and godfatherism determine who is who and what is what. The appointment and installation of a king is subject to State Governor’s approval. The Governor appoints and dethrones a king at will. Even if the king does not commit any offence, the fact that he is not in agreement with the Governor politically, is enough reason for his removal. This negates the tradition of the people and this partly accounts for why most royal fathers lose their respect.

Similar to this is the fact that the royal fathers themselves have turned politicians. They bribe their ways to the throne and even bribe to get proper recognition. Indeed, one is tempted to ask whether true and ‘original’ royal fathers do exist in most African communities today. Most of them operate on the ‘id’ and ego personality. They care less about the comfort of the people they govern inasmuch as they are comfortable.

Not only is this, the upper classes in the society commit grievous crimes but light punishments meted on them if at all they are punished. A case that readily comes to mind is the one inside the *Sunday Tribune* Newspapers of 24th February, 2013, where it was reported that a former Managing Director/Chief Executive of the defunct Oceanic Bank who was accused of fraud amounting to about \$20 million (twenty million dollars) was sentenced to six months imprisonment while one AdépòjùJamiu who stole a hand set was sentenced to three years imprisonment. Worst still is the inclusion and retention of the immunity clause in the country’s

constitution, which makes some people to be above the laws of the land further encourages perpetration of all sorts of vice.

The reason for this may be traced to the fact that most political leaders and administrators today are being driven by what can be described as the 'id' and ego personality. Characteristics of the 'id' include among others: it is closely linked to the biological processes and provide the energy source (*libido*) for the operation of all the three systems. The 'id' seeks immediate gratification of primitive, pleasure-seeking impulses. The 'id', like the new born baby operates on the pleasure principle. It endeavours to avoid pains and obtains pleasure regardless of any external considerations. The 'id' always likes to form a mental image or hallucination of the object that will reduce tension-wish fulfilment. Anybody that is controlled by 'id' trait loves to satisfy his/her needs irrationally with no consideration of reality.

In the area of religion, the king presides over all religious activities. The Yorùbá people even today, believe in the supremacy of God who they refer to as *Eḷédàà* meaning "the Creator". He is given several other names that depict His supremacy over other lesser gods. They also have a pantheon of divinities believed to be messengers of the *Eḷédàà* and intermediaries between man and the Creator. Ìdòwú (1977) opines that the divinities are means to an end and not end in themselves. They are appropriated so that they can represent man well before the Almighty. It is pertinent to mention here that this is not peculiar to the Yorùbá of Southwestern Nigeria, but to most African societies.

The king is assisted by the *Aborẹ* (the diviner) who divines to find out from *Òrúnmilà*, the divinity believed to be a witness of man's choice of destiny in heaven before they embark on any project or to inquire about the destiny of a new born baby. This pantheon of divinities is grouped into three namely: the primordial divinities, the deified ancestors and the third being divinities derived from nature.

Each divinity has its own festival periods during which the *Oḃa* (King) is dressed in his traditional regalia thus imitating his ancestors. The period of celebration ranges from seven to fourteen days. It is important to note that festivals were celebrated with

holiness, sincerity, dedication of the highest order and serious commitment. During the festivals, prayers and sacrifices are offered, requests are made to the gods of the land with the belief that if honestly and sincerely done, their missions will be accomplished.

On education, Awóniyi (1978) explains that the Yorùbá traditional system of education which was operating before the coming of the colonial masters had its main objective as making an individual an *Omọ́lúàbí* meaning, a well-behaved person or someone with good character and this has not changed. He writes:

In essence, the main idea of Yorùbá education has always been to foster good character in the individual and to make him a useful member of the community. Traditional education, therefore, embraces character-building, as well as the development of physical aptitudes, the acquisition of those moral qualities felt to be an integral part of manhood or womanhood, and the acquisition of knowledge and techniques needed by all men and women if they are to take an active part in social life in its various forms (Awóniyi 1978:2).

The idea had been in practice before the introduction of formal education. It was the duty of every member of the society to enforce the observance of the moral rules. Akínjógbìn (2009:117-20) groups this into three different categories namely: *èkọ́ ilé* (home training), *èkọ́ isẹ́* (occupational training) and *èkọ́ ilú* (communal training) which I elaborate further in the ensuing sections.

***Èkọ́ Ilé* (Home Training)**

The main focus of this kind of training is to inculcate good moral values in every individual. The training starts from youth, the language being the first tool. From infancy, the child is taught the language used for greeting, respect for elders, he learns about myths and taboos, from where he brings out different moral lessons.

The training of good character in a child is the joint responsibility of the entire members of the society. It is not singularly done. The Yorùbá say *àgbájọ, omọ́ ní a fì ń sọ, àyà* meaning ‘collective effort brings success’. In the Yorùbá traditional system of

education, all parents want their children to be upright, honest, kind and helpful to others. They spare no effort to instil these qualities in them. For this reason, home training is fundamental in Yorùbá moral philosophy, even in the entire African culture.

Through home training, the child knows everything about his or her lineage, his praise poetry, the roles of the male and the female in the society and so on. A child who is not given home training is called *àbíkó* (the untrained child) while the one who refuses to accept home training is called *àkòṣgbà* (the child who fails to heed home training).

The Yorùbá have different ways of reprimanding the child who refuses to yield to good character training. They do this not only through language but also through paralinguistic models such as ear and eye contact before resorting to the use of the cane.

Èkó Isé (Occupational Training)

The Yorùbá society and many other African traditional societies in general, operate the apprentice system. This idea is borne out of the belief that everybody must provide a means of livelihood for himself. To them, an idle hand is the devil's instrument. To this end, they send their children out as apprentices to learn a trade.

It is, however, important to note that it is not just leasing out the child for apprenticeship that matters, but that such a child is leased to a master who is expected to be morally blameless. This is because it is believed that while the child may take after his or her parents morally, he is also likely to take after his or her master (with whom he interacts mostly) morally and professionally even more than he or she takes after his or her parents. Chief among the lead skills expected to be inculcated in the child by the master is diligence.

The Yorùbá people traditionally believe in the saying that there should be no food for a lazy man. Hence a lazy man has no respectable place in the society. He is subjected to ridicule. There is one poem commonly recited among the Yorùbá which out rightly condemns laziness. It goes thus:

Enibólekorómóbí
Òléfashò, ìyà bora sùn
Òlẹ́ lápákò fí sùsẹ́
Enwáwáyẹ̀òlẹ́, ó sẹ́ o

(He who gives birth to a lazy child has no child
The lazy child sleeps with the wrappers of misery/poverty
The lazy child has hands but cannot work.
Come and see the sorry end of a lazy child).

The Ìjálá (hunter's dirge) chanters also chant to condemn laziness thus:

Alápámásìsẹ́, baba òkúòlẹ́
Àkísàrẹ̀jìgbinni, ní'léaláro
(The one with an idle hand
Is the father of lazy people
His rags would be plenty
In the dyer's shop).

There are a large number of them that cannot be exhausted here. They all depict the Yorubá thinking about laziness in general and a lazy person in particular.

ÈkóǪlú (Communal Training)

In the past, the king brought together pupils of the same age. They formed societies named according to the major incidents that happened during their time of birth. When these pupils grow up, they engaged in communal work that suits their age groups. As they grow, their community assignment became more tedious. Those who were above the age of going to war eventually became the elders of their respective communities.

The advantage therein is that the youths were acquainted with community developmental processes before they became adults. It is also an avenue for unifying people from different families, thus, encouraging cooperation among the people.

For over a hundred years, the Yorùbá lived under this system of education which transformed them into respectable, honourable and popular people in Africa in general. This kind of training emphasized imbibing good character – *ìwàomọ́lúàbí* (good behaviour) in the individual. Children and adults alike were tutored along this line. The anticipated good character included honesty, truthfulness, faithfulness, fidelity, just, and the likes. For instance, if one displayed his item for sale outside, he met it or the money already dropped by whoever wanted to buy. No one would steal away the item as theft was highly condemned.

Before the arrival of the Whiteman in the 17th century, Yorùbá language was spoken from the areas of the *Àgànyìn* (Badagry Area in Nigeria) to the river Niger under Oba of Bini (the Bini Monarch). It was the civil war that disrupted the existing system of education. The war was so terrible that towns and villages were scattered. If not for the fact that the system had been firmly established, it would have been totally erased.

There is no doubt that missionary such as Samuel Àjàyí Crowther who brought Christianity into Yorùbáland believed that the religion and culture of the Whites were better than those of the indigenous Africans. No wonder they embarked on the teaching of the religion trying to make Africans become White men and women. Gradually, the Whiteman's religion and culture dominated those of Africans. For instance, mastery in spoken English determines one's qualification for office/government appointments. Thus the use of indigenous languages was relegated to the background.

In as much as I believe that religion shapes people's moral, it is also evident that a person who cannot be regarded as being religious can be morally good. It is also possible for a person who claims to be religious to be morally bankrupt. This opinion, according to Adérìbigbé (1993:293) is in line with the Humanist Philosophers such as Šoyínká who opines that:

It is perfectly possible to be moral without being religious whatsoever. This is because moral convictions can be correct

and proper without depending on any religious conviction or practice.

Some people, who are supposed to use their positions in the society to improve the moral standard of the people, use them to commit evil. It means that one's position in the society does not determine his moral state. No wonder, the Yorùbá will say “*aṣq, ñlákó, nièyànnílá*” meaning “the size or quality of one's dress does not determine his greatness”. This is what the humanists like the late Tai Ṣolarin believed. He is quoted as saying:

The more we see religious heat being turned on in Nigeria, the more we see corruption, nepotism, of man's inhumanity to man, spreading across our horizon and making the firmament thicker still (*Sunday Tribune*, November 11, 1990: 4).

Even in the homes, English language was encouraged to be used as medium of instruction. Gradually Africans began to hate their language and culture. African children dropped their native names for foreign names. If one may ask, where is the Yorùbá traditional marriage system (the *Alárinà* system) where an intermediary was employed to investigate seriously into the families of the intended couple to determine their compatibility thus ensuring stable and life-long marriage? There is no doubt that its absence today culminated in the steady increase in the numbers divorces where a woman leaves her husband's home to reside permanently with her parents.

What about the importance attached to being virginity intact? This is no more respected by boys and girls of today. To them being virginity intact means being uncivilized. Most girls today lost their virginity at the age of twelve. Rather than been a thing of shame, they see it as a thing of pride.

Where is the importance attached to folk stories, myths and taboos, legends and the likes which were used to entrench good moral habits in both young and old? Where is the importance attached to farming? Where are the traditional farming systems which ensure bumper harvest and preservation of farm products?

Most if not all these have been thrown into the dust bin all in the name of civilization.

This is caused by the belief that foreign ideals and items are superior to indigenous ones. There is no gain saying the fact that some bad African habits were destroyed, the proportion is at par. This resulted in total collapse of African languages and cultures and this cannot in any way help in developing the society, hence the urgent need to revive them.

The Way Forward

It is doubtful if one can confidently speak of a solid African culture today. The neglect of African cultural heritage by the elites who are always prepared to encourage cultural proliferation and bastardization has had its numerous devastating effects on the development of the African society in general.

Ìṣòlá (2009) asserts that the crisis in the Yorùbá culture is manifested in the amount of religious intolerance existing between the foreign religions and traditional African religion. He believes that the most redoubtable enemies of African culture are the neo-Pentecostal movement, the born again, who appear to be guileless victims of globalization. They prefer American music, dress and language and even when they pray in Yorùbá Language, they say ‘Amen’ in American English. He concludes that “these groups of people are not willing to see the difference between faith and culture. Some of them may not be deliberately dishonest, but most of them appear to be hopelessly deluded” (Ìṣòlá, 2009:99).

Above all, he emphasizes it that the cultural education of the child cannot succeed in a culturally hostile environment. He is therefore advocating a holistic approach to cultural re-orientation in the society to create a friendly atmosphere for the child and adult alike to internalize the humane virtues in their cultural heritage.

Going by the views of Ìṣòlá, I would like to suggest the following measures aimed at bringing African cultural heritage back to limelight:

All stakeholders including literary writers have a role to play in efforts at revamping the African cultural heritage which has been badly bastardised. Therefore, we want to recommend that African literary Artists need to be more engaged in the overlapping use of African oral forms to generate new aesthetics. They can be used to correct the moral decadence and attack the forces against the spirit of “*omolúabi*” (good character) not only in Yorùbá society but in Nigeria and indeed in African as a whole. African artists in general and the Yorùbá artists in particular who wish to use them in their works should seek universal relevance for them.

An adage says: charity begins at home”, parents and families in general have very important roles to play in the process of bringing back the glories in African cultural heritage especially in the area of moral diligence on track.

African writers in general should direct their works for the survival of the African cultural value systems. They need to be aware that they are writing for the African society and so, they should engage in works that fits into the African culture. The propagation of the Yorùbá spirit of ‘*omolúabi*,’ for instance, among the citizenry is highly necessary because it is only by so doing that the society can move forward.

Furthermore, literary works, films had better be written in Nigerian indigenous languages, especially those with moral themes. This will allow for better understanding of the message. Parents, guardians, elders, leaders, should encourage the reading of moral books and watching films with moral themes written and presented in indigenous languages such as the Yorùbá language. This will allow for better understanding of the themes.

Africans must not allow colonialism and its attendant civilization to erode the entire African cultural heritage. This is very important if we realize that before a man does away with his cultures, he must be sure he has something of value to replace it. The Yorùbá believe that no matter what a man has or is, he must be prepared to obey and practice the society’s moral laws. By so doing, he is respected by the entire society.

For Africans in general, myths and indeed, oral materials should no longer be seen as inferior. African artists in general who wish to use them in their works should seek universal relevance for them.

There is also the need to further enlighten the populace especially parents on the need to recognize and make use of the African traditions most importantly, the aspect that deals with morality instead of emphasizing foreign cultures to the detriment of the African culture in general.

Unless people allow the universal unconscious to prevail over the personal unconscious, the society may not be better off politically, religiously, and socially.

Aesthetic features such as Yorùbá proverbs, idioms, appropriate diction drawn from Yorùbá folk culture can help to accentuate recourse to Yorùbá culture and history for solution to societal malady.

In African homes, schools, market places and indeed everywhere, the use of African indigenous languages and its cultural values should be encouraged. Babatúndé (2003:88) opines that:

When a child's language is ignored in the educational process, it may manifest into a feeling of cultural and linguistic inferiority. It will then prevent the child from reaching the peak of his potential in personal development and in contributing to societal development.

In his opinion, a child learns better in his or her native language than in another man's language. He, therefore, opines that a child should be allowed to learn his language and learn in it.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the fact is established that African cultural heritage in general has been eroded. This is attributed to a number of factors among which is colonialism and its attendant civilization. However, I have been able to establish the fact that Africans themselves are not helping matter. Their lukewarm attitude towards their traditional cultural heritage is worsening the situation. This is

because they do away with their traditional cultural heritages without having something of value to replace them.

Based on the above, I am of the strong opinion that in order to bring the values of the African culture back to recognition, most if not all suggestions above have to be given a positive thinking. Ìṣòlá (2009:108) writes:

Religion is intended to water culture, sanitize it to make cultural life more stable. You can change your religion and espouse a foreign one, but you cannot change your culture. The truth is that if your culture has not socialized you into acceptable standard of right and wrong, if you have not internalized those humane qualities of integrity, honesty, transparency, accountability through your own culture, there will be no foundation on which any religion can build.

Here, Ìṣòlá is upholding the view that being religious does not translate into being morally upright and so, should not be a yardstick for measuring the morality of any society. On the other hand, being unreligious does not translate into being morally bankrupt. Religion though, is expected to assist in promoting one's cultural values and not to demote them. However, experience has revealed cases of 'religious Clerics' who hide under the auspices of religion to perpetrate evil and devilish acts. It is certain that when Africans were embracing foreign religions, they did not realize that they were at the same time imbibing the culture of those who brought the foreign religions.

An average African child would want to see the deviation between his or her culture and the foreign culture as the result of lack of civilization. This should not be so. I am not saying that all aspects of the African culture are perfect more so, when no culture is stagnant, but what I am stressing is that Africans should not abandon their entire cultural heritage for foreign ones as this cannot in anyway contribute meaningfully to the development of the African societies in general. This infers that there is danger in abandoning one's cultures even when you don't have better ones to replace them.

Africans in general should embrace the idea of culture interference instead of culture abandonment. A situation where a child is scolded for speaking his or her mother language in school, at home or even elsewhere should be discouraged. I could remember that we were made to pay fines for speaking our native language when we were in the primary school. The common slogan then was “Do not speak vernacular”. This idea still exists in schools especially private schools where this instruction is boldly inscribed on walls, trees and even on floors. This situation I will describe as cultural enslavement and should be wholly discouraged if we actually want to move our society forward.

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Historic Buildings, Sustainability and Colonial Heritage in Zimbabwe

Munyaradzi Mawere & Tapuma R. Mubaya

Introduction

During the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries Britain became one of the majestic nations, a dominating imperialistic power that for political, socio-economic and religious reasons conquered vast territories and resources (see also Anckar 2012) in distant areas. In Africa, colonialism is a shared experience given that almost the entire continent was at one time subdued and cowed by imperial countries of Europe (Mawere 2014). Due to its treasury and diversified cultural and natural resource base, Southern Africa became one of the targeted regions that were affected by the inevitable tide of colonialism.

Historically, the year 1890 marked a turning point in the history of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). “Rhodesia” was Zimbabwe’s colonial name from 1890 to 1979, in recognition of Cecil John Rhodes who with his British Southern African Company (BSACo) engineered and financed British settlers’ occupation of the country. Whilst paying homage to Rhodes, this act was an assertion of the conquest of the natives and an announcement of the emergence of a new authority capable of authoring and authorising a new identity for the country (Mushati 2013) that spread across the Zimbabwean plateau. After the end of settler colonial rule and administration in 1980, the country’s name became Zimbabwe literally from *Dzimba Dzemabwe* (houses of stones/houses in stones), in recognition of one of the country’s pre-colonial empires, Great Zimbabwe National Monument (GZNM), that was built through classical architectural genius of the local-indigenous people. It is accepted that as humans create, modify, and move through a spatial milieu, the mediation between spatial experience and perception

reflexively creates, legitimates, and cements social relationships and ideas between societies and their members. This connotes that the journey of the settlers from South Africa to Rhodesia was punctuated with a lot of impediments and predicaments. As a sign of showing that Europeans had succeeded in conquering the various challenges that befell and troubled them as they adapted to their new environments, forts and certain physical structures were subsequently erected. These forts portray a story of heroism, conquest, sacrifice, bravery, and adventure (see also Mataga 2014). Commenting on the importance of the creation of the aforementioned settler heritage, David Hughes (2006) remarks that:

Imperial colonisers do not seize land with guns and plows alone. In order to keep it, especially [...], settlers must establish a credible sense of entitlement. They must propagate the conviction that they belong on the land they have just settled... all the while excluding natives from power, from wealth, and from territory, overseas pioneers must find a way to include themselves in new lands (p. 1-2).

The forts constructed during their settling became part of the invention of a “myth of origin” for the settlers – known initially as the Pioneer Column. As much as the intellectual projects associated with pioneer historiography created a public sphere for the narrative of birth, the forts and battle sites became visual markers of this experience (Mataga 2014).

It is essential to note right from the onset that these forts became the focal points and nuclei on major roads as well as major towns and cities for the colony. Two forts were constructed at Victoria, one in 1891 and the other in 1892, from which the nucleus town of Fort Victoria (now Masvingo City) emerged (Garlake 1965). The forts and settlements patterns established during the occupation of Rhodesia became visual symbols of settler conquest. Resultantly, the military occupation of Rhodesia by the Pioneer Column left in its wake an elaborate network of places that were transformed into official “monuments” by the colonial state (Mataga 2014). In conformity with this, Munzwa and Jonga (2010)

argue that the first colonial urban settlements were developed from military forts, established along the route of entry followed by the Pioneer Column starting with Fort Victoria which was named after Queen Victoria. The other towns which emerged as a result of these forts included Fort Charter (later named Enkeldorn, and now Chivhu) and Fort Salisbury (now Harare). It is worth noting that as the Pioneer Column sought dominance over the indigenous people of Zimbabwe, the landscape often became the canvas upon which this power struggle found expression. Consequently, various physical structures were erected as a way of stamping and legitimising their authority while trying to erase memory of the indigenous people. It is out of this attempt to forge legitimacy and erase memory of the indigenous people that the legacy of several years of colonialism has left physical traces such as historical buildings or characteristic architectural features such as forts which today are considered as part and parcel of the country's esteemed cultural heritage. Unfortunately in Zimbabwe, this kind of heritage has received insignificant attention in urban development policy such that historic buildings are often overlooked as a form of heritage worth conserving. A survey and ethnographic observations carried out in Masvingo City by one of the authors of this chapter during the time which he worked for the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ) revealed that the majority of the colonial buildings in Masvingo City have been either altered, demolished or replaced without the knowledge and consent of the two government organisations responsible for the conservation, management and protection of historical buildings namely; the NMMZ and Masvingo City Council-MCC. NMMZ is a quasi-parastatal organisation under the Ministry of Rural Development and Preservation of National Cultural Heritage which is legally mandated to look after the cultural heritage of the country. From the survey carried out in 2010, it was noted that out of more than twenty-eight historical buildings that were constructed by the colonists, only nine are still intact (Historical Building File 2010). Against this backdrop, it is apparent that the conservation and management of colonial heritage in Masvingo City is a cause for concern as most of them are fast disappearing due to a plethora of

factors. In view of this observation, we argue that the failure by both the NMMZ and Masvingo City Council to ensure sustainable conservation and management of colonial heritage downplays and undermines the value of cultural heritage. This unfortunate reality has been exacerbated by the fact that institutions such as NMMZ and MCC which are expected to play a leading role in conserving this type of heritage have folded their hands and added to the list of spectators watching their disappearance and dilapidation. Yet, the conservation and management of colonial heritage is essential in understanding the past and the present, and connecting the past with the present to forge the future.

Our choice of Masvingo as our case study for this chapter is premised on the basis that it was the first and oldest town to be established by the colonial settlers in Zimbabwe in 1890 (see also Chigwenya 2010). That being the case, Masvingo City is envisaged to represent the earliest and most appealing forms of historical buildings in Zimbabwe. Sadly, the existing historic buildings have not been harnessed to extract both their full economic and historical potential especially taking into account the fact that Masvingo has failed to economically grow to match its age. Besides, most of the historical buildings in Masvingo City were accorded the status of national monuments basing on their unique historic, aesthetic, and architectural values. A national monument is the highest status a site can attain in a country. As national monuments, they are protected by two Acts of Parliament, NMMZ Act chapter 25/11 of 1972 and the Regional Town and Country Planning Act, Chapter 25/12 of 1996 respectively. Unfortunately, at practical level the aforementioned legislative instruments are struggling both at grassroots and national levels to provide the desired protection and conservation measures to the historic edifices. It appears the protection of historic buildings in Zimbabwe has been politicised to the level of assuming that anything associated with the former colonists is nefariously frivolous and unworthy conserving. Conversely, we argue that though historical buildings were mainly constructed by the European settlers, they should be conserved and harnessed to stimulate both socio-economic and sustainable development of the country. It is sad to note that Masvingo City

besides being the oldest city in Zimbabwe is still one of the smallest cities in the country owing to its semi-aridity and the unavailability of heavy industries. Yet, the town boasts of a diversity of untapped cultural heritage resources which if properly and innovatively harnessed and packaged alongside the famous Great Zimbabwe National Monument, Kyle Dam and National Park among other tourist attraction centres in the province can substantially change the economic landscape of the region as well as the country's economy that is currently bleeding.

While many cultural heritage researchers have studied many of the various dimensions of cultural heritage, insignificant attention especially in the context of Zimbabwe has been paid to the potential of historical buildings as drivers for urban community development and sustainability. Born out of this realisation, the present chapter adopts six historic buildings in Masvingo City as its case studies critically probing into their perceived economic potential in fostering and sustaining urban livelihoods while promoting sustainable development of communities in which they are located. These include the little known yet spectacular Italian Chapel, Thomas Meikles building, Charles Austin Theatre, Old Fort Victoria Hotel, Bell and Curfews Towers. These historic buildings (also known as colonial buildings), among many others, have given Masvingo a unique cityscape. We maintain that their striking architecture, historical, and aesthetic values can be tapped for purposes of fostering socio-economic and sustainable development in Masvingo and Zimbabwe as a whole.

Understanding Historical Buildings as Heritage

The great buildings of the past 'do not belong to us only, they have belonged to our forebears and will belong to our descendants unless we play them false. They are not in any sense our property, to do as we like with. We are only trustees for those who come after us.' A historic building has a special message from its creator and thus, its original structure and appearance must not be altered or falsified (Morris 1875:17; emphasis original).

Certainly there are many interpretations of the heritage concept – historic building – as there are heritage practitioners. Many heritage scholars simply leave the definition as broad and malleable as possible. Johnson and Thomas (1995), for instance, simply note that heritage is virtually anything by which some kind of link, however tenuous or false, may be forged with the past. Their interpretation of heritage, which includes historic buildings, is historical and broad in scope. For Ashworth *et al* (2007:236), ‘heritage is a word more widely used than understood ... It is often simplistically and singularly applied, and pluralised more commonly in rhetoric than reality’. It is interesting to point out that the discourse of heritage is political in nature and many a time those in the echelons of power accords themselves the privilege to choose what they consider as heritage to suit and glorify their tastes while advancing their political interests. The same political impasse obtained when the colonial settlers assumed political authority in Rhodesia. In the course of the time, they erected forts and buildings with the intention to erase heritage of the indigenous people and create a new one which they considered appropriately theirs. Most of these buildings were later listed as national monuments. In many formerly colonised African countries, the various traces and remains that constitute colonial heritage have played an enormous role not only in evoking historical memories but in also generating income and promote socio-economic development as some of them have stamped their authority in the cultural tourism industry. On this note, we concur with Turnbridge and Ashworth (1996) who consider heritage as something that is created and influenced by the specific needs and desires of the social groups who will utilise and embrace that sense of heritage. Turnbridge and Ashworth, thus, are correct when they contend that heritage is a created phenomenon continuously recreated as new according to changing attitudes and demands of the society in which the heritage is found. Other scholars who agree with Turnbridge and Ashworth include Halbwachs (1992) who argue that heritage is often used as a form of collective memory, a social construct shaped by the political, economic, and social concerns of the present. This means that the study of heritage does not involve a direct engagement with

the study of the past; otherwise it will not be distinct from history. Instead, the contents, interpretations, and representations of heritage resources are selected according to the demands of the present and, in turn, bequeathed to an imagined future (Ashworth *et al* 2007). It follows, therefore, that heritage is less about tangible material artefacts or other intangible forms of the past than about the meanings placed upon them and the representations which are created from them (Graham *et al* 2000; Graham 2002; Smith 2004).

While the view of heritage in any given society will inevitably reflect that of the dominant political, social, religious or ethnic groups in what Smith (2006) refers to as the ‘authorised heritage discourse’, the sheer number of actual and potential participants and stakeholders in transnational societies involved in heritage conservation and exploits means that there is no simple binary relationship of insider/outsider, coloniser/colonised, or even hegemonic/resistant (see also Mataga 2014). From this understanding, we argue that heritage is past-present centred and is created and recreated, shaped and reshaped, conserved and managed in response to the demands of the present but of course in view of the past. This connotes that heritage is open to constant revision and change as a result of and according to the changing attitudes, needs, demands, wishes and hopes of the people where the heritage resource is found. Narrowing down to the question of heritage and in particular colonial heritage to historic buildings, it would not make sense to start talking about them without unpacking cultural heritage which is the bearer of both colonial heritage such as historic buildings. Loosely interpreted, cultural heritage is about all the aspects of a community’s past and present that it considers valuable and desires to pass on to future generations. The value of heritage resource could be from the perspective of socio-economics, development, religion, and politics, among others. No wonder scholars like Graham *et al.* (2000: 2, 157) define cultural heritage as ‘the contemporary purposes of the past or that part of the past which we select in the present for contemporary purposes, be they economic, cultural, political or social.’ We should underscore that whatever interpretation might be accorded to cultural heritage, it is a resource for every people and

every nation hence it plays an important role in nation-building and sustainable development.

Of paramount importance to note from our discussion and analysis above is that historic buildings are a constituent component of cultural heritage. What then makes a building “historic”? Different countries have different definitions, but the most common criteria would typically include age, association with important people or events, aesthetic quality, character, and craftsmanship (Guido and Rana 2012). Besides, buildings are often designated “historic” because they were the first, the most representative, or the best example of a building style, type of construction, or innovative engineering or construction technique. Historic buildings are a very important form of cultural heritage that showcases the past architectural achievements of human beings. As noted by Gülkan and Wasti (2009), buildings and structures may be classified as historic for three main reasons:

- They are associated with acts of historical importance;
- They are old and a long time has passed since their construction, and;
- They are monumental and irreplaceable.

We underline that what makes a building or structure historic is its longevity. We, therefore, agree with Gülkan and Wasti (2009) that what makes an edifice historic is that which makes it a must to be preserved for future generations such as one or more of its cultural, architectural, symbolic, social or historic attributes. Historic buildings can include any structure of significant character or special historic, aesthetic interest, or religious value as part of the development heritage, or cultural characteristics of a society, city, state, nation, or the world at large. Such structures are recognised as having special status and worthy of conservation so they are protected from inappropriate alteration.

According to NMMZ Act chapter 25, all buildings and structures that were constructed on 1st January 1910 or before are considered as historic buildings (Mubaya and Mawere 2014). These buildings cannot be altered without the consent and approval of the

Executive Director of NMMZ. This is clearly spelt out in section 27 (i) of the NMMZ Act chapter 25/11, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), any person who proposes to alter materially or demolish any building before the 1st of January 1910, shall give written notice of such proposal to the Executive Director of NMMZ so as to be received by him/her at least 'fourteen days' prior to the commencement of such alteration or demolition. A notice given in terms of subsection (i) shall include particulars relating to; (a) the situation of the building in question, and (b) where it is proposed to alter such buildings, the extend of such alteration, and (c) the date upon which it is proposed to commence the alteration or demolition of such buildings (Historic Building File 1995). Our reading of the NMMZ's understanding of historic buildings is that they are those buildings that give people a sense of wonder and want to know more about the people who constructed them. Given the diversity of culture in urban areas, urban historic buildings become a very important component of heritage that mankind has created over the past years as part and parcel of the socialisation and interaction with the environment that represents urban culture. Historical buildings, thus, are unique, valuable and irreplaceable assets which should be conserved for both the present and the future generations.

Historic buildings in Masvingo City

The colonial past is present in human life worlds of the formerly colonised in many ways, some conspicuous, some unnoticed. In Zimbabwe, as in other formerly colonised countries elsewhere, it is embodied in material culture, monuments, architecture, and museum collections and related materials. In the ensuing paragraphs, we discuss some historic buildings in Masvingo City which we think could be used to promote sustainable development while improving the image of the city. In doing so, we proffer the argument that besides exhibiting architectural values, these buildings if properly managed, conserved, and marketed, can be harnessed for cultural tourism purposes and the promotion of sustainable development.

Italian Chapel

The Italian Chapel which is located 4km east of Masvingo City along the Masvingo-Mutare Highway, was built by Second World War Italian prisoners captured by the British and kept at the 5th Camp Extension of Fort Victoria. It is a memorial camp for the dead inmates from the five camps in the then Rhodesia, that is, Kadoma, Mvuma, Bulawayo, Harare and Masvingo (Italian Chapel File 2011). The richly decorated chapel built by bored yet talented prisoners of war during the years 1942 to 1946, is now a memorial to 71 Italians who died during internment in Rhodesia. The paintings and mosaics are the works of an Italian Civil Engineer, who was himself a prisoner of war (Italian Chapel File 1997). Two wings of the Chapel were added after the war and inside are interred the remains of 71 Italian prisoners who died in captivity. Despite being occasionally opened for weddings by the Roman Catholic Church, the Chapel is also a popular tourist destination (Italian Chapel File 2011). The main attractions at the Chapel are the magnificent paintings, murals and simulated ceiling which make a visit a worthwhile experience. However, little is being done by both the NMMZ and Masvingo City Council to market the place as a cultural tourist centre.



Figure 1: Picture of the Italian Chapel

The Bell Tower

The Bell Tower was erected in 1891 and is a well-known historic landmark in Fort Victoria (now Masvingo). According to the Bell Tower File (2009), the tower was recorded as historic building number 373 in the then Rhodesia. It was used as a monitoring point to guard the town during the 1st Chimurenga War. The tower had a square enclosure with high walls surrounding it and two towers at opposite corners. During that time it had a maximum gun posted on it and inside it was a platform that enabled soldiers standing on each tower to point their rifles in all directions (Bell Tower File 2009). The bell in the tower was rang every day at 9 P.M as a signal to remind the indigenous Africans to vacate town premises. A warning was also sounded from the tower as a warning to the colonial security agents in the event of any disturbing eventualities like strikes by indigenous Africans.



Figure 2: Showing pictures of the Bell Tower

Curfew Tower

The Curfew Tower is a historic building located in Masvingo City. It is situated near the current Masvingo Provincial Registration Offices and was recorded historical building number 337/338 in the then Rhodesia. It was built in 1893 by the BSACo as an extension of the fort. The tower was declared a National Monument in 1938 (Curfew Tower File 2013). The Curfew Tower houses guns, which were used in the First Chimurenga War. Today, it is situated in Hughes Street and is accessed through the District Administrator's gate. It saved as a shelter to a guardian soldier who manned the town on the lookout for Ndebele warriors (Curfew Tower File 2013). It was built on a square platform with high walls encompassing. It has two rooms and two floors with the ground floor that worked as a reception and the first floor housed a gun and two soldiers who manned the town, looking out for intruders (Curfew Tower File 2013).



Figure 3: Showing pictures of the Curfer Tower in Masvingo

Victoria Hotel

When constructed during colonial era, Old Victoria Hotel was built to serve as a hotel for the elite group, mainly the ‘white’ community. After independence, the hotel was turned into a commercial centre. Parts of the original Victoria Hotel has been renovated and turned into a fast food court: the Chicken Inn, bookshops, electronic shops and boutiques, driving schools and bus booking offices, locksmith services and various medical surgeries. Thus, the NMMZ and Masvingo City Council, have failed to sustainably conserve the historic building as a form of heritage.



Figure 4: Showing Pictures of Old Victoria Hotel

The Charles Austin Theatre

The Charles Austin Theatre is undoubtedly one of the oldest structures erected in Fort Victoria during the colonial period. It was officially opened in 1973 by the president of Rhodesia known as Dupont. The theatre which forms part of the Civic Centre complex in the Queen Elizabeth Gardens was named after Alderman Charles Austin in recognition of his many years of service to the Victoria Community. Fort Victoria has made a significant contribution to Rhodesian theatre far in excess of its size as a town and was possibly the best centre of theatrical activity at that moment. The opening of the Charles Austin Theatre gave birth to drama groups and film productions in the area.



Figure 5: Showing Charles Austin Theatre

Thomas Meikles Building

Another historic structure in Fort Victoria is the Meikles Building which was owned by John, Stewart and Thomas Meikles who emigrated from Scotland to South Africa around 1880, according to oral evidence. Oral history also has it that around 1892 the brothers opened a successful trading business in Fort Victoria Province in the then Rhodesia. The building attracted other businesses like banking and the town eventually grew along Allan Wilson Street now Robert Mugabe Way. However, the original architectural design of the building has significantly changed over the years. Owners of the building were changing over the years and each one was striving to make the building suit the modern standards thereby affecting the originality of the building.



Figure 6: Showing Thomas Meikles building

Historic buildings as potential springboards for economic sustainable development in Masvingo City

As argued by many scholars, there is interconnection between cultural heritage and sustainable development in so far as cultural heritage can be used by the community as an economic resource and drive towards sustainable development (see for instance, Marshall 2002; Pwiti and Chirikure 2008; Kuper 2003; Damm 2005; Rossler and Saouma-Forero 1999, and Watkins 2003). Timothy and Nyaupane (2009), writing on cultural heritage and tourism in developing world, for example, pointed out that visits to cultural and historical resources have become one of the largest and fastest growing sectors of the tourism industry. Elsewhere in Africa, Robben Island of Cape Town, South Africa, where the late former South African president Nelson Mandela was imprisoned for 18 years of his 27 years' incarceration imprisoned during apartheid, is a good example of a viable heritage tourist resource that is earning the country more than anyone could have imagined if, after independence, the resource was left idle. After the demise of Apartheid government in South Africa, Robben Island Prison, one of the most well-known island prisons on earth, was converted to a museum resulting it being named Robben Island Prison Museum.

The Island, which houses Robben Island Prison Museum, the house where Robert Sobukwe lived in solitary confinement for nine years, the Kramat (Shrine) of Tuan Guru (a Muslim leader) and the Leper's Graveyard, is a World Heritage Site some 9 km (5.5 miles) offshore from the Nelson Mandela Gateway at the V and A Waterfront in Cape Town. A 2013 tour to Robben Island by one of the authors of this chapter revealed that South Africa receives around R60 000 from tour fees on daily basis. The estimation was based on the logic that the boat that took tourists to the Island had the capacity to carry 60 people per trip with each adult person paying R250 and children paying R150. The boat was reported to make about 4 trips (but depending on the weather and the vessel) every day which translated to R60 000 per day with each ferry ride taking about a half hour each side. This living example supports our contention that if properly conserved and managed, historic buildings play an unparalleled role in promoting sustainable development especially in old cities such as Masvingo. It is on the basis of such revelations similar to this paraded here that Nurse (2006), for instance, argues that culture is the fourth pillar of sustainable development along with social, economic and environmental dimensions. This implies that historic buildings play a pivotal role in sustaining urban livelihoods and promoting socio-economic development. Unfortunately, there is dearth of literature that explicitly examines the potential on urban livelihoods of historical buildings especially in Zimbabwe.

There are critics who consider use to be among the biggest threats to historic buildings, potentially leading to commercialisation, exploitation, devaluation and destruction (see for instance, Serageldin et al, (2000). There are others, like Netzer (1997: 4), who contend that 'the greatest successes in heritage preservation can occur when the heritage element is in actual use, and thus capable of generating revenue to pay for its preservation' and Koboldt (1997: 56) who argue that 'many if not most of the benefits derived from cultural heritage are realised only in the course of (its) actual use.' As such, the very notion of conservation has drastically changed from preservation to sustainable use and management of change in both the cultural and natural

environment. More specifically, in a new developmental context, heritage is now recognised as both engine and catalyst of socio-economic development. Graham *et al.* (2000) have suggested a theoretical framework, based on three main economic dimensions of heritage to explain its developmental role. First, they identify heritage as “an economic sector in itself” – often referred to as “the heritage industry” – “using resources, producing products, and generating returns in profits, (incomes) and jobs.” Second, it is also considered “one element in economic development alongside others, frequently exercising a catalytic or integrating role in development projects” due to its capacity to attract economic activities and accommodate economic functions. Finally, it is looked upon as ‘an instrument in the management of economies at various spatial scales from the international to the local, as for example, in the creation and promotion of place images for dominant economic purposes’ (Graham *et al.* 2000: 155). Such an approach to heritage and development links sustainability and conservation as two complementary processes that aim at achieving wise use of resources, continuity of supply, and a minimum of intervention in the fabric of cultural identity – including its physical, social, economic and artistic aspects. Integration is seen as a way of ‘advancing constructive evolution as opposed to destructive revolution’ (Rodwell 2003: 60). In light of the ensuing discussion, it is now apparent that cultural heritage has stopped being only a burden to national budgets, and is gradually transforming into a significant “value-adding industry”. Anticipations show that investments in heritage are going to grow even further with heritage becoming ‘the most significant product of the 21st century, determining communities’ future’ (Cernea 2001: 45). Looked upon through the magnifying lens of sustainable development and its principles, cultural heritage – with its important ‘contemporaneity value’ (Greffé 2002: 163) and its unique integrative functional and ‘socially progressive potential’ (Pendlebury *et al.* 2004: 11) – comes out as a dual force: as an integral part and as a vehicle towards sustainable development. As suggested by the Brundtland Commission of 1987, sustainable development is a ‘development that meets present needs without compromising the ability of future

generations to meet their own needs' (WCED 1987:43). It has been known for some time that cultural heritage can play a significant role in socio-economic development in many countries. Studies published by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank pointed to the importance of heritage in sustainable development and the potential role of heritage assets in contributing to the economic revitalisation of historical urban centres (see for instance, Serageldin and Martin-Brown 1999; Rojas 1999; Cernea 2001).

Not only in the academic literature, but in policy documents of international organisations, national, and regional governments, heritage is repeatedly identified as a powerful economic and social resource, a “development asset” that can be used to “catalyse local-level development,” provide employment, generate income, revitalise local urban and rural areas, enhance environmental protection and strengthen communities’ social capital (World Bank 1998: 15). In tandem with current trends within the world, the Zimbabwean government has since realised the potential and current role that cultural heritage sites are playing to foster socio-economic development. No wonder scholars like Silberberg (1995) call all communities living around cultural heritage sites to make use of heritage resources therein to foster socio-economic development.

In line with calls for the fruitful utilisation of cultural heritage resources, we argue that historic buildings have their own intrinsic value and any nation that claims to cherish cultural achievement in any field has a duty to care for them. We reiterate that historic buildings help define the character of past communities by providing a tangible link with the past. Conserving historic buildings offers the opportunity not only to conserve the past, but also to define the present and forge the future. Such edifices constitute a rare and unparalleled legacy civilisation-wise and socio-economically. Unfortunately, this inheritance is being gradually erased due to insensitive modernisation and urbanisation processes which are both unapologetic and unaccommodative of historic buildings especially in developing countries like Zimbabwe where cultural heritage legislation and policies are yet to be known and

appreciated at grassroots levels. On this note, we hasten to advance that the knowledge of traditional building skills associated with historic buildings is also in jeopardy of being chunked out and vanish into narcissism in the absence of supportive developmental policies that ensure the survival and conservation of this priceless piece of heritage. Yet, if properly conserved and managed, historic buildings could be utilised to enhance socio-economic development at local and national levels.

One of the most important economic benefits resulting from historical conservation is its effects on the tourism industry. Economic development and preservation of historic buildings can be mutually beneficial because the buildings can help boost the cultural tourism industry. Some of these buildings carry memories of the past and if these heritage sites are successfully restored and conserved, they could, as happened in the case of Robben Island Prison Museum we previously made reference to, be converted into more popular and attractive tourist's spots. As noted by Manwa (2007), Zimbabwe's Ministry of Tourism and Hospitality Industry, which is responsible for promoting tourism, sees historical and cultural heritage tourism, as a potentially significant growth opportunity. What is still needed, however, is to strengthen the country's historical and cultural tourism and create a conducive environment for investors while bringing to the fore cultural mix as an important component to the cultural tourism product. Cultural tourism is tourism that focuses upon the rich past of people or areas as preserved and portrayed in monuments, historic sites and culture (Ibid).

Closely tied to urban cultural heritage tourism is township tourism. As Zimbabwe prepares itself for the rejuvenation of the tourism sector, the Government, through the recently adopted National Tourism Policy, is seeking to replicate South Africa's highly successful township tourism concept. The Township Tourism Initiative focuses on development of historical cultural landmarks in former African Townships with the objective to realising and exploiting their full potential and in view of socio-economic development. Township tourism is an alternative form of culture tourism which emerged in the 1990s in the metropolises of

developing counties. Essentially, this type of tourism involves a visit to the most disadvantaged parts of cities and townships to see how the local people live (Mutana and Zinyemba 2013).

The major selling point for tourism in Zimbabwe has been traditionally on wildlife, historical monuments like Victoria Falls and Great Zimbabwe Monuments as well as other traditional tourism products like boating and sailing (Manwa, 2003). This necessitates a paradigm shift in the way Zimbabwean tourism product is packaged. Fortunately, the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority (ZTA) has noted with concern the need to rebrand the tourism product as a way of promoting Zimbabwe as a tourist destination (Mutana and Zinyemba 2013). There is an increasing consensus on the importance of tourism in Zimbabwe as a strategic sector in the national economy insofar as it makes an essential contribution to the economic well-being of the resident population and to the economic objectives of the government (Sanderson *et al* 2013). With all these strides by the ZTA, it is our fervent hope that if historic buildings are properly conserved and managed, this will enable the numerous visitors to Masvingo to enjoy its built environment while the city benefits economically. Business in the city will also benefit greatly as visitors will stay much longer given that they will have more to see in addition to attractive tourist spots in the province such as Great Zimbabwe National Monument and Lake Mutirikwi.

Historic buildings: Constraints, challenges and prospects

Historic buildings in Masvingo City and by extension the other parts of Zimbabwe share a variety of similar challenges and problems. Among the most obvious is their integration and adaptation to the needs of the contemporary society. In view of the above, the remaining few historic buildings that have stood the test of time are private owned and as such, are not being properly conserved and managed as stipulated in the NMMZ Act chapter 25/11 which protects them. Historic buildings are under threat from economic development and change. Critical action is needed to bring together development and heritage and to integrate culture

and sustainable development in a manner that retains the authenticity of historic urban cores. We, in fact, found out that the disappearances and deterioration of historical buildings in the city of Masvingo are wide and dynamic. Greater parts of the buildings are losing out to social and economic motivations. We also noted that the desire to pursue commercial interests by different individuals as well as the reluctance by NMMZ and the Masvingo City Council to enforce and publicise the law and revive the then defunct Masvingo Historic Advisory Committee in the management of historic buildings has further contributed to the wanton destruction and disappearance of the impressive historic buildings.

A letter dated 4 December 1998 retrieved from the Historic Building File states that Masvingo has lost most of its historic buildings. Again, another letter dated 11 May 2010 clearly states that there are only nine intact existing historic buildings in Masvingo town (now Masvingo City). The rest were either demolished or replaced with new buildings (Historic Building File 2010). It is sad to note that the demolition of historic buildings have been going on without the consent of the legal custodians of the buildings. Looking at the number and state of historic buildings left in Masvingo City, one would observe that the buildings are at the verge of extinction due to demolition, replacement, unguided renovations, ignorance, negligence, poor management, modernisation, natural factors and activities of informal traders among many other factors. May (2006) articulates that historic buildings are increasingly threatened by pollution, neglect, replacement, and lack of knowledge. Not knowing the historic buildings or their values (or ignorance) about appropriate protection measures can have a devastating impact on historic buildings. For instance, many developing countries such as Zimbabwe owing to limited and strained budgets do not carry out regular and systematic studies/surveys to identify and prepare inventories of historic buildings. As a result, the public or even the site managers do not have a clear knowledge of historic buildings in their own town.

Apart from that, historical buildings are also faced with different threats that include environmental issues as well as

negligence. Negligence is often linked to ignorance. Negligence can slowly but irreversibly damage historic buildings. As we alluded to above, there are many historic buildings in Masvingo that were either destroyed or renovated without the knowledge and consent of the City Council and the NMMZ. Most of the houses in the Masvingo Main Rank Area (in Mucheke Suburb) where some liberation war veterans like Simon V. Muzenda once lived, are cases in point. The houses which numbered nearly hundred when they were constructed in pre-independent Zimbabwe, are now numbering only a few dozen with most of them having been (or being) in the process) renovated. Unfortunately, people or the local government does not pay much attention to their protection such that demolitions and renovations are done without any form of control or guidance. Constant exposure to different kinds of threats and lack of care of the buildings gradually damage their faces and reduce their value as tourist heritage spots. This observation resonates with that of Feilden (1982), who notes that most of the historic buildings across the world are at the verge of extinction due to demolition, renovation, harsh weather conditions and activities of informal traders. Thus, we note with concern that the future of these buildings is bleak without active measures being taken to ensure that they are well protected and conserved.

The demographic growth and the country-wide drift of population from the rural areas to Masvingo City is one of the factors that is also contributing to the deterioration of historic buildings as this causes overcrowding. At the same time, the unhealthy conditions created by activities of informal traders especially during the 2008 Zimbabwean crisis have worsened the deterioration of the buildings thereby robbing the country of an opportunity to conserve its highly regarded heritage. Moreover, the desire to pursue commercial interests by different individuals has further contributed to the disappearance or deterioration of ancient buildings in the city. The majority of these commercial mongers have tried to make ends meet by embarking on informal trading activities like money –changing, vending, and other such illicit business activities which compromise not only the moral fabric of business but the areas where the activities are being carried out. The

uncontrolled sticking of street corner advert posters, for example, has compromised the architectural aesthetics of historic buildings such as the Italian Chapel, Charles Austin Theatre and Old Victoria Hotel. Whatever the activities of business mongers are, the fact remains that their presence in the city has in one way or the other, affected the historical structures. In this regard the proliferation of graffiti, wanton use of fire and some other unhygienic practices had their share in causing the deterioration of the historical structures.

However, it is sad to realise that historical places continue to gradually disappear especially in developing economies of the world. The forces of modernity and globalisation have mesmerised the world and attempt to create a world with a universal culture. According to a study carried out by the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe in conjunction with the Municipality of Masvingo in 2011, Zimbabwe has lost more than 30 per cent of its heritage buildings constructed before 1910 to demolition over the past 30 years.

The other challenge of historic buildings in Zimbabwe is that while all the other typologies of heritage are generally managed by curators, currently there is no curator-in-charge of historic buildings. It is paradoxical to note that the government of Zimbabwe through the National Museums and Monuments Act chapter 25/11 is emphasising the conservation and protection of historical buildings and sites but is not doing much to save such structures particularly those which are found in the city centre. As the urban areas grow, many buildings that ushered in these different urban areas, grew out of favour to the extent that they were either reconstructed or pulled down to accommodate new ones. Challenges, constraints and threats to the conservation of historic buildings, thus, come from various quarters. In most cases, the buildings lose part of their faces or replacement with new buildings as a result of economic pressures to develop valuable property.

Lessons and recommendations

For most historic buildings and places, it is well established that the best way to protect them is to keep them in active use. This may

involve adaptations and alterations to keep the place in use and some compromise may be necessary; however, the special interest should not be unnecessarily affected and every effort should be made to minimise loss of, or damage to, the qualities of the building or place. Historic buildings need periodic and often substantial reinvestment in preservation management, and conservation works so that these buildings may contribute to economic sustainable development of cities.

Furthermore, historic buildings which form the core of historic city centres incorporate aesthetic, cultural, social, environmental, and educational values that must be passed on to future generations. These buildings are a unique endowment, but also a steadily diminishing resource—in some cases even at risk of disappearing. To counter the possible irreversible loss of heritage buildings and the non-economic values they hold, heritage buildings need to have economic value today (Guido and Rana 2012). Below in the ensuing sections, we enunciate some recommendations, based on our research findings, that if adopted can reverse the losses and salvage the destruction of historic buildings in Masvingo:

i) A Historic Building Advisory Committee

A Historic Buildings Advisory Committee that is wide and inclusive should be revived. The duties of the Committee include advising on policy matters and introduce public input and expertise into the conservation and management of historic buildings. The committee should include representatives from NMMZ, City Council's department of Housing, Architects, Building Inspectors from the City Council, Staff from local Archives, Officials from Local Government Housing Departments, Real Estate Agents, University officials from the Departments of Urban Planning, Archaeology, Heritage Studies, History and any interested organisations or individuals with an interest in the preservation and conservation of the country's historic buildings.

ii) Historic Buildings Inventories

An important outcome of the evaluation process is an "Inventory" or list of significant historic buildings. An Inventory consists of basic site data, such as the location and date of

construction, in the form of photographs, maps or sketches and other supporting documentation. The Inventory also includes a description or evaluation of each place's significance. NMMZ should carry out a thorough condition survey of historic buildings in Masvingo City. This should include documentation of the buildings which should be accompanied by photographs, plans, uses of the buildings and problems being experienced by the buildings. In short, NMMZ and the Masvingo City Council should regularly update the catalogue of all historic buildings in the town.

iii) The owners of historic buildings should be informed that their buildings are protected by legislation and as such they should seek for approval from the relevant authorities before altering or demolishing the building. And, if it means the houses are used as cultural tourism spots, the owners of the houses will also have benefit from the proceeds received from tourists by the responsible authorities.

iv) NMMZ should appoint a Curator-in-Charge responsible for the conservation and management of historic buildings in Masvingo. His/her duties would include the documentation of historic buildings, facilitating and coordinating meetings, conscientising the public on the importance of historic buildings, marketing historic buildings among other duties.

v) Funds permitting, MCC and NMMZ should have a standing budget set aside for the conservation and management of historic buildings because historic buildings give Masvingo a quality townscape. Masvingo cannot hang on to the claim that it is the oldest town in Zimbabwe without this tangible evidence.

vi) Architectural Conservation

Architectural conservation describes the process through which the material, historical, and design integrity of humanity's built heritage are protected from unwanted change and prolonged through carefully planned interventions (Griffith 2010). This could be done through cleaning of the exterior of the historic buildings or by putting up measures that prevent oxidation and decomposition through acids and atmospheric chemicals. The measures include sterilising by brushing or spraying with a minimum 25 % to 36 % hydrogen peroxide on structures affected by organic growths such

as mosses and lichens; applications of water repellents, gap filling, brushing, and washing with distilled water (Renano-Edwards 2010).

Conclusion

Urban historic buildings are a very important component of heritage that mankind has created over the past years as part and parcel of the socialisation and interaction process with their environment. Historic buildings are a unique and irreplaceable type of heritage which reflects a rich and diverse expression of past societies and forms an integral part of local, regional and national cultural identity. They are significant and invaluable heritage of our culture that once lost or damaged cannot be replaced. This chapter has shown how colonial buildings in Masvingo City are either being lost or diminished in value as heritage. On that note, we proffered the argument that colonial buildings must be conserved because they evoke a very strong sense of the past, besides that they can also be used as a vehicle to economic development and sustainability in urban areas. We, thus, maintain that the unique qualities of colonial buildings in Masvingo City have an enormous potential to boost the socio-economic status of the city by attracting tourists – through heritage tourism – taking into account the benign climate and natural environment.

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Africa Must Get Rid of Colonial Debris

Nkwazi Mbango



Figure 1 Dr. Livingstone's statue, Mosi-oa Tunya, Zimbabwe

Introduction

Generally speaking, any heritage for any people or society acts as a link between the past and the present be it traumatic or rewarding. African heritage, as any heritage has two facets. It has positive and negative impacts on the society. As we Africans Strive for the

future, our heritage plays an important role especially self-evaluation. I therefore in this chapter look at African heritage as far as colonial debris or colonial legacies re concerned. I strongly suggest that Africa has to do away with colonial debris that—for long—have been treasured without underscoring the fact that such colonial debris traumatise our people. I see no logic whatsoever to emulate and revere—for instance—the effigies of colonial agents whose role in colonising africa is great. I think that time for erecting effigies of our people has at last arrived.

Historically, we cannot deny the occurrences of some events such as colonialism, liberation and other struggles that Afica has always been involved in. we also consider the law of reprocity whereby two sides or societies complement one another. However, this has never been the case between colonisers and the colonised. Africa – currently – has many effigies of european colonialist while the West does not have any of African icons of liberation. To do justice to ourselves and those that colonised us, Africa needs to erect the effigies of her heroes and heroines. It is of no use whatsoever –for example –for Arica to treasure the effigies, names and deeds of colonial agents be they merchants, missionaries, explores and colonial governors. So, pulling down all colonial effigies does not act as an act of decolonising the minds of our people, but also reducing or removing the trauma such effigies have caused to our people.

When the status of Cecil John Rhodes at the University of Cape Town (UCT), South Africa, was brought down on 9 April 2015 after one student protested its presence amidst the college which was supposed to be a centre for critical thinking I was elated due to the fact his happened when I was writing this chapter. Such heroic and awakening act gave me more strength apart from motivating me. It assured me that there were people who were thinking like me. So, it was like the first litmus paper for my thoughts. One student felt traumatised by the presence of this colonial reality and its legacy. This informs us about how some of our people have been traumatised for years in places where the monuments of agents of colonialism that tortured Africans still loom high among them. What transpired at the UCT Campus must be a starting point

or a spark of what should follow as far as colonial mementos are concerned. Such uglier past needs to be erased from amidst us even if there are those who think that they are a part of our history. I tend not to agree with this. I don't think if let say your ancestors were criminal you would like to glorify their criminality instead of trying to erase it. As Eyal Weizman once said that architecture and the built environment are a kind of a slow violence, figurines, and all symbolisms of colonial agents, is the architecture of colonialism which shows how Africa has nary divorced her colonial past. The existence of such disgrace amidst us, apart from traumatising us, shows how we need to decolonize our minds so as to see the trauma. The need to decolonise the African mind was long suggested by African scholars and political figures such as Ngugi wa Thiongo and Julius Nyerere, Paulo Freire, and others. So, too, we need to decolonize our streets, universities, rivers, lakes, national parks and with many other things with African tug. Africa needs the architecture of freedom and emancipation that will replace all this messy and contaminative colonial architecture she currently treasures instead of erasing. For South Africans, for example, the statues of Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu, Shaka Zulu, Solomon Mahlangu, Steve Biko and other freedom heroes evoke hope and act as a reminder of the brutal past they went through. Such statues are the beacons to the future generation. For, apart from showing the brutal past, they preserve heroic struggle and resilience of Africans against colonialism and other imperialistic vices. So, if Africa wants to keep her brutal past, she should avoid keeping it brutally. Instead of stomaching such ridiculous statues of our tormentors such as Cecil Rhodes, we must erect those of our heroes and heroines such as Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, Thomas Sankara, Queen Rweej and others.

Colonial monument and symbolism

In simple and clear parlance, those colonial monuments amidst us symbolize the death of our freedom and the death of normalcy when it comes to critical thinking. They are the badge of shame and enslavement. Furthermore, they signify the lack of memory and

vision for those keeping and espousing them. We need to pull them down and replace them with the figurines of our heroes and heroines. After this is done, we need to take on names of our streets, soccer teams, mountains, cities and other African things that were “defecated” on by being given European names unreasonably. We need to emancipate ourselves as a people. By doing so, we will be sending clear signals that we are ready to go into the future with, free, de-traumatized, pure spirits and minds. This is a sacred role we have to strictly play ourselves. If we cannot liberate ourselves, nobody can. It is we who have to bring true liberation of ourselves and the coming generations through reunifying and rebuilding Africa.

What’s more, when the statue of Rhodes was brought down, I remembered what had transpired in Zimbabwe two years before. Despite being a pariah state after her long-time president Mugabe took land from white settlers, Zimbabwe still had something to offer. News that Zimbabwean ruling party, (ZANU-PF) tabled a bill asking for renaming Victoria Falls was good news especially for African countries suffering from the same disease of the past. The *MailOnline*, 8 December 2013 quoted The Local Government Ministry as saying, “Institutions bearing colonial names must be changed and be given indigenous names...school syllabuses in schools must also change.”

The *MailOnline* Aug 31st 2015 reported that Mugabe’s Zanu PF party was intending to change the name of Victoria Falls. Succumbing before West machinations, some media houses such as the *Daily Mail* wrote or reported things without either balancing their stories or just using common sense or they wrote with angst and bigotry. What did Mugabe have to do with such a decision if at all the ruling party decided unanimously? For those who know the true Mugabe, he had nothing to do with this move. And if he did, he did so accidentally or he was labouring under vengeance but not patriotism. He, too, needs to be emancipated by being taught to respect and care for his people. A free person cannot cling unto power for this long. Again, given that some media houses have always painted Mugabe with the same brush, whatever he or his party does is taken negatively even when it is logical and

progressive. According to the Victoria Guide, I was baffled to read one story saying that Victoria Falls were discovered by a white man. It writes on its website, “The final debate relating to Livingstone’s discovery of the Victoria Falls relates to the date of discovery” (see <http://www.victoriafalls-guide.net/david-livingstone-and-the-discovery-of-the-victoria-falls.html>).

What a lie! Nobody can discover a place already inhabited with other human beings. Such a claim implies that whoever discovers others, he or she doesn’t respect them. To whoever claiming to discover others, such a people are as good as beasts that can talk or occupy anything. According to Eyewitness to History.com, Livingstone discovered the falls in 1855.

Even if Mugabe was behind this name restoration, he was, to some extent, right. How can such an attraction keep on bearing the name of the person who authorized the colonization and robbery of Zimbabwe? Africa might be poor economically but not mentally. So, restoring her felled names should make African proud instead of looking at those trying to rejuvenate them with sheer suspicion and indifference. Africans should be happy when such traumatic symbols such as that of Cecil John Rhodes are bulldozed even if this is done by a madman or a devil. On this note, I was thrilled when I witnessed the felling of Cecil John Rhodes’ statue at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, as below:



Figure 2: Rhodes's statue being removed from UCT Campus (Photo by the BBC)

After getting rid of herself of colonial debris, Africa needs to erect the effigies of her own heroes and heroines in order to enable the future generations to evidence the makers of the history of the liberation of Africa. So, the role that the colonial debris played as the part of Africa's heritage can be played by new statues that are meaningful for Africa. Such statues will not only act as reminders on how Africa fought colonialism, will also evoke pride to our people as part of their heritage

By deciding to resume the real name of Victoria Falls which is Mosi-oa-Tunya, Zimbabwe has harbingered practical decolonization of the mind and land. In my interview with Mawere (2015) notes:

As soon as you enter grade 1 in Mozambican schools, your traditional name is changed. You are given a Portuguese name and forced to drop off the traditional one. I was personally luck that I didn't start my grade one in Mozambique; otherwise I could be one of the Pedros, Joas or Diaz, etc. And, just imagine, this continues to happen some four decades after Mozambique attained its national independence from Portugal!

However, I don't support Mugabe's policy on land; Zimbabwe's take on decolonizing one of her hallmarks is commendable and comfortable. It is sad to find that after over 50 years of independence Africa can't be independent even about using her real names I have. Since independence, many African countries still pointlessly cling unto colonial carryovers—cum—hangovers. I don't know if there is even a single street in Amsterdam, Berlin, Lisbon, London, Paris or Madrid that commemorates African kings and personalities despite the same having made their wealth from Africa. Even in America that was built by black slaves, it is only a few statues of black people that are seen compared to those of white people (see Mungazi 1996).

As Africans, time for assuming our true identity has arrived shall we aspire to fully and truly emancipate and decolonize our minds and land. It is sad to note that many Africans still succumb to foreign names as if they did not have their own. To try to cut down a shameful nexus that comes with such self-denial, they call such fake names baptismal ones. Even if we, in English, go and examine what baptismal names are, we find that are not original ones but Christian-superimposed ones.

The step Zimbabwe took is credible and commendable shall it go deeper into exploring other important areas of the country. Ironically, Harare still has many streets, roads and other places with colonial names such as Coventry Lytton, Prince Avenue, Prince Edward Swimming pool, Lawley, Borrowdale etc. Again, Zimbabwe's struggle to do away with colonial leftovers started a long time ago when Salisbury was pulled down and renamed Harare just like Lourenco Marques in Mozambique that became Maputo. Some other countries took bold steps by totally abolishing colonial names such as Burkina Faso and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

We currently still have capital cities which bear colonial names such as Dar es Salaam-Tanzania (Mzizima or healthy town in Swahili) which assumed an Arab name in 1866, Freetown- Sierra Leone (KoyaTemne renamed in 1787), Khartoum (Soba) Lagos-Nigeria (Eko in Yoruba renamed in 1372 by Portuguese to mean Lakes), Windhoek-Namibia (Aill Gams in Khoekhoe to mean hot

springs or Otjomuise in Otijherero to mean streams was renamed in 1844, Libreville (1839) Brazzaville- Congo (named after a French man Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza who is said to have found the city while the Bateke tribe had already established under the name Nkuna- 1880), and Niamey-Niger (Arlit 1890) (Wikipedia) mention a few. When you tell people to replace colonial names with the original ones they complain about expenses of changing books. Is there any fiscal value that is equal to one's real and true identity? Why should Africa have many European names in many places while the same Europe doesn't have any African names? Before Europeans we are savages. Again, are we truly savages who can't respect and appreciate our identity? Does this need donors or experts from Europe and America? African true leaders need to face this challenge and do the right thing at this very right time. This chapter is aimed at harbingering this move which is a redress to African heritage especially culture and identity.

People and things: Theorising names in time

Returning to our true past is our duty, sacred one. As William Hazlitt (1778-1830) put it, "Fame is the inheritance not of the dead, but of the living. It is we who look back with lofty pride to the great names of antiquity." Dogs and other animals can accept any names given to them because they don't use them. Instead humans use them to call and order them. To the contrary, humans should not act like animals to forget their history, origin and self even after many years of indifferences and insincerity as it is in the case of Africa and superimposed-colonial names.

I like this humorous quote as Gamain and McKean (2005) put it:

"What's your name," Coraline asked the cat. "Look, I'm Coraline! Okay?" "Cats don't have names," it said. "No! No!" said Coraline. "No!" said the cat. "Now you people have names. That's because you don't know who you are. We know who we are, so we don't need names, (page not provided; also available

at: <https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/133494-what-s-your-name-coraline-asked-the-cat-look-i-m-coraline>).

For many people, Zimbabwe looks bad especially when it started taking farms from white settlers who grabbed those farms from the Africans at the time of occupying Zimbabwe. However, she still can have something nice to offer; traditions, and self-awareness. Is this a bad thing really?

When it comes to self-awareness, it goes beyond names and naming things as we have seen above. A few years ago, I was musing on how African rules went to Japan to gatecrash the G-8 Conference. Despite degrading themselves, they still had some defenders of their self-willed degradation. I stumbled on a clue after one reader sent me an email contending that it was the right thing for our rulers to do. What puzzled me even more is the fact that a friend encouraging me to take such infamy as a good thing was among the so-called educated persons. For him, African rulers would be given some loans and aid. This is what mattered to this educated friend of mine. Instead of haggling about begging and self-dressing down, this friend of mine and I were involved in what I later called intellectual dialogue based on paradigm clash or perspectival differences. My argument to counter his endorsement of gatecrashing the G-8's conference was just telling him that our rulers lacked intellectual ability to understand things. I argued that African dependency is one of the colonial legacies that our rulers and other Africans take to be a normal thing. The friend of mine demanded that substantiate my claims. I just asked him to show me at least 20 books the current rulers of Africa had written. To cut the long story short, our conversation reminded me of another important thing about intellectualism vis-à-vis African rulers. I tried to imagine! How many current African rulers have ever written a book like the founders did? Apart from Mugabe's and Museveni's books, I don't see any! Nelson Mandela, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah and others wrote books. Others used to comment on papers eminently being Nigeria's Obafemi Owolowo. Their books helped us to weigh and measure their intellectuality and vision altogether. Their

contribution to the dialogue is still appreciated. I can link the tendency of harbouring colonial legacies, debris and statues to intellectual bankrupts or intellectual impotency. If our rulers were intellectually sane, they surely would know their history. So, too, they would have written books so that the world would assess their policies and visions. They would not keep colonial effigies. This is why a student at the UCT saw what our rulers could not see with the exemption of Zimbabwe.

Cleansing Africa of colonial legacies

To do away with colonial legacy including intellectual one, Africans including political leaders need to write new books dealing with the current situation without referring to a true history of Africa that they have to rewrite altogether. By so doing, Africa will be able to show how her heritage is as important as other heritages say of the West, Middle East and other civilisation of the world. When a few or many rise up to this challenge, they must be supported. For, so doing disseminates information and imparts knowledge to the present and new generation. Where are the new books, apart from a few, written by the authors of this generation including our rulers? Are the already written books being fully used in our schools and universities? Don't even know the type of literature that is taught to African Children with current generation. Famous and doyen African writers like Mongo Beti, Wole Soyinka, Chinua Achebe, Ferdinand Oyono and others are either dead and or exiting the scene. New ones need to slink into their shoes and move Africa ahead. Isn't this the end of African Writers' Series really? Again, who cares to invest on knowledge while our rulers are the enemies of knowledge? They would like to rule illiterates that cannot pose any danger to their criminal regimes.

I can see professionals from various disciplines abandoning their professions to become politicians. In Tanzania, professor of economics, Ibrahim Lipumba, the former chairman of Civic United Front (CUF), the outgoing Vice President, Dr. Gharib Bilal and many more abandoned their field to join politics. In Zimbabwe, we have many academics such as Jonathan Moyo, Arthur Mutambara,

and Welshman Ncube, among others, who abandoned the academic field to join politics. In Kenya, the late professor George Kinuthia Saitoti and many more did the same. This is wrong however everybody has the right to choose what to do. Those joining politics believe that they are contributing to their societies while they end up becoming robbers who got knowledge without applying it. They need to make big bucks through political chicanery. Thus, alas, like tomatoes, make easier and quick fortunes while those they rob become poorer and poorer! Who could believe that professors like the one who was Kenyan Vice President and Minister of Finance, the late Saitoti would be used and duped by illiterates to ruin Kenya's coffers on top of nearing the country to bankruptcy?

According to the Telegram March 16th, 2015, Gambian strong man, Yahaya Jammeh, abusively used the then minister of health, a doctor of medicine by trade, to legitimize his nonsense of discovering a cure for HIV/AIDS. The Telegram wrote:

President Yahyah Jammeh, the dictator who has defied medical opinion since 2007 by claiming to have found a cure for HIV-AIDS, has found allies in a British homoeopathic group sponsored by the official suppliers of homoeopathic medicine to the Royal family, (page not provided).

Jammeh, who practically is semi illiterate, is not alone in using the so-called literate to spread his phoney discovery. Seeking political mileage, and thanks to being illiterates, Kenyan former president Daniel arap Moi and Zaire's Mobutu Seseseko forced academics to claim that they discovered HIV/AIDS cures at certain times. This means that sometimes those we think are literate are really the opposite and vice-versa (See Mawere, 2015b). I believe being literate does not necessarily mean to be formally educated. Kenyan concoction was called Kemron that was later proved to be fake one. Again, the so-called African academics and scientists were trying to outsmart Europeans after they were made to believe that HIV/AIDS originated from Africa while, ironically, HIV/AIDS was first discovered in the US in 1981 (See Illife 2006); Rugalema 2000); and Kalipeni 2004). Finding how stigmatic and traumatic the

menace is, they decided to allege that HIV/AIDS originated from Africa. They did not bother to tell how it came to America and be discovered there first before Africa! Why couldn't people use common sense to first pin down the origin of the disease they were made to believe was African? Again, how could do they contradict their masters? What a colonial legacy!

You can see the death of intellectualism all over Africa now as far as African rulers are concerned. For instance, in Malawi, former president who answers to the title doctor, Bakili Muluzi wanted to tamper with the constitution to run for the third term in office. Baker (2002) notes:

One is Bakili Muluzi, elected president of Malawi in 1994, after 31 years of authoritarian rule under Hastings Banda. He won a second term in June 1999 and is due to complete this in 2004. Yet it is known that the president's loyalists in the ruling party, the United Democratic Front (UDF), began in 2000 to secretly lobby MPs to amend the constitution, to allow him to run for a third term, (p. 294).

If he were well and truly read and educated, he'd never have wasted time seeking re-election after wrapping up his two terms in office. His knowledge and common sense would have informed him that what he wanted to do was unethical, unconstitutional and illegal. Interestingly we still have other rulers who are still attempting or successfully duplicating the same gimmick simply because their colonial monsters do not raise a red flag against their flapdoodle. Look at the type of rulers that Africa has. Muluzi, later, faced the shame of trying to bribe a judge. But the same has a PhD that most African rulers are given by Western universities so as to satirize them. To make them look enlightened, their bootlickers like to refer to them as doctor so and so while they actually are quacks who got honorariums they turned to be real. More on Malawi, who would risk thinking that another doctor, former Malawi's president, the late Bingu wa Mutharika would groom his brother to take over shall anything happen? Looking at all this bunkum I remembered my friend and professor Sean Byrne who used to tell us that

education is for human emancipation, self-awareness and being aware of others. Being truly educated does not necessarily mean having certificates, but doing something for the human cause, to bring positive changes to the society one lives in. Akinpelu (1981) also makes a similar argument. Africa still has many slaves in spite of her many PhD holders. A political beggar is a self-made and willing slave, especially, when such a person answers to the titles such as president, doctor or professor. Such a person wrongly referred to as His or Her Excellency without any excellent manner or qualities, in reality, does not deserve such titles or respect.

Our rulers neither write nor read. If they do, nothing comes out of it. Why haven't they brought changes? Most of the time, our rulers spend much time and taxpayers' money attending banquets and making trips abroad aimed at doing monkey business. The Ugandan Daily Monitor August 31st 2015 had this to say:

Alas we have remained a net exporter of primary commodities and are more reliant on aid, grants and donations. Thus, our leaders find themselves pre-occupied with globe-trotting to tell the world that "we have everything but do not know what to do with it. We are failures. We need any type of help to run our countries, (page not provided).

They are ruling without philosophies and visions except for a few. In short, most of our rulers are but bluffing and fluffing. A few of our rulers who ever tried to write books either compiled their speeches into books; or paid someone to write about them or write for them. For instance, Benjamin Mkapa, former president of Tanzania did compile his speeches into a book and that was that. Jakaya Kikwete hired Andrew Morton to write about him the same Daniel arap Moi did. Ironically, you wonder for a country like Kenya that has produced famous authors such as Ngugi wa Thiong'o Micere Mugo, Grace Ogot and others her president to hire an expert from another continent. I don't imagine if an African can write the biography of the queen of England. Does it mean there was no Kenyan writer who would have written Moi's Biography or it is because of the same colonial debris? Although

this can be seen as a trivial matter or even disliking of other people Western countries taught us how to protect their values as they destroy those of others. Arguably, African rulers who do not trust their people can't deliver them. When it comes to true authors, many African rulers cannot even touch the hem of their garments. Yet still, wherever such rulers are, they still pride themselves to have served their countries diligently without stating their policies so that they can be known to their people and the world at large.

Western leaders such as Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and others write books about their policies and lives. So, too, they teach at universities when they retire or do work related to their specializations and experiences or choices. Here are our African leaders I only heard only of former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo talking about establishing his library. It is a rare experience. For, in Africa, this venue is not for presidents or prime ministers. Moreover, in Western countries, some senior officials in various departments go to academic life or keep on contributing to the society after retiring while African ones sit and scoop fat perks for doing nothing. In 2008, I witnessed the ex-Chief of Staff of Canada, Gen. Rick Hillier being appointed the Chancellor of famous university of Memorial University of Newfoundland and Labrador (MUN) and former minister of foreign affairs Dr. Lloyd Axworthy being appointed in the same capacity at the University of Winnipeg. Ask me where the retired chiefs of staff of African countries go. Everybody knows. Either they join politics to run for some positions or being appointed the head of government parastatals. No more. For, this does not help fostering African heritage and vision.

The habit of not reading or writing books for African rulers has affected the population especially youths who call themselves a new generation. Youths are wasting precious time reading dirty things (for those who happen to read) though not all. Mawere and Nyamnjoh call such literatures waste West produce for Africa. If there is anything most of our youths get from spending much precious time online is nothing but distancing themselves from their true relatives and heritage by embracing cybernetic ones. Most of our youths are busy with modern gadgets watching foolish things

due to the fact that they don't have role models. I wonder to see old Caucasians flocking libraries to borrow books in their neighbourhood. After retiring, most of them spend much time reading so as to expand their knowledge in various fields. When it comes to Africa, the saying goes that when you want to hide something from an African, just hide it in the book. As if this is not enough, publishers, in the main, are attracted to porno-related works in lieu of helpful ones. For example, currently, Tanzania – where I hail from – has many more pubs than schools and libraries. So, too, it has many more tabloids than serious newspapers. Those who put hand on hard news end up bankrupt due to the fact that many readers like porn things. In Tanzania, one porno-tabloid sells more copies than newspapers. Kareithi et al., (2005 cited in Josephi, 2010) note, “Ironically, the mainstream newspapers, such as *Business Times* and *Financial Times*, struggle to maintain a circulation of mere 20,000 copies a week, while the scandal tabloids sell up to 100,000 copies a day,” (p.159). Books are rotting in bookshops and shelves while the beer is king that contributes a lot in the national budget. On their side, rulers have ceased to think creatively. Every fiscal year they just hike the price of beer, tobacco products and others to top up to their foreign-donated funds and loans. This has been going on for many years as the country cascades into abject poverty. This is but a typical replica of many African countries. According to *Jamii Forums* (the biggest online forum in Tanzania) May 13th 2008 quoted the Parliamentary Budgetary Session whereby the Moshi Rural Member of Parliament (Chadema) Philemon Ndesamburo asked the house to thank sippers for drinking heavily so as to contribute to the national budget! Can Africa forge ahead this way really?

To show how Africa has lost her sense of self, I once witnessed demonstration in Dar Es Salaam where some Tanzanians were condemning and asking America to stop invading Iraq. Yet, when Rwanda and Uganda invaded the DRC, the same did not bother to take to the streets! I wondered how Arabs in Iraq would be more important than neighbouring Africans in the DRC. I don't think Iraqis would waste their time to condemn the invasion of any African country. To many, Africa ceased to exist many years ago.

Furthermore, due to ignorance and the poison of imported religions, wonder not to find that some Africans regard their co-religionists to be more of their relatives than their true blood kinships. They have indeed been brainwashed and lost ties with their own true African cultural heritage and identity. Again, when it comes to the Middle East or Europe where these religions came from, the situation is different. People from there know their blood relatives and their heritage and care about them first before faith-sired ones.

This is why we have many economic refugees from Asia living in Africa respected and supported by those who think they are their co-religionists. They are living better life than their hosts thanks to their connections to the high and the mighty in upper echelons of power in many African countries. If one happens to touch them, their co-religionists will stand up and defend them saying they are targeted because of their faith. We recently witnessed xenophobic attacks in South Africa perpetrated against indigenous Africans. Nobody pointed a finger to the same from Asia however doing so is still xenophobic. What stands out is that this xenophobia targeted indigenous Africans. This implies that non-Africans are untouchable.

Had South Africans—who perpetrated xenophobic attacks against their fellow African brothers and sisters, been well read—indeed, they'd not have dared to commit this sacrilege. Africa needs to look back to the sixties and seventies when reading and writing was an in-thing. There is no way we can forge ahead without being intellectually informed and well off. For, it is at this time, at least, many leaders tried to Africanise Africans in Africa. Remember the Nyerere's, Sekou Toure's, Lumumba's Sankara's, and Nkrumah's Policies of pan Africanism.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, Africa needs to revisit her past vis-à-vis her heritage to gage what should be accommodated, treasured, revered and what should not. Essentially, as indicated above, treasuring and preserving traumatic-colonial debris is nothing but re-enacting the

trauma that Africans have always suffered for the whole time colonial debris have been kept as part of Africa's heritage. We strongly that such debris especially effigies and names of people, places and other hallmarks must be decolonised as the surest way of emancipating our continent and its people. We call upon academics, media and other institutions to embark on the journey to reinventing ourselves as means of realising our total freedom from all types of yokes we have been in as a society of people. Ridding Africa of colonial debris is the sacred duty of all Africans especially politicians and academics. We cannot sit aside and look while our people are traumatised. However, it should be underscored that proposing of getting Africa rid of colonial remnants should not be wrongly taken as suggesting to erase the history of Africa and what transpired in the past. Our heritage is a mixture of good and bad legacies. However, we need to treasure good ones. I have never seen Germany and the West in general treasuring Hitler's and Mussolini's effigies. Ironically, it is only in the Christianity where the cross is revered whereas –as the symbol of curse– was used to crucify Jesus Christ. That is their choice. Treasuring the effigies of colonial agents such as Rhodes is an insult for Africans who are aware of the miseries the works of such characters caused the continent and its people. Suffice it to say that one way of decolonising the minds of our people and cleansing the land is through pulling down, erasing and eradicating colonial legacies be they intellectual or physical.

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Memorial Heritage as Fountain of Peace and Justice in Africa: The Case of *Ifá* in Nigeria

Òkewande Olúnwòlé Tẹ̀wógboyè

Introduction

This chapter focuses on *Ifá* as memorial heritage of safe justice in Yorùbá tradition. *Ifá* is seen to be the foundation of Yorùbá culture. This means every aspect of Yorùbá life, including religion, philosophy, science, ideology and so on has one link or another with *Ifá*.

The work relies substantially on secondary data from Yorùbá literary texts, especially *Ifá* corpora and philosophy associated with the memory of administration of justice among the Yorùbá of West Africa. The knowledge of *Ifá* is central to the establishment of the traditional system of dispensation of justice, this is because, any aspect of Yorùbá life that is not sourced in *Ifá* may just be a mirage, because *Ifá* is seen “as store house through which the Yorùbá comprehend their own historical experience and understand their environment” (Abímbólá 1977: 31). Ọbáyọmí (1983: 7) notes that “*Ifá* is fundamental in the explanation of the components of the Yorùbá culture” in other words, there is no aspect of Yorùbá life that is not entrenched in *Ifá*; or any aspect that lacks *Ifá* reference may be “controversial.” In other words, *Ifá* serves as intangible heritage among the Yorùbá of Africa.

The chapter is sub-divided into: the Yorùbá intangible heritage and dispensation of justice, the Yorùbá traditional judicial institutions and powers as intangible heritage and the Yorùbá memorial heritage of suit-filling, hearing, and judgment execution. The chapter concludes that there has been a formidable, reliable and dependable traditional memorial judicial system of peace and justice among the Yorùbá. And that, this memorial heritage system

can stand the test of time, as most of the modern principles are not foreign to the African memorial judicial process.

The Yorùbá Traditional System: Setting the Background

This work examines the Yorùbá memorial heritage in the dispensation of justice with reference to *Ifá* and Yorùbá philosophy. Memorial heritage is a constituent of intangible heritage expressed through historical recounts, proverbs, idioms, songs and other “traditional” expressions. *Ifá* has been defined by scholars in different ways that establish the inexplicable and unlimited scope of its knowledge, wisdom and values. Indeed, it is regarded as the bedrock of other aspects of Yorùbá life. For this reason, to simply define it as a religion, without exploring its social and cultural links will be inadequate. Akíntólá (1999: 1) views *Ifá* as the philosophy of or wisdom divinely revealed to the Yorùbá deity of *Ifá*, *Òrúnmìlà*. Farrow (1926: 36) avers, *Ifá* is the greatest oracle of the whole of the Yorùbá that is “consulted on all important occasions.” *Ifá* is regarded as the spokesperson not only for the gods but also for the living. It is regarded as the living foundation of Yorùbá culture (Abímóbílá 1977a: 14). Munoz (2003: 179) sees *Ifá*’s scope beyond the Yorùbá cultural society when he says “*Ifá* is the most universal divinity among the Yorùbá and other West African people.”

Ifá is known to different people by different names throughout the world. For example, *Ifá* is known as *Fá* among the Fon of Republic of Benin, *Eva* to Nupes, *Ifá* in Cuba, USA, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Surinam and Togo. *Ifá* is referred to by the Ewe as *Afa*, *Ephod* by Jews, *Geomancy* by Europeans and Margays (Ọdẹyẹmí 2013: 5). With these different realizations of *Ifá* nomenclature which cut across nations of the world, the prominence of *Ifá* can neither be underestimated nor doubted. In fact, *Ifá* has over 70 million followers in Africa and the Americas. Adeóyè (1985: 174), giving meaning to the name and origin of *Ifá*, contends that “*Ifá*” was loaned from Egypt to Yorùbá language. There are historical evidences to support this claim. For instance, Johnson (1921: 7) claims that Yorùbá languages, “spring from

Upper Egypt or Nubia”. Àtandá (1980: 2) argues that “their real place of origin was either Egypt or Nubia.”

In 2005, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) proclaimed *Ifá* as one of the 86 traditions of the world to be recognized as masterpieces of oral and intangible heritage of humanity (Robinson 2008). By this proclamation, *Ifá* joined the league of heritages and therefore requiring urgent preservation. *Ifá*, as a religion, science or literary text, has over time been of great interest to scholars in different areas of human endeavours, like medicine, philosophy, religion, art and culture. For instance, Akiwówo (1983: 139-157) examines the various *oríkì* (panegyrics) of *Ifá/Òrúnmìlà* from the sociological perspective. He associates different meanings with *oríkì* *Òrúnmìlà* that show different socio-religious values. The *oríkì* manifests and establishes the fact that the knowledge, wisdom and values of *Ifá/Òrúnmìlà* are inexhaustible. The work of Abimbólà (1975: 25-6) focuses on the concepts of *orí* (head), *ẹbọ* (sacrifice), and *ìwàpẹlẹ* (humility), their relationships, and how they complement each other in the Yorùbá belief and value system, with reference to *Ifá/Òrúnmìlà*. The work of McGee (1983: 95-114) focuses on mathematical observations in the *Ifá* divination system. He examines the prime factors in *ẹṣẹ-ifá* (*Ifá* poems) and links the existing symbols in *Ifá* with mathematical formulae. His inquiry establishes that *Ifá*'s knowledge is based on some mathematical knowledge and principles.

One of the reliable ways to establish the veracity of Yorùbá culture is to reference its etymology from *Ifá*. According to Nobles and Goddard (1984: 75), “there are many different ways to discuss the Black family literature as there are techniques for developing and/or documenting the lifestyles of Black people [...] Black culture is a belief in and/or direct practice of traditional African cosmological, ontological and philosophical understanding of the universe.” In this regard, any findings on the Yorùbá culture that is not rooted in *Ifá* may just be a mirage. But, “what still survives in oral tradition and oral literature, particularly in *Ifá* corpus, is a good indication of the intellectual achievement of the Yorùbá” (Àtandá 1980: 29). Oḃáyomí (1983: 76) succinctly put it that *Ifá* “is fundamental in the explanation of the components of the Yorùbá

culture.” In other words, the present attempt is aimed at establishing through *Ifá* the traditional administration of justice in Yorùbá tradition. Matterson and Jones (2000: 95) observed that “keeping poetry alive meant keeping it in touch with what is considered its vital origins in orality.” This chapter, therefore, demonstrates that the process, principles and procedures for securing a safe justice is fully entrenched in *Ifá*; the application of which made the Yorùbá society to experience peace before the introduction of the “modern” method of dispensation of justice is instituted. Furthermore, the whole of *Ifá* is philosophical in nature. In other words, *Ifá* messages are rendered in metaphor. This is why Akintólá (1999: 1) observes that “*Ifá* is the philosophy of, or wisdom divinely revealed to Òrúnmìlà” therefore, it may be impossible to delve into the memory of the Yorùbá philosophy without the knowledge of *Ifá*. There is also no aspect of life-human, animals, materials that are left out in *Ifá*. Agbájé (2005:1) asserts that Yorùbá philosophy “has to do with life, perhaps in human beings, animals, rocks, soil and plants...” *Ifá* is a vehicle of Yorùbá philosophy. “Yorùbá philosophy and values are preserved and disseminated through *Ifá* medium” (Abimbólá 1977a: 14). This is why Šótundé (2009: 52) asserts that “Yorùbá proverbialism is a complete representation of the Yorùbá philosophy of life.” These philosophical statements are facts and representation of truth. Šótundé (2009: 21) reports that “every proverb is truism, re-stating a philosophical dogma.” Proverbs have been observed to have met all the attributes of philosophy. Šótundé (2009: 2) categorizes sources of proverbs into three aspects: the social interaction between people, the folkloric experiences and communities and the animism and animatism “through which primitive people sought and found a meaning for existence in relation to their immediate natural environment.”

The hermetic aspect of philosophy is useful in the present understanding of the Yorùbá philosophy under examination. On this note, Crofton (2000: 89 & 90) aptly notes, “the belief that there is a secret, ancient body of wisdom, surviving in written texts of the 1st-3rd centuries AD that accurately discusses the working of the natural and supernatural worlds and that mastery of these texts

provides an enhanced understanding and control of nature.” There are ancient philosophical values by which the ancient people (Yorùbá) regulate themselves and their society. In addition, there is no aspect of human life uncovered by these philosophical values. One of these aspects of life is how the Yorùbá secure safe justice through the memorial philosophical heritage. This observation was made by Agbájé (2005: 51) that “The Yorùbá traditional philosophy has reached a remarkable level because of the social structure which is a guarantee of freedom, peace stability, law and order.”

The Yorùbá Intangible Heritage of Traditional Institutions in the Dispensation of Justice

The hierarchical memorial institutions of justice put the *Olódùmarè* (God) at the elms of judicial affairs. He is regarded as *adákéḍájó* (a silent judge). His power of omniscient and omnipresent is unquestionable. The Yorùbá do remember that “*Olúwa ló mejó dá*” (God is an incorruptible judge). As he is regarded as the Supreme Being, his supremacy power is incontestable. To the Yorùbás “*Ọlórún dá ọ l’ẹ́jọ́, o ní kò té ọ l’órùn, níbo ni o tún fẹ ro ẹ́jọ́ rẹ?*” (You are judged by God and you are contemplating of an appealing the judgment; where do you want to present the case again?) (Adéoyè 1985: 52). The application of natural laws as regulator of judgment is at play in this instance. It is one of the African memorial heritages of dispensation of justice. This is scientific generalization that both explains and predicts physical phenomena as laws of nature are generally assumed to be descriptive of and applicable to the world. The natural law (under the control of God the Almighty) is superior to all other human laws or legal systems. It is a balanced and impartial one. This law is universally enforceable on human activities. Philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Grotius believed in natural law, which is universal, ‘natural’ to humanity, identical with morality, and the standard against which all secular laws, should be judged. Akíntólá (1999: 98 & 9) reports that:

It is because this code of Natural Laws derives from *Òrúnmilà*...has been predicated by the logic of Yorùbá Metaphysics. This same fundamental Code of Natural Laws also constitutes the foundation of all Ethics...it is also from this same code that all Legal systems, of all ages, derive...Accordingly, Yorùbá Ethics is therefore a breakdown of, or derivation from that code of behaviour enunciated by *Olódùmare* Himself to govern the activities and inter-creature group relationships among divinities and human beings.

The supremacy of law is entrenched in the natural law and enacted by God. Law is intended by the Society as the instrument of justice; but that assumes that the laws themselves are just. Law is often used by a particular society to implement its morality. Crofton (2000: 114) reports that “this means laws serve as a regulator of control of attitude and behaviour for a peaceful society. Law is also superior; is greater than the rulers and their subjects as well.” In the Yorùbá traditional system, there are norms that regulate the activities of an individual and those of the society as a whole. Aláke (2004: 23) affirms that, a norm “is a specific guide to action which defines the acceptable and appropriate behaviour in particular situation.” The regard and respect for the moral laws among the “traditional” Yorùbá guarantee a safe and peaceful society. Àtandá (1980: 29) says, “The Yorùbá feared violating moral laws, particularly in their dealings with their fellow human beings. The results of all this was that the rate of crime among the Yorùbá up to 1800 was extremely low”, because, people feared the repercussions of the impartial judgment in regards to punishment for violating societal rules. Besides the societal norms, customs, moral and natural laws, there are unwritten laws which are strictly adhered to, from *oba* (the king) to the ordinary man in the society which serves as memorial heritage. Character, attitude and behaviours of people are regulated under the ambit of these unwritten rules or laws, including the king. As Johnson (1921: 49) reminds us “although, the king as supreme is vested with absolute power, yet, the power must be exercised within the limit of the unwritten constitution.” There are checks and balances and separation of power in the Yorùbá

political system. This is an important memorial heritage among the Africans especially, the Yorùbá of West Africa.

Next to the *Olódumare* are the deities or the gods and the supernatural spirits. These are numerous in number and their attributes and scope of power. What is important here is to recognize them as authorities in the dispensation of justice in Yorùbá tradition. As Káyòdé (1984: 4) avers that “Divinities are believed to have been brought into being by the Supreme Being and each divinity has a role to play in the ‘governmental’ set-up of life in the community...there are those in charge of maintaining justice such as the god of iron and thunder.” The divinities are deeply involved in the administration of memorial safe justice among the Yorùbás. In fact, in some instances, the ancestors are believed to play an active role towards ensuring a safe justice, especially in family matters, such as controversial chieftaincy crises, sharing of the family properties or when a case of mistrust among family members arises. The spirits of the living-dead are sometimes invoked as arbiters of memorial heritage for securing safe justice among the Africans. “Death is merely a veil as the dead still interact in some inexplicable ways with the living” (Adétugbò 2001:7). Káyòdé (1984: 4) notes that:

Life has no value at all if the presence and power of ancestral spirits are excluded...To Africans, ancestors are not dead, buried and gone forever. They inhabit the spiritual world and still take active interest in the affairs of their families. There is strong belief that physical death does not put an end to existence.

This implies that the Yorùbá gods and the spirits are not excluded in guaranteeing a safe justice in the society. The involvement of the memory of the spirit being into the process of safe justice in Yorùbá society gives room for the reliability and dependability of the Yorùbá judicial system, because the power and process of dispensation of justice is not only residing on human beings alone, but along with supernatural and spiritual beings as well. Sometimes, the culprits are reprimanded by the supernatural

powers and the gods. “It is strongly believed that anyone who works against community life will be punished by the gods” (Káyòdé 1984: 5). The gods are not to blame.

Next in power of authority in the dispensation of safe justice among the Yorùbá is the king. The Yorùbá believes king is second in command to the gods, divinities or the supernatural beings. The king is regarded as *aláṣẹ̀ èkejì òrìṣà* (second in command of authority to the gods). Káyòdé (1984: 5) reports that “at least in the African traditional communities, kings and chiefs are accorded due respect and are believed to be ‘second to the divinities.’” *Ifá Ọ̀kànràn Ìwòrì* in (Salámi 2002: 410) claims that:

...Nígba ìwáṣẹ̀
 Àwọn ọ̀ba n tọ̀run bọ̀ wálé ayé
 Ilé ayé tí àwọn n lọ yíi dára báyii?
 Wọn bá tọ Ọ̀rúnmilà lọ
 Ọ̀rúnmilà níwọ Ọ̀ba
 Ìwọ nìkan ló bori gbogbo èniyàn láyé...
 Ilé ayé bá tẹ́jú
 Pẹ̀ṣẹ̀ṣẹ̀ láyé lọ...
 Wọn ní taa lẹ́ rí pẹ̀lú ẹ...?
 Wọn ní a rí Akódá
 Wọn ní a rí Aṣẹ́dá
 Wọn ní a rí Olúwo
 Wọn ní a rí Odùgbònà
 Wọn ní a rí Àgbọ̀ngbọ̀n.../

In the ancient time
 The kings were coming down from heaven to the earth
 will this world they are going be pleasant for them?
 They went to Ọ̀rúnmilà
 Ọ̀rúnmilà said, you the king
 You are to dominate on all the human beings on earth...
 The earth was flat spread
 The earth spread without an end...
 They said who do you see with him?
 They said we saw Akódá

They said we saw *Aṣẹ̀dà'*
 They said we saw *Olúwo*
 They said we saw *Odùgbònà*
 They said we saw *Àgbongbòn...*

The power and the authority of the king is entrenched, enforced and endorsed by the *Ifá*. Oḍẹgbola (2014, p. 179) reports from *Odu-Ifá Ìwori W'owó* that “Tifa loba” (*Ifá* owns the king). This domineering power of the king is divine as well. Likewise, the earth is to be administered by the five chiefs, who happened to be first chiefs on the surface of the earth. These chiefs are found to be *Ifá* chiefs as well (Adéoyè 1985). The Yorúbás believe that “Ọba l’ó ni ayé, òrìṣà ni ó sì ni Ọba, ṣùgbón, Ọlórún ni olówó àwọn òrìṣà” (the king owns the earth, the deities owns the king but God is the controller of the deities) (Adéoyè 1985: 52 & 188). The memorial heritage of administration of justice is in the order of authority laid down in *Ifá*. The king is sometimes regarded and respected just as the gods, deities or divinities. In this regards, *oba* is a living divinity or god. He has both the spiritual and temporal unchallenging power. He is *ikú bàbá yèyè* (the one reserved with the power to kill). His power to kill is exercised in the administration of justice. His personality and status is always respected and honoured for “arọbafin loba pa” (The king kills the one that is disrespectful to him). He can pronounce death sentence and pardon on an accused. *Oba* represents both the dead and the living. Maciver and Page-Charles (1950: 603) assert that “Dead heroes, dead kings, and ancestors, real or mythical, are translated to the ranks of the gods, and the living kings already possess the attribute of divinity.” As powerful as the king is in the Yorúbá tradition, there are institutional checks on him and his activities, including on judicial matters. The power of *afobaje* (king makers) is exercised in case the king behaves *ultra vires* (Adéoyè 1979: 273). He has as many as *baalẹ̀* (village heads) and *yòyè* (chiefs) under his jurisdiction as possible, depending on the scope of his territorial power. The position of *Oba* is graded in Yorúbá land. There are first class *Oba*, second class and so on. Their class is as well associated with their power. This is also influenced by their judicial power as well. For instance, it is not

all the *Ọba* that are vested with the power to pronounce capital punishment on the accused. This is why it is often said that “*Ọba ju Ọba lẹ, ìjòyè ju ìjòyè lẹ*” (King is more than king as Chief is more than a chief). Their superiority or seniority is determined by their traditional roles, including judicial function. Some *Ọbas* do prostrate for another *Ọba* as a sign and mark of respect. This respect that is accorded to the king is unconnected with age disparity, but as a symbol of respect for the office holder, in this case, *Ọba*. This is why the Yorùbá do classify some *Ọbas* as “*Ọba tí gba ìdòbálẹ Ọba*” (A king that other kings prostrate for). There are two categories of chiefs under *Ọba*. The first is the family chief. He is referred to as *olóyè-ilé* (family chief), and his office is *oyè-ilé* (chieftaincy title). The office is hereditary. In this case, the chief occupies the position of his fore-fathers. Some of the hereditary chieftaincy titles in Yorùbá tradition are; *Ọtún-àgòrò*, *Jagun*, *Ààrẹ-àgò*, *Balógun*, *Abesè*, *Başòrun* and so on. This category of chief are involved memorial heritage in the administration of justice, as they occupy a traditional office; their roles is also traditional in nature. They act as Chiefs-in-council for the king. In fact, some chieftaincy office are rated and accorded with respect of the king’s status, for instance, *Başòrun* in the political administration of *Ọyó*. Restricted judicial power is accorded to him because he can be cautioned and checked, just as he acts as checks to Alaáfin (Smith 1983: 42-64). Johnson (1921: 69) says “but if he is ultra-tyrannical and withal unconstitutional and unacceptable to the nation it is *Başòrun*’s prerogative as the mouth-piece of the people to move his rejection as a king in which case His Majesty has no alternative but to take poison and die.” This is referred to as “war chiefs” (Fádípẹ 1970: 232). The second category of the chiefs is the honorary chiefs. This office is conferred on an individual by the king for some roles performed or expected to be performed in the locality. This is more of “financial inducement” to the king today. This is not restricted to a family and the title cannot be inherited. This category of chiefs performs an advisory role to the king. The category of these chiefs is not on salary as the traditional chiefs.

Another traditional institution vested with power of dispensation of justice is the *Baalẹ* (the village head). Every village is headed by *Baalẹ* that performs judicial functions, along with his

chiefs. Their titles are associated with the village or community they oversee. *Baalè* as well has some chiefs as subjects who are sometimes delegated with judicial functions within their traditional power.


Baalé (family head) is also an important traditional institution in the administration of justice. His major role is to ensure peaceful co-existence among the family members. He operates under the control of *Baalè*. The last institution is the elders in the Yorùbá society. To the Yorùbá “àgbà kì í wà lójà, kórí ọmọ titun wọ”. (Things must not go out of hand in the presence of an elder). The pools or the wisdom of the elders in the Yorùbá society cannot be glossed over. The Yorùbá believes that the youth may be wealthier or occupy honourable and respectable positions than the elders, there is no way to possess, acquire or purchase wisdom like the elders. This is natural endowment that is given to the elders most of the time. To the Yorùbá, “ọmọdé ò lè láṣọ bí àgbà, kó tún lákúisà bí àgbà” (a child cannot have cloth and rags as the elder). This is also realized as a form of power. The elders know the past history, the memorial heritage that is relevant in the adjudication of a case. To the Yorùbás, “ìrírí ṣ’àgbà ọgbón” (experience is greater than wisdom). In many African societies such as the Yorùbá, experience is considered as the springboard of wisdom. One cannot be considered wise unless he or she has acquired some experience, the experience of which is normally associated with age. The elders employ the past relevant memory of a case to resolve a current one. *Ṣótundé* (2009: 366) reports that:

Elders are the Custodian of the people’s heritage, the link between the Society and the *ọba*, and the joint rulers (with the *ọba*) of the Community to keep the Society going as a corporate entity, the rules and regulations put in place for the good of the public, by the authorities in the Society i.e. Elders have to be complied with.

To the Yorùbá “ọrò àgbà bí kò bá ṣe lówuúrò, bó pẹ tíí á ṣe lójó alẹ” (words of elders will sooner or later come to pass). There is no way wrong judgment can be delivered with the presence of the

elders. In other words, there is rarely a report of miscarriage of justice with the presence of the elders in the society. The hierarchies of the Yorùbá memorial heritage of judicial institutions can be illustrated with the diagram propose below:

Yorùbá Hierarchy of Memorial Heritage Institutions of Justice



Yorùbá Traditional Judicial Institutions and Powers as Memorial Heritage of safe justice

In Yorùbá society, a case is determined by the appropriate court with the power of jurisdiction to hear the case. The traditional institutions in the dispensation of justice are influenced by the traditional judicial power vested on such traditional court. To the Yorùbá, “*ilé la ti n kèsòò ròde*” (charity begins at home). The process of dispensation of justice starts from the family court *aganju*, *gbòngàn-ìgbéjò-ilé* or *ilé-ìgbéjò* (open-family court). *Baálé* presides on this court, where some *baálé* of each *èdèdè* or *ikángun* (compound) are as well in attendance. This usually involves a case with two or more family members or between husband and the wife. There is decentralization of judicial function to each family in Yorùbá tradition. The oldest, knowledgeable and wise person occupies this position in a situation where such a family is not of the traditional chieftaincy, as explained earlier; otherwise, *Baálé* (the chief) of such family presides on this court. Fádípè (1970: 224) reports that “owing to the partial decentralization of the judicial machinery among the Yorùbá, the administration of public justice may be said to begin at home, (according to the nature of the parties involved) and to end with the highest state tribunal as well as the highest court of appeal.” *Baálé’s* court is an appellate court; that is, parties involve in a case can seek redress in higher courts. The family roles or hierarchy of authority is highly respected in the adjudicating process. Settlement of open fight may involve settlement and appeal. If no party has been wounded, the matter ends there. If both disputants are of the same compound, the matter will be taken up by the *Baálé* (the family head); if another compound is involved the two *Baálé’s* serve as arbiters (if they are in good terms of relationship). The jurisdiction of this court can award fines or jail the accused in some cases, depending on the community. For instance, in Ògbómòṣò, Òyó state of Nigeria, *Baálé’s* court has a prison where the accuse serves jail term “*Baálé ní ilé èwòn tí à n pè ní Poolo. Níbè ni a máa n fì àwòn èlèwòn sí, á kó sèkèsèkè sí wòn lówó àti ẹsẹ*” (family head has a prison cell referred

to as *Poolo*. There, the convicted persons are kept, fettered on feet and hands) (Agíri 1978: 100).

The next court is that of the village, presides over by the *Baálẹ̀* (The village head). The jurisdiction of this court covers civil and criminal cases. It is an appeal court because, family court is appealed at this court. Agíri (1978: 100) says “...*Ṣùgbón ẹ̀sẹ̀ pàtàkì tí ó burú bí i kí á fọ́lẹ̀, kí á sunlé, kí á pànyàn àbí kí á huwà idálúru, ọ̀dọ̀ Baálẹ̀ ni àwọn ẹ̀jọ̀ wònyí n lẹ̀. Baálẹ̀ àti àwọn ijọyẹ̀ ilú ni yóò ẹ̀e idájọ̀*” (...but offences on criminal cases such as burglary, setting a house ablaze, murder, or causing civil unrest are referred to Baálẹ̀ and his chiefs to arbitrate on). This means *Baálẹ̀*'s court is a higher court. Fádípẹ̀ (1970: 209) accounts that the court handles cases involving “criminal cases or what might be called indictable offences, unlawful murder, treason, burglary, arson, unlawful wounding, manslaughter, incest, witchcraft and sorcery and knowledge of women of the mystery of occult societies.”

The final court of justice is headed by the king. According to Fádípẹ̀ (1970: 209), “the judicial function of the council consisted of its being the highest court in the country as well as the final court of appeal...” on one hand. The king, on the other hand, is vested with the prerogative power to grant pardon. This court can hear cases appealed from lower courts (as explained earlier), and cases involving a village and the other, rift among the chiefs and so on. The court awards capital punishment fines and jail the convicted individual(s). “The *Alaáfín* was in his person, of course, the highest court of appeal” (Fádípẹ̀ 1970: 235).

Besides these three categories of court, there can also be a special court of tribunal. This is specially composed by the *Ọba* and his chiefs to handle specific cases. In such a tribunal, it may comprise some elders outside of the member of the council; even sometimes elderly women. For instance, case involving market women. *Ìyálọ́jà* (head of market women) or *Bàbálájé* (head of market men) may be a key member in this type of tribunal. In this case, he or she acts in the capacity of a tribunal and not a regular court. In other words, such a tribunal reports its activities back to the *Ọba* and his council. The tribunal recommends their findings to the council of *Ọba*. This type of tribunal is temporary in nature as its

activities terminate after the conclusion of its judicial assignment. Besides, there is a standing tribunal in the Yorùbá judicial system as well. In other words, the tribunal is recognized by the tradition with cultural judicial functions. The composition of members is a “closed form”, for instance, it is cultic (specifically for specialized group). This form of tribunal is vested with the power to fine, punish and sometimes pronounce capital judgment on the culprit. For example, if a case of murder is involved, the *Ògbóni* secret fraternity was to handle the matter. The body is the chief Administrative and judicial one; the composition and the names vary according to community. For instance, the tribunal is named *Èlúkú* (connected with the Orò-bull-roarer cult) cry was raised and the street cleared of women at once in order to give unhampered movement to officials of the *Ògbóni* not only in arresting the person who had committed the murder, but also in dealing promptly with any attempt to enforce private justice. The offender is apprehended, arrested and prosecuted. The *Ògbóni* is a powerful Yorùbá tribunal recognized and established by *Ifá*. For instance, *Ejì-Ogbè Méjì*, Abimbólá (1977b: 1 & 2) reminds us that, “àwọn Ògbóni wá ní, Ta ni ó tánràn araa wọn”? (The *Ògbóni* fraternity asked who is to be punished). The theft case between the Monkey and the farmer was taken to the *Ògbóni*: the Yorùbá judicial organ. Abimbólá (1977b: 99) reports that “iwájú àwọn Ògbóni ni wọn mú ẹdun lẹ, nítorí pé, àwọn ni onídàájọ ayé àtíjọ” (*ẹdun* was taken before the *Ògbóni* who were the judicial organ in the ancient time). In another context, the *ògbóni* cult oversees the maintenance of peace, social and political order of the society; especially, among the *Ègbá* and *Ìjẹbú*, Ògùn state of Nigeria. ÒgúnṢínà (1992: 59) claims that the *Ògbóni* “was more powerful among the *Ègbá* and *Ìjẹbú*...It performed all state functions including taking positive actions against any threat to the social and political order.” Whatever the court status is, the judge or judges must be knowledgeable, wise, experienced in age and in the tradition of the Yorùbá. This is why not just anybody can be a judge (Àtandá 1980). Ṣótundé (2009: 366) notes that “in most case, the superiority of brain over brawn has been demonstrated”. To the Yorùbás, “ogbón ju agbára lẹ” (wisdom is more than power), and that “agbà ò kọgbón” (being old does not mean being wise). These

bodies are responsible for the intangible heritage particularly memorial heritage as they serve as pillars of memory that guarantee democracy, peace and justice in Yorùbá tradition.

Memorial Heritage of Suit-filling, Hearing, Judgment and Execution of Judgment

Case Filling

After the determination of the court jurisdiction has been determined, the complainant files his or her case in the appropriate court. “The complainant usually spoke twice, but in some communities either party could speak more than once. In all communities, cross-examination of opponent and his witnesses was allowed.” (Fádípè 1970: 232). This stage is referred to as *ìfẹ́jọ̀sùn* (lodging of a case). The appropriate court official then constitutes a team to hear the case. In civil cases, the defendants pay hearing fee with the same amount with the complainant (plaintiff). A lots of financial and materials investment accompany judicial memorial heritage. This is why the Yorùbá are reminded that “ẹ́jọ́ n fówó...” (Case demands for money). In another context, “O fọ́ kẹ̀gbẹ̀ tán, O kọ́rì s’Ọ̀yọ́ọ́ lọ gbóníSẹ́ ọba wá, owó oníSẹ́ Babalááfin ẹgbàajọ, owó irinsẹ ẹgbàafa, bọ̀sùhìn o wí tìrẹ ẹgbẹ̀rindinlógún, kí ẹ́jọ́ tó parí owó lọ rẹrẹrẹ” (You went to bring the king’s servant after you have broken a calabash container, the financial charges of the king’s servant is One Thousand, Six-hundred Thousand Naira, the transport fees is One Thousand, Two hundred Naira, come forward to present your case involves sixteen Thousand, before the case ends debt has accumulated) (Òkẹwándé 2013: 33). This is why everyone runs away from case that ends in a formal judicial institution. According to Fádípè (1970: 233), “All this revenue, including the hearing fee and the summon fee, was divided up among the judges, the lion’s share falling to the king.”

The Yorùbás believe in presentation and explanation of a case than to fight; thus the Yorùbá will say “ẹ́jọ́ là á kọ ẹ̀nikan kì í kọ́ja; nítórí, bí a bá ja tán wọ̀n á ní ká rojọ́.” (Learning to present and explain oneself is better than to fight; for if after fighting, explanation of oneself will be necessary). To the Yorùbás, “ija ọ

dọlá” (There is no gain in fighting). Whichever the court that hears a case, the proceedings is the same. ‘Pacifism’ aspect of philosophy is relevant here. Crofton (2000: 149) reports that is the “belief that VIOLENCE even in self-defence is unjustifiable under any condition and that arbitration is preferable to WAR as a means of solving disputes.” There is no way to live together without a fight since tongue and mouth do fight together. What is “evil” is, not to allow for peace to reign and the impossibility for further and continuous peaceful co-existence of the individual(s) involved in a case. “Agbẹ má jà kan ò sí, a jà má rẹ ẹ ni kò dára” (No one lives with another without a fight, what is bad is not to allow for friendly living after the quarrel). Every possible effort is made to “quench the fire” of a quarrel or fight before it snowball to court case. The Yorùbá believes that, ‘a fight’, ‘misunderstanding’ or a ‘quarrel’ should not be left unresolved immediately. “Bí ọrọ bá pẹ nílẹ, a máa gbọn ju ni lọ” (if a case last longer, it becomes a critical case to resolve). The Yorùbás believe that, misunderstanding should be resolved immediately as one can know the beginning of a case without knowing the end. This is why Yorùbá don’t entertain a court case, except when all preliminary efforts at resolving the rift at initial stage proofs abortive. The Yorùbá prefers that prevention is better than cure, “àtẹbi ati àrẹ, Ọlórún mọ jẹ ká rẹjọ” (God should prevent us from either justified or convicted case). They believe that, “a kì í ti kóótù bọ ká Ẹ̀rẹ” (We can’t be friends while coming from the court). The *ẹ̀sẹ-Ifá Ìròsùn Èlérin*, Ọdẹgbolá (2014: 242) discourages any form of fight or misunderstanding. The *Ifá* corpus claims that:

Ọ̀rúnmià ní kí á mọ jà ló dùn
 Ifá mo ní kí á mọ jà ló dùn Bara Àgbọ̀n m̀rẹ̀gún.
 Ifá ní tí a bá jà, inu kì í dùn mọ.../
 Ọ̀rúnmià says what is preferable is that we should not fight
 Ifá, the father of Àgbọ̀n m̀rẹ̀gún, I says preferably we should
 not fight.
 Ifá says should we fight, we will be unhappy.

The Yorùbá believes as well that “bí a bá já tí a tún rẹ, eré ò lè bí eré àpilẹ̀ṣe mọ́” (If we fight and be friendly again the tempo of the friendship can no longer be maintained). To this effect, Yorùbá encourages *ìwàpẹ̀lẹ̀* (good character) in whatever they do. A well behaved individual is regarded as *omolúábí* (well-mannered individual). This virtue guides the individual’s behaviours in the society Abímọ́lá (1975: 389-420). To the Yorùbás, “ẹ̀ni tí a bá pè ní Fọ̀lọ̀runṢọ́ kò gbọ̀dọ̀ fọ̀kùn ọ̀gèdè gun ọ̀pẹ̀” (whoever’s is Fọ̀lọ̀runṢọ́ (literally means in God’s care) must not climb a palm-tree with a banana’s rope). The *Ifá* corpus *Ìwòrì* fore-warned and reminds the Yorùbá that:

Ìwòrì tèjú mọ́hun tí nṢeni
 Awo má fẹ́já igbà gun ọ̀pẹ̀
 Mọ́ pé nítorí pé o ti Ṣawo ko tó figbà tó ti já tán gun ọ̀pẹ̀
 Ìwòrì tèjú mọ́hun tó nṢeni
 Awo mọ́ fíbínú yòbẹ̀
 Ìjà kì í dé kòrò gun ra wọn káwo wọ́lé yòbẹ̀
 Ìwòrì tèjú mọ́hun tó nṢeni
 Awo jìnnà sẹ́jò tá à bẹ̀ lórí
 Awo kì í léjò
 Ìwòrì wá tèjú mọ́hun tí nṢeni
 Káwo mọ́ sán bantẹ̀ awo.../

Ìwòrì mind your own business
Awo don’t climb palm-three with partially cut rope
 Don’t say you are somebody and be committing unlawful acts
Ìwòrì mind your own business
Awo don’t draw out a knife while temperamental
 Don’t because of a little misunderstanding draw out a knife
Ìwòrì mind your own business
Awo, be far from a snake with head uncut
Awo do not run after a snake
Ìwòrì come and mind your own business
 Let not *Awo* put on a wrapper of another person... (Àládé

1978: 17).

An *omoluabi* (well behaved individual), metaphorically referred to as *Awo* in the above *Ifa* corpus, will distance himself or herself from doing something unjust or immoral and will be far from being temperamental, be tolerant, flee evil and not trespassing by doing things unlawful. By so doing, the society will be in peace. In another context, the virtue of *omoluabi* is based on the respect for the elders. This may be realized as respect for the senior in the society. Disrespect for the elders create disharmony and rancour in the society, the Yorubás believe that “*aiṣàgbà fẹnikan ni ò jáyé ó gún*” (disrespect for someone a senior creates disharmony in the society).

The Yorubá intangible heritage and memory of safe justice: Court proceedings

During the period of court proceedings, the accused are always in a sober mood and must show remorse. The accused may be on his or her knees or by prostrating. This is why the Yorubás say that “*ẹlẹjọ kì í mejọ ẹ lẹbi kó pẹ lórí ikúnlẹ*” (An accused that admit being guilty will not stay long on his or her knees). There are other body postures that must be portrayed by the accused. Postures such as *itẹríba* (bowing down), *ikáwópònyìn* (folding back of harms), *wívolẹ* (looking down) and so on.

There are traditional established memorial heritage of ensuring safe judgment. Any judgment that fails to recognize these principles render the judgment null and void, that is, of no effect. Some, but not limited to these are:

(i) The principle of being under the law of tradition. For instance, you cannot be a judge (presiding) over your own case otherwise known as *nemos judex in causa sua* in modern legal term.

(ii) Principle of fair hearing (hear from the other party), otherwise known as *audi alterem partem* in modern legal term.

(iii) Witnessing

(a) Swearing/oath taking

(b) *Ẹpẹ* (curse)

Case 1 is the superiority of the laws. The tradition put everyone under its ambits. In judicial matters, nobody is above the tradition. From *oba* down to the elder, no one is allowed to preside on the case that he is involved. For, “*ọbẹ kì í mú kó gbẹ èèkù ara rẹ*” (no knife is sharpened to carve its own handle). In other words, the higher authority presides on the adjudication matter even if it involves *oba*, the king makers or the deities are involved in pronouncing verdict. In the modern system, it is recognized as *nemos judex in causa sua* (you cannot be a judge in your own court). The Yorùbás believe that “*ọlọgbọn kan ò tẹra ẹ nífá rí, bẹẹ ni ọmọràn kò lè fira ẹ joyẹ*” (There is no *Ifá* priest that ever initiates himself, just as no knowledgeable person coronate himself). Adéoyè (1972: 115-6) opines that “*ohun tí ó tilẹ burú nínú ọràn yí nípé ọbẹ kì í mú kí ó gbẹ èèkù ara rẹ, darandaran d’ọbẹ tí ó mú, ó sì tí gbẹ èèkù ara rẹ, nítoripé oun nìkan l’órojọ láisì jẹ kí ẹni tí ó ti olè mọ sọrọ...*” (The worst of the matter is that no knife is sharpened to carve its own handle, the Shepherd became a knife that sharpened its own handle because he didn’t give room for the one that alleges him of stealing). In this case, the shepherd behaved contrary to the tradition by justifying himself in a case that involved him, hence, he was sentenced to death.

Case 2 is the principle of “*agbẹjọ ẹnìkàdà àgbà ọ̀sìkà*” (the one that judges without hearing from both parties involve in the matter is a chief of wicked). In the modern legal language, *it is audi alterem partem*. In other words, Olúyedé (1988: 470) says “the concept of fair hearing must be considered not only from the angle of the accused but also from the angle of society at large and the victim of the crime” This principle is so important to the extent that it is entrenched into the national constitution of Nigeria. The Yorùbá philosophy as well as *Ifá* is emphatic on this principle towards ensuring a safe judgment. For instance, in *Ìwòrì Méjì*, Akíntólá (1999: 188) claims:

Anìkàn dájọ, oò Ẹun,
 Anìkàn dájọ, oò Ẹẹyan;
 Nígba tí o ò gbọ tẹnu ẹnìkejì,
 Emi l’o dájọ Ẹe?

A díá fún Ọ̀rúnmilà,
 Èyí tí akápò rẹ̀ ó pè lẹ́jọ̀ lódò Olódùmarè
 Olódùmarè á ràn^{sẹ} sí Ọ̀rúnmilà
 Pé kí ó wá sọ̀ idi nàà
 Tí kòfi gbé akápò rẹ̀
 Nígbà tí Ọ̀rúnmilà dé iwájú Olódùmarè
 Ó ní oun sa gbogbo agbára oun fún akápò.
 Ó ní ipín akápò ni kò gbà
 Nígbà nàà ni ọ̀rò nàà
 Tó wá yé Olódùmarè yéké-yéké
 Inúu rẹ̀ sì dùn wípé
 Ọ̀un kò dá ẹ́jọ̀ ẹ̀kún kan
 Ni ẹ̀lẹ̀dàá bá ní látọ́jọ̀ nàà lọ
 ọ̀mọ ẹ̀dà kan
 kò gbọ̀dò dá ẹ́jọ̀ ẹ̀kún kan;/

Whoever judges by hearing from one side has done wrong
 whoever judges by hearing from one side is inhuman
 when you have not heard from the other party
 why did you judge?

Cast divination for Ọ̀rúnmilà
 That his treasurer will sue
 To the court of the Olódùmarè
 Olódùmarè then sent for Ọ̀rúnmilà
 That he should defend himself
 Why he fails to favour his treasurer
 When Ọ̀rúnmilà got to the presence of Olódùmarè
 He says he did all that he could do for the treasurer
 He says it is the treasurer that rejected his shares
 It was thereafter
 That the matter became clear to Olódùmarè
 He was happy that
 He did not judge by hearing from one party involved in the

case

Then the creator says from that day
 no creature

Must judge a case without hearing from the parties involved in a case.

From this *Ifá* corpus, *Olódumare* corrected the error of miscarriage of justice committed by *Òrúnmìlà* and *Olódumare* set a precept for this principle of African memorial heritage of fair hearing in the attainment of safe judgment. In another context, *Ògúnda Méjì* supports this as reported by. Abimbólá (1967: 125):

Ni Ògún bá fíbá wọn níbè
Ó bi wọn lẹ́jọ́
Wọn rò fún un.../
There Ògún met them
He asked them to present their case
They expressed themselves to him...

The third party must be an arbiter on matters of misunderstanding between two or more individuals. To the Yorúbás, “àìsí ẹ̀nikẹ̀ta lẹ̀yàn méjì n jàjàkú akátá” (In the absence of the third person makes two persons fight tired). It is the duty of every elderly Yorùbá person to mediate between two or more people involved a misunderstanding or a physical fight. If it is physical fight, effort is made to separate them and if it is impossible, some people who are more “powerful” are mobilized to mediate. This is why “the actual settlement of such a dispute very rarely, in the pre-colonial days, got to the notice of the authorities unless some serious physical injuries had been inflicted” (Fádípẹ̀ 1970: 224). This is an application of mediation in retributive justice. In this case, the aim is to intervene and arbitrate in quarrels and misunderstanding. This is different from restorative justice, which is justice that seeks to put the injured party back to the position he or she was before the act or omission he complained of. If on the other hand, the reparatory justice is adopted, the case undergo memorial due process of justice whereby compensation, damages and fines are awarded as the case demands.

Witnessing

In order to ensure justice, the roles of witnesses cannot be overemphasized. The Yorùbá believe that “bí Ọlórún bá rí ọ, jẹ kí ènìyàn nàà rí ọ” (if God sees you, let human beings see you as well). In other words, it is a means of ensuring a safe justice. There are memorial heritage of rules that protects a witness from being intimidated, harassed or threatened while divulging information that can help in securing justice. For instance, “Bí ẹ̀nìkàn bá ń dá àìyà já ẹ̀ni tí yíò wá jẹ́rì ní ibi ẹ̀jọ̀ kan, tàbí tí ó ń dí i lẹ̀wọ̀ láti wá jẹ́rì nwọ̀n lẹ̀ fi Olúwa rẹ̀ sí ìtímọ̀lẹ̀ bí olúwa bá sì ní ẹ̀jọ̀ nàà nwọ̀n kí yíò dá a láre” (if anybody threaten a witness to a case or is interfering through him or her to influence the court proceedings, the person can be jailed, and may not be vindicated) (Ọ̀gúnḃòwálẹ̀ 1966: 47). A witness must be able to account for what he or she saw in connection to the case. According to *Ọfún Méjì* (Àjànàkú 1978: 1-11):

Ọ̀rúnmilà ní ọ̀rọ̀ hù

Ifá ní ọ̀rọ̀ hù

Baba Àgbọ̀nnìrẹ̀gún,

Ó ní bí ọ̀rọ̀ bá hu,

Ó ní ojúu ta ló ẹ̀?

ọ̀mọ̀ eku bọ̀ síbẹ̀, ó ní ojú Ọ̀un ló ẹ̀

ó ní bọ̀rọ̀ bá hu nkọ̀, ó ní bó bá hu kan,

ó ní wọ̀n a tẹ̀kan, ó ní bó bá hu méjì,

ó ní wọ̀n a tẹ̀ méjì

Àwọ̀n àgbàgbà ní irọ̀ ló pa, èké ló ẹ̀

Wọ̀n pa a, wọ̀n dàrí rẹ̀ sápo àmìnìjà ẹ̀kùn

ọ̀mọ̀ ẹ̀ja nàà fò síbẹ̀,

ó ní ojú Ọ̀un ló ẹ̀

bẹ̀ẹ̀ lọ̀mọ̀ ẹ̀yẹ̀, ọ̀mọ̀ ẹ̀ran.

Gbogbo wọ̀n ní wọ̀n fò síbẹ̀,

Tí wọ̀n ní ojú wọ̀n ló ẹ̀

Wọ̀n ní bó bá hu nkọ̀?

Wọ̀n ní bó bá hu méjì,

Wọ̀n ní wọ̀n a tẹ̀jì

Wọ̀n ní bó bá hukan,

Wọ̀n ní wọ̀n a tẹ̀kan

Wọn ní irọ̀ ní wọn pa,
Wọn bá darí wọn sí àpò àmìnjà ẹ̀kùn
 ọmọ erin wá fò síbẹ̀, ó ní ojú òun ló Ẹ
 wọn ní bí ọ̀rò bá hu nkọ?
 Ó ní bó bá hùkan òun a tèjì
 Ó ní bó bá hu méjì òun a tẹkan
Ọ̀rúnmilà ní “O Ẹun, Ẹun, Ẹun,!”/

Ọ̀rúnmilà says word manifests
Ifá says word manifests
 Father of *Agbọnirẹ̀gún*,
 He says if the word manifests
He says in whose presence was it?
A rat came forward and says it was there
 He says that if then word manifest, it says if it manifests
 one,
 It says they will print one, it says if it manifests two,
 It says they will mark two strokes
 The elders said it is a lie, it is malicious
 It was sentenced to death..
 Fish also came forward
 that it was in its presence.
 So did a bird, and animals
They all came forward
They proved that it was in their presence
 They said if it then manifests
 They said if it manifests two,
 They said they will print two strokes
 They said it manifests one,
 They said they will print one stroke.
 They said they have all told a lie,
 They were all sentenced to death.

**An Elephant then came forward to prove that it was in
 its presence**

They said if the word manifests
 It says if it manifests one, then it will mark two strokes

It says if manifests two, then it will mark one stroke.
Òrúnmilà says “thank you, thank you, thank you!”

From the above *Ifá* corpus, the rat, bird and other animals testified to have witnessed the *Ifá* marking process which is contrary to the actual manifestation, recognition, reading and markings of the *Ifá* divination symbols. But an Elephant testified the real *Ifá* divination symbols marking. For instance, the true situation of *Ifá* symbol marking is “If two palm-nuts remain in his palm, he makes one vertical mark on the powder of the divination. If one palm-nut remains, he makes two marks below the first mark” (Abimbólá 1977a: 5). This gives the true account of *Ifá* symbols marking as testified by an Elephant in the *Ifá* corpus above. Elephant was commended for testifying the truth of the situation while those that testified before it (rat, bird and other animals) were sentenced to death (as highlighted from the corpus). This shows that falsification and perjury can lead to capital punishment under the memorial heritage of safe justice as witnessed from the *Ifá* corpus. The Yorúbás believe that you should reports whatever you saw. The Yorúbás frown at *àbeso* (rumours mongering), *agbósò* (second-hand information), *àròsò* (fiction) and *ìlérò* (assumption) as bases of information to testify to a case during memorial court proceeding.

Swearing and Oath-taking

This is one of the actions taken so as to achieve a balanced judgment and to realize a safe and peaceful society. Witnesses are not left out to undergo swearing and oath taking, so as to base their judgment on evidence on fact. In Yorùbá tradition, there can be two forms of swearing: heavy and light. In the light form, it always occurs between one or more individuals so as to believe each other on a matter. This may also occur between a buyer and a seller in regards to a market or financial misunderstanding or mistrust. This form of swearing is unreliable or not dependable one in judgment (Moréniké 2015). On the other hand, the heavy form of swearing is employed during the memorial hearing process. No one will ever joke or take this form of swearing for granted. “Ó jẹ̀ ìbúra tó léwu” (It is a dangerous form of oath) (Ládélé et al 1976: 75). The type of

swearing depends on the case involved. For example, it relates to business matter, especially, monetary issue, coin may be put inside water for the people involved in financial misunderstanding to drink. It may take a form of swearing by the land, if the matter relates to land issue or on critical cases. Land is a god in Yorùbá religion. Whoever swears contrary to the truth by land will surely bears the brunt, which may sometimes cost his or her life. The Yorùbá believes that “*ẹni tó bá dalẹ̀ yó bá lẹ̀ lẹ̀*” (whoever betrays land will go with the land: be buried under the ground). Some religion objects or symbols are used to swear by the parties involved in a case. For example, iron object represents *Ògún* (the god of iron). If the parties involving in a case belong to the same religion, the *àwòrò òrìṣà* (priest) of such a religion may be required to perform the oath or swearing for the parties involved. This is referred to as *ìbúra olórìṣà* (swearing of god’s worshippers). Whoever swears in “bad faith” is avenged by the god. If the *Ifá* worshippers are involved, *ìgbá odu ṢíṢí* (removing the cover of *odu* pot) is used as object of swearing. This type of swearing is rarely employed as its negative repercussion is catastrophic. If the dead person is involved in a matter, *ìlẹpa* (the sand particles of where the coffin rests) may be put in the water for the disputants to drink. In some cases, if the situation that surrounds the death of someone is controversial, the family may want justice, by wanting to avenge the death by *ríró òkú* (performing cultic rites of retaliation on the corpse). The outcome of this type of swearing is instant without making any mistake. It is observed that some of these forms of swearing are realized in form of judgment, especially, the forms of swearing that are religious in nature, as it involves and invokes the power and the spirit of the supernatural beings. The involvement of the supernatural forces in the maintenance of peace, order, and justice among the Yorùbá cannot be underrated. For example, *Ifá* oracle plays an important role in finding out the truth behind any hidden matter.

Èpè (curse)

This is a form of cultic verbal act. It belongs to the Yorùbá incantation class, as its efficacy is not negotiable. *Ọfọ* (incantation) is “a restricted poetic form, cultic and mythical in its expectation”

(Ọlátúnjí 1984: 139). In some cases, *ọfò* is regarded as “the restricted poems due to their cultic, mystical and fearful attributes” (Alex 1992: 46). *Èpè* (curse), on the other hand, possesses all the attributes of *ọfò* (incantation) as it also have mythical, fearful and cultic attributes. The only difference between them is that while *ọfò* is mostly realized in poetic form *èpè* may take the poetic or prose form.

Swearing/oath and curse resembles to some extent, but different in few aspects. For example, you can curse an individual but, you cannot swear by an individual except by God, the Almighty. Furthermore, a curse is “cultic” which everybody in the Yorùbá society is careful to play with; but, swear/oath may be for a protective matter. In other words, many of us are involved in oath making in one way or the other, for example, the politicians taken an oath of office.

To the Yorùbá, “*ogun ló má a n̄ Ṣini mú, èpè kì í Ṣini jà*” (It is war that mistakenly put one on captives, curse does not work by mistake). For instance, the Yorùbá believes that “*èpè níí polè*” (curse kills a thief). *Èpè* (curse) is employed by the elders in a critical situation, as in this case, arbitration or judgment. Children are restricted from invoking a curse; as the Yorùbá people believe that verbal act cannot go without its positive or negative roles. There different types of curse such as *èpè aláṣòbì* (curse of family), *èpè ìlú* (curse of town), *èpè owò* (curse of business), *èpè èsìn* (curse of religion) and so on.

Memorial heritage of judgment and execution of judgment

Memory is a heritage expressed through historical recounts, songs, proverbs, idioms, riddles, folk-tales, legends myths among other “traditional” medium of expressions. These are beliefs and practices which have been preserved and handed down by words of mouth from generation to generation. The interpretation and understanding of memory enables one to know the beliefs and practices of the people which are described as “living and active” (Amponsah 1977: 9). Abimbólá (1975: 417) succinctly put it that “The Yorùbá concept of existence transcends the time when the

individual is on the earth. It goes beyond that period and includes the memories which a man leaves behind after his death”

The Yorùbá people employ memorial knowledge in the implementation of judgment. After presentation of cases by the complainants, witnesses, completion of investigations and establishment of facts and evidence have been completed, pronouncement of judgment follows. Overview of the hearing process is presented by the chief judge on the matter. The opinion of the associates judges is sought, “beginning with the most junior (only in Òyó does the senior member of the tribunal speak before the junior) (Fádípè 1970: 232). The memory of this is brought to the lime light by (Adéoyè 1972: 113) that “kí nwọn tó nanu mú ètò àtí dájó, ìkò yí kòkò rán wọn létí ohun tí ó **ṣelẹ̀** níbi tí nwọn gbé wòran ní gbògàn ÒrìṢánlá, ní ìbùgbé èsan Àrẹ̀mọ̀ Olódùmarè” (before the proceeding to the judgment, this team first reminded them of what happened where they observed at the hearing hall of ÒrìṢánlá, the abode of the first son of Olódùmarè). This is an established memorial heritage of safe justice. ÒrìṢánlá is a Yorùbá god in charge of creation. It is referred to as *Obatalá*. The *Ifá* priest says he acts as personal assistant to *Olódùmarè* in the process of creation (Adéoyè 1985).

The memorial heritage of justice says that one must have judicial capacity or jurisdiction to act as a judge and must act within the jurisdiction capacity being guided by the memory. This means that memory is the qualification needed for one to become a judge in traditional Yorùbá society. Every judgment shall undergo re-examination by the Almighty judge (God), who is an incorruptible judge of the whole world for “*ọ̀ba ayé kì í rí amòòkùn jalẹ̀, Ṣùgbón, ẹ̀lẹ̀dàá a máa rí i. Ẹ̀lẹ̀dàá nàà ló sì lẹ̀ Ṣedájó afeyíngéran*” (the king of the world cannot see a thief in the dark, but, the creator sees him or her. And it is only the creator that can judge the one that divides meat by teeth) (Adéoyè 1972: 118). Every case judged by the worldly judges will be revisited by *Olódùmarè*. This should be in the memory of any mediator or judge. “*Oluwa ló mejọ̀ da*” (God is an incorruptible judge). Adéoyè (1972: 118) reports that:

ejò tí nwón bá dá l'áiyé yíò jẹ̀ atúndá l'òrun, bí nwón
 bá sì Ẹ̀jò dá, wón dẹ̀sẹ̀ fún iṣẹ́ tí nwón kò l'áṣẹ̀ fún
 tí nwò Ẹ̀. Èlẹ̀ṣẹ̀ kì í lọ̀ láìjìyà. Nítorí náà, ẹ̀dà tí ó bá
 dá ejò idákúḍá d'ẹ̀lẹ̀sẹ̀ yíò sì jìyà ẹ̀sẹ̀ rẹ̀.../
 the judgment of this world shall be revisited in heaven,
 and if there is a miscarriage of justice, they committed
 sins for acting outside their limit of power. A sinner does
 not go unpunished. Therefore, any human being that
 misjudged a case commits sin and will surely be punished
 for sins committed.

To this effect, the corpus above explains that, the memorial
 justice is not terminal. The terminal judgment is delivered by God.
 This statement is metaphorical, because, the world is referred to as
 market. To the Yorùbá “ayé lọ̀jà, ọ̀run nilé” (The world is a market,
 heaven is home). In other words, this world is a temporary place
 while heaven is a permanent place.

The implementation of judgment must be seen to be carried
 out. This depends on the degree of the punishment. For instance, if
 fine is awarded, it must be paid within the prescribed period by the
 judgment. If the convict is to serve a jail term it has to be carried
 out accordingly as well. The nobles, chiefs and important
 personalities in the society are not as well exempted in this form of
 punishment. The punishment may be through beating, if the
 offence committed is “light”. The convict may be sentenced to
 exile. In this case, his continuous stay in the community cannot
 guarantee a societal peace. If *ọ̀ba* is convicted, he may be asked to
 commit “self-suicide” this is done by opening the *igbá ìmà* (sacred
 calabash) which is forbidden to do by any king and be alive.

Conclusion

This chapter has critically examined intangible heritage as
 fountain of memory, peace and justice in Africa with reference to
Ifá in Nigeria. The chapter examines the roles of traditional
 institutions, power and limitations in the dispensation of justice.
 The power of *Oloḍumare* (the Almighty God) is at the elms of affairs

with unlimited judicial power; while the gods and the supernatural spirits, kings, village heads, family heads and elders are entrenched with limited power of memorial justice. This work further examines the Yorùbá traditional institutions and its power of jurisdictions in ensuring memorial safe justice. On one hand, the court of *Olódùmare* (God's court) is celestial, natural and not appealable. On the other hand, the court of the king is a supreme court. This is a terrestrial non-appealable court of the Yorùbá land. The courts of *Baálẹ̀* (village head) and *Baálẹ̀* (family head) are appellate courts. The Yorùbá traditional procedures of securing memorial safe justice such as supremacy of the traditional rules, customs and norms, not presiding as a judge on a case involving an individual, hearing from both parties involving in a case before judgment, input of witnesses, oath-taking and curse toward ensuring memorial safe judgment are examined.

The chapter makes a critical argument that Africans, in their many cultures across the continent, have a dependable and reliable ways of guaranteeing safe justice. The memorial heritage guarantees peace and safe justice that equally put every individual under the ambit of controls in order to ensure peaceful co-existence among Africans. In other words, nobody is above the societal judicial and natural controls. It is equally observed that, there are codes that regulate activities of individuals and groups in the society which have stood the test of time. And, the Africans memorial heritage of safe justice is relevant input in the modern judicial system.

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The Challenges of Honouring Female Liberation War Icons in Zimbabwe: Some Discourses about the National Heroes Acre

Ngonidzashe Marongwe & Blessed Magadzike

Introduction

This chapter problematizes the apparent exclusion of deserving heroines from the National Heroes Acre which contains only six heroines out of the more than one hundred heroes interred there. This discussion is influenced by two profound questions that a Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) provincial official, Mapiye Hwekwete, raised. At the burial of Sheba Tavarwisa in an unmarked village graveyard in rural Gutu, Hwekwete asked the then Vice-President of Zimbabwe, and ZANU-PF Second Secretary, Simon Muzenda: “what unforgivable crime did she (Tavarwisa) commit not to be buried at the (National) Heroes’ Acre?” And, “what criteria are used by government to award national hero status among its pioneer war veterans?” (Matikinye, 2007). The questions raised by Hwekwete are pertinent because of the impressive resume that Tavarwisa carried from the Second Chimurenga where she sat in both ZANU’s central committee and in the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) High Command as the Deputy Secretary for Education (Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 2000). While the questions carried a lot of value regarding the trivialisation of Tavarwisa’s war biography, they raised germane issues that challenged the omission of other women who played prominent roles during the struggle for independence and in the post-independence period from the national shrine. Among these are Freedom Nyamubaya, Thenjiwe Lesabe, Ruth Nyamurowa, and Catherine Garanewako. Although drawn from the First Chimurenga Mbuya Nehanda played a central role as a spiritual guide to the Second Chimurenga (Tungamirai, 1995). The

contributions of these women, which will be expanded in the section titled: “Revisiting some women’s Second Chimurenga biographies”, will form the background for the argument in this chapter. The questions also speak directly to the challenges and dynamics of honouring heroes in Zimbabwe that have been raised by some scholars. *Inter alia*, apart from attempts to trouble the graded memorial order the heroes’ acres created (Werbner, 1998 and Kriger, 1992), controversies have continued to animate the National Heroes Acre, including the questions on what attributes make national heroes, the process of conferring heroism, the criteria for selecting national heroes and the politicisation of the selection process have been discussed (Kriger, 1992; Fontein, 2009; Werbner, 1998, *The Standard*, 5 August 2010). Some of these debates have the potential of eroding the important symbolism, meanings and messages that the National Heroes’ Acre is supposed to convey as the epitome of Zimbabweans’ valour against the British imperialism and as the pre-eminent liberation heritage site.

Be that as it may, the chapter acknowledges that it is not only some women who played prominent roles during and after the Second Chimurenga who have been denied interment at the National Heroes’ Acre. There are also some men such Ndabaningi Sithole, the founding president of ZANU and Henry Hamadziripi who was Secretary for Finance in the ZANU’s Dare Rehondo that directed the ZANU war efforts during the 1970s when the political leadership of ZANU was in prison, and a man who allegedly recruited Josiah Tongogara and Simon Muzenda into ZANU (Matikinye, 2007). Canaan Sodindo Banana was the first (ceremonial) President of Zimbabwe and a key architect of the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU and Patriotic-Front Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU). Michael Mawema and James Chikerema were among the founding fathers of Zimbabwean nationalism and occupied various positions in the National Democratic Party and ZAPU, among others. Wilfred Mhanda trained ZANLA cadres at Mgagao Military Training Centre in the early years of the 1970s (Dzimbanhete, 2014) and was also the deputy Political Commissar in Zimbabwe people’s Army (ZIPA) (Mataire, 2014). ZIPA was a joint military taskforce forged by

ZANLA and ZAPU's military wing, Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), from around 1975 mandated with spearheading the resumption of the liberation war effort (Mataire, 2014). However, while important the discussion of these men falls outside the purview of this chapter, which tries to focus on the troubling of the underrepresentation of women at the national shrine in Harare. As well, the chapter acknowledges the significance of debates concerning some individuals who have been declared as national heroes and heroines but are perceived in some sections as not deserving of the honours, including Chenjerai Hunzvi, Joseph Calverwell, Sabina Mugabe and Border Gezi (Matikinye, 2007). There have also been cases where some deserving and selected heroes have refused interment at the shrine.

Whilst a lot has been written about the politicisation and the partisan nature of the selection of the heroes interred at the various heroes acres and the conferring of the different levels of heroes' statuses, very little has been said about this issue of irregular gender ratios at the National Heroes' Acre in Harare. Significant attempts have been done by Werbner (1998) and by Goredema and Chigora (2009). As such, the chapter builds on the questions asked by Hwekwete to problematize the omission of influential women cadres from the Second and Third Chimurenga from the National Heroes' Acre. As an attempt to expand the horizon pursued by these questions and by the other earlier studies cited above, the chapter asks, as the central question, to what extent have women been deliberately omitted from the National Heroes Acre? This question follows largely derives from the contention by Sahla Aroussi (2011) who posited that there exists a genealogy across the world of the purposeful downgrading of women's contributions in commemorations. Born out of this huge question, is: what narratives can be proffered to account for this behaviour by the post-colonial state in its quest to eternalise its anti-colonial struggles with misleading representations in place? Is the selection process gender insensitive? Also, is this unrepresentative gender ratio at the National Heroes Acre a reflection of how the anti-colonial struggle was executed?

Largely, this chapter argues that more prominent women who helped to execute the Second Chimurenga and the Third Chimurenga need to be visibly acknowledged by their interment at the national shrine. This is not least because about a third of all ZANLA cadres (Lyons, 2004: 236) or up to 10 000 (Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 2000: 41) were females (Lyons, 2004: 236). Some of these female cadres operated at the warfront in various capacities while others helped with the protection of the rear bases in Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania (Mutsvangwa, 2015, & Mudeka, 2014). From these differing roles, some of the women, as outlined at the start of this introduction, would distinguish themselves so that they lay a serious claim to be considered as national heroes.

In the light of the above, the purpose of this chapter is to try to imagine some potential discourses for the omission of women at the national shrine. Broadly, the chapter contends that the omission of women from the national shrine, leads to the exclusion of women from the country's liberation heritage. It also belittles the contribution of women to the struggle for independence and in the general struggle for the development of the country in the postcolonial era. This is because erected heritage sites are powerful in the formulation of collective memory because "visual and material representation of the past remains a central aspect of the performance of history and heritage" and "collective memory is represented in part by the memorials [a government] chooses to erect" (Mataga, 2014: 7-8). At the metaphysical level, burial shrines are closely linked with spiritual discourses. To this extent, death signifies a transition to a purer being with powers over the living (Tirivangana, 2010). More than this, burial places for important people, for example the old, rulers and spirit mediums like Matopos also become important spiritual sites. As such, the omission of women from the national heroes' shrine in Harare potentially excludes them from spiritually guiding the nation. Suffice it to say that the spiritual realm has almost always been largely a women preserve in Zimbabwean history.

The chapter also maintains that the absence of women can be traced back to the nature of the masculinised Zimbabwean

nationalism dating back to the period of the Second Chimurenga. This nationalism, while offering some hope and empowerment to some women through the adoption of new gender roles (Ranger, 1985) that aimed at debunking the “cult of domesticity” that promised equality with men (Chogugudza, n.d: 36-37), did not completely emancipate or advance the women while at times it was even suppressive of women advancement (Kriger, 1992 and Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 2000). Our argument here is that once the women remained suppressed during the struggle for independence, in the modes articulated by Kriger (1992) and Nhongo-Simbanegavi (2000) in which women were not given more military duties and assigned to supportive roles in the struggle such as cooks, nurses, mothers and teachers, among others, it is little surprising that this was later reflected in the improper gender representation ratios that are now apparent at the national shrine where the major criterion for one to be there is supposed to have been one’s outstanding contribution during the Second Chimurenga. In order to fully interrogate the unfinished gender question in Zimbabwe’s postcolonial representations of its struggles, the chapter is divided into three segments. The first segment deals with the profiling of the biographies of some women who are absent from the National Heroes Acre but whose biographies make them meritorious candidates. The second part places the heroes’ acres and the National Heroes’ Acre in context. The third discusses, using the conceptual framework of femocracy, the skewed inclusion of women at the National Heroes’ Acre. This section intends to outline the fact that while the chapter is in favour of more women heroes to be buried at the national shrine, these have to be based on their valiant contributions to the Second Chimurenga. The fourth tackles the historical tensions in the representation of gendered relations emanating from the pre-colonial Zimbabwean states and in the liberation struggle, which overall help to discuss the inequitable gender ratios for heroes and heroines at the national shrine.

Revisiting some women's Second Chimurenga biographies

In this section we revisit, in brief, some of the biographies of some prominent women who are missing from the National Heroes Acre when their illustrious contributions to the Second Chimurenga make them worthy of receiving the honour of entombment at the national shrine. This is to demonstrate that women played a critical role in the war of liberation in Zimbabwe. This argument is buttressed by the words of the current President of Zimbabwe in 1978 (cited in Chogugudza, n.d: 34) that “without women's full participation, the struggle for social, political, economic and cultural independence may not be achieved”. And, he also argued that “our women fighters have demonstrated beyond all doubt that they are as capable as men and they deserve equal treatment, both in regard to training and appointments” (Ibid, 39).

We begin by profiling Sheba Tavarwisa. A trained military officer, she was one of the early cadres to join ZANLA in the early 1970s (Mudeke, 2014: 93). Tavarwisa later on trained freedom fighters, both males and females, some of who went on to hold senior positions in ZANU-PF (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2013). Based on her previous work experience as a teacher, she was deployed as a deputy secretary of education in the ZANLA High Command (Mudeke, 2014). She was the only female in this powerful ZANLA supreme decision making. She was also a member of ZANU's Central Committee from 1977, as well as a vital member of the Women's department in ZANU (Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 2000). The positions she held during the period of the struggle made her, arguably, the most senior woman in ZANU, including being senior to some heroines who have been buried at the National Heroes Acre, like Julia Zvobgo and Sally Mugabe, whom she worked with in the women's League.

Tichaona Freedom Nyamubaya who was interred at the Mashonaland West Provincial Acre received military training at Tembwe Military Camp in 1975 (Mutsvangwa, 2015). She was later deployed to the ZANLA's Tete (operational) Province which made her to be deployed at the warfront inside Rhodesia where she operated under the provincial leadership of Perence Shiri

(Mutsvangwa, 2015). At the war front, Nyamubaya worked herself up to assume the high position of Field Operations Commander (Mutsvangwa, 2015). After independence she wrote fictional literature, for example *On the Road Again* and *The Dusk of dawn*, that were related to some pitfalls of the liberation struggle, especially that of women. She also set up and ran a non-governmental organisation, Management Outreach Training Services for Rural and Urban Development (MOTSRUD) that sought to uplift the livelihoods of poor and urban households (Zhangazha, 2015).

Another female figure who played a big role during the Second Chimurenga was Mbuya Nehanda. Mbuya Nehanda, born Gandakadzi Charwe Nyakasikana, is a central figure of the First Chimurenga of the late 1890s as a spirit medium. However, her spiritual role extends also to the Second Chimurenga, where even in her death she continued to spiritually influence the waging of the war. This derived from the influence of her words, “my bones shall rise” (Chogugudza, nd: 33), that she allegedly uttered just before her execution, on the ZANLA cadres. This was demonstrated by the fact that a medium or guardian of the spirit of Nehanda was in the 1970s escorted to Mozambique by the guerrillas to protect her from the Rhodesia State functionaries (Tungamirai, 1995:42). Other nationalists, like the late Simon Muzenda occasionally recited the poem “Nehanda” written by Solomon Mutsvairo that sought her spiritual guidance to lead them to victory against settler imperialism (Mutsvairo, 1956).

Ruth Nyamurowa is another woman who played a leading role in the Second Chimurenga. Though she received state assistance for her funeral in 1982, she was not conferred national hero status. An accomplished female ZIPRA cadre, she later on during the Second Chimurenga became the commander of ZAPU’s Victory Camp in Zambia in the 1970s (Goredema and Chigora, 2009: 80-81). This was an exceptional feat for a woman to occupy such a leading and prestigious role in the ZAPU and ZIPRA’s anti-colonial history. This rise was not only rare for females during the struggle for independence it also showed the matchless capability, bravery and heroism that she exuded that drove the independence of Zimbabwe forward.

Thenjiwe Lesabe is another illustrious cadre who was not buried at the National Heroes Acre, though she had played instrumental roles during the Second Chimurenga and in the post-colonial phase. She began her nationalist activities from the early 1950s which culminated in her joining of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress in 1957 (Ngwenya, 2011). She later joined the National Democratic Party (NDP) on its formation in 1959 and was elected as the first chairperson of the movement's Women's League. She maintained the same position in ZAPU which replaced the banned NDP. Lesabe continued to be actively involved with ZAPU's affairs by actively participating in the national executive of the People's caretaker Council (which ran the affairs of the banned ZAPU) where she was tasked with mobilising war materials and provisions. From around 1975, she was chosen into the Zimbabwe People's revolutionary Council, which was directly responsible for coordinating ZIPRA's war efforts (Ngwenya, 2011). After independence Lesabe became a member of the ruling ZANU-PF's Politburo as Secretary for Women's Affairs or chairperson of ZANU-PF Women's League following the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU (Newsday, 14 February 2014). She was also appointed as Minister of various portfolios, including as Minister for Women's Affairs and Employment Creation (*Newsday*, 14 February 2011). On why she was not chosen to the National Heroes' Acre, it is alleged that her province of origin (Bulawayo) had only asked for state assistance with the funeral and not for her to be accorded hero status (*Newsday*, 10 June 2011).

Catherine Garanewako, who was accorded a provincial hero status upon her death in 2004, also played a key role during the struggle for independence. She was a trained ZANLA cadre. In the post-independence era, she served in the army and attained the position of Captain (Chitemba, 2012). She was among the few female cadres to attain this officer's rank in the army of Zimbabwe (Ibid). Attaining such a high rank in the army in the post-independence was unique in the country and it was in part built on her military exploits during the Second Chimurenga where she operated alongside her friend, Ireen Zindi, who at one time was a ZANU-PF Member of Parliament (Chitemba, 2012).

Heroes' Acres and the National Heroes' Acre: the creation of memorialisation

Heroes' acres in Zimbabwe were established in 1981 to honour departed heroes or iconic figures who played prominent roles, especially in the Second Chimurenga that culminated in the independence of the country in April 1980. Primarily, the selected heroes were honoured by having their bodies or remains of their bodies buried at different heroes' acres that were erected in different parts of the country. Their establishment was marked by the interment of the remains of Second Chimurenga icons, ZANLA supremo, General Josiah Tongogara and Zimbabwe African People's Union vice-President Jason Ziyapapa Moyo. These heroes' acres were established following the worldwide trend of erecting monuments, wartime shrines and memorial sites for war time veterans. This development in modern times has been done in the United States of America with the erection of various statues of prominent war leaders after the American Civil War (Savage: 1997). The same has also been witnessed in Australia following the commemoration of First World War heroes for the British Empire that was marked by the construction of the Shrine of Remembrance in Melbourne in 1934 (Inglis, 1998). It also followed the pattern of using public sculptures for war memorialisation in ancient Greece, imperial Rome, republican France and fascist Germany (Samwanda, 2013: 46). In a strong sense also, this followed the tradition that had been set by the Zimbabwean colonial masters seen through the monumentalisation of the World's View graveyard, where Rhodes and some white veterans of the 1893 Anglo-Ndebele war's remains are interred, and the statues of First and Second World War veterans in different parts of the country (Magadzike, 2011). Besides the above, the erection of the National Heroes' Acre was meant as a direct challenge to the white dominant memorialisation and heritagisation project noted above. This was in the mould of a power project that was meant to performatively, first, correct and at the same time supplant an existing dominant narrative about heroism and more broadly about the writing and presenting of the nation's memory. As Mataga (2014: 183) asserts, not only was the

National Heroes Acre established to counter the Rhodesian Matopos white heroes acre, but also the establishment was accompanied by the promulgation of a Heroes Day in early August of every year that supplanted the Founders Day, which commemorated the occupation of the country in 1890. Second, it was to create a link between the postcolonial governance and the foundations for the country. As such, the National Heroes' Acre is an important feature in the creation of the history of the liberation of Zimbabwe (Samwanda, 2013:47). Broadly, in Zimbabwe this emanates from the pre-eminence given to the Second Chimurenga heroism as well as other wars of liberation (*zvimumurenga*), that is the First Chimurenga (a war against colonial invasion) and the controversial Third Chimurenga, which was supposed to usher economic independence to the country.

This trope has been strengthened by the eminent role that is accorded to war in the re/making of the Zimbabwean nation and in the making of heroes for Zimbabwe in the ZANU-PF narratives (Mugabe, 2001) and in what has now become popularly known as patriotic history (Ranger, 2003). In both the ZANU-PF discourses and in the patriotic history, heroism is strongly suffused with the language of war. As an affirmation to this, the ZANU-PF website boldly states that the heroes' acres are for "Zimbabweans who waged a protracted, bloody and arduous armed struggle against the white settlers". The National Heroes Act Chapter 10:16 makes it the more clearer by stating that the "designation of heroes is done by the President where the President considers that any deceased person who was a citizen of Zimbabwe *has deserved well of his country on account of his outstanding, distinctive and distinguished themselves in the liberation struggle*, such a person is awarded a national, provincial, or district hero status of Zimbabwe" (our emphasis). The above therefore confirms the status of interment at the National Heroes' Acre as "a symbol of bravery and selflessness for those whose remains are laid to rest there". This has helped to craft a nationalistic discourse anchored in militarism. Critically, this is also significant in that this discourse has been used as the foundation for legitimacy to rule the country by ZANU-PF (Kriger, 1992). The above may lead one to the question: why war memorialisation?

Notwithstanding other explanations, it may be credible to suggest that fighting in the Second Chimurenga has come to confer legitimacy to not only to rule the country but for the construction of a heritage of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe that is rooted, almost exclusively, in war.

Heroes' acres are governed by the Heroes' Acre Act of 1984 and through the heritagisation processes that later took place, they also became the responsibility of the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe which governs them under the 'National Museums and Monuments Act chapter 25:11. To date the country has close to 100 heroes acres scattered across the country where thousands of heroes have been buried. These are hierarchized broadly into the National Heroes' Acre established at Warren Park in Harare, the ten Provincial Heroes' Acres and the several district heroes' acres. The differences in the statuses of the heroes' are based on the perceived significance of the contributions of the individuals especially to the Second Chimurenga from 1966 to 1979 and to the controversial Third Chimurenga of 2000 to 2003, whose objectives and methods of fighting it are still contested. Broadly, the National Heroes Acre is meant for the burial of those considered national heroes derived from those who led the struggle for independence and those who made tremendous and selfless contributions to the country. These are largely the political and military leadership of ZANU, ZAPU and the combined ZANU-PF. Provincial heroes' acres are meant for liberation war heroes, that is, those who made significant contributions fighting at the war front, while the district heroes' acres cater for liberation heroes, including those who supported the struggle in non-combatant roles (Goredema and Chigora, 2009: 77). In the next section we turn to a pithy discussion of the National Heroes Acre with a particular view to bring to the fore the esteem associated with interment at the place.

The National Heroes Acre: The pride of Zimbabwe

Of the many heroes' acres that were erected in Zimbabwe, it was the National Heroes' Acre, situated in the capital city, Harare,

which was chosen as the interment shrine for those whose valour, from past, present and future (Ministry of Information, 1995:2), was viewed as having surpassed that of others and hence deserving recognition as national heroes. It was commissioned on 57 acres (13 100m²) of land around Warren Hills in Harare. In the graded order of the heroes' acres (Werbner, 1998 and N. Kriger 1992), the National Heroes Acre was built as a commemorative burial shrine for the political and military leadership of the Second Chimurenga, and recently, of the Third Chimurenga. Generally, these are considered to have made tremendous contributions to the liberation of the country. According to the Ministry of Information and Publicity (1995: 3), because the National Heroes' Acre is the epitome of "the bravery and selflessness" it is, thus, "the pride of the people of Zimbabwe." Accordingly, the exemplary deeds, bravery, selflessness and colourful biographies were in this case considered to have surpassed those of their peers in the anti-colonial struggles. As a result of the connections with the highest order of valour, the National Heroes Acre came to represent a new biographical order of the country whereby the selected heroes' biographies were deeply immersed in the liberation struggle narratives. As a result, there is a lot of prestige associated with being interred at the National Heroes Acre.

Due to the significance attached to the National Heroes Acre, it was deliberately, if not conspicuously developed to separate it from other sites set aside as provincial and district heroes' acres. The location carries a lot of both strategic and symbolic significances. As Mataga (2014: 188) avers, the National Heroes' Acre is:

[...] strategically located on an elevated hill with 360 degree views of the city. The towering monument can be seen from many parts of the city and its undisturbed natural environment of indigenous trees is endearing amidst a growing urban metropolis. Its shiny black granite entrance is eye-catching, its granite wall and graves are visibly attractive, and its eternal torch lights the city skyline continually.

Furthermore, the design layout of the shrine literally separates it from “ordinary cemeteries” with the conspicuous placement of the graves on a terraced platform and the public seating area (Ibid: 189). In addition, the shrine is also decorated in iconography that conforms to the official discourse on the founding of the Zimbabwean nation including a depiction of the Great Zimbabwe site and its chevron patterns and the imaging of the figures of Nehanda, Kaguvu and Robert Mugabe, Second Chimurenga fighters and the black masses (Ibid:189). The shrine is also decorated with bronze sculptures, especially the Tomb of the Unknown soldiers that were done by the Mansudae Overseas Project Group of companies with the help of some local sculptors (Samwanda, 2013). At a different level, the overall architectural layout is influenced by the shape of the AK 47 rifle, a gun that played a prominent role in the liberation of the country. The shape of the shrine from the grand parade and the burials is that of two AK 47 guns (Magadzike, 2012). The statue and tomb of the Unknown Soldier represents the trigger of the gun whilst the curving burial platforms represent the magazine of the gun. On the other hand, the cobblestone platform represents the butt of the gun, whereas the individual graves represent the bullets of the gun. In addition to these, the steps that lead to the eternal flame represent the muzzle guide of the guns and lastly, the flame tower itself represents the Bayonet of the gun and the flame itself is the blood of the enemy (Magadzike, 2012).

Burial at the National Heroes’ Acre carries a lot of honour and esteem to both the one whose remains will be entombed and to the surviving family members. Besides the prestige associated with the public broadcasting of the funeral, the mourning period and burial, as well as the televised annual commemorations at the national shrine, there are serious attempts at the extolling and lionising the virtues of the hero or heroine being laid to rest, maximising the coverage of their life history, declaring of public holidays to encourage multitudes to attend, flying flags at half-mast for the duration of the “national mourning period and state assisted funerals” (Mawere, 2015: 59-60) and making the national shrine a place where visiting global leaders and dignitaries are taken to for them to appreciate the sacrifices made in the becoming of

Zimbabwe. What is also significant is that the graves at the National Heroes' Acre have been accorded a national monument status, which is "the highest status that is given to any site of importance" (Mataga, 2014: 187). As well, there are significant benefits that accrue from attaining this national hero status, including financial, to the surviving family members who are entitled to a state pension. It is, thus, an important signifier in the [re]creation of the country's liberation heritage, which tries to powerfully and performatively immortalise the liberation war heroism of those buried there (Schumaker and Joan Macgregor).

An important gendered discourse that Samwanda (2013) discerns about the National Heroes' Acre that speaks directly to the central question of this chapter is the pictorial representation of women in the Tomb of the unknown soldiers. The picture of the Tomb of the unknown soldiers is composed of two male figurines and one female figure. As Samwanda (2013) contends, what seems to downgrade the contribution of women to the Second Chimurenga is that the woman appears in non-combat gear of "ordinary shoes and socks, as well as [a] long skirt" while the males "appear in full military attire from berets down to combat boots" (Ibid: 53-54). From this image, Samwanda (2013: 54) argues powerfully that, while the one woman and two males speaks to the findings of Lyons (2004) that one third of the combatants were females, on the whole the "women are being removed from the war narrative as fighters and reframed as unequal partners. They are being re-imaged as mothers and supporters of men ... [in the Second Chimurenga and in the post-colonial administration ...]."

Heroines [not] at the National Heroes Acre: Absent-presence and femocracy

The period 2000 to 2015 was marked by a significant increase in the number of former high ranking military cadres who had joined the Second Chimurenga being buried at the National Heroes Acre. Altogether, more than twenty members of these former military personnel and members of the other security arms like the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP)

and the Zimbabwe Prison and Correctional Services (ZPCS) found themselves making it to this revered shrine which embodied a sacred status in Zimbabwe's anti-colonial struggle narratives. These include, among others, Eliah Bandama, Vitalis Zvinavashe, Paul Gunda, Cornius Nhloko, Josiah Tungamirai and Mernard Muzariri. Reading through their mini biographies produced during the course of their burials, the most cited reason why these cadres had managed to make it to the heroes' acre was their valiant engagements at the war front during the second liberation war. They are also considered to have remained loyal and faithful to ZANU-PF ideals unlike the others who "faltered" or began to question the leadership of ZANU-PF (*Newsday*, 10 June 2011). However, in contrast to this achievement by the war's former male military personnel, only six heroines since 1981 had managed to find their way into Zimbabwe's war bibliography as represented by the National Heroes Acre. The lucky six selected were Sally Mugabe, Joana Mafuyane Nkomo, Julia Tukai Zvobgo, Sunny Ntombiyelanga Takawira, Ruth Chinamano and Sabina Mugabe (*The Standard*, 5 August 2010). Thus, by 2015, the six represented less than five percent of the more than one hundred luminary gallants interred at the national shrine. Broadly, this scenario affirms the gendered nature of the national shrine in the mode expounded by McDowell (2008). To McDowell (2008:337) cited in Aroussi (2011: n.p) "commemorative landscapes, particularly those which evoke the memory of war, are among the most gendered, as they largely document the experiences and narratives of men and often elide or complicate the interpretations of women."

Furthermore, despite the fact that these six women had prevented the National Heroes' Acre from becoming a male only burial site, one of the enduring arguments about the women whose remains have been buried at the National Heroes' Acre is that most of them were in one way or the other connected to nationalist male leaders who were also buried or were almost likely to be buried at the National Heroes Acre. They were either wives or close relations of dead or living senior nationalist and political leaders (Goredema and Chigora, 2009: 78-81). As such, while some of these women played active and distinctive political or military roles during the

Second Chimurenga, their legacies are intricately tied with that of their male relatives. It is this situation which has created arguments that many of these women entombed at the national shrine are undeserving of the highest honour bestowed on them. Goredema and Chigora (2009), for example, argue that some of the women were laid to rest at the National Heroes' Acre for playing supportive roles to their male spouses and not directly to the national cause. The quote below of President Mugabe's speech on the conferment of hero status on Mama Mafuyane, the late vice-President Joshua Nkomo's wife, clearly illustrates this view:

Through sheer effort and determination she raised her family virtually all her children singlehandedly, ensuring that they receive good education while their father was in detention or had left the country to lead the armed struggle. She took most of the pressure thus keeping her husband well sequestered and thus focused on the enormous challenges of leading the struggle for independence, therein lies her heroic contribution (*The Herald*, 30 June 2003 cited in Goredema and Chigora, 2009: 79).

To further illuminate this view, most of the selected heroines had never been at the war front during the Second Chimurenga. To this extent, whilst women like Ruth Chinamano had once been detained and Sally Mugabe had been involved through nationalistic political protests (Lyons, 2004: 235), none had direct combat experience. It is instructive to also note that the rhetoric as narrated at Joana Nkomo's funeral, and broadly describing the other women heroines at the National Heroes' Acre, signifies the virtues of desirable but emasculating motherhood in conflict situations, a motherhood that preserves the purity of the nation sought and a motherhood that allowed men to continue with their valour in the struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe without worrying about their families. This, as Aroussi (2011: n.p) argues, besides affirming the relationship between nationalism and masculinity, the position of women in the conflicts stands in direct contrast to the men or 'fathers of the nation' who would be associated with "virility, national pride, patriotism, courage, physical strength, militarism and self-sacrifice".

The above discussion on the close association between the women heroines interred at the National Heroes' Acre and Second Chimurenga influential military or ZANU-PF male figures speaks to the seminal phenomenon of femocracy that Mama (1997) introduced. Considering femocracy as an antithesis of feminism, Mama describes femocracy as: "an anti-democratic female power structure, which claims to exist for the advancement of ordinary women, but is unable to do so because it is dominated by a small clique of women whose authority derives from their being married to powerful men, rather than from any actions or ideas of their own" (Mama, 1997:31 cited in Ibrahim, n.d). One of the consequences of femocracy, through acquiring associational power from the males, is to reinforce patriarchal tendencies than to promote gender equality as it tends to promote the fallacious belief that for women to be worthy, they have to be connected to the powerful men (Ibrahim, nd). Thus, "femocracy is a feminine autocracy running parallel to the patriarchal oligarchy upon which it relies for its authority, and which it supports completely" (Mama, 1997:31 cited in Magadla, 2013). While the concept of femocracy is largely ascribed to the assumption of undue political power by First Ladies (Ibrahim, n.d), we use it here, in the mode adopted also by Goredema and Chigora (2009), to explore the links between the elite women who were buried at the National Heroes Acre to powerful political and military figures associated with the Second Chimurenga and their assumption of at times undeserved heroes' statuses. This notion of femocracy is also important in the discussion of the apparent omission of the not-so well connected women who played significant roles, military and/ or political, during the Second Chimurenga but who were ignored for national hero status, as already mentioned earlier. As such here, we contend that the exclusion of Tavarwisa, Nehanda, Nyamubaya, Leasabe, Garanewako and Nyamurowa is largely connected to their not marrying high ranking military and political figures.

We also seek to debunk the valence of femocracy by revisiting the articulation of the plethora of roles that women played in the struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe. From these numerous roles, it is not therefore necessary to place women at the National

Heroes' Acre largely because of their relationships with powerful Second Chimurenga male figures. Even though Bhebe and Ranger (1995: 26) argue that "there have not been any fully satisfactory gendered accounts of the war and its aftermath" what has been established is that many women were already involved in the struggle by the mid-1970s as either combatants or in other capacities. To this extent, as Fay Chung (2006:81) avers, it was the female combatants who carried loads of weapons into the country from Zambia through Mozambique. To her, "women were ... better suited" to walk this long distance "not only because they were already accustomed to carrying heavy loads of water and firewood, but also because the Rhodesian security forces were less suspicious of women, whereas they suspected every man of being a guerrilla". Mhanda (2011: 43) buttresses this notion of the heavy involvement of women in the liberation struggle by estimating that of the ten Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) combatants who were selected to undergo military training in China in the mid-1970s, four of them were female of which Sheba Tavarwisa was one of them. However, such upon their deaths, such combatants as Sheba Tavarwisa, Catherine Garanewako, Thenjiwe Lesabe, Tichaona Freedom, Nyamubaya and Ruth Nyamurowa, were not considered heroes enough to be buried at the National Heroes Acre. This is despite the fact that their male colleagues, even those who joined the struggle after them and some were trained by some of these female cadres, managed to make it to the National Heroes Acre. Whilst this argument carries a lot of purchase, we seek to go further to imagine other potential reasons for the omission of women at the National Heroes' Acre. It is to these other potential discourses that we turn.

Zimbabwean women in pre-colonial Zimbabwe

This section deals with the representation of women in the historiography of pre-colonial Zimbabwe. Among others, this is meant to complicate the understanding of gender dynamics in early Zimbabwean communities. It is also meant to trek the genealogy of gendered inequalities in the country, some of which have been

replicated at the National Heroes' Acre. There have been concerted efforts to write the place of women among the pre-colonial Shona and Ndebele societies as empowered. Among other arguments, and as an affirmation to the respect that women were accorded in the pre-colonial Mutapa and Rozvi States, women were found in high-ranking positions in their states. In this regard, wives of chiefs were found to wield enormous amounts of power (Beach, 1980: 96). Some women considered to even having had authority to govern parts of states. For example, there was Nehanda who ruled a province in the Munhumutapa state in the 15th century (Mudenge, 1986: 41). The same state also had a regiment entirely composed of female cadres (Kriger, 1992: 192). Still in the Mutapa state, other chiefs' wives administered "their own houses, lands, and vassals", while others in the Manyika and Mashonaland controlled vast territories (Smidt, 1992: 29). Also among the Shona, as in other African states, Queen mothers played a key role in administration, for example, they could nominate or impeach chiefs (<http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-5440-201-1-DO-Topic.html>). In other areas, women relatives were also responsible for choosing and installing new chiefs and or other leaders (Smidt, 1992:29). Continuing on this discourse, one can then argue that the fact that their physicality as women did not inhibit the women from assuming higher social positions. Thus, as Oyewumi Oyeronke would probably have said, the "social order requires a different kind of map, not a gender map that assumes biology as the foundation for the social" (Oyeronke, 2005: 13).

It has, however, to be pointed out that the occupation of these high positions in Shona societies, as in many others on the continent, was frowned upon by some. Furthermore, one has to be careful not to take these few politically recognised women for the generality of women's empowerment. To begin with, and in contest to the findings of Beach, above, Mudenge (Mudenge, 1986:104) and Mazarire (2003) have posited an interesting argument that shows that power was not equally shared by the wives of chiefs. To Mazarire (2003:47), there were "class differences" between the wives. The first wife (*Vabosi*) had more power followed by other

married wives (*varongo/vakaranga*) and at bottom were the adopted wives (*vakadzaji venbaka*).

Linked to the above, the age of a woman significantly determined her social status in many of the pre-colonial Shona states. Age was associated with wisdom, closeness with ancestral spirits and symbolised the woman's productive and reproductive contributions to her married family (Schmidt, 1992: 22-23). In this regard aged, women with many children and grandchildren were better respected than young ones or those without children. Female fecundity, in this respect, was also associated with their contribution to the family's production. Crucially, aging was associated with "drying out" (Lan in Schmidt, 1992: 23). To this end,

[a]t birth, children are considered to be wet. Soft and bloody, they are thoroughly human and lack all authority. Elderly people, who are virtually ancestors themselves, are hard, dry, and bony. In human life they hold the utmost authority. The ancestors, dry, brittle, and bloodless, are wiser and more powerful than people. They can cure illness, provide rain, and are omniscient concerning past and future events. Like infants and small children, young women, during menstruation and child birth, are also considered to be wet. Thus, it is only when they are post-menopausal, brittle, and dry that they possess a degree of authority. In other words, women acquire power when they are least women and most like men and the ancestors (Schmidt, 1992: 23).

Gendered dimensions of the Second Chimurenga

This section tries to [re]present the rather polarised views on the origins and impact of the nationalist-based oppression of women, which eventually affects their hero status. Broadly, the section pits the nationalist perspective against the revisionist one on the impact of the Second Chimurenga on the emancipation of women. It seeks to portray an ambivalent reading of the liberation war on gendered differences and sexuality. Through this, it locates the entrenchment of gendered inequalities against the backdrop of

the liberation movements' claims of strong inroads towards gender parity. The thesis of this section is that while there could be other points of origin for the gender oppression of women, the evolution of Zimbabwean African nationalism from the 1940s, and especially its crystallisation into the Second Chimurenga in the 1960s and 1970s, fertilised and intensified the process of gender oppression. This is, however, not meant to debunk the general emancipatory narrative and liberatory nature of the Second Chimurenga. It is, however, meant to estimate the effect of the gendering of roles during the Second Chimurenga on the according of heroism on women in the post-colonial era in Zimbabwe.

Most rural areas of Zimbabwe were militarised during the 1970s. This was due to the fact that most rural areas were used as bases by the African nationalist movements in their fight against the Rhodesia Front government forces (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989:25) resulting in the deployment of Rhodesian troops in these rural areas. David Lan points out that rural people were sandwiched between two forces and suffered being put in keeps or protected villages (Lan, 1985:133). Brickhill weighs in and says that by 1978 "guerrilla war had reached most rural areas and had encircled the economic heartland of the country" (Brickhill, 1995:53). Broadly, this led to a 'democratised' instrumentalisation of violence and the widespread violation of human rights. The effect of this confrontation on the rural areas and on rural women is, however, still hotly disputed.

Nationalist historiography, which celebrated and glorified the Second Chimurenga, portrays a rather romanticised version of how the war encompassed ideals towards the liberation of women. Among other things, it posits that under Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led struggle for independence, women were liberated, or there were giant steps in that direction. In direct contrast, revisionist historiographies argue that nationalist movements were patriarchal and generally oppressive to the cause of not only women, but other interest groups like workers, for example, in the name of the common good of the African struggle. Terence Ranger, Ngwabi Bhebe, David Lan and Julie Frederikse, among others, argue that

the Second Chimurenga was generally emancipatory to women. On the whole they posit that if women were not *per se* liberated, they were at least afforded the space for new empowering opportunities divorced from, and which challenged their traditional gendered roles (Ranger, 1985:206-7). Ranger, basing his argument on the Makoni district, says

men in their fifties, ... who were used to controlling a flock of dependent women [...] now found that the initiative had passed to young men with guns. The young men called upon the unmarried women of Makoni to act as their cooks, informants and messengers and in these later two roles, teenage girls were able to exercise a good deal of power, for the first time in Makoni (Ibid: 9).

Norma Kriger, however, disagrees and says this liberation of women did not last long because of men's and traditional leaders' opposition to the open beating of men who abused their wives by the guerrillas as this was viewed as interference in domestic affairs (Kriger, 1992:192). She also argues that the mere adoption of new roles by the women is not enough testimony on its own for it to be called emancipation. She also says at the end of the day women returned to being "controlled subjects" (Ibid: 193) due to the opposition by men. Ruth Weiss brings the ambivalence more clearly in an interview with a female ex-combatant who, while acknowledging some semblance of advancement, highlighted that women were sexually exploited by senior ZANU and ZANLA leaders (Weiss, 1986:95). Nhongo- Simbanegavi is even more critical and says, for example, that ZANU did not have a gender policy and "in fact, no reference at all was made to gender inequality in the Political Commissariat's whole collection of lecture material" (Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 2000:38).

Nationalist historians have argued for the existence of a common nationalistic agenda against colonialism and that this thread bound the different sections together. These nationalist grievances were around the need to remove the Rhodesia State and around the skewed land distribution between the races (Lan,

1985:148-149; Ranger 1985:185-186). Bhebe and Ranger add issues around human rights and dignity for all in the state (Ranger, 2001). Julie Frederikse adds the point that Rhodesian oppression of the peasants for example conscientised them, so that by the time the guerrillas mobilised them, they were ready to support them (Frederikse, 1982: 90).

As revisionist scholarship has rightly contested, the latter is an oversimplification and narrowing of African grievances and African nationalism. Norma Kriger for instance argues that peasant participation in the Second Chimurenga was as much based on the desire to unsettle the Rhodesia state as it was meant to address peasant on peasant and class differences in the rural areas (Kriger, 1992: 177). In this way, she posits that there were struggles within the peasantry, for example, between the youths and the elders, the poor and more affluent peasants, and also between the common peasants and the traditional leadership, which were more important in drawing peasants to participate in the liberation struggle (Ibid). Added, the peasants did not have a choice in the face of guerrilla force, which led to fear of ZANU, for example, before and after independence (Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 2000: 140-15).

Nationalism has also been attacked for serving the interests of the bourgeois leadership by calling for unchallenged unity, which encouraged despotism. Ranger, cited in Raftopoulos, says “there is an accumulating tendency in the very nature of nationalist movements that the ideological good of unity overrides notions of pluralism or associational autonomy”, and that “by the late 1950’s with the emergence of mass nationalism it had come to be accepted that the nationalist movement must dominate all these other spheres” like religion, domesticity, education, gender, sport and work (Ranger in Raftopoulos, 2000:25). Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni in a more critical analysis contends that the nationalist movement was on the surface populist to win support across the spectrum, yet it was largely “hegemonic and intolerant of diversity, internal criticism, and dissent. As a movement, it was basically sweeping in what it claimed and annihilatory in what it rejected” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ND). Masipula Sithole (1999) agrees and talks of “struggles within the struggle” in the liberation movements. From

the above, nationalism was associated with intolerance and violence, which were less conducive towards women empowerment.

Patriarchy and associated tendencies have also been ascribed to the liberation movements, and that these stifled women development, liberation and advancement within these organisations. Nhongo-Simbanegavi (2000: xix) describes it as a “legend” that women were advanced and cites the failure of ZANU to remove patriarchal practices such as *lobola* and polygamy in camps in Mozambique during the Second Chimurenga. She sees a dichotomy between official ZANU and ZANLA rhetoric on the one hand and sad reality on the other, on how women advanced in these organisations. To her, while there were some trained women guerrillas, these were largely not deployed on the battlefield. Rather they were more often relegated to the provision of support services, such as, nursing, teaching, child minding or they were deployed in liberated or semi-liberated zones (Ibid: xxi). This reduced their chances of advancement to leadership positions in ZANU and ZANLA. The above discussion is enhanced by the findings of (Chogugudza, n.d: 41) that it was only out of increased pressure from human rights organisations that both ZANLA and ZIPRA drastically increased the numbers of their female combatants. As Woldemikael (2014) posits, although the positions that were assumed by women were important in the struggle against imperialism, they nonetheless feminised and civilianised the women combatants. Nhongo-Simbanegavi (2000: 8) cites as open discrimination against women in ZANU, especially the pregnant or those having monthly periods (Ibid: 8). Notwithstanding the other potential reasons that this could have provided better security to these women, it also spoke, as Schmidt (1992) has already contended, to the majority Shona groups’ cultural practice of considering such women as unclean.

Arguing in a similar fashion is Norma Kriger. For her, patriarchy did not end with the assigning of new roles to women in the struggle (Kriger, 1992:192). Again the participation of women in wars was not novel in Africa. She cites Mutunhu’s claim that in pre-colonial Mutapa state of Zimbabwe, one of the most dependable army units was made entirely of women (Ibid). Quoting the *Southern*

Africa for July/August 1979, she also says “only 5% of cadres sent for special courses by ZANU abroad were women, all ZANU representatives abroad were men; leadership selection was biased in favour of men”(Ibid:193). In addition, there were also claims of the sexual violation of women in camps in Mozambique and also in areas where guerrillas operated in Zimbabwe (Ibid). If we agree with the revisionist scholars on the Second Chimurenga, we are confronted with a situation where the condition of women remained suppressed or worsened due to their relegation from the “hot war” front and reinforced patriarchal tendencies in the camps outside the borders of Zimbabwe.

Conclusion

The chapter has waded into the debates around the National Heroes’ Acre as a site that excludes women. It has, broadly, posited that the exclusion of women can be understood through historicising the unequal gender relations from the indigenous Zimbabwean communities from the pre-colonial period and in the colonial period. The asymmetrical relations were buttressed by the developments during the period of the struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe between the 1960s and 1979. The chapter has also argued that the disproportionate gender representation of national heroes at the national shrine also speaks to the masculinised and patriarchal imaging of both the birth of Zimbabwe and of the waging of the Second Chimurenga. Both, as discussed in the chapter are largely framed in strong male and militarised combat terms. The chapter has also discussed the dangers of the exclusion of the bulk of the deserving women veterans of the Second Chimurenga as leading to the belittlement of the contributions of women in the struggle for independence and in the writing of the history of the independence of Zimbabwe. On the whole, the omission also leads to the lop-sided framing of women in the country’s liberation heritage.

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When Yaa Asantewaa Meets Deborah: An African and Biblical Dialogue on Women Leadership in Liberation War Heritage

Kojo Okeyere

Introduction

Many women in Africa today are weighed down and inhibited by androcentric customs and traditions in their societies (Aina, 1998; Amoah, 2002; Oduyoye, 2007). Although in some traditional African societies, women are well positioned within the public arena (such as among the Akan¹ who have the office of a queen mother and also allow for women chiefs), there still exist certain customs, practices, and beliefs that subordinate women to men. For instance, some African men are generally of the view that women are naturally weak, and inferior to men who are strong, courageous, and fearless (Kambarami, 2006). Such a belief is supported by several proverbial sayings. Two examples below from the Akan of Ghana paint the reality and conviction within African societies on the subordinate position of women to men.

- Saying 1: **sɔ ɔ tuo toa, ɔ twere bɔ rima bo.**
- Literal Translation: *A gun only goes off when it rests on the chest of man*
- Saying 2: **ɔbaa tɔn nyadoa, ɔntɔn atuduro**
- Literal Translation: *A woman sells garden eggs and not gun powder*

According to the first saying, men undertake difficult tasks. Women are weak and should be given less demanding tasks. This explains why in traditional Akan setting, there is the notion that the place of women is in the kitchen. Also when women face problems

¹ The Akan is a multi-ethnic grouping occupying a large part of the southern part of Ghana. They constitute 47% of Ghana's population (GSS, 2013).

that demands courage such as encountering a snake, they often yell, “**mmarimma mmra o**” meaning “*men should come and help them out*”. The second saying affirms the notion of women’s frailty by limiting the exploits of women to less demanding and aggressive tasks such as selling garden eggs. Sayings such as above explain the reasons why in some Akan communities, when there are meetings to discuss pressing problems, the gathering would be mainly constituted of men. Women stand some distance away from the men and observe the men deliberate on the issue (this is a personal observation from Ekoo, a village in the Central Region of Ghana, where I currently reside). Thus among the Akan, courage, bravery, strength, and heroism reside in men. Largely, women are not viewed as capable of exhibiting these masculine attributes. Revealing of these proverbs, therefore, is the cultural ideology of androcentricism.

Although masculinity has positive benefits to it (Englar-Carlson & Kiselica, 2013), the ideology that females are incapable of displaying courage, strength, and bravery too often degrades the image of women and constrains their contribution to development. However, several historical antecedents in African heritage challenge this view. Nowhere is this male chauvinistic ideology conspicuously challenged than in the traditions of Africa’s liberation. As wars fought to free peoples from cruel oppressions of foreign enemies, liberation wars in Africa were occasions when values of valour, strength, and bravery were needed. Per the above Akan, women have no place in such spectacle. But this was not the situation during the trying period of many African societies in their battle with colonial forces. Indeed, there are recorded events where some women demonstrated these so-called masculine attributes, and were the main protagonists in the fight for freedom for their people and societies. Examples of such courageous African women include Yaa Asantewaa of the Asante of Ghana, Nzingha of Ndongo (present day Angola), Queen Nyamazana of pre-colonial Zimbabwe, and the “Mino” of Dahomey (present day Benin) (Esherick, 2004). These examples challenge the androcentric ideologies which have fostered and perpetuated male interest over and against female concerns and contributions to society. They also

question the cultural legitimacy and acceptance of the image of African women as docile and lacking power.

Despite the access to education, economic opportunities, and political participation by African women today (International Alert, 2012), the goal of an equal playing ground for women to unleash their innate competences in the march towards a sustainable world is far from reality. Women in Africa are continuously denied education, freedom of speech, and economic empowerment (Tuwor & Sossou, 2008). Recently in Kenya, the United States President, Barack Obama, charged Kenyans to end discrimination against women, since it retards their development. Although it cannot be excused, discrimination towards women stems from culturally constructed androcentric ideologies which have not changed much over the years even in the face of modernisation in many African societies. So entrenched have these ideologies seeped into the fabric of African societies that women themselves believe and promote their subordination to men through various cultural traditions such as early marriage, female genital cutting, and widowhood rites, of which they (women) are protagonists in their promulgation.

African women may be thought to be important and powerful, but relative to African men, irrespective of age and status, African women lack culturally valued authority. The ambivalence of Africa's cultural heritage, with respect to the contradictory place of women in society, however, should not be seen as a barrier to Africa's development. Rather, it should call for a critical engagement of the traditions, unearthing androcentric interests and dealing with them appropriately. Although both men and women have been agents of the making of history, it is men who have largely shaped the nature and symbolic production of history and its legacy. This explains why the little space women find in this male dominated cultural narrative has to be given the needed attention in order to balance the androcentric interests. Besides, any sustained effort in tapping the full potential of African women for Africa's development cannot turn a blind eye to the continent's cultural assets contained in her heritages. Accordingly, this chapter examines the leadership role of Yaa Asantewaa (of the Asante of Ghana) in her struggle for

the liberation of her people. It does this by dialoguing with the biblical portrait of a similar role played by Deborah as she helped liberate her people from Canaanite oppression. With Deborah representing the Christian tradition and Yaa Asantewaa, an African tradition, the chapter explores how biblical and African traditions complement each other in acknowledging and promoting women as partners with men in the fight for liberation and development. The inclusion of the Christian tradition has become imperative in the face of its assimilation within the African culture.

In order to achieve the above goals, the chapter is organised as follows. The first part of the chapter focuses on Yaa Asantewaa by exploring her personality and contribution in the war against the British. The second shifts attention to the personality of Deborah and the role she played in the liberation of her people. In the third part, the two traditions are examined, by exploring areas of similarities and differences in order to come up with qualities and symbols which can constructively engage African women who find themselves in leadership positions. Since the fight for liberation has taken different dimensions today, the fourth part, which concludes the chapter, draws on the leadership symbols and qualities of these two women to push for the leadership involvement of African women in the liberating march for a sustainable world in areas such as education, politics, justice, and economic empowerment.

Tough and Defiant: Yaa Asantewaa Fights the British

The last five years of the nineteenth century was tumultuous and fateful for the Asante kingdom. Not only did these years witness the exile of the Asante king and other prominent chiefs of the Asante kingdom, but also the fall of the Asante Empire and the Asante confederacy (Boahen, 1972). In the midst of this chaos, however, emerged Nana Yaa Asantewaa, the queen mother of Ejisu, a heroine whose exploits against the British earned her a legendary status in the history of the Asante and Ghana. Before delving into Yaa Asantewaa's exploits, the historical background to her leadership role is first given.

It was under the reign of Nana Prempeh I (1888-1931) which saw the most dramatic events in the Asante kingdom. In the first place, the accession of Prempeh I to the throne was not unchallenged. He faced stiff opposition from Yaw Atwereboana who had the backing of the Asante states of Kokofu, Nsuta, and Mampong (McCaskie, 2007). Prempeh I, on his part, was supported by the states Bekwai, Dwaben, Offinso, and Edweso. This resulted into a civil war, which led to the victory of Prempeh I and his faction due to the support they had from the British (Boahen, 1972; McCaskie, 2007). At a tender age, Prempeh I was put on the throne. The Asante confederacy, during this time, was not under the British, hence Prempeh I could undertake reforms to strengthen the fragile unity of his kingdom. This was exactly what he did. He was able to mend the division within the Asante Empire through diplomacy and war as in the case of Kokofu (Boahen, 1972). He also aimed at strengthening the larger Asante confederacy first through alliance with Kwahu and Akyem Abuakwa in the south and Salaga and Gyaman in the north. Through conquest, he was able to annex territories such as Atebubu in the north into the empire. These actions strengthened the Asante Empire economically since it meant the control of more trading routes and the payment of taxes. These achievements, however, did not sit well with the British, who all this time had their eyes set on the inter-land of Ghana (then Gold Coast) and were looking for ways to annex it into the British colony. Thus, they took measures to reverse the achievements of Prempeh I and sought to remove him, since he was the charisma around which the Asante people rallied (Boahen, 1972).

First, British forces were sent to Akyem, Kwahu, and Atebubu to foil the plans of Prempeh I. Then between 1894 and 1895, the British requested Prempeh I to accept British resident, but he politely refused. Capitalising on the heavy fine imposed on the Asante during the Sagrenti War (1873-74), the British requested Prempeh I to redeem the entire fine, a demand which was unrealistic. Prempeh I agreed to pay but in instalments. This was rejected by the British who ordered his arrest and subsequent exile, together with other prominent chiefs of the Asante kingdom. It is important to note that Prempeh I did not resist the British during

his arrest (Asirifi-Danquah, 2007). He offered himself because he did not want innocent Asante lives to be lost and, he also believed that his arrest would halt the British interest in the Golden Stool (Boahen, 1972).

In the midst of this confusion, Yaa Asantewaa emerged as a female leader who stood against the imperialism of the British Empire. But who was Yaa Asantewaa and how did she come into the spotlight? According to Asirifi-Danquah (2007), Yaa Asantewaa was born in 1832 to the couple Kwabena Ampoma and Madam Attah Poh at Ejisu. Since her mother was a royal of Ejisu, Yaa Asantewaa became a member of the royal family of Ejisu through birth. Though the only daughter of her mother, Yaa Asantewaa had a normal childhood, which included the domestic chores typical of girls in a traditional Akan home (Donkoh, 2001). After going through *bragro* (puberty rites for Akan girls), she was married to Owusu Kwabena, a prominent member of the Asante elite (McCaskie, 2007). Uncertain about when Yaa Asantewaa was made Queen, Boahen (2003) says she was functioning as a queen from the 1880s and 1890s. Asirifi-Danquah (2007), on the other hand, claims she was enstooled as queen mother of Ejisu in 1869. Whatever the case might have been, it was her position as a queen mother of Ejisu which enabled her play such significant role in the resistance against the British.

Writing on the concept of Asante war leader, Arhin (2000) posits that “A leader of the ‘rising’ was the one to initiate, in consultation with others, the planning and execution of the strategy and tactics of the war, the mobilization of men and material for it, the declaration of armistices(s) and the negotiation for peace with the enemy.” Accordingly, for Yaa Asantewaa to be considered as the leader of the British resistance war of 1900, she should have carried out most of the activities which define an Asante war leader. Below is a discussion on her role in the 1900 Asante war with the British.

First, Yaa Asantewaa is seen as the initiator of the war in 1900 (Asirifi-Danquah, 2007; Arhin, 2000; Donkoh, 2001). Unlike Prempeh I, who surrounded to the British because he did not want the loss of Asante blood, Yaa Asantewaa saw a much higher price

in kowtowing to British rule. Not only did such a move mean the loss of Asante freedom, but also the denigration of Asante identity. Armed with such passionate attachment to the Asante Kingdom and culture, Yaa Asantewaa harboured a dislike for the British who employed various tactics to weaken the Asante confederacy. The British under the guise as mediators meddled in the political affairs of Ejisu (McCaskie, 2007). They also exiled the Asantehene and important chiefs, including the chief of Ejisu, who was her grandson (Donkoh, 2001). What was more, the British continued the search for the Golden Stool, the heart and pride of Asante Kingdom (Donkoh, 2001; McCaskie, 2007). For Yaa Asantewaa, these and other actions by the British could not go unchallenged. Thus, when on 28th March 1900 the Governor of the Gold Coast, Sir Fedrick Hodgson, put forward a number of demands to an assembly of Asante chiefs which included Yaa Asantewaa (the only female among the Asante group), she could not remain passive any longer. Obviously considering the demands as ridiculous, Yaa Asantewaa openly revealed her displeasure and defied the Governor, while the other chiefs were stunned by the Governor's demands (Asirifi-Danquah, 2007).

Her open defiance later led to a meeting with the Asante chiefs to discuss the way forward for the Asante people (Boahen, 2003). The importance of this meeting to the war is seen in the powerful speech made by Yaa Asantewaa which incited her fellow compatriots to go to war (Asirifi-Danquah, 2007; Boahen, 2003). The influence of Yaa Asantewaa's personality and speech led to her colleagues appointing her as their leader of the war. Without hesitating, Yaa Asantewaa accepted the challenge, fired a gun to signal the beginning of the war and immediately begun making preparations for the war (Boahen, 2003). Thus, Yaa Asantewaa became the leader of the Asante resistance against the British. This position was difficult and challenging considering the military superiority of the British, but nevertheless readily embraced by a spirited woman who was prepared to die for her kingdom and people, than to watch the white man take away their freedom and dignity.

As the Commander-in-chief of the Asante army, Yaa Asantewaa took several measures to ensure the success of the Asante army. She set up units and camps at various strategic places. Asirifi-Danquah (2007), for instance, reports that several units were formed including, Kintampo-Nkoranza unit, Kumasi-Cape Coast unit, and Offinso unit. These units were responsible for battling the British forces at their respective locations. Boahen (2003) also reports of Yaa Asantewaa making Nana Afriyie the leader of the war on the battle field. In this way, Yaa Asantewaa was not directly involved with the battle, but rather served as the master brain behind the entire resistance, giving directions and encouraging the people to fight. Yaa Asantewaa made sure she was in control of the war through her representatives at the various councils. According to Arhin (2000), in an account by Fuller in one of the encounters between the Asante and the British, it was Yaa Asantewaa's representative, Akwasi Boadu, who gave instructions on the direction of the war. Thus Arhin (2000:103) concludes, "[t]he passage also meant that it was Yaa Asantewaa's representative who gave orders at these meetings deriving his authority from the queen mother."

Her role as the Commander-in-chief is visibly seen in how she mobilised people for the war. Asirifi-Danquah (2007) reports of Yaa Asantewaa's manipulation of the male libido when she pleaded with the gods to strike down any woman who sleeps with a man who refuses to join the war. This strategy resulted in twenty thousand men joining the Asante army. She is also reported as visiting the soldiers in the battlefield, encouraging them to put up a brave fight, and supplying their needs (Donkoh, 2001).

Finally, Yaa Asantewaa played the important role of negotiating on behalf of the Asante forces. Negotiation was an important strategy used by both the Asante and the British during the war. The British employed it on several occasions when they were frustrated by the strategies used by Yaa Asantewaa and her forces. Having Ejisu as her capital, Yaa Asantewaa undertook most of her negotiating roles in Ejisu. During the siege of the fort in Kumasi, series of negotiations ensued between the British and Yaa Asantewaa. Boahen (2003) records that the strategy of starvation

used by Yaa Asantewaa and her forces on the Kumasi fort led to the British going to her to negotiate for logistics and food. However, when Ejisu was defeated, Yaa Asantewaa now became the active party seeking to negotiate with the British. Boahen (2003) records her meeting with the British representative, Colonel Willcocks to end the war. Knowing the Asante were weak, the colonel rolled out several demands which infuriated the Asante and led to renewed hostilities, until Yaa Asantewaa willingly submitted to the British in March 1901.

Dynamics of Women Leadership: The Case of Deborah in Judges 4-5

Deborah and her exploits as a leader are captured in Judges 4-5. The book of Judges is part of the Deuteronomistic history which stretches from Joshua to Kings. A preliminary comment needs to be made before turning attention on the main subject matter of Deborah's liberating exploits as detailed in Judg 4-5. This is on the notion of history in the bible and how it relates to the story of Deborah. Biblical history is a hotly contested issue (Barr, 2000; Malamat, 2001). While many deny the Old Testament of any historical value, not until the period of the monarchy (typical of the minimalists – Lemeche, 1998; Whitelam, 2002), others strongly argue for a historical validity of the Old Testament accounts, beginning from the period of the patriarchs (typical of the maximalists – Kitchen, 2006). There is also the proposal for a middle ground as evident in the work of Finkelstein and Silberman (2001). With respect to the book of Judges, many scholars agree that per the arrangement of its materials, there is an artificial structure imposed by a redactor (Gabriel, 2003; Noth, 1981). For some, this signals a distorted account of real history, so much to the extent that little history can be salvaged from the stories as they stand. Others also hold the view that despite the artificial structure, there are within the stories historical kernels that have been preserved. For the purposes of this chapter, I take seriously the historical claims of the story, and at the same time pay attention to its literary character.

In her role as the liberator of the Israelites, Deborah served as a mother, wife, prophetess, judge, and warrior. In order to appreciate these multiple roles, the background to her exploits as a leader is briefly discussed below. After the Israelite crossed into Canaan, they remained without a leader. Joshua was dead, but they needed to respond to a threat of the remaining inhabitants in the land of Canaan. They consulted YHWH and Judah was nominated to go to war (cf. Judg 1:1-3). Judah achieved great successes in the continuous attempt of the Israelites to drive the Canaanites away from the land. However, her successes did not extend to the lowlands, and other tribes also failed to evict the Canaanites and other inhabitants (cf. Judg 1:21; 27; 29; 31-32). So the Israelites had to co-exist with the Canaanites and other inhabitants of the land. But how would that turn out in testing the loyalty of the Israelites to their God? Theologically, the Canaanites remained in the land as a test tube to measure Israelites faithfulness to God (McCann, 2002). As it turned out, the Israelites failed the test, setting in motion the cyclic events of Israelites sin against God, God raises an enemy to oppress them, Israelites cry out to God, God listens and raises a deliverer for them, there is a period of rest, and the Israelites sin again. The title given to such leaders is “judge” (*šofet*). Apart from judicial functions, primarily a judge was one who brought deliverance to his or her people. Before Deborah served as a judge, Othniel, Ehud, and Shamgar had come to play their role (cf. Judg 3).

Deborah entered into the fray after the death of Ehud. Once again, the Israelites sinned and God handed them over to an oppressor. This time it was the Canaanite king Jabin and his army commander Sisera. It is the army commander Sisera, however, who struck fear among the Israelites. He terrorised the Israelites for twenty years with chariots of iron numbering nine hundred (4:3). He also commanded a large fighting force (4:13). His figure symbolized “power of military technology in the service of oppressive political policy (Hamlin, 1990: 81)”. In the midst of this chaos, Deborah is introduced. Invested in her character the first time she is introduced are three descriptions: a prophetess, a wife, and a judge (4:4). The images of a warrior and mother also emerge

in Judg 5. How these depictions are actualised in her leadership duties?

Although the figure of a judge in the book of Judges carries the special role of a war leader, it also refers to one with the authority to administer justice (Wolf, 1962). We begin Deborah's leadership role with this latter meaning. As an administrative judge, Deborah is depicted as seated under the shade of a palm tree in the Ephraimite hills (4:4). The phrase, "to her the sons of Israel went for judgement" (4:5b), reveals her essential role of delivering justice. Indeed, apart from Samuel who is the only judge depicted as actually administering justice (1 Sam 7:6), in Judges, it is only Deborah who seemed to have functioned within this legal capacity (McCann, 2002). Her services were public and opened to all, not restricted to a section of the society. But this image of a woman judging Israel at this moment in Israelite history has been questioned by several scholars such as Williams (1991) who in his book does not even refer to her role as a judge. Other scholars are of the view that Deborah did not exercise this civil authority because if she did, it made her the first and only woman to have played that role in the entire Old Testament (Block, 1994; 2001), quite a difficult reality to accept. Despite these reservations, the narrative is very unambiguous about this important role of Deborah. She stands with Moses in the entire Old Testament as the only two judges who the Israelites went up to for judgements (Schneider, 2000).

Deborah's role as a prophetess, however, has received more positive evaluations, possibly because the phenomenon of female prophet (**n^cvī'āh**) is relatively popular than that of a female judge (Miriam is the first to be a named prophetess – Exod 15:20). Thus, Goldingay (1995), for instance, considers Deborah as the first prophet proper. Her prophetic function basically resides in the oracle she gave to Barak. As the narrator puts it;

She sent and summoned Barak the son of Abinoam from Kedesb in Naphtali, and said to him, "The LORD, the God of Israel, commands you, 'Go, gather your men at Mount Tabor, taking ten thousand from the

tribe of Naphtali and the tribe of Zebulun. (Judg 4:6 – RSV translation)

Being the subject of three verbs in the verse (sent, summoned, said), Deborah was the main protagonist in the encounter with Barak. Her revelation of God's intervention in Israel's affairs affirmed her as a figure endowed with the divine favour. Thus, she summoned Barak, and she commissioned him for the impending task. She then assured him of success, and proclaimed that victory will be his (4:7). When Barak was hesitant, she went with him to reassure him of God's favour (4:9). These actions of Deborah place her within the circle of other prophets such as Samuel, Isaiah of Jerusalem, and Micaiah bin Imlah who gave oracular guidance for battle.

Like the other judges who mainly functioned as military commanders, Deborah is captured as a military leader by the accounts of Judg 4 and 5. However, questions have been raised on the validity of such image because of doubts over whether she participated in the battle (Mayfield, 2009). There are good reasons for such scepticism, the prominent being Deborah's absence from the story from 4.14b to 4.15 which relates the actual battle. This being the case, why is the description of Deborah as a warrior popular among scholars (cf. Yee, 1993; Rasmussen, 1989)? Deborah is the one who summons Barak (4:6). She and Barak conscript the army (v. 10). She accompanies Barak to the battle field (4:10). She sounds the battle cry (4:14). Despite her direct involvement in the unfolding saga, she is not depicted as holding weapons and fighting. The text describes her as three times going with Barak: twice in 4: 9, and once in 4:10. Thus, it is unusual when she fades away just when the battle takes place. Rasmussen (1989: 79) explains this unusualness with the argument that Deborah's disappearance in the actual battle is as a result of male redactors or editors who feared that the reception of Deborah as a warrior among women could be likened to "cults of the goddesses Asherah and Anath for the commemoration and empowerment of women in a male-dominated culture". Rasmussen's argument proves how difficult it is to use the text to portray Deborah as a warrior, hence the need to resort to

other forms of arguments such as the nature of the socio-political conditions pertaining in Israel during the period of the judges (cf. Hackett, 1985). But as Yee (1993) explains, the textual difficulty arises from the limited definition we have assigned to the notion of a warrior. Androcentric concepts of a warrior refer to the individual who aggressively participates in the battle proper and emerges victorious. However, warfare involves series of activities among which the actual battle is just one of them. If the concept of a warrior is extended to encompass the individual who acts before, during, and even after the battle proper, one would not hesitate in concluding that Deborah is a warrior. Nonetheless, whether this proposal is taken or not, one thing the text is unambiguous about is how Deborah's leadership in time of war proved decisive for the deliverance of Israelites (Yee, 1993).

Finally, the song of Deborah stresses her role as a "mother in Israel" (5:7). This victory song depicts the difficulties Israelites encountered before Deborah emerged (5:6-7). Social and economic lives were threatened due to foreign enemies invading Israelites territories. Traders could not move their wares, and ordinary citizens could not travel (5:6). In the midst of these difficulties, Deborah arose as a mother to save her children, Israelites. Exum (1985) understands Deborah's accomplishments as including "counsel, inspiration, and leadership." In other words, she appropriates her leadership roles as "a mother in Israel ... who brings liberation from oppression, provides protection, and ensures the well-being and security of her people." As Ryan (2007) points out, the portraits of Deborah as a mother in Judg 4-5 is cast in a double edged sword. On one side is the soft, nurturing and caring mother, who ensures fairness in her society, while on the other side is the hardened and strong woman who wants and leads her children to war to fight the enemy. Both images are valid descriptions of the maternal instincts.

Comparing Notes: Yaa Asantewaa Meets Deborah

Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah prove to be women who acted in the arena of public life of their respective societies. Having made

their mark in leadership roles, these women are remembered and celebrated by posterity for their direct agency in the fight for freedom. Historical study of the contributions of women to development in a world dominated by men, however, has gone through phases of tacit rejection to tacit acknowledgement and to overt acceptance of the important role women play in the society. Interestingly, the story of the two women and others bear testimony to the ambivalence that confronts scholars in their attempt to understand the participation of traditional women in the social and public arena. On the one hand, there are institutions which women do not only participate, but also control (such as puberty rites; institution of queen mother among the Akans). This way, women have their contributions to society created and preserved. On the other hand, there are cultural practices such as female genital cutting, child marriage, and widowhood rites and ideologies such as a woman's place is in the kitchen, women are weaker than men, and myths and taboos which present women as contaminants because of the flow of menstrual blood.

Challenging as it may seem, the ambivalence of women's role within the traditional society rather presents scholars the opportunity of confronting the reality of the competing ideologies and identities women have to contend with as they play their role in society. But scholars need to make a choice, a conscious one for that matter, to tilt the narrative in a way that positions women as today's creators of their tomorrow's future. One such way is to highlight the intangible cultural heritage of women who have lived extraordinary lives. In this respect, stories of Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah are a unifying source for women liberation and development across the borders of space and time and cultures. Below, we explore how their narrative display points of commonalities and divergences as well as how they complement each other to demonstrate the leadership prowess of women.

Although set apart by about three millennia, the exploits of Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah speak to each other in a profound manner. First, the chaotic background to the leadership roles of the two women deserves attention. In the case of Yaa Asantewaa, she had witnessed the exile of her paramount chief. This was a blow to her

because her state Ejisu had negotiated its way from an unstable position of constantly causing trouble within the Asante kingdom to the stable position of a strong ally of the Asantehene (paramount chief), which led to the recovery of several treasures previously lost (McCaskie, 2007). Thus, the exile of the Asantehene, Prempeh I, by the British compromised these achievements. Yaa Asantewaa also witnessed the exile of her grandchild, chief of Ejisu. To make matters worse, she had to endure the constant pestering and threats of the British who directed their energy at finding the Golden stool, the heart and soul of the Asante people and Kingdom. Deborah on her part operated in times of uncertainty and chaos (Bellis, 1994; Yee, 1993). Judging by the phrase “in those days there was no king in Israel” which appears not less than four times in the book of Judges, one realises the disorder that characterised the period. Apart from the general disorder within Israelite communities, Deborah and her people had to contend with sustained oppression for twenty years from an enemy with superior weaponry (cf. 4:3). Born out of crisis, leaders arise to arrest situations that threaten the survival of their communities. This is what Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah did.

Difficult situations call for experienced hands. Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah defied the norms of their society by emerging as the hands that dealt with the troubling situations their respective societies faced. Among the Asante people, women had a role to play in warfare. An *obenmaa* (queen mother), for instance, was part of the decision makers in the making and unmaking of war (Arhin, 2000). On the battlefield, women supported the men through songs and mockery of the enemy. Clearly, these traditional roles of women, however, were background issues; they did not venture into the mainstream of war. This explains why the actions of Yaa Asantewaa command many respect and praise from the Asante. She departs from the traditional roles when she first acted as the Commander-in-Chief of the Asante army. By virtue of this role, she was the main brain behind the Asante army, their strategy and tactics. She was the force behind the convictions of the Asante people to fight, and she ended the war when she surrounded to the British. Through her actions, Yaa Asantewaa called into perspective

a redefinition of the military and political functions of women within the Asante society.

In a similar way, Deborah alongside Jael proved to be warriors when they helped defeat the Canaanites. Operating within a patriarchal society, Deborah was strong and resolute in her leadership role. Yee (1993) argues that the structural makeup of the pre-monarchic Israel made it possible for women to emerge as leaders. For instance, the lack of centralised authority meant that families and clans were the centres of power. This made decision making a domestic affair, one that women were actively involved (Yee, 1993). The decision for men to go to war, for example, would have had the women deciding on that. Coupled with the nature of pre-monarchic Israelite warfare (which was guerrilla in approach), women were important stakeholders in Israelite war during the period of the judges. Yee (1993), however, points out that pre-state Israelite society was very much a patriarchal one, and the actions of Deborah and Jael were the exception and not the norm. The book of Judges supports this position since only these two women are recorded as having played exceptional roles within the military history of the people. So in assessing Deborah's role in the war against the Canaanites, we need not only look at it from the perspective of the social structure that enabled her to assume such position, but also to probe into her personality which unravels her as a strong willed individual with the conviction to fight for the liberation of her people.

Though exceptional female leaders, Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah are connected by the assistance they had from men. This is an important aspect of their leadership: one that projects the message of women collaborating with men towards a common goal, instead of they undermining the authority of men. In the case of Deborah, Barak was her right hand man; the leader of the army. Many readers are intrigued of the image of Deborah, a woman, leading and commanding Barak, a man, into war. Indeed, the figure of Barak has been praised by scholars (Niditch, 2008; Frymer-Kensky, 2002; Ryan, 2007), and mocked by others (Exum, 2007; Yee, 1993). But such value assessment of a male figure working in a subordinate position to a female character promotes the perception

that males should always be the superior in their associations with women. Should men always lead with women following? Certainly not! The ancient story of Deborah confronts modern readers with the reality that leadership roles are not the prerogative of one sex, but rather open invitations. This idea finds validity in the story of Yaa Asantewaa. When the male chiefs were stunned and deflated by the British, it was Yaa Asantewaa who stood up to fill the important void of providing the necessary visionary leadership for the resistance against the British. Although initially reluctant, the men became gingered with the inspiration Yaa Asantewaa gave. As a result, they did not hesitate in offering their support for the resistance.

An important quality women leaders exude, as evident in the examples of Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah, is the multiplicity and complexity of their functions. Deborah, for instance, is presented as a prophetess, a wife, a judge, a warrior, and a mother (Mayfield, 2009). No character in the entire book of Judges combines these familial, judicial, religious, and political roles (Fewell, 1992). Thus, Goldingay (1995: 24) identifies Deborah as the “greatest figure in the book”. Similarly, Yaa Asantewaa combined the roles of a mother, a wife, a queen mother, and a military leader. As a queen mother, she was crucial to judicial matters in her state. Indeed, after the exile of his grandchild, chief of Ejisu, she acceded the throne and became the primary political figure in her state. By virtue of social place of women in a patriarchal society, women leaders cannot help but take on multiple roles. For instance the roles of wife and mother are constant for most women in traditional societies. Women who want to distinguish themselves, therefore, would have to first negotiate through these primary roles before they can progress to other non-familial secondary roles. What this means is that women have more work to do as leaders at the societal level. For some people, the low representation of women leaders at the societal level is because of primary roles which serve as constraints for many women. But as much as there is truth in this claim, Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah challenge such oversimplifications of women position in traditional societies, and rather call for an appreciation of the nuanced gender relations in

traditional societies which allowed women to challenge patriarchal hegemony.

Binding the two women again is their commitment to defending their societies, even with the use of force. However, the image of women fighting causes a lot of problem. For scholars such as Sigal, and Fewell and Gunn, such portrayals justify the use of violence (Bellis, 1994). Fewell and Gunn (1990: 409), for instance, write,

In reality, however, it is the authority of violence that is justified. And in the face of that authority, the woman, Deborah, has offered no real alternative. A woman in a man's world, her voice hardening, merging with a man's voice, defines that world by oppositions and so finds her place in it.

Some scholars try to tone down the imagery of a woman warrior by reducing Deborah to a vessel used by Yahweh to achieve success for Israel (Assis, 2006; Block, 2001). As Rasmussen (1989) points out, these studies present Yahweh as the force and protagonist for the success of Israel. "Yahweh's choice to work wonders through women says more about Yahweh than about the women" (Rasmussen, 1989: 81). In this respect, Yahweh is responsible for the violence, and the women were puppets being used by Yahweh. But as Bellis (1994) and Sakenfeld (1997) ask, what is wrong with a woman fighting? Is violence limited to males alone? In any case, Deborah's use of violence needs to be put in context. She initiates fighting in the context of twenty years oppression from the Canaanites (Bellis, 1994; Sakenfeld, 1997). Hence, it is unfair for anyone to condemn her for her use of violence.

Yaa Asantewaa also resorted to violence to defend her people. Having observed the British mock and terrorize Asante communities, she realised that any solution which excluded violence was not tenable in the face of the British imperial ambitions. Earlier non-violent strategies failed to work for Prempeh I, and this led to his exile together with high profile Asante officials. For Yaa Asantewaa to continue on the path of passive resistance of the British would easily be read as a sign of fear. Her decision to fight the British, accordingly, was reactive and defensive, and far from

being an arbitrary decision. Despite the plausible defence for the use of force, some perceive Yaa Asantewaa as an antithesis of Asante womanhood, in so far as she took up roles which were not prescribed for women in the traditional setting (Donkoh, 2001). Precisely, they question how a woman could defy male leaders and singlehandedly challenge the British. Although such a view is not intrinsically negative, it nevertheless portrays Yaa Asantewaa as a defiant in her world. Carefully observed, such a view does not reflect the true nature of the position of women in traditional Asante society. As a matrilineal society, the Asante culture allowed women access to the political, religious, and social arenas of Asante public life. For instance, the institution of queen mother allowed active participation of women in the political administration of the state. Thus, the emergence of Yaa Asantewaa as a military leader, though unconventional, was nonetheless, not inconceivable for the Asante people.

As heroines, Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah share a lot in common, but their story diverges from each other in one major way: while Deborah was successful in bringing liberation to her people, Yaa Asantewaa failed in her quest. Success and failure bind their stories together as a testimony of ups and down of women leadership. Focusing particularly on Yaa Asantewaa's failure, such a conclusion is only acceptable within the context of the immediate outcome of the war between the British and the Asante. The British wanted to annex the Asante confederacy as part of the Gold Coast, and this they achieved. Yaa Asantewaa and the other officials who were seen to be impediments to British aspirations were sanctioned with exile. However, with respect to the Golden Stool, the spiritual symbol of the Asante nation, and a primary reason for Yaa Asantewaa's resistance, the British failed in that respect. More importantly, the supposed failure of Yaa Asantewaa is a suspect when her selfless and determined acts are assessed by posterity. The point here is that through her actions, Yaa Asantewaa bequeathed to posterity the values of bravery, self-determination, strong character, and freedom. In this respect, her success or failure becomes a matter of perception. What is important here is that the true value of women leadership in military and political affairs

should not be reduced to the immediate goals and outcome of their encounter with their enemies. Rather, it should be measured by the impact their leadership roles have on the society and posterity.

Conclusion: Women Leadership in Today's Liberation "Wars"

The imperative need for women leadership is as important today as it was in the past. Many African societies continue to reel under poverty, illiteracy, political instability, and social disintegration. The transition of African societies from traditional to modernity, although significant, has not brought about the much desired transformation. In the case of women, this transition has produced mixed feelings, with many African women facing unparalleled abuses and discrimination. Although few African societies are bedevilled with wars, many of these cases being internal wars, the major problem facing African societies today is poverty, corruption, children and women abuse. While men, since post-independence Africa, have been the ones in charge with navigating Africa into a prosperous future, women in recent times have entered the foray of political leadership in Africa. It can be argued that the relative minimal success of post-independent Africa is attributable to the absence of women in the corridors of power. Without going into the validity of such claims, it seems quite apparent that collaboration between men and women is a better option than the domination of one sex over the other. The stories of Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah challenge us to re-examine the roles of women within the broader goal of creating a harmonious society. Below we explore how such a challenge can be taken up.

First, as visionary leaders, Nana Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah challenge women today to have a vision if they want to achieve a goal for themselves and society. A trait of successful people, vision is needed by all yet uncommon to find. The kind of vision one has is dependent on the environment one finds oneself. African women can be inspired by the numerous challenges that confront their societies: poverty, corruption, human rights abuse, HIV-AIDS, and discrimination against women. These vices are the modern wars being waged by African countries. It is worthy to note that a

number of women and women groups have responded positively. Donkor (2001) for instance, reports of women groups in Ghana such as Ghana Women Initiative Foundation (GWIF); Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA); Lady Pharmacists' Association of Ghana (LAPAG) who in the spirit of Yaa Asantewaa have championed the fight for economic, social, and political empowerment of women.

However, women activists face numerous challenges in their struggles. In a report by CIVICUS in 2011, these challenges included the deeply entrenched patriarchy within African societies, gender based violence, and sexual harassment. But this is where once again the stories of Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah become relevant. The ability for the two to defy the odds within their cultural settings and remain committed to their leadership goal of bringing liberation to their people is a powerful message to African women in activism. Commitment is the key principle here. Armed with this tool, African women need not kowtow to any form of pressure they encounter in their fight for liberation. What is important is for them to equip themselves with the necessary skills and knowledge in this age of competition. Both Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah displayed incredible leadership skills, especially in the area of giving direction. This is critical if African women are to succeed in their fight against injustice.

Equally important is for African women leaders to be in touch with the people they hope to liberate. Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah demonstrated good interpersonal skills which was key to their roles as leaders. Deborah for instance used her office as a judge and prophetess to connect to the people. As a queen mother and later the regent for Ejisu, Yaa Asantewaa was easily accessible to her people. According to Boahen (2003), Yaa Asantewaa was caring to her subjects. She was generous and promoted the welfare of her people especially the women, advising them in particular to abstain from borrowing from men. The leadership style of Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah demonstrate that one cannot survive as a leader when one is out of touch with the concerns of those being led. This means that African women leaders should not take for granted the need to connect with the people at the grassroots. Too often, there

is the impression that their problems are well known without actually bonding with the people to discern their true concerns and priorities.

Linking to the above point is a leader's ability to motivate and bring others on board in the fight for liberation. It is not only important to connect with the people, but also essential to motivate them to move in tandem with your dreams. A leader's ability to motivate, to move people in concert with her vision, is critical, especially when the enemy is perceived to be dangerous and deadly. Ordinarily, many aspire to be free when faced with oppression, but they are too often over taken with fear in the face of a formidable enemy. This is where true leadership surfaces, since a leader cannot do the job alone; others are needed to take up various roles to achieve freedom. Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah once again prove to be good role models in their outstanding feat of bringing others to support their visions for freedom. In the case of Deborah, she had to contend with the mighty Canaanites, who were not only numerous, but also had access to superior weaponry. It is not surprising that Barak, her right hand man, was sceptical in going against such a mighty force. Equally impressive is Yaa Asantewaa's ability to whip up the interest of the Asante chiefs to take up arms against the British. Women leaders in Africa would need to understand that others are needed to take up various roles in the fight for liberation. But people would not just jump onto the bandwagon, unless they are given a reason to do so.

In motivating and bringing others on board, Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah show that it is possible for women and men to work together towards a common goal. With the notion that African societies are patriarchal, African women leaders may have the tendency to pitch their struggles against men. However, the enemies are the cultural ideology and the socialisation process and not men per se. Indeed, many men yearn to be freed from the shackles of socially imposed constructs of men dominance, and aggressiveness. Nevertheless, African women leaders need to find a way to manage the ego of their male counterparts and work with them towards a common goal of a free society. This is where the real challenge is. But as Barak worked with Deborah and Akwasi Boadu with Yaa

Asantewaa, it is clear that many men are prepared to partner women in the fight for freedom. Such disposition on the part of men should not only be welcomed by African women leaders, but also be sought for since the two complement each other in their struggles.

Finally, as role models, Yaa Asantewaa and Deborah stood for justice within their respective societies. Their leadership roles were contextually relevant in as much as they were aimed at solving problems which affected the entire society. Their stories show that leadership is not personal, neither is it selfish. Although it resides within an individual, it should always radiate towards the society and the good for all. Anything less than that questions the motivation behind one's leadership aspirations. Equally, African women in their leadership roles should emulate the commitment to societal welfare and bring to bear the double edged maternal instinct of loving the people, but also fighting for them when they are threatened.

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Memorialisation of Liberation War Heritage in Africa: An Appraisal of Some Selected Zimbabwean Landscapes of Cultural Memory in Mozambique and Zimbabwe

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The past is everywhere. All around us lie features which, like ourselves and our thoughts, have more or less recognisable antecedents. Relics, histories, memories suffuse human experience. [. . .] Whether it is celebrated or rejected, attended to or ignored, the past is omnipresent (Lowenthal 1985: xv).

Introduction

Memorialisation of war experience has emerged as one of the primary phenomena of the late 20th and early 21st centuries (Login 2014). For Carman and Harding (1999), warfare has a long precedence stretching back into pre-history and the practice of constructing memorials to commemorate conflict (see also Borg 1991, Carman and Carman 2005, Carman and Carman 2006, Chaniotis 2012, Cooley 2012, Low 2012). It is worth noting that memorials which were established before 1850 especially in Europe were characterised spatially, by their physical proximity to the battle site or their location within religious institutions, and functionally, by their commemoration of the event itself or high ranking military figures. Admittedly, around 150 years ago, this process of commemoration underwent a perceivable shift, both in its geographical location, and in its focus. For instance, in the latter half of the 19th century, war memorialisation grew to encompass all those who had died (even in outside Europe, for example, in Africa) as a result of a conflict regardless of rank or station, and including civilian casualties (Login 2014). Surprisingly, in the last 20 years or

so, more memorials and museums (of history and/or memory) were established in comparison with the previous two centuries, thus, necessitating the need to undertake a broader, more detailed analysis of the issue (UNESCO 2014). Despite the long history of war and commemorative practices across the globe, the academic study of commemoration is a relatively recent development. It grew from increasing interest in the study of ‘memory,’ and in particular in ‘collective or social memory’ which became a central academic concern during the 1980s and beyond (Olick et al. 2011: 3; Erll and Nunning 2012: 1).

While it is true especially with reference to Africa that the practice of erecting monuments to all those that had died in conflict is a distinct contemporary phenomenon, this phenomenon did not appear fully developed in its present form, nor should its current form be seen as static and unchanging. Rather, war memorialisation developed gradually, drawing on earlier commemorative and monumental forms in response to constantly changing socio-political circumstances (Login 2014). The urge to honour the dead and remember violent struggles is as prevalent as the impulse to try to repress terrible memories and move on with life. Societies around the world undertake memorial activities to preserve historical memory relating to traumatic events. In cultural and social studies much attention has been devoted to how memory crystallises into sites or places of memory, locales of collective remembering (Nora 1984). Memory in this sense is associated with a “re-collective” conception; it is considered as a conscious and wilful human process of recalling the past. For Nora (Ibid) the materiality of the place is not considered to be decisive (despite the presence of inscribed monuments and memorials); the crucial issue is the past event, a gone past, and the will to remember it through site embodiments.

It is clear that when engaging with historic memorials a duality can arise between an object’s remembrance value and its heritage value. The active remembrance value relies on understandings of the object as a signifier of the events it was originally built to commemorate. But the time that has passed from its construction can give the memorial value as an object of heritage that has gained

new meanings and undergone multiple transformations throughout its history (Login 2014). These memorial sites now form part of a major tourist industry in many parts of the world such that the presentation of the tangible memorial as a heritage object necessarily has implications for its intangible remembrance value. Fundamentally, the presentation and interpretation of these memorial sites has limited their understanding to a singular narrative, perpetuating the role of the memorial as an object of remembrance rather than emphasising the multiple meanings they now carry as objects of heritage (Login 2014). Whilst the objects themselves have little intrinsic or artistic value, what makes them part of a shared heritage, as John Carman (1999) argues is the fact that they represent the intangible qualities that people value. As a result, the conservation and presentation of memorials as heritage must in part be contextualised within rising global awareness of the importance of intangible cultural heritage. This is what motivated UNESCO in 2003 to invent the concept of intangible cultural heritage. In fact, UNESCO invented the concept of intangible cultural heritage to take account of those aspects of a society's heritage which were smaller in scale, or centred on practice, and in response to the criticism that heritage criteria privileged large scale monumental structures.

Scholars such as Halbwachs (1980), Schwartz (1982), and (Nora 1989) have noted with concern that memory is a social (re-)construct created by a particular group over a period of time. This social construction and reconstruction is in recognition of the fact that the past is often actively and selectively utilised to meet the needs of the present. Thus, nations and memory are indivisible. It is on the basis of such understanding that Misztal (2003: 155) talks of 'communities of memory', whereby memories help to mark social boundaries and define (or redefine) collective identity. As a social and political tool, the goals of memorialisation by and large vary from time to time as collective memory is often in keeping with the prevailing ideas and values of the dominant political group.

However, given the complexity of memory and its often-subjective nature, memories are often distinct from and in conflict with the actual recorded history, as collective memory often serves

political functions (Cairns and Roe 2003). In its function as a political tool, memory is linked directly to social remembering and forgetting. In post-conflict situations, for the purposes of re-writing national narratives, memory is used to select and sometimes distort the past to serve present political interests (Cairns and Roe 2003). Roe and Cairns, in their examination of social memory as a process in social identity formation argue that collective self-esteem through memory is one of the ways in which social or political identity is constructed through collective memory. According to Hamber and Wilson (1999), the process of uncovering the past, more specifically through memorialisation, allows a country to develop a common and shared memory thereby creating a sense of unity and reconciliation.

Memorials, like memory which actualise them, mediate the past, present and future (Davison 1998). It can be argued that memorials as a significant part of the backdrop of collective memory in post-conflict nation-states have become a mechanism via which victims and survivors can become active agents in the process of history by re-inventing themselves and re-telling their stories for themselves and generations to come. According to Field (1999), memory is much more than the recall of past stimuli and experiences. It involves emotion, will, and creativity in the reconstruction of the past to serve present needs while projecting into the future. It is also important to note that the past can be used to build and foster individual, group, and national identity; provide moral ideals and examples in justifying the status quo; and empower marginalised groups in their struggle against the status quo or demand to redress past injustices. However, the past can also be misappropriated and 'abused' by the dominant political group to serve present social and political purposes (Cairns and Roe 2003). This entails that memorialisation is a highly politicised process that reflects the will of those in power. It is important to note that 'memories are not ready-made reflections of the past, but eclectic, selective reconstructions. . .' (Lowenthal 1985: 210). People remember or forget the past according to the needs of the present such that social memory is an active and ongoing process. Rowlands (1993) makes an archaeologically useful distinction between inscribed

memory practices, characterised by repetition and public access, and incorporated memory practices, characterised by opaque symbolism and secrecy. Inscribed memory is manifested in materially visible commemorative activities such as the construction of monuments, whereas incorporated memory lends itself to obliteration or fleeting acts that leave few archaeological traces (Bradley 2000:157–8).

Narrowing the discussion to the African continent, African countries waged a century-long struggle against colonialism leaving behind it a trail of heritage resources. These heritage resources need to be presented to the present generations and bequeathed to future generations for the benefit of posterity. It is indisputable that the legacy of the liberation struggle is sacrosanct; hence the need for its proper documentation. Yet, the legacy of the liberation struggles in Africa is not without contestations. The Zimbabwean war of liberation, as elsewhere in the African continent, for example, is one of the fiercely contested historical terrains in the academic and political circles in general. As noted by Muwati (2009:1), ‘it is an indelible, lived and living reality, a hotbed of controversy, contestations, contradictions, inconsistencies, mysteries, truths, half-truths and untruths.’ At the same time, the liberation war continues to be a source of history and a platform for engaging various post-independence realities. This is corroborated by burgeoning productions that continue to talk about the war up to date, directly or indirectly (Muwati 2009:4).

In Zimbabwe, the liberation war attracted a lot of interest at home and abroad. At home, peasants, both males and females, joined the war as combatants or supported the guerrillas as ‘water giving support to fish’. At the international level, many neighbouring and distant countries got involved. Among countries that rendered assistance to Zimbabwe included, but not only, countries like Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, China, Russia, and Cuba. These became known as the frontline states as they supported Zimbabwe materially, logistically, and psychologically. Indeed, the war was costly in terms of human life, resources and dignity (Muwati 2009). The protracted bitter war of liberation through which Zimbabwe gained its enduring and sacrificial political independence has culminated into a number of

places of historical, social, cultural, scientific, and educational value that deserve recognition as part and parcel of the liberation war heritage (see also Mupira 2010). The war was characterised by massive violence perpetrated mostly against the masses by both the nationalist liberation armies and the Rhodesian Defence Forces. Images of this violence continue to be etched in national memory, and regularly replayed by, mainly, the post-colonial nation-state of Zimbabwe to conscientise and educate the current generation on the importance of safeguarding their liberation heritage. The need to honour and give diligent respect to fallen heroes and heroines as well as to give respectable burial to all those who perished while sacrificing their dear lives to liberate the country from the ruthless colonial repression is indubitable. It is against this unequivocal realisation that the Government of Zimbabwe soon after independence decided to set up liberation war memorials starting with the National Heroes' Acre in Zimbabwe and later others in Mozambique and Zambia. These emotional memorials serve as sources of inspiration for the present and future generations. Unfortunately, it is paradoxical to note that National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ) – a governmental organisation legally mandated to look after liberation war heritage (LWH) among other several cultural heritages sites within and outside the borders of the country – has taken charge of heritage places associated with the liberation war without adequate backing and the blessings of the legal instrument governing cultural heritage. This is mainly because besides the National Heroes' Acre, the existing legislation does not adequately capacitate NMMZ to enlist more LWH sites onto the National Monuments Register. In fact, LWH is not adequately embraced and enshrined in the current Act.

Despite the shortcomings highlighted above, the Zimbabwe Liberation War Heritage Programme (ZLWHP) aims at memorialising Zimbabwe's liberation war history through the establishment of shrines and site museums that are basically meant to reconnect Zimbabweans with some of the unbearable and emotional incidences of the past. It is crucial to set the record straight given that the definition of liberation war heritage has and remains a source of considerable disagreement among scholars. It

remains subject to confusion, doubt and disagreement, and even elementary questions of definition, terminology and delimitation of the field to be explained, are still not settled (Valentine 1987:43). The conceptualisation of the term is a matter of interpretation. Wilson (1988) rightly pointed out that defining liberation war heritage is a challenging task. He argues that the label, as popularly used is imprecise.

In this chapter, liberation war heritage is defined as inheritance from the struggle against colonial rule from 1893 to the present. It comprises, tangible and intangible and movable and immovable vestiges of the country's liberation struggle (Mupira 2010). The tangible movable elements include objects (weapons, machinery, vehicles, and uniforms), photos, documents, diaries, films, statues, graves, among others. The tangible immovable elements include Heroes' Acres, military camps, monuments, buildings, memorials, battle, and massacre sites. Intangible heritage comprises tradition, oral history, performance (songs and dance), ritual, memory, legends, skills, techniques and knowledge systems associated with the liberation struggle (Mupira 2010). The erection of these monuments and memorials is designed to encode selected memories and historical narratives.

In post-colonial African countries such as Zimbabwe, the heritage landscape was re-written when the leaders of the new born nation-state sought to express independence through the erection of monuments dedicated to those who sacrificed their dear lives for the liberation of this country from the bondage of colonialism. This was on the pretext that the majority of African people, Zimbabweans included, have always attached great importance to the events of the past. The sites where historical events took place are regarded as highly important, and sacred to a greater extent. This is the reason why groups of war veterans and survivors of such atrocious massacres from across the country pay visits to liberation war sites such as Chimoio, Nyadzonya, Freedom Camp, and Mkushi, among many others inside and outside the country.

In the aftermath of the war of liberation and of the large-scale sufferings and deaths which ultimately culminated into the attainment of political independence, this chapter explores the

political and managerial dilemmas that have arisen in the memorialisation of liberation heritage in Zimbabwe. Special reference is given to four liberation heritage sites outside the country (two in Mozambique and the other two in Zambia) which were both administrative head-quarters of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe African People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), respectively. The chapter also seeks to examine how liberation war heritage has been manipulated to satiate the political desires of those in the echelons of power. The issue of LWH was unilaterally initiated by the Government of Zimbabwe as a way of perpetuating the memory of the liberation war so that present generations would appreciate the contribution of those who participated in the war, and that future generations could be furnished with the country's past heritage. This way, people can draw inspiration and pride from their past heritage and build a better future.

Zimbabwe is perhaps one of the countries in Southern Africa with the highest concentration of liberation heritage sites located inside and outside the country. Within the country, the National Heroes' Acre and several Provincial Heroes' Acres are cases in point. Outside the country numerous liberation heritage sites have been identified. At some of these sites, monuments and memorials are erected and conserved in the belief that they will pass down messages for perpetuity. Owing to the inadequacy of legislation and policies relating to the management and protection of this type of heritage, no significant inroads have been achieved so far despite the rehabilitation of the graves of the people who perished as a result of the war. Zimbabwe like most countries in Africa, has not developed a comprehensive heritage legislation and policy document supported that guides the memorialisation of liberation heritage. As a result, most of the efforts and plans regarding the memorialisation of liberation heritage remained unrealised and ended up being manipulated and sometimes abused by those in the hierarchies of power.

This chapter examines the way sites of resistance, trauma, and massacres are being memorialised in post-colonial Zimbabwe. While the difficult challenge of memorialising massacre sites

confronts many post-conflict societies in many parts of the world, few represent as profound a loss as Chimoio, Nyadzonya, Freedom, and Mkushi Camps where more than 1000 people died during the struggle for independence. Nonetheless, the chapter argues that whilst LWH is being used as a political compass by the ruling party ZANU PF, it is surprisingly being peripheralised and underfunded. This makes the deemed rehabilitation of liberation war heritage sites an unfinished business.

Understanding memory and memorialisation

Memorialisation generally refers to the processes through which memory is perpetuated. As such, it can include physical sites of memory, art and memory projects, oral history collections and archives, all of which evoke the past and aim to, in some way, ensure that people continue to remember and celebrate (or condemn) the past. Put simply, memorials encompass all kinds of engagements specifically designed to remember the wrongs of the past such as the massacre of people at different liberation war memorials dotted in and outside the country. Understood as such, memorialisation becomes a process that satisfies the desire to honour those who suffered or died during conflict and as a means to examine the past and address contemporary issues. Adding to that, memorialisation provides a form of acknowledgment to the victims and a social recognition of the harm that they suffered so that they do not grieve alone in silence (Frédéric Mégret 2010:27). Moreover, memorialisation initiatives take a wide variety of forms which range from formal museums and monuments that evolved over years and costed millions of dollars to ephemeral collections of condolence notes, flowers, and pictures of victims at sites where they died or vanished.

Fundamentally crucial to note is the fact that memorialisation consists of all condensed efforts aimed at remembering the past and in this case we are referring to the heartless killings during the Second Chimurenga (the Shona term for ‘revolutionary struggle’) war of liberation. Precisely, memorialisation is based on the assumption that learning about the past carries a deep moral,

historical, and metaphysical knowledge that will help prevent past atrocities such as the ruthless massacre of unarmed civilians at Chimoio and Nyadzonya in Mozambique during the peak of the war of liberation from recurring. That being the case, memorialisation resources such as memorial sites, museums, and other such places of memory is crucially important for countries such as Zimbabwe that underwent and experienced violent conflicts and wars in the past. Remembering is a basic human instinct, and memory being idealistic in nature cannot be imprisoned as it will usually come out in one form or another. The challenge is to find ways to harness memory wholesomely to learn lessons from the past in an effort to avoid repeating the ills and perpetuate the goods.

Besides, memorial expressions are extremely diverse. Major forms include authentic sites (for example concentration camps, former torture and detention centres, sites of mass killings and graves and emblematic monuments of repressive regimes); symbolic sites (such as permanent or ephemeral constructed monuments carrying the names of victims, renamed streets, buildings or infrastructure, virtual memorials on the internet and museums of history/memory); and activities (such as public apologies, reburials, walking tours, parades and temporary exhibits) (Bickford 2014).

For the purpose of this chapter, memorials are understood as physical representations and/or commemorative activities, located in public spaces, that concern specific events regardless of the period of occurrence (wars and conflicts, mass or grave human rights violations), or the persons involved (soldiers, combatants, victims, political leaders or activists) (Bickford 2014). The goals assigned to memorialisation processes are usually multi-faceted and, regardless of their diversity in form and shape, memorials have both private/reflective and public/educative purposes (Bickford 2014). They are geared not only towards the past (recalling events, recognising and honouring victims and enabling stories to be related and re-told), but equally to the present (healing processes and rebuilding of trust between communities) and the future (preventing further violence through education and awareness-raising). The multiplicity of memorial entrepreneurs means that

memorialisation may focus more on one goal rather than another, in some cases heightening or leading to tensions and mutual suspicion.

Disagreements over how to remember the past especially about what events occurred and what sorts of stories to tell about them is a nearly universal phenomenon. Often, the stories that “win out,” and are told for decades to come, are the ones that have the backing of those in power. Politicians and other people in authority positions can manipulate memories to tell a certain story or encourage people to think in a certain way; and powerful groups can promote versions of events that reflect well on them and meet their present needs (Kammen 1993). Collective memories work much the same way as they foster and define group identities, telling a group of people where they have come from, who they are, and how they should act in the present and future (Gillis 1994). This is precisely the focus of the establishment and perpetuation of liberation war heritage shrines in Zimbabwe. People should draw inspiration and lessons from the past which shapes the present and influences the future. People are what they are because of what they have experienced in the past and people select elements from the past that they deem to retain and maintain in the present and pass on to future generations as well.

Theorising heritage and commemoration

It is generally agreed that nations and memory are indivisible. No wonder Misztal (2003) talks of ‘communities of memory’ where memories help to mark social boundaries and define collective identity. This means groups, families, ethnic, racial or religious communities, all the nations, or global diaspora networks, are in part constituted by memory. They are made up as units in parts from the sense of shared past and common journeying that memories furnish but these communities also help to constitute memory in the sense that they socialise people into what should be remembered and forgotten (Misztal 2003). It is for this reason that more often than not there is always a strong link between memory and nationalism. In fact, nations need a narrative by which to

construct a sense of nationhood, a historical narrative of the past, a sense of the travails and triumphs on the journey to nationhood, a sense of collective identity and solidarity and so on; all of which memories help to supply, construct and reconstruct. Basing on this understanding, Misztal further argues that nations require a sense of their past for reasons of social cohesion, memories of which are embodied in acts of public commemoration and in public memorials, in public images, texts, photographs and rituals that socialise people in what to remember.

There is, therefore, a nexus between the past and the present. Yet, “while many countries are embarrassed by the cruelties performed against racial minorities (and sometimes majorities) throughout history, special interest groups and proponents of heritage commemoration are forcing legislators, policy makers and other public officials and organisations to acknowledge the atrocities of the past and commemorate them” (Timothy and Boyd 2006:3). By and large, heritage and commemoration are very similar. This is because both involve processes of selective remembering and forgetting or representing and silencing the past, which are fundamentally political, contestable and often very controversial. Besides, both have been central to nationalist projects such that they are often involved in the marginalisation not only of different representations of the past, but also of other ways of remembering, managing or dealing with it and its physical remains. Furthermore, both heritage and commemorations reify particular ways of remembering or recounting the past, but also of dealing with its material remains, in the form of objects, landscapes and bones. Interestingly, commemoration often relates to more recent, and sometimes very traumatic, events, involving the death and sacrifice (Rowlands 1993) of an individual or a group for, or on behalf of, a ‘nation’ or another large ‘identity group’, while ‘heritage’ at least in its more old-fashioned, ‘monumentalist’ manifestations may appeal to achievements, constructions or practices in the ‘deeper’ past for the purposes of the (often nationalist) present.

Apart from that, both ‘heritage’ and ‘commemoration’ inevitably involve selective forgetting (Forty and Kuchler 1999) or silencing in order to legitimise a cause in the present through

references to the past. However, while commemoration often urges the living not to forget a debt to the dead (even as war memorials may seek to foster a simultaneous forgetting of the grim actualities of death (Rowlands 1993:137), heritage more often seeks to narrate and represent the practices and achievements of the past in order to inform or entertain the living. In more material terms, while state commemoration often involves the massive construction of monuments to encourage or cajole the living into particular forms of remembrance, heritage processes commonly involve selectively preserving, conserving, representing and managing existent remains of the past, for the purpose of informing, educating and entertaining the present. Commemorative sites and events are often more serious affairs, akin to a funeral, with an emphasis on the loss and sacrifice of the dead, the ongoing debt of the living and their requirement to 'feed' (Rowlands 1993) or 'finish the work of the dead', whilst heritage sites can be more frivolous, less emotive of sacrifice and loss, and much more amenable to commodification. If heritage is a celebration of or declaration of faith in the past (Lowenthal 1985) that seeks to inform the present, selectively, about it, commemoration often carries not only demands for an atonement or acknowledgement of the debt of the living to the sacrifices of the dead, but also functions of reconciliation, healing and the resolution of suffering, even if it is not always 'obvious how they do this' (Rowlands 1993). In short, it is important to highlight that the distinctions between heritage and commemorations can sometimes be very murky as the two normally overlap.

The inception and recognition of Liberation War Heritage in Zimbabwe

The need to honour and give appropriate respect to dedicated and self-sacrificing fallen sons and daughters of Zimbabwe whose innocent blood was spilled and shed for the independence of Zimbabwe is indisputable. Their unparalleled contribution and the undying liberation legacy that the gallant sons and daughters of Zimbabwe left will always act as a compass to guide and direct the vision of the present and future generations. Soon after the

attainment of independence, the post-independent government in 1981 saw it noble to prioritise the recognition and management of a new brand of heritage namely, liberation war heritage. To this end, the National Heroes' Acre which is located in Harare's Warren Park high density suburb was constructed as a pioneer project of its own kind. Apart from that, a site museum showcasing liberation war heritage was also constructed to enhance the presentation and interpretation of the highly priced heritage. To ensure that this heritage received the attention it dully deserves, NMMZ was given the responsibility by the Government of Zimbabwe in 1994 to conserve and manage the fabulous Heroes' Acre. Gradually the concept of liberation war heritage cascaded down to Provinces and as such, Provincial Heroes' Acres were set up in each of the ten provinces of the country. The idea behind the development of these Provincial Heroes' Acres was to construct an interpretative centre at each of these shrines. Sadly, due to financial constraints, the Provincial Heroes' Acres were not fully developed as most of them are yet to be completed. The only activity that is being carried out at these Heroes' Acres is the rehabilitation of the graves of the people interred therein. It is at these sites that people from these Provinces converge and commemorate the Heroes Day – the second Monday in August of every year. During this day various activities geared towards evoking people's memories of the liberation war are maimed and carried out. Some of the interpretative centres at these Heroes' Acres are furnished and punctuated with displays that showcase some of the prominent figures who immensely contributed to the liberation struggle in their respective Provinces. The Masvingo Provincial Heroes' Acre, for instance, has some displays which show some of the prominent battles sites in the Province. Owing to lack of funds, the project was aborted before the exhibition was officially opened.

By 1996, NMMZ's responsibility regarding the management and protection of liberation war heritage extended to sites in neighbouring countries starting with Mozambique and Zambia. In line with this development, NMMZ embarked on colossal rehabilitation programmes within and outside the country. As alluded to above, the rehabilitation programmes slowed down

sharply in the late 90s and the turn of the millennium due to resource constraints.

However, as part of the memorialisation of the liberation struggle, shrines have been constructed in Mozambique (Chimoio and Nyadzonya) and Zambia (Freedom and Mkushi Camps) among several others in Tanzania, Botswana, and Angola. One of the very important features especially at Chimoio and Freedom Camp is the wall of contemplation on which the names of the people who died in these heartless and callous massacres are inscribed. Due to the tremendous values enshrined in these emotional shrines, a significant number of visitors from all walks of life are thronging them for purposes of drawing inspiration and connect themselves with the past.

Importantly, the management and protection of LWH in Zimbabwe is being achieved through proper identification, documentation, protection and presentation of places associated with the liberation struggle. The Zimbabwe Liberation War Heritage Programme (ZLWHP) focuses on memorialising Zimbabwe's liberation history, hence it encompasses several elements that should link and reconnect Zimbabweans with a distant past. The identification process has so far been limited to Mozambique and Zambia respectively and has also focused on the identification of burials and mass graves of liberation war fighters. The major documentation of LWH has been associated with the exhumation and reburial of the remains of liberation fighters in mass graves at former bases in Mozambique and Zambia. To ensure successful conservation and management of liberation war heritage, NMMZ has worked closely with sister heritage management institutions in Mozambique and Zambia.

The rehabilitation of Zimbabwe's liberation war heritage

The road to freedom was maddened with many obstacles and needed man and women of high integrity, discipline, and dedication to rid the country from the oppressors' obnoxious yoke. The oppressors tried in vain to dampen the masses' will, desire, aspirations, and determination to liberate their country.

Undoubtedly, independence came into being after a gruesome, bitter and protracted liberation struggle that entailed a lot of sacrifice, suffering, and deaths. Lives were lost, families broken, herds of cattle decimated, large tracks of land rendered uninhabitable and studies and promising careers cut short. The colonial machinery was as brutal as it was callous using various methods from open savagery to biological warfare. The earth was watered by the innocent blood of committed and determined revolutionary martyrs and fighters. These heroes and heroines, thus, laid down their lives for Zimbabwe to be liberated. They subordinated their individual interest to Zimbabwe as a whole, cherishing qualities such as loyalty, dedication and patriotism.

In a bid to win the war by all means necessary, the oppressive regime took a genocidal route and the ugly scenes of Chimoio and Nyadzonya (in Mozambique) as well as Mkushi and Freedom Camp (in Zambia) among many others. These sites will remain engraved in the minds of the people of Zimbabwe and other concerned citizens of the world given the seeds of memory embedded therein.

Interestingly, soon after independence, the government of Zimbabwe came up with the idea of honouring the gallant sons and daughters of the soil who had sacrificed their lives for the liberation of Zimbabwe. The exercise also focused on the establishment of decent burials for identified liberation heritage sites outside Zimbabwe. This project was designed to cover sites identified as Liberation War Camp and Battle Sites, in host countries such as Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Angola, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. The phases of the project include: the identification of the Liberation War sites, traditional acknowledgement of the souls of these fallen sons and daughters of Zimbabwe; physical rehabilitation of the burials, erecting memorial shrines and site museums/interpretive centres, conservation and promotion of ZLH. The heroes and heroines identified include freedom fighters and dedicated supporters of the liberation of Zimbabwe caught up in the war in Zambia and Mozambique. In Mozambique, Liberation Heritage Sites are found at Chimoio, Nyadzonya, Doroie, Chibawawa, Nyangao, Tembwe, Maroro, Mavonde, Mapai, Madulu, and others. In Zambia, there are at Freedom Camp, Nampundwe,

Mkushi Mulungushi, Kabanga, Kavalamanja, Sinde, Solwezi and others. In Botswana, there is Selibe Phikwe, Dukwe and Francis town. In Angola there is Luso and Boma, while in Tanzania, there is Nachingea, Morogoro, Mgagao, Iringa, and others. Usually, these were training camps, administrative centres, transit points and logistic houses for civilians. Let us hasten to point out that while acknowledging the large numbers of Liberation Heritage Sites inside and outside Zimbabwe, this chapter will only focus on four sites indicated above as it cannot adequately and convincingly cover all the above-mentioned sites due to its scope.

People who fled the war and crossed over to neighbouring countries like Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana were called refugees. They were of all ages. They constructed barrack type shelters of pole under thatch. Host countries and other countries donated food and clothing. However, these provisions were not always enough to go round. The only abundant resource was water, which was drawn from nearby rivers. Refugee camps could carry anything up to 15 000 people at any one time, and this posed great challenges on food, clothing and health provision. There were makeshift clinics, which were staffed by those with medical backgrounds, as well as those who were trained in the camps. Due of scarcity of food, malnutrition weakened the immune system, and diseases took their toll. It is under these conditions that refugees were cruelly massacred by the Rhodesian Security Forces. Thousands were killed at Freedom Camp, Mkushi, Mulungushi, Nyadzonya, Tembwe and other camps. The Rhodesian strategy was designed to attack all known locations regardless of their being military justifiable targets. There was also the use of excessive force with disregard to non-combats targets whether of Rhodesia origin or local civilians in host countries.

These shrines are an expression as well as a symbol of the indefatigable, collective will of Zimbabweans to be the makers of their own history, and to be their own liberators by participating in the protracted, arduous and bitter struggle for self-determination. The shrine arouses national consciousness, forges national unity and identity. Present and future generations will wish to identify themselves with the heroes' ideals, values and actions. The shrine

engenders the spirit of patriotism, altruism, and fellow feeling as it allows Zimbabweans to examine their heritage. The shrine shapes and directs the aspirations of Zimbabweans, orienting them to strive for noble goals. It is a symbol of the masses' struggle for freedom that transcends tribalism, ethnicism, regionalism, and racialism. It exists as a monument to the glory of the final victory in unity. The shrine serves to inspire all Zimbabweans, especially the youth to follow the footsteps of the heroes and heroines.

Liberation heritage war memorials: Case studies in Mozambique and Zambia

More than three decades have elapsed since Zimbabwe's war of liberation ended but it has continued to attract debate, comments and documentation. Newspaper articles and scholarly narratives of the liberation war continue to be produced and keep on appearing. It is critical to note that some of the resultant accounts are distortions of what really took place during this important occurrence (Dzimbanhete 2013). History resides in the minds and memories of those who participate in its making, and multiplies in the minds and memories of those to whom it is preached. Thus, the history of the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe has vast and varied sources.

Narrating the Nyadzonya attacks

Nyadzonya Massacre Site is located in the Manica Province of Mozambique about 100 km from the Machipanda Border Post. To get to the site one turns off from the Machipanda-Chimoio highway along the Tete Road. From this turn-off, the site is about 65 km along the Tete Road and about 13 km along a dirty road. The turn-off into a dirty road is just about 5 km after the Pungwe River Bridge, near a gravel quarry site. The camp was located on the inside bend of Nyadzonya River which is densely forested by deciduous Savanna vegetation. Nyadzonya was a Refugee Camp with untrained occupants and no military activities were being carried out.

On 9th August 1976, an attack on the Nyadzonya Refugee Camp in Mozambique by the Rhodesian Security Forces killed more than 1000 Zimbabwean refugees (see Muchemwa 2015). Even the soldiers who took part in the Nyadzonya massacre knew that the camp was inhabited by thousands of unarmed refugees. In fact, when the enemy forces arrived in their disguised appearance, many refugees ran towards them, thinking that they were comrades who had come to select the next group of recruits to go for training (Makanya 1991). As expressed by one of the participants in the massacre, the intention of the Rhodesian regime was ‘to wipe them out while they were unarmed and before they are trained rather than wait for the possibility of them being trained and sent back armed into Rhodesia’ (Martin and Johnson 1981:241). The total number of people believed to be at Nyadzonya when it was attacked was 5 250. At approximately 8.25 in the morning, five open truck and two armoured cars entered the camp through the main gate. Six guards were stationed at the gate. FRELIMO usually assigned duties to two of their soldiers at the gate daily, but unfortunately there was none on the 9th of August 1976. Of the five trucks, four had benches at the sides with about seven people sitting on each of the benches. The truck which was in the lead was carrying about twenty people. No one was able to accurately ascertain the number of occupants in the two armoured cars (Reid-Daly 1982). On arrival in the camp, the trucks took their positions and started to address the comrades with a loud speaker system saying: ‘*Pamberi neZANU!*’ (Forward with ZANU!), *Viva FRELIMO!*’ (Long Live FRELIMO!), *Zimbabwe tatora,*’ (We have taken Zimbabwe’). *Ma-comrades, misai vanhu mumalire tikutaurirei nyaya dzeZimbabwe*’ (Comrades, stay in your lines and let us explain you matters relating to Zimbabwe’) (Reid-Daly 1982). Meanwhile, comrades from all corners of the camp came to the trucks in response to the pseudo address.

An emergency whistle was also blown which accelerated the rush. An emergency whistle could be blown any time when comrades were asleep and everyone would be expected to assemble within five minutes at the location where the whistle sound originated. The purpose of the emergency whistle was to prepare

comrades for possible immediate evacuation of base if for instance, there was credible evidence of an imminent enemy attack (Mutambara 2008). While this rushing was going on, Security Officers were advancing to the trucks to check who they were. Other comrades of the Security Department were already demanding passes from the occupants of the trucks. The trucks were bearing Mozambican number plates (Reid-Daly 1982). The number of comrades who were then around the trucks (within the radius) was about 3000 and almost 1 500 were about 500-yards radius of the trucks. Meanwhile, a voice shouted through the loudspeaker, '*Vana veZimbabwe!*' All of a sudden the enemy fired. After the first shot, all hell broke loose, light machine-guns, sub-machine NATO and other sophisticated machines on the armoured cars were opened.

Several hand grenades and tear gas shells were thrown at the crowd. A mixture of smoke and dust covered the entire plain ground between the parade area and the new kitchen. Some comrades who were crawling away were run over by the advancing enemy trucks (Reid-Daly 1982). To get out of the enemy one had to cross Nyadzonya River. Small boys and girls and even elderly comrades who were unable to swim were drowned in the river and some attacked by crocodiles. It is estimated that almost 200 comrades lost their lives in the river. Other comrades decided to hide in the banks of the river and survived, while others were trapped and shot by the enemy. This indiscriminate shooting continued for about 45 minutes (Reid-Daly 1982). The enemies then got out of their trucks and were amazed to see the number of bodies lying about in the area between the parade and the kitchen. They inspected some of the comrades to see if they were dead, and if not, they finished them. All the enemies unmasked their masks and ordered the comrades who were injured to stand up with their hands raised up and surrender. About 300 comrades stood up. They were ordered first to pick the bodies of the girls and to heap them in one of the small barracks. This barrack was later burnt. Roughly about 1 028 comrades were either killed by the enemy fire or were drowned in the Nyadzonya River, or ran away from the camp after the massacre (Reid-Daly 1982).



Figure 1: Showing Nyadzonya Massacres

Reliving the Chimoio Massacres

Chimoio town is in central Mozambique and is the capital of Manica Province. During the era of the Portuguese colonial rule that ended in 1975, Chimoio was known as Vila Pery. The town is located along the main rail and road connection linking Beira, a strategic port city and capital of neighbouring province of Sofala, to Mutare, capital of the eastern Manicaland province of Zimbabwe (Mutambara 2008). Chimoio town is about 85 kilometres from the border with Zimbabwe and 170 kilometres from Beira. The name “Chimoio”, rather than the town itself, has more significance to the people of Zimbabwe and is immortalised in the annals of the country’s history (Mutambara 2008). Its significance stems from a farm that was abandoned by its Portuguese owner during the height of the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique, and donated by Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) government to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) which was formed in 1963 with Ndabaningi Sithole as its founding leader (Mutambara 2008). This farm became known as Chimoio ZANLA Headquarters (referred to as just “Chimoio”). The farm became the nerve centre of all ZANLA operations. ZANLA was the armed wing of ZANU, one of the two liberation

movements that spearheaded the struggle for Zimbabwean independence (Dzimbanhete 2013).

The camp was set up to accommodate and rehabilitate Zimbabweans fleeing the war in the then Rhodesia. As a refugee camp it got assistance from world bodies such the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Red Cross. As the war intensified the armed wing of ZANU (ZANLA) later converted Chimoio into a training ground for liberation war fighters (Mupira and Bvira 2012). It was to become the largest rear base for training freedom fighters in Mozambique. The base together with others such as Tembwe and Nyadzonya became targets of Rhodesian attempts to dampen the spirits of the freedom fighters through well-coordinated callous air bombings and massacres. The indiscriminate attacks aimed at exterminating the ZANLA war machinery resulted in the loss of thousands of freedom fighters and innocent civilians.

Operation Dingo, also known as the Chimoio massacre, was a major raid conducted by the Rhodesian Security Forces against the ZANLA headquarters at Chimoio on 23rd November 1977. More than 3000 ZANLA fighters were reported as killed and 5000 wounded while only two government troops died and six were wounded. The massacre left many surviving cadres and their families traumatised physically, psychologically, and emotionally. The traumatic effects are manifest in many living War Veterans who experienced the event. The site serves as an educational tool in the instruction of the current and future young generations about the history of the liberation struggle (Mupira and Bvira 2012).

The legacy left behind by over 3 000 freedom fighters and war collaborators who lost their lives in the Chimoio massacre is engraved in Zimbabwe's history (Sunday Mail 2013). Despite the seemingly vast time which has lapsed since the genocide, the 3 000 plus people who lost their lives are only gone in the flesh but will not be forgotten as the legacy they left behind is still very much alive (Sunday Mail 2013). Chimoio reminds people of the arduous root that the Zimbabwean people went through to gain their independence from colonial rule. It was the biggest guerrilla and refugee camp set up by ZANU outside the country to wage the

armed struggle against the Smith colonial regime. This was pursuant to the failure of repeated attempts to solve the racial conflict in the then Rhodesia through peaceful means and civil disobedience. Thousands of heroes and heroines showed their commitment to the liberation struggle by defying the rigours of guerrilla life in the jungles of Mozambique. It was from this camp that all the strategies, organisation and execution of the liberation struggle in Rhodesia were planned. Famous figures of the liberation struggles such as Cdes Josiah Tongogara, Rex Nhongo/Mujuru, Teurai Ropa Nhongo/Mujuru, Sheiba Tavarwisa, Oppah Muchinguri, Edgar Tekere and Robert Mugabe lived here together with thousands of cadres. Cde Robert Mugabe was nominated and elected as the President of ZANU in 1976 under one of the trees on this site.



Figure 2: Showing school destroyed at Chimoio



Figure 3: Showing Chimoio Massacre

After the attainment of independence by the country in 1980 it took a while before anything was done at Chimoio and other camps where massacres were carried out by the Rhodesians during the time of the war. In the late 1990's the government of Zimbabwe saw it fit to honour and preserve these places that had much significance in the liberation history of the country. Thus, the rehabilitation exercise was done which was carried out by the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe National Army.

Liberation war heritage shrines in Zambia

Mkushi Girls Camp

Mkushi Girls' Training Camp came into existence in 1977 to cater for the female cadres and refugees. Like was the case in other liberation movements, the role of women in the military was varied from active service in guerrilla warfare, communications, the medical service, the secretarial service, administrative service and in the executive body. The females were therefore to undergo some form of training in military skills to prepare them to be able to defend themselves. The political programmes set by the party were that they would have to be placed in various administrative departments in the civil service of the new Zimbabwe. They were to

be prepared for their future through training in various fields preferably abroad where such specialised training was offered. However, whilst they were in transit they needed to undergo some localised programmes such as self-help schemes and developmental skills. During this training, occasional batches would be dispatched to countries that offered specialised skills training abroad.

The camp site is located some 150 kilometres from Kabwe Town which is itself 130 kilometres from Lusaka the capital of Zambia. To get to the camp from Kabwe one exits the town from Buyantanshi Township on the northern outskirts along a dirt road which leads to Lunsemfwa River. A 'Y' junction provides two alternative routes; one goes through the pontoon, while the other on the right goes through the bridge. The roads lead to old Mkushi Rural Business Centre, however, before the centre a right turn leads to isolated villages that form the extreme western outer boundaries of the former girls' camp. From one corner village, the road follows an eastern direction towards Mkushi River. Another junction as one track to the left that tends to follow a north-eastern direction, this leads to the Mpale River. The Mpale River flows from the north to the south-east, and pours into the Mkushi River which flows from the north-east to the south, and pours into the Lunsemfwa River. This river, flows from the west to the east and pours into the Luangwa River which in turn, flows to the south into the Zambezi River.

The site composed of two camps. Camp 1 spreads over an area of about 1000 square meters and is located to the west of the Mpale River. This was the main training camp with at least up to 3000 inmates. Camp 2 was a holding camp for the trained personnel, male security personnel and a detention facility for discipline. It also served as an outpost overlooking the south-eastern sector. The area within the perimeter of localised defensive foxholes that were dug about 20-30 meters apart around the camp. An arrangement of makeshift barrack rooms were constructed in pole and grass among tents and bivocs (small grass shelters). The camp headquarters was located to the east about 100 meters from the river. A bunker complex about 50 meters to the north was part of the headquarters supposedly to house the communications system of the camp.

Camp 2 was spread over a much smaller area although it had a much wider view mainly because of the much open flat area that extends east from a high ground that overlooks the Mkushi River

Reflections on the Mkushi attack

Mkushi camp complex was attacked on the 19th of October 1978 at about 1145 hours in a coordinated attack with Freedom Camp. This operation was code named Operation Gatling. At Mkushi the Rhodesians used the following forces; 6 Dakotas with 120 paratroopers; 2 Canberra's Bombers; 2 Hawker Hunters Fighter ground attack aircraft; unknown numbers of helicopters with 45 Heliborne Troops and an 81milimeter mortar team.



Figure 4: Showing Mkushi on fire in 1978

The attack at Mkushi can be defined in terms of a massacre, in that the Rhodesians met no resistance what so ever. The 13 instructors were armed with small arms that could not match the Rhodesian firepower. The girls were not fully trained in combat to present formidable resistance, those that were armed were equipped with SKS semi-automatic rifles that were used purely for training,

these had come from other training camps, and technically could not be used in battle.

There were no plans for retaliation in case of an attack, as this camp was believed to be out of range of the Rhodesian war machine. There had never been an attack of this nature in any case. The only plans that existed were basic state of alert and training drills that put everyone on standby in their foxhole to wait for further orders. This drill would normally be practiced at sunrise, sunset and when aircraft over flew the area or when vehicles drove into the camp. This was a ZIPRA standing operational procedure that applied to all training camps.

Rhodesian troops occupied the camp complex for about 6 days having laid an ambush further up the road; the first casualty of that ambush was Alick Nkata a senior Zambian news producer who wanted to cover the events of the attack. He was mistaken for a ZAPU/ZIPRA official and was killed as he drove through to the camp. This incident was followed by a joint ZIPRA, Zambian Army and Police contingent which drove in to investigate. 14 police officers, 15 Zambian army troops, an undisclosed number of ZIPRA personnel were killed. The police were buried at St Mary's cemetery in Kabwe while the army casualties were buried in Ndola. Casualty figures for Mkushi were difficult to ascertain due to the spatial distribution of surface remains exposed over 20 years and the effects of taphonomy, however, a total of about 1000 girls and a few male instructors may have perished at Mkushi Camp. The camp was never visited after the attack for fear of booby traps and land mines the first people to go there were the Rehabilitation team.

The Mkushi rehabilitation

The rehabilitation exercise revealed that a substantial number of casualties were killed in foxholes. Some were killed in bunkers that had been prepared during defensive training exercises. Another substantial number of casualties were found on the surface at random all over the camp complex suggesting that the attack came in as a total surprise and it is believed that some inmates were caught doing their daily routine. The delays in friendly forces coming to their rescue resulted in bodies decomposing and the

injured bleeding to death. The result was that Mkushi Camp became the only camp to have the highest number of unburied human remains ever known during the entire war.

Grave memorials constructed at Mkushi add up to 15 measuring between 15 meters by 5 meters for mass graves and smaller graves of between 4 meters by 5 meters. The general pattern of the graves is a cluster at the Headquarters and another cluster to the north-east where a large number was killed in a bunker. These became the mass graves. Work done so far at the site includes the construction of 11 mass graves and the erection of a 90m x 90m perimeter fence. The main features that comprise the shrine are the Dedication Stone 3 meters by 50 centimetres of polished granite with an inscription written in Shona, Ndebele, English and Portuguese. This stone commemorates the many Zimbabweans who died in the Liberation war. Another visible feature at the shrine includes a 3 meter high conical Tower of Freedom which depicts the spirit of independence. The Roll of Honour with a list of all known names of those that perished in that particular country is also another visible landmark at the shrine. A prominent feature at the shrine is the Site Museum where a chronic of the Liberation War History is exhibited. The museum will contribute to the understanding appreciation, and respect for Zimbabwe's Liberation Heritage. Last but not least is the Mass Grave Memorials in which the remains of those who lost their lives are finally put to rest.



Figure 5: Showing embassy staff on the visit to Mkushi before the 2006 rehabilitation



Figure 6: Showing Mkushi after 2006 rehabilitation

Freedom Camp (Chikumbi)

Freedom Camp commonly known as Chikumbi Site is located to the north of Lusaka, the capital city of Zambia. This site is located 20 km north of Lusaka, the capital of the Republic of Zambia along the Kabwe Road. The camp is also popularly known as the Chikumbi Farm. The name Chikumbi refers to the headman who is under Chief Mungule. The name was coined after the realisation that most Liberation Movements in Southern Africa were at some time or another accommodated at this site for the

purpose of pursuing freedom for their countries. The site existed since the early 1960s after the Republic of Zambia became independent and pledged to accommodate liberation organisations, which were still in the process of liberating their countries. Freedom Camp was mainly used as a transit holding point for recruits, even those going abroad for further training. It was also a transit point for those going to operational bases or other camps. The camp housed trained personnel on rest and recuperation from operational areas. The disabled or wounded combatants sometimes also passed through this site.

The site is considered a sacred shrine by Zimbabweans as it undoubtedly epitomises Zambia's selfless and unwavering contribution to the liberation of Southern Africa by supporting various liberation movements in countries such as Angola (MPL), Zimbabwe (ZIPRA), Namibia (SWAPO), South Africa (PAC and ANC) and Mozambique (FRELIMO). All these liberation movements were housed at this site when they embarked on protracted armed struggles to liberate their respective countries from colonial regime. In this way, Zambia immensely contributed to the freedom currently enjoyed in these countries. Zimbabwe was the last country to be hosted at the site by the Zambian Government, thus, the latter immensely contributed to Zimbabwe's bloody and arduous march to independence, which was eventually attained in 1980. In recognition of this immense selfless by Zambia and the need to honour Zimbabweans who sacrificed their priceless lives at this site, Zimbabwe has seen it prudent to accord this site a national monument status.

Freedom Camp as the headquarters of ZIPRA is a testimony and reminder of the selfless sacrifice that Zimbabweans made in liberating Zimbabwe. The shrine is an expression as well as a symbol of the untiring collective will of Zimbabweans to be the makers of their own history, destiny and to their own liberators by participating in the protracted, arduous and bitter struggle for independence and the subsequent development of Zimbabwe. The spirit of the heroes and heroines buried at this shrine should be kept alive, nurtured and cherished not only for the present but for

the future generations of Zimbabwe, as well as the Zambians who also sacrificed their lives in support of Zimbabwe's armed struggle.

Freedom Camp just like Chimoio Camp in Mozambique, the National and Provincial Heroes' Acres in Zimbabwe serves to continuously inspire all Zimbabweans to follow the footsteps of the heroes and heroines who sacrificed their lives for the liberation of the country. In recognition of the role played by the heroes and heroines either buried within or outside Zimbabwe the Government of Zimbabwe has according set aside a day in August every year, as national days known as 'Heroes Day.' On this day the entire nation remembers its heroes and heroines and pledges itself to continue serving the nation with total dedication and commitment as was done by these selfless individuals. As such the site holds educational and research values and will remain as a source of inspiration to the present and future generations in Zimbabwe and Zambia.

Freedom Camp was attacked on the 19th of October in a co-ordinated attack with Mkushi Camp complex. Estimated figures of between 600-800 Zimbabweans were killed during the attack. Today, the only features visible are old buildings formerly used by the occupants, relics of ZAPU vehicles, the gravesite, mango trees and a few eucalyptus trees. Within the gravesite, twenty-three mass graves are fully rehabilitated to the expected standards. 120m x 120m perimeter fencing has been put in place and a Liberation War Memorial with a Roll of Honour has also been put into place. The site is fully taken care of by the custodian of the site. A site museum is expected to be in place soon as the necessary consultations have already been made and the process of putting up the structure is already underway. The site museum at Freedom Camp shall reflect different aspects of the Liberation Struggles, as was the situation in Zambia. Freedom Camp being the former Headquarters shall capture important aspects of the struggle from all other noted sites within Zambia.



Figure 7: Showing war memorial shrine with roll of honour



Figure 8: Showing remnants at Freedom Camp



Figure 9: Showing destroyed houses at Freedom Camp

The ugly side of memorialisation

The commemoration of tragic events, during or following conflict, including long afterwards, involving public art and the mobilisation of collective memory, can convey messages of peace, recognition, reconciliation and community solidarity, but also in too many cases self-victimisation, thirst for revenge and martyrdom (UNESCO 2014). It is worth noting that memorials such as those discussed above can sometimes address issues that can be very divisive. More often than not, in memorialisation processes, some actors may use the battlefield of memory to further their own agendas (Todorov 2004). Adding to that, memorials may be deployed to mobilise against the enemies of today and of the future, for example nationalist propaganda that manipulates symbols and revitalises emotions from the past in which memories of humiliation inspire the desire for revenge and are used to justify further aggression based on any historical or ancestral right (Kattan 2002).

Moreover, memorials may also serve as places of pride and celebration of past crimes for radical groups. This can be the case, for example, of burial sites of war criminals, in particular when no reference, explanation or historical perspective is provided in relation to the crimes committed, through a plaque or nearby museum. Such cemeteries become further politicised by visits of high-ranking governmental officials (UNESCO 2014). Memorial dynamics are always political processes. Governments play a key role in framing the perception of the past. Unfortunately, too frequently they initiate top-down projects resulting in the imposition of unilateral or partial visions of history. Memorialising the past evolves within particular political, social and cultural contexts and is modulated by different political forces, the weight of lobbies and the evolving concerns of society and the interests of key stakeholders. Some monuments are met with indifference, others become places of crystallised emotions and tension and some are removed as a tangible sign of a new era. The principle questions to be asked and debated in the public sphere each time are: What are the specific intended goals of the memorial? Who is it made for? What will be its likely socio-political impact? Who participates in its establishment, including in the design, execution and stewardship? Does it include plurality of narratives?

An essential element for successful memorialisation is collaboration between the authorities, citizens and civil society, especially representatives of those directly affected by past events. Authorities have a key role to play: they have the responsibility of managing the public space and the capacity to maintain monuments and museums and develop national strategies across a territory and over the long term, taking into consideration a wide array of narratives. Civil society has the capacity to mobilise groups of population, grant popular legitimacy, organise events and generate public debates.

Memorialisation processes are emancipatory only when all sides, the political sequences and consequences of events are remembered and when the community and especially key stakeholders are able to have a voice in crafting the development of transitional justice strategies (Ramírez-Barat n.d.). It is crucial to open safe public

spaces that allow the participation of all in the discussion and ensure the credibility of the process, as well as its ownership by people: in the end, it is the process itself, i.e. the conversation about the past, more than the end result, be it a monument or a performance, that is most beneficial.

After the killing of more than 8,000 Muslims in Srebrenica in July 1995, the international community made a major effort to develop techniques of DNA identification of bodies. Today, the remains of more than 70 per cent of the thousands missing in the wars of the former Yugoslavia have been identified and returned to their families. However, in many countries, where a large number of people have died in wars or internal conflicts, sometimes decades ago, applying such cutting edge techniques is financially or otherwise unfeasible. Consequently the default policy has been to do nothing (UNESCO 2014).

The issue cannot always be ignored, however, as mass graves continue to be found, for example when constructing new roads or buildings. Authorities are torn between the imperative of development and the building of a memorial, the respect due to the dead, the obligation to treat the place as a crime scene and the need to search for the perpetrators (or the fear of seeing them publicly identified should they hold public office). In some instances, the families of missing people themselves reject proposals for the construction of memorials, fearing that this may serve as an excuse not to open the mass graves. Adamantly opposed to their demands for exhumation being buried beneath some symbolic concrete, they consistently demand the physical return of the remains of their loved ones (UNESCO 2014).

Conclusion

The government of Zimbabwe identified the development and management of the legacy of the liberation struggle as an important aspect of heritage conservation in the country and initiated the Liberation Heritage Programme (LHP). The LHP consist of a series of sites that express the key aspects of the Zimbabwean liberation experience. These sites are linked together by a common historical

narrative of the liberation struggle and experience and consist of historical evidence of events and activities associated with the history of the struggle. The LHP is an embodiment of collective experiences, ideals, values and principles which unified Zimbabweans as a people. As such, the present chapter has established that the serious study and research of liberation war heritage (or colonial heritage in Zimbabwe is of particular current interest. This is basically because Liberation Heritage Sites have a multiplicity of inherent values that are fundamental to both current and oncoming generations.

The development and rehabilitation of these sites is largely dependent on supportive policies and legislative instruments that lay the foundation for their protection and management. The chapter has demonstrated that liberation war heritage has assumed centre stage in Zimbabwe to the extent that the Government through its institutionalised arms such as the NMMZ has devoted to erect and develop shrines inside and outside Zimbabwe as a gesture of honouring the people who selflessly sacrificed their lives for the liberation of the country. Lack of supportive legislation and policies as well as the involvement of all stakeholders have negatively impacted on the development and recognition of these sites by the broader Zimbabwean community. Though met with financial constraints and limitations, the project is meant to inspire and motivate the present generations especially those born after independence to cherish and uphold the emotional legacy bequeathed to them by their predecessors. The chapter has also argued that the commemoration and establishment of such shrines is normally controlled by those in the echelons of power, and thus, is prone to manipulation to further and satiate their political whims and interests. Above all, the chapter has noted that issues to do with the commemoration of liberation war heritage are more often than not, controversial as there is currently no standardised approach to the phenomenon.

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Akan Asafo Company: A Practical Model for Achieving True African Liberation and Sustainable Development

George Anderson Jnr.

Introduction

“Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African Continent” (Nkrumah, 1963: 136; See: Webster, Boahen, & Tidy, 1967:383).

This extract from Kwame Nkrumah’s independence speech suggests that Africa is in ‘bondage,’ hence, the need for a total liberation and development. Nkrumah’s observation largely stands to be valid. This is because recent events in many African countries suggest that Africa needs total liberation from the whims and caprices of external powers. There seems to be more influence and control that is Western on the various quarters of Africa than Africa being confident to take its own initiatives for political, cultural, and socio-economic development. In this regard, the call for the need for Africa to employ pragmatic measures that are typically African to liberate itself and to uphold its cultural heritage is more urgent now than ever. On liberation and sustainable development in indigenous Akan societies, Akan history indicates that the roles of the Akan Asafo Company played important roles. The Akan Asafo Company as a well-structured unified force served as the backbone of the Akan State. Primarily, it functioned as a military, political, and social force to enhance liberation and development (Sam, 2014:22; Acquah, Amuah, and Annan, 2014:50-60).

This chapter adopts the Akan Asafo Company as a practical model for a true African liberation and sustainable development. In doing so, this chapter examines the roles the Asafo Company played in the Akan societies that were geared towards liberation and

sustainable development. From their roles, this chapter deduces lessons, which if applied to Africa, can result in true African liberation and sustainable development.

The research designs used are the historical and descriptive. Wiersma (1986) notes that historical research is the type of research design that deals with critical inquiry into past events. This inquiry, Wiersma (1986) further observes, helps to produce an accurate description and interpretation of those events. Although historical research as Wiersma posits will centre on critical inquiry into past event, the definition seems to lack an important element, that is, the present dimension of events. Kothari (2004) explains descriptive research to mean a design that describes the state of affairs of a phenomenon (p. 2). One may understand Kothari to imply that descriptive research design allows a researcher to observe a particular phenomenon and define the parameters surrounding such phenomenon. This chapter adopts the two research designs because the topic under discussion requires a historical and descriptive analysis of past and present events. This chapter relies on secondary sources of data. However, in order to achieve the set objective, this chapter is structured into three sections. The first conceptualises the terms liberation, and African liberation. Following is an overview of the Akan people of Ghana and a detailed description of the Akan Asafo Company. The third section of this chapter deduces lessons from the roles of the Akan Asafo Company which if applied. The lessons will inform how a true African liberation and sustainable development can be achieved in this milieu.

Conceptualising African Liberation

Some Euro-Americans have designated Africa variously. Africa, for instance is described as a 'Dark Continent', 'savage', 'barbaric', and 'heathen' (Awolalu, 1976:3). Aside such descriptions, Africa is perceived to have no rational capabilities of philosophical thought about entities. In this regard, we turn to Smith (1961) who reminds us of what Ludwig says of Africans. According to Smith (1961) Ludwig maintains, "*How can the untutored African conceive of God? ... How can this be? [...] Deity is a philosophical concept which savages are*

incapable of framing” (Smith, 1961:1). One can infer from Ludwig’s quote that Africans are irrational, and are incapable of knowing anything, which is not the case. Nonetheless, there is reason to maintain that such descriptions and mentalities the Western world has conceived about Africa inform Africa about the need to examine its status quo critically.

In today’s world, one reads from the dailies, web and observes the different (economic, political, religious, social, and cultural) difficulties and events Africa is going through. Kah (2012) enumerates and provides explanations to some of the difficulties encumbering Africa at present respectively. He observes that the image of Africa in the present global economy and society is one of a continent at odds with itself. For him, within the African continent are armed conflicts such as those in Somalia, the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Yemen and North Africa. The fruit of such conflicts has been displacements and refugee predicaments, destruction of the environment, and ethnic cleavages among others. Other problems of the continent are environmental pollution through careless disposal of waste and oil spillage, unsustainable exploitation of forest resources by unscrupulous logging companies and the resultant challenges to climate change and global warming. The persistent drought and the advancing desert from North Africa have made agricultural productivity unreliable and threatened human existence through famine. In the social domain, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, malaria, and cholera are some of the challenges for the health authorities in countries like Cameroon and Benin. Potable water has remained a scarce commodity in many parts of Africa leading in some cases to the death of many poor and vulnerable groups like old people, women, and children. Other challenges of the continent are illiteracy, and attaining the millennium development goals. Besides, the dumping of waste and other second hand products from the North are becoming a social health hazard to the many vulnerable people of the African continent. Africa is also described as a continent that contributes very little to the knowledge economy, which is largely controlled by the western world. The problem of human capital has been

compounded by an alarming rate of brain drain. Many teachers, doctors and nurses trained by African governments to improve on the quality of education and health have without a conscience abandoned their jobs for menial jobs like selling fuel and distributing newspapers in countries of the North (p. 27).

In reality, the difficulties and other current events as Kah (2012) maintains allude to the point that Africa needs true liberation to steer and foster sustainable development. By 'liberation', Clapham (2012:4) holds the view that "liberation is defined by struggle". By struggle, one may understand Clapham to imply, fighting long and hard with great heroism. This fight as he maintains is often at great cost. For him, the fruit of such fight is the realisation and achievement of freedom for peoples and the regaining of lost territories from oppressive regimes, whether these be external colonialist. In the context of this chapter, 'African liberation', will mean a total economic, ideological, educational, political, religious, social, and cultural, freedom of Africa and her ability to be dependent on her own resources without soliciting for any aid or whatsoever from any country/state outside the continent.

True African liberation and development in Ntalaja's (1987) view is achievable when liberation starts from within Africa. Here, one may understand Ntalaja to suggest a unified Africa (See: Nkrumah, 1963). That is, an inclusive Africa whereby all fellow Africans will come to the fullest realisation of the need to recognise each other as one, but not being at each other's throat so that they can achieve a common good. Ntalaja's (1987) stance was informed by his observations in the some African countries. His observations present to him an impression that Africans are enemies to themselves. He supports his stance by referring to a development that involved South Africa and Namibia's quest to be liberated from colonial oppression. Ntalaja (1987) noticed that there was a unanimous support among Africans when it became necessary for the realisation of freedom by South Africa and Namibia. Nonetheless, in the case of Eritrea and Western Sudan, liberation was viewed as controversial and lacked the support of Africans (p. 7). For Ntalaja, this 'betrayal' should not have been the case. In fact, his expectations were that irrespective of the differences among

African countries, when it comes to the question of liberation, Africa must have one common voice. For him, the colonialists had and have nothing beneficial to offer Africans. In this regard, Africa must unite and come to the fullest realisation of defending and protecting the needs and interest of fellow African countries and citizens (See: Nkrumah, 1963, Kah, 2012; Webster, Boahen & Tidy, 1967:383).

The Akan People of Ghana and Akan Asafo Company

Writing on the Akan, Appiah-Sekyere and Awuah-Nyamekye (2012) maintain, the Akan people of Ghana are those who hold on to the African indigenous religion that their forebears bequeathed to them. The Akan people, the two authors maintain have gone through the influence of Western culture since the first time the Western missionaries landed on the west coast of Africa. Besides what the aforementioned authors tell us, statistical data from the Ghana's 2010 Population and Housing Census records that the Akan represent 47.5% of the total population of Ghana. The Akan, according to the Statistical data are mostly located in the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions; greater parts of the Western and Eastern regions; the whole of Central Region except the Efutu and Awutu around Winneba; and a small area in the Northern part of the Volta Region. The Akan include the Asante, Bono, Denkyira, Tufu, Assin, Wassaw, Sefwi, Akwamu, Akwapim, Akyem and Adansi. The main languages they speak are Twi and Fanti (Appiah-Sekyere & Awuah Nyamekye, 2012:129; Anderson, 2015:55-57, Anderson, 2013:257-8; Awuah Nyamekye, 2009:2; Ghana Statistical Service, 2010: 34.).

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Akyemfo Asafo No. 2, Akyem-Nkodwo No. 3, Boase Wombir Asafo No. 4, Abese No. 5, Alatamanfo Asafo No. 6, and Enyampa Asafo No. 7 (Brown, 2005:18).

Many documented and oral literatures exist on Akan Asafo Company. Some of the documented works examine the various transformations the Akan Asafo Company has gone through across some timelines. Others assess their social, cultural, political, and religious significance as far as development and liberation of indigenous Akan societies are concerned. In this part of the chapter, I discuss the etymology, origin, and then enumerate some of the significant contributions of the Akan Asafo Company to society liberation and sustainable development. Such an enterprise this chapter sets out to execute will bring to the fore how the Akan Asafo Company serves as a practical model for achieving true African liberation and sustainable development.

On the etymology of 'Asafo', variant hypotheses have surfaced in many literatures. Nonetheless, here, I must be quick to maintain that the term Asafo has been used in several contexts (Danquah, 1928:224; Nkrumah, 1995:36; all cited in Li, 1995:330-331). For this reason, there would be the need to distinguish the use of the term in the context of this chapter from other kinds of 'Asafo' to avoid confusion. For example, the Christian congregation in the Akan parlance is called 'Asafo'. There are other dancing and playing clubs formed by youngsters that are all called 'Asafo'. There is a church in Ghana that is called 'Christo Asafo'. However, in the context of this chapter, the term 'Asafo' does not imply congregation members, clubs, or a name of a church. The term 'Asafo' will imply a well-organised indigenous military force that existed and continues to exist prior to the emergence of the Europeans.

Aggrey (1978) for example, presents the etymology of 'Asafo' by examining the views of three schools of thought. He writes that the first school of thought traces the etymology of 'Asafo' to the word '*Asefo*', meaning *colleagues*. The second school of thought maintains, '*Asanfo*' meaning *dancers*. The third school of thought maintain '*Asafo*' meaning *warriors*. Aggrey's observations vis-à-vis further researches, he concludes that the view of the third school of thought outweighs the others. Here one may understand Aggrey's

position in view of what the Asafo Company stand for in the Akan Community. Secondly, it could probably result from some personal communications he might have had with some of the leaders (Supi) of the Asafo Company, which informed his conclusion.

Perkin (1994) and Turkson (1982) seems to agree on a uniform etymological trace of the term 'Asafo'. The two scholars maintain that the word 'Asafo' is derived from the root word 'sa', which means 'war', and the 'fo', which signifies *plurality of people*. Therefore 'Asafo' means '*war people*' or '*the people who wage war*' or *people engaged in warfare* (Perkins, 1994; Turkson, 1982:4-16). The explanation the two scholars above maintain tie with the third school of thought that Aggrey (1978) concludes the etymology of the term 'Asafo' on. Unlike the stance of the three scholars above, Nketia (1974) gives a different etymological definition of 'Asafo'. He notes that 'Asafo' is derived from the local word '*Kwasrafo*' meaning '*commoners*'. Nonetheless, this etymological trace of the word 'Asafo' to '*Kwasrafo*' by Nketia (1974) to mean '*commoners*' has vehemently been debunked by Addo-Fimling who maintains:

It (referring to commoners: insertion, mine) comes from the period of indirect rule by the British, when the traditional authorities acted in collaboration with the English officials. This system separated the members of the Asafo companies from the regal families, thereby the members of the Asafo became the representatives of the common people in the political realm" (Perkins, 1994: 28).

Another important deliberation in this chapter centres on the etymology of Asafo. Turkson (1982) describes the Asafo Company as a traditional military unit of a local society. This unit consists of able-bodied young and old men under a leader. Their primary aim is to initiate or expel opposing forces. Aside this function, they perform social, political, as well as religious functions in time of peace (Turkson, 1982: 4-16). Like Turkson (1982), Acquah (2002) sees the Asafo Company as a quasi-military organisation, which is part of the socio-political set-up of almost all Akan societies to protect and defend their communities (Acquah, 2002; Sam,

2014:16). On this same note, De Graft Johnson describes the Asafo Company as:

Asafo is primarily a warrior organization and is the name given to all male adults banded together for any purpose, especially war. In its wider sense, it is a socio-politico-military organization embracing both men and women, including stool-holders or persons holding positions.... In its narrower sense the Asafo connotes the third estate, or common people, which socially goes by the nomenclature of Kwasafu, sometimes also described or referred to, politically, as 'mbrantsie', or "young men" to distinguish them from the 'mpanyinfu', or "chiefs and elders" (De Graft Johnson, 1932: 308).

From the etymological definitions discussed above, we come to understand the term 'Asafo' as a well-organised military team of able men who stand as a force to defend the integrity of a society from external or internal attacks.

Aside the etymological meaning of Asafo, we look at the origin of Akan Asafo Company. Many traditions exist on the origin of Akan Asafo Company. However, many scholars (Kea, 1982; Turkson, 1982; Li 1995; Wartenberg, 1950) have not agreed beforehand on a univocal stance on the origin and motivation for the formation of the Akan Asafo Company. This, to some extent informs Turkson (1982) to argue that the history surrounding the origin of Akan Asafo Company is speculative. For him, it is because scholars have not been able to state the exact date or even where the Akan Asafo Company originated (p. 4). Li (1995) posits that two main schools of thought have offered explanations on where and the reasons that accounted for the formation of the Akan Asafo Company. According to Li (1995), the first school of thought holds the stance that Akan Asafo Company was indigenous to the Fante Society whereas the second school of thought maintains that AkanAsafo Company came into existence because of the presence of early Europeans (pp. 327-357).

Concerning the view of the first school of thought Li (1995) discusses, it would seem that Aidoo (2011) buys into that position. This is because Aidoo (2011) maintains that Asafo Company originated several centuries ago among the Akan peoples of

southern Ghana (p. 23). To be more specific, Bentum (2006) refers to Annobil and Ekuban (1982) who opine that the Asafo Company existed with the Fante ethnic group before the arrival of the Europeans (Bentum, 2006: 13, See: Kea, 1982:132). To establish a closer connection with the origin, Wartenberg (1950) suggests that: the very origin of the Akan Asafo Company is from Asebu (an inland Fante town) which experienced a heavy attack from the Asante warriors. Adler and Barnard (1993) observe:

Although these warrior groups are active throughout the Akan area, it is the Fante tribe, inhabiting the coastal region of Ghana that has developed a sophisticated and expressive community with a social and political organization based on martial principles and elaborate traditions of visual arts (p. 8).

On this note, there is reason to suggest that Akan Asafo Company emerged from the Fante of the Akan people of Ghana. Aside the Akan who are well noted for the Asafo concept, Sam (2014) and Li (1995) have shown in their studies that the Ga, Guan, Krobo and the Ewe people of Ghana have adopted the concept of Akan Asafo Company (Sam, 2014:17; Li, 1995:328).

Another issue worth noting aside the origin of Akan Asafo Company is the factors that gave rise to its formation. According to Kea (1982), many reasons might have accounted for the formation of the Akan Asafo Company. However, in his studies, which much centred on the Gold Coast, he notes that the Denkyira, Akwamu and Asante's fashion is one of the significant factors that accounted for the formation of Akan Asafo Companies in the Akan societies. Kea maintains that the Fante State saw these three states as threat to their middlemen role in the slave trade. This is in view of the constant opposition and attacks from Denkyira, Akwamu and the Asante. In this respect, the Fante States saw the need to form a formidable force that will expel and counter attack both the internal and external attacks so that they can preserve their autonomy and status. This, according to Kea led to the formation of the Akan Asafo Company among the Fante States (Kea, 1982:132. Fynn, 1971; Sanders, 1979). Cruickshank (1853) on a similar note, but not

completely different perspective from Kea (1982) indicates that considerable jealousy and rivalry between companies, which often led to violent conflict, accounted for the formation of the Asafo Company. According to Cruickshank (1853), within a particular town, there were instances where some indigenes felt disgruntled. In this regard, they rebelled against authority and destroyed society's properties. In such an instance however, there was need to establish a force that would be able to surmount such uproar (Cruickshank, 1853:245).

From the factors that accounted for the formation of the Asafo Company, we turn to their administrative structure. Scholars like Aggrey (1978), Edusei (1981), and Turkson (1976) have indicated in their researches the administrative structure of the Asafo Company. The scholars opine that the Asafo Company is composed of the "*Tufobene*" who is the military advisor to the chief of the township. Next in line is the "*Asafobaatan*" the advisor. The "*Supi*" is the commanding officer, while the divisional captain is called the "*Safobene*" (for the male) or "*Asafoakyere*" (for the female). Other ranks in the Asafo are the "*Asafokomfo*" (the priest), "*Okyerema*"—head of the "*Akyeremafo*" (the drummers), "*Frankaatunyi*" (flag bearer), "*Sekanbonyi*" (sword maker), "*Okyeame*" (spokesperson or linguist), "*Abrafoo*" (police officers) and "*Adumfoo*" (executioners) (Aidoo, 2011:26; Aggrey, 1978; Edusei, 1981).

Membership to the Akan Asafo Company according to Shumway (2001), Turkson (1982), and Adler & Bernard (1993) was based on the patrilineal inheritance system. This is because according to Nti (2011), among the Akan, it was believed that children got their *sunsum* (spirit) from their fathers. It was this belief that eventually determined the latter's personality and character. To the extent that the Akan believed the spiritual was stronger than the physical, it also endowed traits such as boldness, bravery, courage, and resoluteness (Nti, 2011:96-97). The four scholars (Shumway, 2001; Turkson, 1982; Adler & Bernard, 1993) maintain that every able-bodied child belongs to his father's company is bound up with certain deities that are worshipped within the father's patrilineal descent group. This sense of belonging is obligatory for all fathers

to ensure that all their able-bodied male children are initiated into their Asafo Company (Aidoo, 2011:25; Adler, & Barnard 1993).

From the discourse on the origin and factors that gave rise to the Akan Asafo Company, the following impressions emerged. First, there is reason to maintain that the Fante Group of people are the institutors of the Akan Asafo Company. Secondly, the Akan Asafo Company existed long before the coming of the Europeans.

Roles of the Akan Asafo Company

This section of the chapter subdivides into two. The first presents the roles of the Asafo Company. The roles centre on political, socio-recreational, and military. The second deduces lessons from the roles the Akan Asafo Company play in the traditional society, which if applied to Africa, can result in true African liberation and sustainable development. The Akan Asafo Company played and continues to play several roles in the traditional Akan societies. It must be noted however that the roles Akan Asafo Company play are not extinct. The roles are extant. However, the Akan Asafo Company has undergone some changes. The changes however at this point are insignificant for discussion.

The Akan Asafo Company plays many roles in the traditional society. Some of the roles are, but not limited to political, social, recreational, military, religious, economic, and cultural (Sam, 2014; Acquah, Amuah, & Annan, 2014). Nonetheless, in this chapter, the political, social, and military roles of the Akan Asafo Company will be discussed.

On the social level, the Akan Asafo Company in the colonial era bore the brunt of ordinances enacted by the government to enforce public and construction works. For instance, they were responsible for clearing bush footpath roads, and organising general sanitation exercises. In addition, the Akan Asafo Company responded and acted on emergencies that befell the society. For instance, when a person was reported missing or when there were occasional accidents on the sea such as capsizing of canoes and drowning of amateur swimmers the Akan Asafo Company had the responsibility

of saving survivors and retrieving bodies from the sea (Acquah, 2002:3-4; Nti, 2011:100).

Besides the roles discussed above, the Akan Asafo Company provided communal entertainment. Each Company had its own ensemble of drums, gongs and other accessories such as bells and rattles. In view of this, the companies saw the need to provide communal entertainment through drumming, singing and dancing. During festivals or state function, the Akan Asafo Companies turned out in their respective outfits parading all their paraphernalia, including flags and banners. In the procession, the companies entertained the public with various antics in marching, dancing, and mock combat (Sam, 2014:22; Acquah, 2002:3-4). The Akan Asafo Company had other responsibilities also. Nti (2011:100) notes that in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Akan Asafo Company were expected to be in charge of policing the community, maintaining peace and security in markets. In criminal occurrences, the Asafo Company were called upon to enter the forest in order to capture a murderer or highway robber, and, if necessary, in search of a would-be suicide.

On the political front, the Asafo served as a mouthpiece through which the problems of the indigenes were heard. In the words of Ulzen (2013:97), the Akan Asafo Company formed an 'ill-defined' sort of parliament. There, the community members presented their displeasure and grievances. Sam (2014) posits that chieftaincy rested on the laps of the Akan Asafo Company. They were responsible for the instalment and dethroning of chiefs or traditional rulers. On the question of instalment of chiefs, the Akan Asafo Company was responsible for fetching an elected chief from his house. As a farewell to the elect as a commoner, they gave him a last ceremonial flogging, smeared him with white clay, and brought him before the assembly. Afterwards, the Akan Asafo Company would then perform rituals associated with the installation of that new chief. In the unfortunate event of an Omanhene (chief) being found guilty of a crime and sentenced to be deposed, the execution of that order was the sole preserve of the Asafo Company. These roles in the indigenous political processes enhanced their influence

over the Omanhene (Sam 2014: 22; Acquah, Amuah, & Annan, 2014:50-60; Atingdui, 1995:4; Li, 1995:327-357; Nti, 2011:99).

Another important and the last of the roles of the Asafo Company this chapter discusses is their militancy role. As noted earlier, the primary reason for the establishment of the Akan Asafo Company was for defence. By defence, the Asafo Company helped in ensuring peace and tranquillity in their society. The Akan Asafo Company did this by making sure that all opposing forces and attacks that were motivated internally and externally were quashed. Aside the Akan Asafo Company protecting their own society, there were instances where they joined forces with other Akan Asafo Companies in other neighbouring societies into an efficient military unit to repel attacks on neighbouring communities (Aidoo 2011:24-25; Doortmont and Smit 2007:283). It must be emphasised that today, the Akan Asafo Company do not engage in any warfare as they use to. This is because of the establishment of a modern government standing army for defence purposes. Again, with the inception of District Assembly concept, assembly leaders now mobilise people for communal labour on community bases or in electoral areas (Turkson, 2014:21).

Having discussed the roles the Akan Asafo Company play in the societies, attention is shifted to discussing some lessons that can be deduced from their roles, which if applied to Africa, can result in true African liberation and sustainable development.

From the Roles of the Akan Asafo Company: Lessons for Achieving True African Liberation and Sustainable Development

Here, this chapter presents some practical lessons construed from the roles of the Akan Asafo Company. The lessons are that which if applied to Africa, can result in true African liberation and sustainable development.

First, we learn from the Akan Asafo Company the philosophy of unity/togetherness. This concept of unity and togetherness reflects the Bantu concept of Ubuntu. According Ramose (1999), Ubuntu is a philosophy of life that is concerned with the

reinforcement of unity, oneness, and solidarity among the Bantu people. This philosophy of togetherness and oneness, Ramose observes was instrumental in maintaining social cohesion, administering peace and order for the good life of everyone in the society and even strangers (Ramose, 1999 as cited in Mawere, 2012: 3-4). Like the Bantu people as Ramose echoes, the Akan Asafo Companies saw themselves as one people and came together as a unified force to repel attacks from an enemy (Aidoo, 2011: 24-25; Doortmont & Smit, 2007: 283). In Africa today, critical reflections on past and present events allow one to suggest that there is no unity and togetherness on the African continent (Nkrumah, 1963:132, Ntalaja, 1987: 78). Furthermore, there is reason to echo that African Union (AU) as an organisation has failed to ensure African unity and togetherness. However, from the socio-military roles of the Akan Asafo Company, there is reason to suggest that for Africa to experience a true sense of liberation, and sustainable development, Africa must unite let go of the variant ideological, political, economical, personal and religious differences. Hence, upholding the concept of Ubuntu and acknowledging that Africans by nature have one destiny, dream, tears, pain, and future (Nkrumah, 1963; Mawere, 2012: 3-4). When Africa becomes conscious about the need to unite like the Akan Asafo Company, Africa will experience true liberation and sustainable development.

Secondly, from the social roles of the Akan Asafo Company is the display of the ethic of hard work. By hard work, Acquah, (2002: 3-4) and Nti (2011:100) reminds us about what the Akan Asafo Company displayed in enhancing liberation and sustainable development. We recall the public and construction works (clearing bush footpath roads, and organising general sanitation exercises and attending to emergencies or crises that befell the society) the Akan Asafo Company spearheaded in their indigenous societies. Unlike the Akan Asafo Company, one observes a general negative attitude towards work and development in Africa. My observations at some work places in Ghana, brought to my attention about how some Ghanaian workers report to work late, rudely receive clients, spend much time on break, watch movies during working hours, play games (Zuma deluxe, solitaire and Mario) and are busily hooked on

phone with their friends. Such an observation presents the question of how Africa will be capable of experiencing and achieving true liberation and sustainable development while they do not attach seriousness to work. From the social roles of the Akan Asafo Company, there is reason to suggest therefore that Africans and in particular, Ghanaians should develop positive attitude towards work and be creative in their dealings. This will enable Africa to realise true liberation and sustainable development.

Other important lessons from the Akan Asafo Company are evident in their self-management, determination, and independent roles. Largely, the Akan Asafo Company did not depend on the chiefs and elders before undertaking initiatives in the society. The Akan Asafo Company did this because of the realised internal politics of nepotism and bureaucracy among the chiefs and elders of the society in decision-making. Such internal politics did not allow the Asafo Company to depend on anyone before executing their tasks. However, can Africa and Africans boast of being self-dependent, economically resilient, and determined in the midst of the affecting issues pertaining to sustainable development, decision-making and socio-politico-religio-economic liberation? On another note, there is the need for Africa and Africans to be able to embark on innovative projects and take decisions without relying and consulting the Western world. Almost every year, many African countries including Ghana is noted to rely on Chinese, World Bank, and American loans for economic developments (Republic of Ghana, 2011:3). The question however is, is Africa not capable of building and depending on her natural and human resources to the fullest realisation of their liberation and development? In fact, Africa is capable. Nonetheless, the seeming greed, nepotism, segregation coupled with egoistic tendencies among government officials and African leaders to a large extent has thwarted the campaign for Africa's liberation and sustainable development. The lesson the Akan Asafo Company is putting forth to Africa and Africans in their quest for a true liberation and sustainable development is the idea of self-management of both Africa's natural and human resources, determination and independence. Making

conscious efforts to implement these agenda will allow Africa to realise true liberation and sustainable development.

Finally, the Akan Asafo Company provided and protected the interests of society members. The Akan Asafo Company did these by providing peace, security, and rescuing the perishing. They served as spoke persons to the members of the society when they (society members) were at the disadvantage. By protection, security, and peace, we turn to Aidoo (2011), Doortmont and Smit (2007) who in their researches have deliberated on the military roles of the Asafo Company. The three scholars maintain that the Asafo Company as a military unit repelled attacks and chaos that affected the lives and daily operations of the people in the society. In some instances, the Asafo Company served as ombudsmen who curtailed the operations of robbers and intruders. The scholars add that the rigorous military roles the Akan Asafo Company played ensured peace and promoted liberation and development in the various indigenous societies. Taking cues from the Akan Asafo Company as Africans, there is the need to empathise with each African nation's plights. In doing so, Africa must put all hands on board to helping the afflicted nations. Not only this but also, well-resourced African countries should assist the poor and less-resourced countries to develop. This would imply that Africa should be anti *'Dɛi wo fie asem'* (Yankah, 2011:1), which literary translates, *Mind your own business*. Going back to the Akan Asafo Company, Africa and Africans are therefore reminded to the need for supporting the welfare and wellbeing of every nation on the continent. If Africa comes to the realisation of a unified continent, there is more room to argue that Africa can achieve true liberation and sustainable development.

Conclusion

This chapter dealt with the Akan Asafo Company. In doing so, discussions were centred on examining the roles of the Akan Asafo Company. Out of the roles, this chapter deduced lessons, which if applied to Africa, can result in true African liberation and sustainable development. Some of the roles the Akan Asafo

Company played, which this chapter discussed, reviewed were the social, political, and military. Of the three areas this chapter centred its deliberations, the lessons that were deduced for Africa's liberation and sustainable development are as follows. First, Africa must unite as a unified force, develop its human resource capabilities through rigorous education for the self-management of Africa's natural resources. Second, Africa must be determined and independent without depending on Western and Eastern countries for aid. Third, Africans must be hard working, eschew laziness, and have a positive attitude towards work. Finally, there is need for Africa to protect the interests of member states.

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Exploring Zimbabwe's Liberation Heritage: An Assessment of the Potential of "Protected Villages" as a Significant Heritage Typology

Godhi Bvocho & Farai Mudododzi Chabata

"Time did not ever end because endings were always also beginnings, and new life always emerged from death" – (Michael Rowlands 1993)

Introduction

Zimbabwe's liberation heritage is diverse in nature and its typologies range from people, places and stories as well as memorial sites related to the struggle for independence. Conservation efforts have largely focused on both sites and burials but little attention has been given to 'protected villages' (also known as keeps) as an invaluable heritage typology requiring conceptualisation, research as well as preservation for posterity. There is a conspicuous dearth of literature on issues concerning identification, documentation, conservation, and presentation of the material remains, spatial landmarks as well as oral testimonies of the liberation struggle. Whereas this is taking shape, albeit at a slow pace, the heritage is fast disappearing into oblivion as the authenticating resources, especially eye-witnesses are giving in to natural wastage. Similarly, material evidence lying scattered across the landscape is succumbing to agents of weather forces and anthropogenic activities. The spate of available literature on the liberation struggle or the Second Chimurenga of the 1970s which brought Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 has almost entirely focused on causes and course of the war. This is barely adequate given the fact that the struggle for freedom in Zimbabwe and southern Africa was so multifaceted that its significance that extended far beyond the continent (Isaacman, et al, 2005:56). Protected Villages attracted significant attention from

the international media as well as other organizations, and by the 1960s the region was the world's last bastion of colonial rule.

As a liberation heritage typology, Protected Villages depict the bond that existed between the freedom fighters and the masses. Yet, they were created as part of a package of punitive measures employed to loosen the liberation fighters' grip on the masses. Initially instituted under a military strategy dubbed "Operation Overload", reminiscent of the post-1920 Nazi Concentration Camps in Germany, "Protected Villages" remained a significant and outstanding phenomena in the making and remaking of liberation heritage in Zimbabwe. This chapter argues for the recognition of Protected Villages as a significant typology, and not just a mere historical phenomenon, through systematic recording and documentation of the various Protected Villages that lie idle across the country and or/region. Using examples of Protected Villages in Mashonaland East and Mashonaland Central Provinces, the chapter explores the potential and possibilities for this heritage typology as it relates to people's experiences, individual and collective memory, places and events in the 'Keeps' specifically and Zimbabwe in general.

Historical Background

In November 1965, Ian Douglas Smith the then Prime Minister of Rhodesia (as Zimbabwe was known at the time) made the infamous Unilateral Declaration of Independence which saw the Rhodesian government being declared illegal therefore unrecognized internationally. The British Government's responded to UDI by making a declaration of their own stating that there was to be "No Independence Before Majority Rule" (NIBMAR). In 1974, at the height of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, the Rhodesian government responded to increasing infiltration of nationalist guerrillas by concentrating isolated African farming communities, also referred to in some writings as peasants (Kriger, Ranger), in "Protected Villages" (PVs). The programme's prime objective was to sever the ties and communication between the guerrillas and the local rural African communities. Rasmussen

(1979: 255) estimates that about 300 000 people were in protected villages by mid-1977; and the government still had plans for creation of more such villages. The Protected Villages are also estimated to have averaged about 2500 residents living within chain-link fence enclosures illuminated by electrical lights at night (Rasmussen, 1979: 256). Rhodesian soldiers stationed at these 'villages' had orders to shoot dusk-to-dawn curfew violators. In fact, the District Commissioners stood on the Rhodesian Government's considered view that,

if villagers harbour terrorists and terrorists are found in villages, naturally they will be bombed and destroyed in any manner which the commander on the spot considers to be desirable in the suitable prosecution of a successful campaign...] Where the civilian population involves itself with terrorism, then somebody is bound to get hurt and one can have little sympathy for those who are mixed up with the terrorists when finally they receive the wrath of the security forces Hansard, 1975 cited by Manungo, 1991: 201).

It should be noted that the Rhodesian government did not consider itself as obligated to provide food or supplies for the Africans in the "PVs". The Africans had to walk long distances between the Keeps and their farms. However, attempts were made, as far as possible and for security reasons as well, that villages were sited near to the existing agricultural fields. Cilliers (1985), estimates that each family was allocated a plot of fifteen square metres on which to construct a home in the Protected Villages. Problems such as malnutrition in the Keeps compounded by neglected farms which became prey for untended livestock galvanized the resolve of the Africans in supporting the liberation struggle. Whereas Protected Villages had been set up as part of a package of punitive measures, they inadvertently became beacons and bastions of resistance against colonial rule in Zimbabwe. In fact, the Protected Villages created a host of new internal grievances that became additional mobilization factors for the freedom fighters or guerrillas. By the Rhodesian Government's own admission and as

pointed out by Ken Flower² (1987), the policy ultimately backfired. Drawing on the critique by Kriger (1992), we argue that internal grievances were more significant than nationalist propaganda in mobilizing the rural African population whom Ranger (1985), Manungo (1991) and Kriger (1992) refer to as ‘peasants’. Hence it is paradoxical that as a heritage typology, ‘Protected Villages’ are conspicuous with their absence on the national monuments register.

The plight of Africans in the PVs can perhaps be best put in context through the searching words of Bishop Donal Lamont of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), cited by Manungo (1991: 203),

do Rhodesians really understand the plight of these people? To try to appreciate it one might ask: ‘How would the residents of any of our towns feel if they were one day summarily ordered to leave their homes and be transported into the veldt taking whatever they could carry and were placed into fenced compounds, told to build whatever accommodation they could with whatever was lying around and then commanded to remain inside such compounds from six o’clock in the evening until six o’clock the following morning.

At times the curfew hours could be extended whimsically by the Rhodesian commanders on the spot. For instance, in his study of Protected Villages in the Chiweshe Area, Manungo (1991) points out that some of his informants stated that the decision to move Africans to Protected Villages (“PVs”) was taken unilaterally by the Rhodesian Government without consultation with either the British Government or the local people themselves and their leaders such as Chiefs. In any case, some of the chiefs were not regarded as important especially if their attitude toward the Rhodesian Government was deemed subversive. Overall, the desperation and the impunity with which they treated African living in the communal areas during the Second Chimurenga is evident from the above background.

² Kent Flower was the Rhodesian Government’s Intelligence Chief during the Liberation Struggle in Zimbabwe

Not surprisingly, when the war ended Africans came out of the Protected Villages an impoverished lot. Tarzan Muparadzi, an ex-combatant interviewed by Teresa Barnes (1995: 129), pointed out that he had to use some of his demobilization payment (money) to buy clothes and food for his parents as they were coming out of the protected villages. They had been robbed both of their lifestyles as well as their social and economic wellbeing. It was no longer easy for them to free carry out their traditional seasonal ceremonies such as the rainmaking ceremonies (*Mikwerera/zvipwa*). In fact African spirituality had become perverse in the eyes of the settlers from the time of the Ndebele-Shona Risings (First Chimurenga) of 1896/7 which had seen spirit mediums like MKwati, Nehanda, Kaguvu and Siginyamatshe courageously playing a part in coordinating resistance to colonial occupation.

The process of creating Keeps

The first official public indication of a strategy of Protected Villages in Zimbabwe, then Rhodesia, was given by Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Wickus de Kock, in December 1973. This followed an intelligence report early in 1973 that was received by the Rhodesian regime that Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) cadres were living and operating within the Chiweshe Communal Area. Four protected areas were established from October 1973 onwards in Gudza and Mukumbura in the Zambezi Valley. These keeps tended to be identified by a sequential numbering system but also assuming the name of the village or area they were situated, for example, Chipfunde in Murewa or Nzvimbo in Chiweshe or Chimoio in Mutoko. At this initial stage, contends Cillier (1985:83), the armed forces were not involved in the schemes as it was the Department of Internal Affairs which first proposed the concept of concentrating the local population in specific areas for ease of control and ‘protection’. By May 1976, PVs had spread across the country to include parts of Murewa notably, Pfungwe and Uzumba as well as Mutoko. PVs in Zimbabwe were created under strategies dubbed “Operation Overload One” in Chiweshe and “Overload Two” in Madziva; and

the military justification for both was the insurgent or the guerrilla threat that was fast approaching the capital Harare itself then Salisbury.

The creation of Keeps was preceded by what was referred to as a “High Density Force Operation” lasting four to five days (Cilliers, 1985). Troops were clandestinely deployed throughout the adjacent white commercial farms to seal off the African farming areas referred to at the time as Tribal Trust Lands and to saturate them with Rhodesian Security Forces. A total of 21 Protected Villages were created in the Chiweshe District alone. Cilliers (1985:85) points out that construction work at the PVs was immediately followed by transportation, intelligence and fencing teams that enabled the total resettlement to be executed simultaneously. Mashonaland Central Province particularly in Centenary, Shamva, and Mt Darwin Districts experienced many attacks and casualties on white settler farms. As a result more than sixty percent of the keeps were established in these two provinces.

When the PVs were created very little attention was given to the sanitary and hygiene challenges that would come with overcrowding Africans in one place, as well as the socio-political ramifications of disrupting the centuries old socio-economic fabric as Africans were forcibly resettled into small fenced enclosures, fortified with sand bags and guarded by white officials and their black assistants. They had to abandon their homes, which were often burned by the Rhodesian forces without any compensation. All traffic in and out of the PVs was controlled by the Smith regime through rigorous identity checks and body searches. The peoples’ livelihoods, health, education, and social and cultural norms suffered greatly. According to Julie Frederiske (1982: 84), some three-quarters of a million people were forced to move into PVs or Keeps, as Africans came to call them, displaying their resentment at being treated like animals. *Figures 1 and 2* give a visual impression of the overcrowding and squalid conditions which beset African during their forced stay in the PVs:

Figure 1: Chimoio Protected Villages under construction in the Mutoko District of the Mashonaland East Province in Zimbabwe)



Figure 1

Figure 2: Showing Pachanza Protected Village in the Mutoko District of Mashonaland East Province in Zimbabwe (Note the density of the huts)



Figure 2

The Rhodesian media's response to the Protected Village Programme and its curfews was no more and no less than

predictable. The media was gagged to parrot the official position on the state of the PVs. Julie Frederikse (1982: 88) aptly summed up the media's response to the PVs programme,

initially, the domestic newspapers gave some to reports of dangerous health and welfare conditions inside the PVs and the violence that befell those who ventured outside them after curfew, but very soon they were echoing the regime's propaganda that civilians actually appreciated their resettlement because of the protection offered against 'terrorists'. Some foreign media and domestic church groups [such as the CCJP] attempted to reveal villagers complaints about the hardships of PV life, but there was a virtual news black-out inside Rhodesia on any negative view of the programme[...]. Less important, however, than the propaganda *about* the PVS was the propaganda *to* the PVs."

As noted by Bhebe and Ranger (1995: 15), Protected Villages surrounded by a guerrilla-dominated countryside never matched the intended effectiveness of choking the guerrilla insurgency, and; partly because Rhodesian 'psychological warfare' was half-hearted and ineffective. One of the significant weaknesses in the manning of the PVs has been noted by Cillier (1985: 85) that only the gates of the PVs were guarded, the fences around the village did not effectively prevent communication between the villagers and the guerrillas or the freedom fighters. On the other hand, so resolute were the Africans living in the PVs who defied all the odds such that even after their confinement they continued to risk their lives by smuggling food, for instance under manure in ox-drawn carts in order to keep the spirit of resistance alive (Manungo, 1991). The time they spent during the day outside the PVs was often used to provide the freedom fighters with vital information. There is no evidence in historical texts to suggest that the support the guerrillas got from the local African people significantly diminished after the establishment of PVs. In the end Protected Villages can be regarded as commemorative symbols of the resilience of humanity in the face of adversity, encapsulated by an unwavering quest for independence.

Post-independence Zimbabwe: Contemporary uses of Protected Villages

Local communities are vital in any discussion or discourse on heritage conservation regardless of typology. Structural remnants of Protected Villages in Mashonaland East and Mashonaland Central Provinces vary in both their physical and spatial outlook. Similarly, local communities' appreciation and use of Protected Villages today also differ. Cary's (1998) characterisation of community illuminates the discussion regarding contemporary use of Protected Villages by communities in the Shamva District in the Mashonaland Province of Zimbabwe. The various and rather haphazard manner in which communities in Shamva have converted the standing structures that remained as remnants of the PVs (*See Figs 3 and 4 below*) stirs debate on issues of neglect of this significant liberation heritage as well as the complexity and at times indifferent way with which PVs are perceived by contemporary communities:

Figure 3: One of the keep structures in Shamva District (Mashonaland Province) is now used to house a grinding mill.



Figure 3

Source: Courtesy of the authors.

Figure 4: Keeps in Shamva District being altered for contemporary use without any due regard to their heritage value



Figure 4

Source: Courtesy of the authors

One would have expected the remaining structures to be revered by the local communities as symbolic of the liberation struggle which they desire to either use sustainably or simply conserve as sacrosanct heritage to bequeath to future generations.

On the contrary, this heritage typology is evidently threatened with total extinction as a result of many years of lack of its prioritisation by government through NMMZ. This has been exacerbated by community indifference as evidenced by the abandoned state of Protected Villages in Murewa and Mutoko Districts (*See Figures 5 and 6*) in the Mashonaland East Province of Zimbabwe:

Figures 5 & 6. Remnants of Chipfunde Protected Village in Murewa District (Mashonaland East Province). Local Community has not converted the site to any significant use.



Figure 5



Figure 6

The issue of sustainability of remnant structures is very relevant and critical in the conservation of PVs in that they are the visual and memory aids of the related the narratives and activities. They provide the context through which PVs ought to be heritagised. Sustainability emerged as a concept in 1987 with the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, which defined “sustainable development” as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future

generations to meet their own needs” (Gould, 2009). The definition and nature of community can have a bearing on how heritage is defined and valued by the locals and PVs as a liberation heritage typology are no exception. As noted by Chirikure and Pwiti (2008), layers of complexity are entangled in the definition of “community” and whilst the contemporary discourse of community has an implicit residential bias, there are other forms of communities, among them those based on interests. Communities of interests are called “stakeholders” and transcend communities of place and geographical boundaries. Gould (2009) succinctly describes community as people who live in some spatial relationship to another and who share interests and values.

The protection and conservation of PVs needs to address both contemporary and future needs of local communities. This paper argues not only for the recognition of PVs as a heritage typology for heritage sake but for tangible community and national benefit as well. Both local community and the government could benefit from conserving such edifices through the development of these sites for tourism. Such tourism should serve both to inform and to give the visitor a memorable experience. Tourism has shifted globally from nature to culture as interest in people as opposed to natural wilderness has become the mainstay of tourism. PVs as a liberation heritage typology could be as significant as Cecil John Rhodes’ grave in the Matopos or the statue of David Livingstone’s statue in Victoria Falls in promoting tourism, both local and international. The PVs tell a two-sided story of Rhodesian strategy to contain guerrilla insurgency and the supreme sacrifice of African inhabitants of the PVs in a similar way that Robin Island is showing the duality of apartheid and simultaneously generating thousands of South African Rands for the people and government. Tourism has the potential to generate revenue for the locals as well as the government. Local livelihoods could be enhanced once

Protected Villages as Liberation Heritage

As we alluded to above, “PVs” were symbols of oppression in the then Southern Rhodesia as the settler regime tried to contain

the infiltration of the country's communal areas by Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces. Yet, the PVs, created at any cost, material, monetary or human lives, later turned out to be symbols of resistance and the fight against colonialism because they failed to deter or dissuade Africans from supporting the guerrillas, who in any case were not mercenaries but sons and daughters of Zimbabwe fighting for the independence and freedom of their motherland from the yoke of colonialism. In fact, the indigenous Africans were against the impunity and brutality of the Rhodesian Government who literally created the PVs at any cost. This in itself can be sufficient knowledge for the acknowledgement of PVs as a significant part of the liberation heritage of Zimbabwe both at a community and official levels.

Currently, PVs do not enjoy any form of legal protection, and active conservation due to a myriad of challenges. This has led to PVs becoming more or less a classical example of what Howard has described as "unmanaged heritage, behind the scenes in people's lives" (Howard, 2003: 1). The problems faced by Zimbabwe in the management of heritage in general and liberation heritage in particular remain numerous and profound. These challenges range from lack of adequate funding to lack of education to locals on the importance of such built heritage that tells a story about Zimbabwe's protracted liberation war or the Second Chimurenga. One of these challenges is that the structural and physical remains of the PVs inadvertently seem to represent the Rhodesian side or space in the Keeps. The overcrowding and unsanitary nature of the Keeps is not reflected by the remaining structures at the PV sites. The African experience is mainly left in their narratives. Perhaps NMMZ could consider, among other site development programmes, reconstructing the African huts in at least one of the former PVs to recreate the aura of the colonial times. Else, failure to do so might reproduce the cardinal sin of the Rhodesian media which hardly brought to light the adverse condition that befell Africans in PVs. Yet because of their historicity, the power of their narratives and the nostalgia and emotions that they stir, PVs could, have the potential to become multi-component and multifaceted

heritage places in terms of values, meaning and significance. Lipe's (1984) definition of values is perhaps insightful in exploring the values and significance of PVs. He places values into four main categories namely informational, associate, economic and aesthetic. All these values could be distilled from PVs in addition to historical, national and other cultural sentiments.

Of the one hundred and fifty listed national monuments in Zimbabwe, only a handful fall into the liberation heritage category. Pioneer or Settler Memorials and Portuguese monuments constitute thirty eight percent, rock art sites twenty one percent, Zimbabwe type nineteen percent, and other sites twenty two percent³. The latter is a composite category that lumps together liberation heritage, intangible cultural heritage or scared sites and natural heritage sites. The declared monuments in the liberation category comprise mainly of the National Heroes Acre and ten Provincial Heroes' Acres and Sikombela Detention Camp in the Midlands Province of Zimbabwe which was only gazette as a national monument in 2014. Yet PVs are part of the memory of the liberation struggle at various levels ranging from individual to collective. The structures illustrates in structural juxtaposition, the contrasting realities of the white Rhodesians manning the keeps and the Africans inhabiting them. Unless and until the stories of the PVs are told by many different people who were affected by the PVs, directly or indirectly, and captured through documentation and are made accessible to the public, this heritage stand to be lost through natural wastage of people who hold the testimonies of their experiences in the PVs and well as to the dilapidation of what remains as their physical structures. It is worth noting that PVs are not merely a memory gap in the making of Zimbabwe liberation heritage, but should be perceived in a broader and inclusive context where, as asserted by Johnson (2002) memory is not simply a recollection of times past, but it is also anchored in places past. In fact, PVs as liberation heritage sites, do not merely embody memories of the past, but have themselves become embodied memories (Rowlands, 1993). Therefore, in conserving a critical

³http://www.nmmz.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=42&Itemid=175

balance is required of the tangible and intangible aspects of this heritage liberation heritage typology.

In contemporary heritage management practice, the inclusion of multiple stakeholders has emerged as one of the themes in defining and applying heritage values (Smith *et al*, 2010). Stakeholder partnerships have the potential of enhancing the protection and conservation of PVs while communities are also allowed to use them for their contemporary benefit. The ‘what’s in it for us?’ or ‘who calls the tune?’ are some of many pertinent questions that confront the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe as the statutory body responsible for the conservation and protect of heritage in Zimbabwe in its ongoing efforts to accord PVs adequate legal protection as well as community understanding and appreciation of this heritage typology. NMMZ is currently consulting stakeholders and gathering information to carry out full scale research that will result in the production of nomination dossiers national monument listing and inform subsequent monument development programmes. However, NMMZ should recognise that any form of conservation or presentation of these heritage sites is likely to be political in the sense that, notes Howard (2003), someone will be advantaged by it and that someone else will be disadvantaged. The narratives and activities which could enhance and sustain the PVs as national heritage can be arena of intense debate and contestations.

During a visit to tour and assess one of the Protected Villages in Chiweshe District now surrounded by the sprouting and popular Nzvimbo Growth Point, the Executive Director made an illuminating remark regarding Protected Villages in post-colonial Zimbabwe: “We should now insist that Rural District Councils (RDCs) conserve remnant features of former ‘Keeps’ of the liberation struggle”.⁴ This remark may give the impression that NMMZ is delegating its responsibility to RDCs. On the contrary, it points to the need for NMMZ to engage RDCs as important stakeholders in the protection and conservation of PVs as heritage

⁴ Dr. Godfrey Mahachi, the Executive Director of National Museums and | Monuments of Zimbabwe made this remark during a tour of the remnants of the Nzvimbo Growth Point in Chiweshe on 5th June 2015

places. The remnants of PVs are vulnerable to destruction through various development projects. RDCS are usual the ones who champion and regulate development in most places where the PVs are located. The other potential of protected villages as a heritage typology lies in that they can be a refreshing departure from merely emphasising a narrow formulation of victors' narratives to more nuanced and inclusive histories of the struggle. This could be achieved by providing opportunities to local communities to celebrate the stories, narratives and experiences of ordinary men, women and children, individually and collectively, who together formed a critical mass which caught in between the liberation war tussle between the guerrillas and the Rhodesian Forces. NMMZ can offer a platform for dialogue and site interpretation that allows people to reminisce and tell their stories and even sing and dance like they did during the liberation struggle.

Superficially, the values of liberation heritage can be assumed as subsumed in the history of the war and the broader national perspective. However, NMMZ may need to really determine on a case by case basis the values of each PV from the perspective of the particular community. As highlighted by Ndoro (2001:93) and Johnson (2002), historical sites such as the PVs depend for their value on the recognition society affords them. Therefore, there is need to understand the values to be able to effectively and sustainably manage these heritage sites. NMMZ, as the statutory heritage management agency ought to be wary of overgeneralization and oversimplification of liberation heritage values. To make such values generic is not only folly, but it is also untenable. Conservation of PVs has the potential to shape and enhance cultural identities rooted in shared experiences and memory thereby fostering social cohesion through commemoration. As a heritage typology the potential of PVs in evoking nuanced discussion on Zimbabwe's liberation heritage rests in their propensity to in Fontein's (2009:1) words "retort to, and provoke responses from the living...". And as national heritage, PVs can be an amalgam of physical, cultural and historical legacies from the past (Gould, 2009).

The more general challenges include mass alteration and destruction of sites by development projects. Such a fate has befallen some of the keeps in Chiweshe District in Mashonaland East particularly the PV at Nzvimbo Growth Point whose outlook has been altered due to the development and expansion of this Growth Point (*See Figure 7*).

Figure 7: Nzvimbo Growth Point in Chiweshe (Mashonaland Central Province) Infrastructural developments have altered the remnants and context of this Protected Village



Figure 7

The Rural District Council has taken advantage of the infrastructure laid during the establishment of the protected village to service the present growth point. Whereas this had an advantage of synergy of the past experiences and present needs of the community, two huge water takes constructed close to the protected village's water tank altered and compromised the conservation of the remaining structures. They also decontextualized the setting of the “*keep*”

In essence, heritage is in many ways at the crossroad of development in Zimbabwe. However, one PV in Chief Bushu's area directly under Headman Gono, the local community in collaboration for the local leadership who include the Member of

Parliament for the area, are in the process of refurbishing the former PV in the area with the intention of converting it into a clinic (*See Figure 8*):

Figure 8: Structures at this Protected Village have been repainted as part of efforts to convert it into a Local clinic to serve the community



Figure 8

This is an example that shows that in some cases communities are willing to go it alone without the heritage management agencies. Whereas this is a very noble initiative by the community to ensure that the PV remain a relevant place from the past in the present and for the future, the NMMZ ought to get itself actively involved to ensure that access, use and sustainability are balanced.

Conclusion

From the above discussion, it is plausible to conclude that the experiences, trials and tribulations of the African people who inhabited the PVs should be regarded as a significant part of the ‘mundane’ description of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe as protracted and arduous. PVs caused Africans to face many hardships and a significant disruption of their lives both socially and economically. Yet they remained steadfast in their support of the liberation struggle and the quest for the independence of Zimbabwe. Africans residing in PVs the 1970s subordinated their personal interests to the collective interest of Zimbabwe; and, in the process they endured pain, suffering and brutality in fortitude. Therefore, PVs just like detention camps and battle sites epitomize the supreme sacrifice of the African people toward the independence and freedom of Zimbabwe from colonial bondage. Therefore, Protected Villages or Keeps are synonymous with the struggle in many parts of Zimbabwe especially in Mashanaland East and Mashonaland Central Provinces where more than fifty percent of all Keeps created the Liberation War were found. Their significance as a heritage typology is unwavering and the need to collect, document, conserve, present, promote, safeguard and commemorate the mosaic of “Protected Villages” can hardly be overemphasized. Protected Villages stand as a symbolic duality of space and voice that speaks about the contributions of ordinary citizens in the liberation struggle. The Conservation and protection of PVs is an emblem and a testimony of the important role that civilians played to liberate Zimbabwe and simultaneously generating income streams for communities and revenue for the Government of Zimbabwe through tourism.

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Cultural Heritage in Ghana: A Vehicle for Sustainable Development?

Richard Asante

Introduction

In the past few years, advocates of cultural heritage have underscored its merits and promise for development. Cultural heritage has been conceived of as a vehicle for innovation and change, particularly in developing economies (Peterson, Gavua and Rassool, 2015; Anquandah, 2015; Awedoba, 2002; World Bank, 2001; UNESCO, 2013; Asafo-Agyei, (2008); Ntibagirirwa, 2009). It is argued that as African countries attempt to build burgeoning economies and strong united societies in the twenty-first century, cultural heritage has a critical role to play in this regard and Ghana is not an exception. Ghana, like many other countries in Africa, is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious society with a rich and a wide variety of heritage resources. Ghana is home to some historic monuments and sites inscribed on the World Heritage List of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

The presence of these valuable heritage endowments opens up the country for major development opportunities. However, Ghana is yet to sufficiently tap into its cultural heritage resources for development. Although in recent years, there has been a growing recognition among policy makers and scholars of the importance of harnessing and utilizing the country's rich cultural heritage for development, Ghana is facing major challenges regarding the management and conservation of its natural and cultural heritage resources and sites (Gavua, 2015; Asafo-Agyei, 2008; Ahiawodzi, 2013). The challenge is as a result of a combination of factors such as climate change, globalization, rapid migrations and urbanization.

Despite the importance of cultural heritage, there is a lack of consensus on the meaning of cultural heritage in different cultures. Furthermore, the debate on the nexus between cultural heritage and sustainable development remains highly controversial and inconclusive. Some critics contend that rather than being a vehicle, cultural heritage might be a barrier to development. These debates raise a number of fundamental questions such as: What cultural heritage is and why it has been posited as an important tool for development? In what ways can cultural heritage facilitate or impede development? What constitutes heritage in Ghana? How is cultural heritage being re-defined in the contemporary era of multi-party democracy and globalization in Ghana? How is Ghana using or harnessing its rich cultural heritage to promote development, particularly in an era of globalization? In what sense could it be said that cultural heritage has been and possibly continues to be a vehicle for innovation and change? The primary objective of this chapter is to examine the merits, tensions, and challenges for using cultural heritage to promote sustainable development in Ghana. It is argued that cultural heritage represents an important vehicle for promoting sustainable development but is yet to be mainstreamed into Ghana's development agenda. Consequently, effective identification, utilization, and marketing of the appropriate cultural heritage resources backed by sound policies and programs have the potential to transform cultural heritage resources more as a vehicle rather than an impediment for development.

The chapter is structured as follows: The introduction is followed by conceptualization of culture and heritage, and contestations surrounding them. The next section examines why cultural heritage has been posited by scholars, development activists, and donors as a potential vehicle for sustainable development. This is followed by an outline of what constitute cultural heritage in Ghana, and a critical analyses of the extent to which cultural heritage has been and possibly continues to be a vehicle for innovation and change, or a barrier to development in Ghana. The analyses focus on the contributions of tourism or cultural tourism to Ghana's economy and that of chiefs, the paragons and custodians of Ghana's cultural heritage, culture and

traditions to development. In what follows, the penultimate, I discuss some of the key institutions and initiatives that have been introduced by the government and others to harness our cultural heritage to stimulate development at the national and local levels. The final section presents the conclusion and the way forward.

Defining Culture and Heritage

As a concept, culture has been subjected to many definitions and interpretations. Tylor (1920) interprets culture as that complex whole which includes knowledge, morals, religion, customs and habits or any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2001, cited in UNESCO, 2009:1) defines culture “as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, that encompasses, not only art and literature, but lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs” . In the words of James Anquandah (2015:1) “culture is lifestyle as manifested by a particular people or society”. According to the 2004 Cultural Policy of Ghana:

Culture is the totality of the way of life evolved by our people through experience and reflection in our attempt to fashion a harmonious co-existence with our environment. Culture is dynamic and gives order and meaning to the social, political, economic, aesthetic and religious practices of our people. Our Culture also gives us our distinct identity as a people (National Commission on Culture, 2004: 3).

More generally, culture refers to the entire ways of life. It represents various forms of behaviour, practices and thoughts that are nurtured, held, cherished and maintained as desirable and having importance and relevance for our lives. It is believed that culture serves as the oil that keeps society running. Despite the different interpretations, there is a consensus among scholars that culture is dynamic and not static, consequently, it can be affected by

both local and external influences and stimuli (Anquandah, 2015), such as changes in demographic profile of the society; changes in environment and economy; contact with other societies: through wars, trade, and colonization could result in borrowing of new habits and norms and abandonment of old ways; as well as globalization, technology and scientific knowledge.

Heritage denotes a wide range of inherited traditions, monuments, objects, and culture. The concept of cultural heritage is an essential part of culture as a whole. More broadly, it refers to expression of the ways of living developed by a community and passed on from generation to generation. This includes customs, practices, places, objects, artistic expressions and values. Cultural heritage is often expressed as either intangible or tangible cultural heritage (ICOMOS, 2002). The term “cultural heritage” includes: tangible heritage: the monumental and physical remains of cultures, types of food procurement and preparation, diverse technology and crafts clothing, body decoration, visual art and symbols, secular and religious architecture, monetary medium of exchange, transport systems (Anquandah, 2015). Intangible heritage include: traditional knowledge, local practices, and cultural industries, (Baker, (n.d) languages, dialects, philosophical thought, cosmology, morals and ethics, religious beliefs and rituals oral traditions, folklore, festivals, political ideas, music and dance, social customs related to birth, puberty, marriage, family life, work, death (Anquandah, 2015). I add that intangible heritage also includes voices, values, traditions, oral history.

In the past, cultural heritage referred exclusively to the monumental remains of cultures. For example, Article 1 of the 1972 UNESCO. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage defines cultural heritage under three categories:

- **Monuments:** architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;

- **Groups of buildings:** groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;

- **Sites:** works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view (UNESCO, 2005: 10).

Moreover, Article 2, of the Convention, defines “natural heritage” as:

- Natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view;

- Geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation; and

- Natural sites or precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science, conservation or natural beauty (UNESCO, 2005:10).

However, since the adoption of The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage by the UNESCO General Conference in 2003, UNESCO has been paying more attention to intangible cultural heritage especially (a) oral traditions and expressions, including language as a vehicle of the intangible cultural heritage; (b) performing arts; (c) social practices, rituals and festive events; (d) knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe; (e) traditional craftsmanship. In practice, tangible heritage is inextricably linked to the intangible heritage. Other form of cultural heritage such as cuisine, clothing, and forms of shelter, traditional skills and technologies, religious ceremonies, performing arts, storytelling are also receiving attention.

Importance of Cultural Heritage to Development

In the past three decades, there has been a growing recognition that cultural values matter for development (see for instance,

Harrison and Huntington, 2000; Gyekye, 2003; Awedoba, 2002; Awedoba, 2013; Prah, 2014; Sen, 2006; Ntibagirirwa, 2009; Anquandah, 2015). In particular, it is believed that cultural heritage can be an active agent of social and economic transformation. Through its powerful symbolic and aesthetic attributes, it can foster strong social bonds of relationships which could enhance social cohesion. Gyimah-Boadi and Asante (2006), Gavua (2015) and Nii-Dortey (2015) have noted how successive post-colonial governments in Ghana have drawn on the country's rich heritage and cultural traditions to promote national unity. Furthermore, cultural heritage is essential to people's spiritual wellbeing, and has the potential to promote the common good, while reducing inequalities (Boccardi and Duvelle, 2013). For example, the 2004 Cultural Policy of Ghana recognizes the importance of culture and heritage in fostering social cohesion and political stability. The policy acknowledges that:

Ghana has over 50 ethnic groups whose common values and institutions represent our collective national heritage. Each of these ethnic groups brought together by dint of history, has unique cultural features and traditions that give Identity, self-respect, and pride to the people. Since independence, the emerging civil society of Ghana has recognized the need to promote Unity within this cultural diversity, and Ghana has since enjoyed relative unity, stability, and peace (National Commission on Culture, 2004).

Furthermore, cultural heritage is seen as a powerful asset for inclusive economic development; it has the potential to attract investments and employment in a variety of sectors such as the arts, crafts and tourism industry, conservation and food production, and traditional healing and pharmacopoeia. The 2006 UNESCO, study/report on Cultural Heritage and local development summarizes the importance of cultural heritage. **(See box 1).**

Box 1: Important of Cultural Heritage to Local and National Development

Source: UNESCO, 2006, Cultural Heritage and Local Development

Despite the wide acknowledgment of its importance as an incredible asset to local and national development (World Bank,

- Heritage sites and buildings can have a very positive influence on many aspects of the way a community develops. Regeneration, housing, education, economic growth and community engagement are examples of the ways in which heritage can make a very positive contribution to community life. This is because:
- The historic environment is a proven source of benefit to local economies, particularly through tourism.
- An attractive heritage environment assists in attracting external investment as well as maintaining existing businesses of all types, not just tourism-related.
- People are very proud of their local history, but don't always express how much they value a place until it's threatened. Because it adds character and distinctiveness to an area, heritage is a fundamental in creating a 'sense of place' for a community.
- Adaptive reuse of heritage buildings is an important factor in creating sustainable communities.
- Heritage buildings add value to regeneration projects, both in terms the economic and environmental advantage of reuse over new build and in adding character to a precinct.
- Heritage places can be a potent driver for community action.
- Increased community values and greater social inclusion can be achieved through a focus on heritage matters.
- The heritage places are an excellent local educational resource for people of all ages. Learning about the history of a place is a good way of bringing communities together through a shared understanding of the unique cultural identity heritage places give to an area.
- Areas where the heritage is understood and valued tend to be better looked after than those where heritage items have no link with the community.

2001; Boccardi and Duvelle, 2013), cultural heritage has been absent from the sustainable development debate in Ghana and some other African countries. Worse yet, much of the imported Western

development models that have been adopted and implemented by many African countries including Ghana overlooked the importance of cultural dimensions in development (Awedoda, 2013; Asafo-Adjei, 2008; Ntibagirirwa, 2009; Prah, 2014). For example, in the 1980s the World Bank ceased lending for tourism, including cultural tourism for fear that it was consuming budgetary resources. In more recent times, the World Bank however, has been promoting the idea that the cultural and natural heritage sector can serve as a springboard for effective economic growth and development (World Bank, 2001). The radical change of position of the World Bank is influenced largely by the growing recognition that cultural heritage is indispensable resource and a springboard for socio-economic growth and transformation.

Cultural Heritage in the Context of Ghana

Cultural heritage resources matters for development. Ghana, formerly known as the Gold Coast has a rich history and diverse living heritage. Ghana has two places inscribed under the UNESCO World Heritage Site list. These are:

- Forts and Castles, Volta, Greater Accra, Central and Western Regions;
- Asante Traditional Buildings.

Ghana has a varied collection of European Forts and Castles built and occupied by the Portuguese, Dutch, Danes, Swedes, Germans, French, British and Brandenburg-Prussians between the 15th and 20th Centuries (Ghana National Commission for UNESCO (n.d). About eleven Forts and Castles have been chosen as World Heritage Sites by UNESCO in 1979. These are:

- Elmina Castle, Elmina;
- Cape Coast Castle, Cape Coast (See Fig. 1);
- Fort Saint Antony, Axim;
- Fort San Sebastian, Shama;
- Fort Batenstein, Butri;
- Fort St. Jago (Fort Conraadsburg), Elmina (See Fig. 2);
- English Fort (Fort Vrendenburg), Komenda;
- Fort Metal Cross, Dixcove;

- Fort Amsterdam, Abandze;
 - Fort Patience (Fort Leysaemhyt), Apam;
 - Fort Good Hope (Fort Goedehoop), Senya Beraku
- (See <http://www.123independenceday.com/ghana/heritage.html>).

Fig. 1: Cape Coast Castle



Source: <http://www.ghanamuseums.org/forts/forts-castles.php> - Accessed 12/10/2015

Fig. 2: Fort St. Jago, Elmina



Source: <http://www.ghanamuseums.org/forts/forts-castles.php> - Accessed 12/10/2015

Furthermore, in 1979, ten ancient Asante Traditional Buildings dating back from the 17th to the early 20th Century were also included in the world heritage list (see Fig. 3). The buildings, made of earth, wood and straw are part of the great landmark of Asante civilization (Ghana National Commission for UNESCO (n.d).

Fig. 3: Asante Traditional Building



Photo credit: © CRAterre **Author:** Thierry Joffroy

Source: <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/35/gallery/>

Accessed

12/10/2015

Other elements of the Ghana Cultural Heritage include:

- Adinkra symbols;
- Carved wooden stools;
- Festivals of the various ethnic groups;
- Gold weights;
- Kente cloth;
- Musical genres such as highlife and hiplife;
- Traditional and contemporary musical instruments;
- Traditional dances;
- Traditional ethnic music;
- Mosques in Northern Ghana;

- Artifacts such as pots, stools, musical instruments, textiles, clothing, leather works, weapons, tools, carvings, masks, jewellery, and ritual dolls.

See <http://www.ghanamuseums.org/material-cultural-heritage.php>

In addition to these cultural heritages, there are other private and specialized museums such as the Manhyia Palace Museum in Kumasi, which exhibits the arts and culture of the Asante people (Kuntaa, 2012). Many of these castles and forts in Ghana are protected monuments in the custody of the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB). Along with other exotic sites, the castles and forts have become an integral part of tourism attraction in Ghana. In light of these rich and unenviable natural, tangible and intangible heritages, it is expected that cultural heritage will take a centre stage within the development agenda of Ghana.

Cultural Heritage and Sustainable Development

Cultural heritage is critical for sustainable development. As stated earlier, Ghana like many other African Countries has not adequately given attention to cultural dimensions especially combining indigenous values with colonial heritage (Ntibagiriwa, 2009) as the Asians have done in their development agenda. As succinctly put by Kwesi Prah of the Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society, Cape Town, South Africa, if development must come to Africa, it must come in the cultural features of Africans language and other institutions of culture. In contemporary Ghana there is a strong push by some scholar such as Kwadwo Asafo-Adjei Okrah (2008) and Kwame Gyekye (2003) for cultural renaissance or what is known as “*Sankofa*”, in the Akan language of Ghana, meaning "go back and take" (Sanko- go back, fa- take). Owusu-Amoah, (2012:1) explains that '*Sankofa*' can be “likened to a mythical bird that flies forward with its head turned backward reflecting the belief that, the past serves as a guide for planning into the future.”

Heritage and Cultural Tourism in Ghana

Globally, tourism has been described as the ‘new gold’ that drives job creation, development and economic growth. The tourism sector is currently considered the fastest growing industry in the world in the 21st century and accounts for 11.4% of the world’s national product (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), 2012; Ahiawodzi, 2013). It is the third biggest international export after petroleum and motor vehicles. As stated earlier, Ghana is richly endowed with various natural heritage and historical monuments and tourist sites such as Castles and Forts built between the 14th and 18th centuries by the major European powers such as the Portuguese, Danes, Dutch and Germans. The Cape Coast and Elmina Castles are major holding centres and exit points for African to the Americans during the Trans - Atlantic slave trade. Ghana’s natural heritage sites also include exotic wet lands, crocodile ponds, wildlife parks and scenic mountains. Along with other unique cultural heritage of Ghana such as variety of festivals, skills of artisans in woodcarving, pottery, painting and goldsmith (Ahiawodzi, 2013), have become popular and attractive sites to tourists from all over the world. In recent times, tourism in Ghana has been focusing on cultural tourism to stimulate economic development, complemented with attractions such as historical heritage sites, Museums, game viewing in national parks and historical heritage tourism making the country a gateway for Africans in the Diaspora who visit their native land on the continent.

The 2004 Cultural Policy of Ghana states that:

The State shall actively support research into production and preservation of local foods and the compilation of traditional recipes and methods of preservation. The State shall encourage the consumption of Ghanaian cuisine from all parts of the country and discourage the over- dependence on imported foods; the state shall explore the nutritional values of our local food stuff and promote them; Ghanaians shall be

encouraged to develop a culture of producing what they eat and eating what they produce (National Commission on Culture, 2015).

The policy underscores the growing importance attached by the government particularly to the production and conservation of local traditional foodstuff and recipes previously unexploited and overshadowed by imported foodstuff and recipes. In line with this policy, the government has in recent times been promoting the production and consumption of made in Ghana products.

In Ghana, Tourism centred on heritage, both cultural and natural, represents a major contributor to economic growth and development in Ghana. The tourism sector has been a major source of foreign exchange, government revenues and employment. Tourism has been a source of financial gain, accruing from the entrance fees to heritage sites including museums, guided tours and visits, sales of various handcrafts, photos, among others. Cultural tourism has a multiplier effect, with financial repercussions in other critical sectors of the economy at the local and national levels such as the hospitality industry, transportation and restaurant services. Other effects include entrepreneurial ventures in the entertainment industry (cultural dance groups, night clubs), food (fast food centres), textile (tie and dye, batakari and kente), craft (akuaba dolls, masks, and leather products).

The Tourism industry is currently the third largest source of foreign exchange in the country after gold and cocoa (ISSER, 2014). Earning from tourism was US\$1,8750 million by the end of 2010 (ISSER, 2010). It is estimated by the Ghana Tourism Authority that tourist arrivals increased by 10% in 2013, from 903,300 in 2012 to 993,600 in 2013 (Table 1). The Okwahu Hang and Paragliding Festival attracted about 10,000 tourists in 2013 (ISSER, 2014). Furthermore, the Pan African Historical Theatre Project (PANAFEST) attracted about 10,000 Africans from the diaspora (ISSER, 2014). In total, the contribution of the Tourism Industry to job creation both (direct and indirect) increased by approximately 11% over the 2012-2013 periods (ISSER, 2014).

Table 1: Contributions of Tourism to Ghana's Economy

Indicators	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Arrivals (000)	586.6	698. 1	802.8	981.2	1080. 20	903.3 0	993.6 0
Receipts (million US\$)	1,172. 00	1403 .1	1,615. 20	1,875. 00	2,178. 9	1,704 .7	1,876 .9
Employment (000)	206.1	234. 7	260	291.2	330.5	287	319
Number of hotels (000)	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.8	2.1	n.a	n.a
Number of rooms (000)	20.8	24.4	26.1	27.9	34.2	n.a	n.a
Number of beds (000)	26.1	29.7	31.7	34.1	39.7	n.a	n.a

Source: ISSER, 2014: The State of the Ghanaian Economy, page, 184-185.

Estimates from the Ghana Tourist Board indicate that the contributions of the tourism industry to the GDP of the country have been increasing steadily from 4.9% of GDP in 2005 to 5.8% in 2006 and to 6.3% in 2007. (2008). For example, in 2013, other estimates show that the direct contribution of the Travel and Tour industry to Ghana's GDP was US\$1.34 billion, representing 2.8% of GDP. Besides, the number of employment opportunities directly supported by tourism was 124,000 and Travel and Tour investment amounted to US\$303 million in 2013. It is estimated that International Tourist Receipts increased from US\$970 million in 2008 to US\$1,068 in 2013. The number of annual international visitors to Ghana is now roughly 950,000 and is expected to grow to 1.5 million by 2024 (See citifmonline.com/2015/10/04/facts-and-figures-of-tourism-in-ghana/#sthash.5sFyRdKr.dpuf).

Further estimates indicate that International visitor arrivals have more than doubled in the last five years, almost reaching a million in 2010, with an annual average growth rate of 6.5%

- Tourism accounted for around 6.2% of Ghana's GDP in 2009 (Ministry of Tourism);

- It contributed US\$1.6bn to the economy;
- The domestic travel market averages 11% growth a year.

See <http://www.hitt-initiative.org/countries/ghana>

Some of Ghana's natural heritage such as the Hippo Sanctuary in the Wechi Community has been recently voted by the Earth Watch Institute as the third best conservation site in the world (Ghana Invested Promotion Centre (GIPC, 2000). By the end of 2007, the Hippo Sanctuary had total arrivals of both residents and non – residents of 1,856 resulting in a total revenue of GH¢11,725.30 – (Ghana Tourist Board, 2002). Since 2004, the Paragliding festival at Kwahu in the Eastern Region of Ghana is gaining wide patronage from international and local tourists yearly, particularly during the Easter time period. Thus, earnings by Tourists who visit these sites have contributed positively to the local economy.

Furthermore, in addition, to the natural and exotic sites in Ghana, the textiles industry particularly, Kente which is largely associated with the Asante and Ewe ethnic groups, have contributed significantly to both the local and national economy. The textile industry has a long the tradition that dates back to over 300 years. In Asante, Bonwire is the main centre of production involving over 800 houses with some 2000 weavers. According to James Anquandah (2015) “Bonwire weavers have a repertoire of over 1000 kente designs and motifs most of them identifiable by their generic or specific names among them Sika futuro, Oyokoman, Adweneasa, Kuduo, Babadua, Asasia, Fathia fata Nkrumah, Akosombo Kanea, New Ghana, Sika fre mogya, Abrewa ben, African Unity etc”. Bonwire Kente is patronized by African Americans and other foreign embassies in Ghana (Anquandah, 2015).

Among the Ewes, Kente production is practiced in some townships such as Agbozume (known as the Kente market of the

world) among others. Unlike Asante kente that focus largely on the production of “geometrical” Kente motifs, the Ewe repertoire is unique in emphasizing representational “figurative inlay” designs in addition to producing some typical Asante motifs like Fathia Nkrumah and Oyokoman (National Commission on Culture, 2015). African Americans and the Merchant Bank of Ghana have provided strong support for Kente producers at Dzelukope to access markets in the USA, South Africa and elsewhere. The African American Community in USA has adopted the Kente textile as an item of “identity” (Anquandah, 2015). In *The Copyright Thing Doesn't Work Here*, Boatema Boateng (2011), examines the appropriation of Ghanaian textiles such as “Adinkra” and “Kente” for global markets, particularly among the Diaspora, in the United States. She shows that both textiles have been widely mass-produced outside Ghana, particularly in East Asia, without any compensation to the originators of the designs. Boateng highlights the challenge of using the international intellectual property law to preserve folklore and other traditional forms of knowledge.

Glass Bead Culture

Increasingly, Glass Bead Culture among the Dangme and Asante/Dabaa glass bead technology culture has become popular in recent times. Ghanaian bead industry including glass, bauxite, shell stone beads and spearheaded by private entrepreneurs who use culture as a tool for national development (Anquandah, 2015). The Krobo and Se/Shai Dangme ethnic group resident in Eastern Region and Greater Accra Region respectively practice a puberty rite for females, a tradition that requires girls who first experience their puberty to undergo special traditional cult ceremonies before they can be betrothed and given in marriage. At the climax of the puberty ceremonies, the puberty graduands are dressed in a mass of ornate bead ornaments and Kente textiles. This has led to the growth of an artistic glass bead industry with its major centre at Odumase Krobo. Old Beverage and Ointment glass bottles are purchased, ground and mixed with imported coloured powder fed into clay moulds and baked in high temperature ovens or mud kilns.

The products (plain, bichrome or polychrome beads) are exported throughout Ghana and to Europe and USA. Various African American Private Companies are using this bead culture also to portray African Community identity (Anquandah, 2015).

In Ghana, the beads industry has a fascinating history and plays an important role in contemporary social activities such as displaying beauty, heritage, and creativity. In *Ghana: Where the Bead Speaks*, Esi Sutherland –Addy, Ama Ata Aidoo, and Kati Torda, (2011) examine the history of the beads in Ghana and the role of beads in our society. Beads are an expression of the creativity and aesthetic of our people and an important part of cultural tourism. For example, in 2011, the New Juaben Municipal Assembly, in collaboration with the Regional Coordinating Council, established a beads market. The facility is designed to offer a suitable and permanent place for the trading of beads and other artefacts to create more employment opportunities and improve the income levels of the traders. The beads market is expected to boost and enhance tourist attraction in the municipality, and also offer a one-stop avenue for cultural artefacts and services (The Chronicle, 2011).

In the past few years, a new culture of producing spectacular “fantasy coffins” carved in unique styles to depict the profession of the deceased has emerged in the Ga-speaking area of Teshie-Nungua (Thierry Secretan, 1995). The coffin is built in different designs and form such as onion, cow, fishing boat, car, eagle to reflect the occupation, status or particular attribute of the deceased. More specifically, the coffin may take the shape of a book to depict the burying a Teacher; a Mercedes Benz or “Tro-Tro” Passenger lorry, for burying a professional driver; an Okro vegetable for burying a farmer or market vegetable Saleswoman; a cockerel for burying a poultry farmer. In short, design and shape of the coffins explains the history and background of the subject ([Thierry Secretan](#), 1995). The “Fantasy Coffins” have become popular among many people especially foreign buyers who order them for export (Anquandah, 2015).

Chieftaincy, Governance and Development

In Ghana, the socio-economic and political roles of chiefs in Ghana are legendary and dates back to pre-independent era. The chieftaincy institution complements Government efforts in serving the cultural and social needs of the country. Chiefs are custodians of the country's heritage and values, and embodiments of, and stewards of culture and traditions. The 1992 Constitution (Article 270) guarantees the institution of chieftaincy together with its traditional councils as established by customary law and usage. Similarly, the 2004 Cultural Policy of Ghana, that sets out an agenda for creating and managing a national culture regards chieftaincy as "the Kingpin of Ghanaian traditional culture"; "an anchor of cultural life in all communities and in the nation as a whole". As embodiments of culture and tradition, chiefs also serve as patrons of customary law, traditional customs and usages, traditional arts, folklore, crafts, festivals, and languages. Furthermore, they provide leadership roles in promoting cultural tourism and oversee the task of transmitting oral traditions, and maintenance of historic relics, sites, monuments and cult centres.

In pre-colonial Ghana, chieftaincy was the axis for the exercise of executive, legislative and judicial powers. During colonial rule however, chiefs served as intermediaries between the colonial officials and their subjects. They became dependent on the colonial power and as a result unpopular in the eyes of the educated elite at the height of the decolonization struggles. For example, in the 1950s Kwame Nkrumah became critical of chiefs and embarked on a protracted struggle with them for political control of the rural areas. Despite the antagonism, Kwame Nkrumah used some chieftaincy objects and cultural materials to enhance his legitimacy. Africanize his rule, and develop a new political culture (Senah, 2013). In doing so, "the state profiled and reified chieftaincy as a national heritage" (Senah, 2013: 351).

During this period, some educated chiefs emerged as advocates of modernization and social progress for their respective jurisdiction. In the colony and Asante, Native Authorities promoted education with enthusiasm. The Okyenene, Nana Sir Ofori Atta

was of the view that the provision of education facilities was “one of the foremost duties” of chiefs towards their communities, consequently, any chief who neglected that duty was not worthy of his trust. Nana Sir Ofori Atta in 1937 established the Abuakwa State Treasury, and applied funds from the Treasury to build a private secondary school, Abuakwa State College, at Kyebi in 1937, which prior to the 1960 was the states sole institution of higher learning (Addo-Fening, 2008). In 1943, the Okyenhene set aside funds from the State Treasury for the Abuakwa District education committee to promote and supervise education in the state. Towards this end, a special tax, the “education rate”, was collected from all adult citizens and paid into the central treasury at Kyebi to support education. Moreover, a state scholarship scheme was set up in 1916 to support needy but promising students (Addo-Fening, 2008). In Asante, a scholarship scheme was established by the Asanteman Council, that helped many people including Dr K. A. Busia, former Prime Minister of Ghana from 1969-72 to pursue further studies in the United Kingdom. The Asantehene, Otumfuo Sir Osei Agyeman Prempeh 11, founded Prempeh College in 1949. While in exile in the Seychelles, he advocated the education of Asante “Royals” back home and enrolled his successor, late Otumfuo Opoku Ware 11 in school when he returned to Ghana from exile. Otumfuo Sir Osei Agyeman Prempeh worked with missionaries to open schools in Ashanti, and was instrumental in the establishment of Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST). Furthermore, he introduced scholarships for the education of Asante citizens. In Manya Krobo, in the Eastern Region, Sir Emmanuel and his successor, Nene Azu Mate Kole, provided strong leadership by example leading to agricultural revolution in Manya Krobo (Addo-Fening, 2008).

In contemporary Ghanaian society, the roles of chiefs in society have changed considerably. Chiefs are serving as agents of social and economic development, specifically associated with tourism, and as custodians of culture. Chieftaincy has been described as “nucleus around which micro administration of Ghanaian society is effectively carried out”. The invention of the *nkosuo* stool, chieftaincy, an institution that formerly was purely hereditary, has

been adapted to accommodate foreigners as well as new citizens of Ghana who demonstrate a potential for contributing to the well-being of the communities with which they have become involved (Silverman, 2015).

To preserve their role as symbols of national unity, however, chiefs are forbidden from active participation in party politics. Article 276 “A chief shall not take part in active party politics; an any chief wishing to do so and seeking election to Parliament shall abdicate his stool or skin”. Since the 1990s, some visionary chiefs have been are engaging in peace initiatives and initiating projects towards socio-economic development such as provision of roads, water, schools, markets, health facilities and other infrastructure. The Asantehene, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II has instituted projects aimed at promoting development. For example, the World Bank’s Promoting Partnership with Traditional Authorities Project, the Bank is assisting The Asanteman Traditional Council with a grant of \$4.5 million to build the management capacity of chiefs, rehabilitate schools and build sanitation facilities in 41 communities, develop health education modules for traditional authorities to lead in awareness creation in HIV/AIDS, and build programs to preserve traditional values and culture (Asante, 2010). In addition, the World Bank has given grants to The Asanteman Traditional Council to fund water and sanitation facilities for 1000 communities in five regions of Ghana to supplement Government interventions. In addition, the Asantehene has established an Educational Trust Fund to support students with poor financial background to access basic, senior secondary school and tertiary education. The Asantehene’s fund has been replicated by other chiefs and district assemblies. He has also ventured into the health sector in the fight against HIV/AIDS and established the Golden Development Holding Company with the objective of promoting the general economic development of Asanteman. This is the result of a partnership between the Asantehene and the World Bank (Boafo-Arthur, 2006). Otumfuo Osei Tutu established Asanteman Economic Revitalization Plan to promote private and corporate investment in local industries, re-forestation and irrigation schemes.

On his part, The Okyenhene, Osagyefo Amotia Ofori Panin II, Okyehene, has led the fight against deforestation and other forms of environmental degradation. He has established the Okyeman Environment Foundation to check the destruction of the country's forest resources and environment including the Atewa Forest Range. The Okyenhene has also been a strong advocate in the fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS in Ghana and participated in a race organized in connection with HIV/AIDS education, an event that in the past would have caused his destoolment (Addo-Fening, 2008). In the Volta region, Togbe Afede XIV, the Agbogbomefia of the Asogli State, through collaboration and support from China, in 2008 inaugurated an energy project in Accra. As the Chief Executive Officer of Strategic Initiative Limited, a private equity and portfolio investment firm, Togbe Afede XIV, has been contributing to promoting economic development of Ghana. In 2001, he launched the SAS Best Business Plan Award Scheme to encourage entrepreneurship among young Ghanaian graduates and established the Volta Forum Trust Limited, to promote the socio-economic development of the Volta Region and Ghana.

In May 2004, a three-day National Economic Forum was organized by the government at Senchi for Building a National Consensus for Economic and Social Transformation and pursuit of inclusive and sustainable development. A 22 point communiqué dubbed the 'Senchi consensus' was adopted after the forum. Since then, Daasebre Oti Boateng, The Omanhene, New Juaben Traditional Area, Eastern Region of Ghana and a renowned statistician is currently leading a crusade for the adoption of a globally competitive Home-Grown Economic model to underline grassroots' development applicable to any local jurisdiction in the developing world. He noted that the 'Senchi consensus' establishes the existence of a general consensus amongst Ghanaians for a change and acknowledges the need for a more robust home-grown economic development strategy which has eluded the country for decades. Daasebre Oti Boateng, contends that in the face of mounting poverty in the country, Chiefs can no longer afford to continue to remain as ceremonial relics of ancestral leadership, and patrons of esoteric workshops. He has called for the active

cooperation and commitment of the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs to explore the prospects of re-defining Chieftaincy leadership role in national development.

A study by Raymond Silverman, (2015) found that chiefs are among the key actors shaping heritage at Manso. In 2001, Nana Asare, the Adontenhene of Techiman sought to exploit Manso as a tourist destination. To this end, the Nkoranzahene donated land for the establishment of the memorial gardens. Furthermore, as embodiments of culture and traditions, chiefs superintended over “the dedication of new monuments as well as many of the commemorative events that have been organized over the last ten years” (Silverman, 2015: 130).

Despite the constitution’s recognition, there are sections of the Ghanaian society who perceive chieftaincy as an anachronistic institution, and therefore question its relevance in the era of democratic governance and globalization. Disturbingly, the chieftaincy institution has been associated with various abuses and disputes. As a result, some chiefs have lost their spiritual and moral authority due corruption and dubious land sales.

Institutions for Promoting Cultural Heritage in Ghana

Growing acknowledgement of the relevance of cultural heritage as an irreplaceable asset for social and economic development and transformation, the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana recognizes culture as a vital tool for national integration and development. For example, Chapter 6 of the Constitution, known as “the directive principles of State Policy”, Article 39 states that:

The State shall take steps to encourage the integration of appropriate customary values into the fabric of national life through formal and informal education and the conscious introduction of cultural dimensions to relevant aspects of national planning. The State shall ensure that appropriate customary and cultural values are adapted and developed as an integral part of the growing needs of the society as a whole; and in particular that traditional practices which are injurious to the

health and well-being of the person are abolished. The State shall foster the development of Ghanaian languages and pride in Ghanaian culture. The State shall endeavour to preserve and protect places of historical interest and artefacts.

Furthermore, the 2004 Cultural Policy of Ghana, set out three main objectives are:

Firstly, to document and promote Ghana's traditional cultural values such as those enshrined in concepts of human dignity, attitudes to nature and the environment, law and order, honesty and truthfulness, unity and peace, self-reliance and dignity of labour, family community and national solidarity. Secondly, to ensure growth and development of cultural institutions to make them relevant to human development, democratic governance and national integration. Thirdly, to enhance Ghanaian cultural life and develop cultural programs to contribute to the nation's human development and material progress through heritage preservation, conservation, promotion and the use of traditional and modern arts and crafts to create wealth and alleviate poverty.

The National Commission on Culture has introduced a strategic plan which recognizes various stakeholders such as the District Assemblies, Religious Bodies, Educational Institutions, Social groups, Voluntary Associations, Artistic groups and associations, Non-Governmental Organizations and the Media as critical agencies and Institutions in the promotion of the nation's cultural heritage and seeks their participation in the implementation of policies and programs outlined in the cultural policy document. In particular, the role of the House of Chiefs is regarded as crucial in the task of heritage preservation and cultural transformation (Commission on Culture, 2004).

In addition, Ghana has established various institutions to harness and promote cultural heritages. These include the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board. It is the oldest organized cultural and heritage institution in West Africa. The mission of The GMMB is to identify, acquire, conserve and document the nation's movable

and immovable material cultural heritage for posterity for the purpose of research and education of the public (Kuntaa 2012).

The Functions of the GMMB are:

- Establish, equip and manage museums and material cultural (movable and immovable) heritage of the nation
- Control the export, import, sale and change of ownerships of material cultural property through licensing and issuance of permits.
- Establish a National Register and keep inventory of all material cultural heritage of Ghana (movable and immovable)
- Identify and document for declaration as national monument, structure, objects and sites of historical and cultural significance
- Undertake research publication of all matters relating to material cultural; movable and immovable heritage
- Provision of conservation services to museums, indigenous traditional councils and private individual holding of material cultural projects
- Provision of exhibition space and exhibition services to artists, associations and institutions to organize temporary exhibitions (Kuntaa, 2012).

Moreover, the National Festival of Arts and Culture (NAFAC) was institutionalized in 1961 by the Dr. Alexander Atta Yaw Kyerematen, the founder and the first Director of the Ghana National Cultural Centre now the Centre For National Culture Kumasi. His idea was to bring all Artists/artistes together to perform and exhibit their works once every year. However, over the years, NAFAC has become a biennial national festival to showcase and promote Ghanaian culture, customs and traditions. It is geared towards the cementing of the cultural basis of the country's development as a nation as well as providing a forum to appraise the work of the Ghanaian society and the celebration of its achievements. The Festival at the national level is preceded by District and regional festivals. The objective of the District and regional festivals is to promote grassroots participation to unearth new talents and inventions that will represent the regions at the

National Festival; Create awareness and enthusiasm among the general public about our culture and the values that portray our ‘Ghanaianess’; Showcase the natural peculiarities and economic endowments of the districts and regions photographic exhibitions, local technological inventions, and innovations etc to boost investments opportunities; Promote creative goods and services to boost our creativity and to develop and strengthen the creative arts industry for active participation in the global trade in creative goods and services and; Open up the districts and regions for the promotion of cultural tourism to generate income and development.

In recent times, the ministry of tourism has launched a domestic tourism promotion program dubbed – “Explore Ghana”, with the objective to get Ghanaian citizens and residents in the country to take time to travel across the country, starting from their own surroundings. Furthermore, the Pan African Historical Theatre Festival (PANAFEST) and Emancipation Day celebration have been introduced by the government. These events have succeeded in attracting a significant number of tourists into the country. Also, other events such as ECOWAS trade fair. Ghana Industry and Technology Exhibition (INDUTECH), Ghana Industry and Furniture Exhibition (GIFEX) to promote trade and exhibitions have brought a lot of tourist to the country. Ghana has also designed other cultural events including eco-tourism sites, recreational and leisure and tourists activities, such as the transatlantic slave trade project and the Joseph project, to make the country the gateway to West Africa (Ahiawodzi, 2013). The Ministry of Chieftaincy and Culture has been established by the government responsible for cultural affairs. A current project by the National House of Chiefs that seeks to document the lineage, selection and installation procedures of ruling Houses and Gates indicates the body's commitment to ending chieftaincy disputes in the country. The Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts has also taken a number of initiatives to promote both domestic and international tourism in Ghana.

Conclusion

In the past two decades, cultural heritage has been posited as an incredible vehicle for socio-economic transformation and development, particularly in developing countries (World Bank, 1991; UNESCO, 2013). This chapter examined cultural heritage and its implication for sustainable development in Ghana. It shows that Ghana is a heterogeneous society; the various ethnic groups have unique cultural features and traditions that give Identity, self-respect, and pride to the people. The common values and institutions of the various ethnic and religious groupings along with other natural, tangible and intangible heritage represent Ghana's collective national heritage. Key heritage resources and sites such as Forts and Castles built between the 14th and 18th centuries by the major European powers and Asante Traditional Buildings have been inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List since 1980. Along with other historical monuments and tourist sites have become popular and attractive sites to tourists from all over the world.

Ghana's 1992 Constitution and the 2004 Cultural Policy of Ghana, designed for creating and managing national culture recognize the importance of cultural heritage for sustainable development. Since independence, cultural heritage has been used to promote unity within our cultural diversity and Ghana has since enjoyed relative unity, stability, and peace. Currently, the government is pursuing cultural tourism as a vehicle for socio-economic development. Cultural tourism has been complemented with historical heritage sites, Museums, among others to make the country a gateway especially for Africans in the Diaspora who visit the continent. In contemporary Ghana, tourism including cultural tourism is a significant contributor to economic growth and development in Ghana. The tourism sector has been growing steadily and is currently the third largest source of foreign exchange in the country after gold and cocoa. Besides foreign exchange, the multiplier effect of tourism includes employment generation, and investments in the hospitality industry.

The institution of chieftaincy is important for the promotion of cultural heritage in Ghana. Chiefs are perceived as the custodians and embodiments of the country's heritage and traditional values. As patrons of the traditional arts, crafts, festivals, folklore, customary law, traditional customs and usages and languages, chiefs provide leadership role in promoting cultural tourism and preservation of historic relics, sites, monuments and cult centres. However, some of the chiefs have been involved in corruption and malfeasance and as a result lost their spiritual and moral authority. Chieftaincy, as an institution has also been embroiled in conflicts and chieftaincy dispute is rife leading to loss of life, injuries and destruction of property. Currently, the National House of Chiefs is in the process of documenting the lineage, selection and installation procedures of ruling Houses and Gates. It is expected that this project will help to address some of the underlying causes of chieftaincy disputes in the country.

Since the introduction of the Cultural Policy of Ghana in 2004, some of the initiatives outlined in the document have yet to be implemented, partly as a result of lack of funding. The government should be encouraged to allocate the needed resources for their implementation.

All in all, cultural heritage matters for sustainable development and should be mainstreamed in the country's development agenda. However, as stated, Ghana's cultural heritage resources are under threat due to the forces of globalization, climate change, rapid migrations and urbanization, weak implementation of the cultural policy and lack of funds, and lack of political will on the part of the government. The proper maintenance and preservation of Ghana's rich cultural heritage endowments has the potential to stimulate economic growth and positively affect the quality of life of Ghanaians and sustainable development through economic, cultural, spiritual, and educational gains. Future research should empirically examine the impact of culture heritage on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recently launched in 2015.

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Synergy and Dissonance between History and Heritage: Problematizing Heroism and the National Heroes' Acre in the Context of Zimbabwe's Liberation War

Fidelis Peter Thomas Duri

Introduction

The Zimbabwe National Heroes' Acre – a national shrine – is a commemorative complex of 230 000 square-metres (23 hectares) in extent (Fisher 2010). It is located in the Warren Park Suburb of the capital city, Harare. Its construction started a year after independence on 12 September 1981. The national shrine is protected under the National Monuments Act, Chapter 25:11 (of 1976) which provides for, among other things, the legal protection and maintenance of national monuments and sites (Sibanda 2013; UNESCO Report 2012). The national hero's status is the highest honour that can be given to a Zimbabwean national and the recipient is entitled for burial at the National Heroes Acre (Sibanda 2013). The conferment of national hero's status also entitles the deceased's immediate family to a number of benefits from the state such as a state-sponsored funeral and monthly pension (Sibanda 2012). Within the commemorative complex, there is also the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier that represents thousands of freedom fighters who perished during the struggle and are either not known or not decently buried according to the culture of the land. A museum was also set up at the site to articulate Zimbabwe's liberation war history and heritage (Shamuyarira, Kumar and Kangai 1995).

The National Heroes' Acre was primarily established to represent and articulate the history and heritage of Zimbabwe's liberation war. Lamentably, the monument has been the subject of fierce controversy among various stakeholders, many of who argue

that it does not adequately represent Zimbabwe's anti-colonial struggle because of, among other things, the selectively partisan nature in the conferment of national heroes' status, the omission of some prominent personalities, the inclusion of some controversial and 'underserving' characters, and various distortions in the liberation war narratives, among other reasons. This chapter argues that the politicisation of heroism in Zimbabwe is flawed by acknowledging the contribution of political allies at the expense of opponents and overlooking the contribution of people who did not play central political roles, such as philanthropists, during the liberation struggle. A National Heroes' Acre that honours only politicians, especially people from one political party, leaving out geniuses and philanthropists of national credence, does not justify its existence. In addition, if a National Heroes' Acre only honours liberation war fighters, particularly those from one political party, what it means is that there shall come a time when there will be no one qualifying to be buried at the National Heroes' Acre. In other words, once the whole generation that was directly involved in the liberation war passes on, then the National Heroes' Acre will have to be closed. Hence, there is need to seriously consider other personalities who played prominent political roles in the struggle and ended up in opposition politics after independence and those that did not directly participate in the politics of the liberation war but did commendable work for the national as a whole. This will allow people like prominent national philanthropists to qualify as National Heroes and Heroines. It is the central contention of this chapter that the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party led by Robert Mugabe is at the centre of this discord between the history and heritage of Zimbabwe's liberation war through its monopolisation and privatisation of discourses regarding the anti-colonial struggle and conferment of national heroes' status, and the subsequent burial proceedings at the National Heroes' Acre. The chapter also argues that the image of the National Heroes' Acre can be authenticated and enhanced if the history and heritage of the struggle are harmonised through broader and more inclusive dialogical mechanisms.

Theoretical conceptualisation of history and heritage

The term ‘heritage’ is derived from an ancient French word meaning that which is passed from an earlier generation to another. ‘History’ owes its origins from a Latin term *historia* meaning inquiry (Fisher 2010). David Lowenthal (1998: 128-129) insists that history and heritage are two poles apart, thus: “History and heritage transmit different things to different audiences. History tells all who will listen what has happened and how things came to be as they are. Heritage passes on exclusive myths of origin and continuance, endowing a select group with prestige and common purpose...History is for all, heritage for (us) alone.” Unlike history which is universally accessible and testable, heritage is “tribal, exclusive, patriotic, redemptive or self-aggrandising” and is not primarily concerned with “checkable fact but credulous allegiance” (Lowenthal 1996: 120-121).

Some scholars have accused heritage-mongers for being unscientific by investing in emotions of, and allegiance to, imagined collective identities (Grever, De Bruijn and Van Boxtel 2012). According to Lowenthal (1996), heritage embodies feelings of the past that shape identities and the historical materials that are harnessed to sustain them. Its approach to the past, he asserts, is largely presentist and not particularly concerned with historical accuracy. To the contrary, he regards history as a discipline that adheres to stipulated methods and ethics involving rigorous research, evidence, and rational arguments. On the discord between history and heritage, Lowenthal (1998: 122) argues:

Heritage diverges from history not in being biased but in its attitude towards bias. Neither enterprise is value-free. But while historians aim to reduce bias, heritage sanctions and strengthens it. Bias is a value that history struggles to exercise; for heritage, bias is a nurturing virtue.

The primacy of history, some scholars have concurred, is scientific evidence and not authority; heritage tends to be celebratory while history critiques the past (Seixas 2014); and

heritage emphasises on continuity from the past while history scrutinises and sometimes challenges the perceived bonds between the past and the present (Gadamer 1987). In addition, heritage has sometimes been regarded as a form of political manoeuvring: a “selective kind of tradition,” a “political vehicle for national culture” and a “commoditised form of de-politicised nostalgia masquerading as tradition” (Brumann and Cox 2010: 3-4).

Yet with all these seemingly incompatible divergences, it cannot be denied that history and heritage have some complementary roles. Both are approaches to the study of the past. Their relationship in illuminating the past can, however, be dialectical (Seixas 2014). In addition, both history and heritage cannot represent the totality and accuracy of the past; they both tend to be selective and some events of the past may be packaged and repackaged at the expense of others (Lowenthal 1985). Like heritage, as Raphael Samuel (1994: x) argues, historical narratives can be manipulated by historians; thus history is “an organic form of knowledge, and one whose sources are promiscuous, drawing not only on real-life experience but also memory and myth, fantasy and desire.” In as much as history and traditions can be crafted and invented to create imagined communities (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), “heritage distils the past into icons of identity, bonding us with precursors and progenitors, with our own earlier selves, and with promised successors” (Lowenthal 1994: 43).

Even though Lowenthal (1998) views history and heritage as separate practices, he identifies some symbiotic interactions between them, particularly the manner in which heritage can be derived from historical narratives and the way in which heritage delivers history to the ordinary people some of who may either be illiterate or cannot access the archives and libraries. “Heritage-mongers”, Lowenthal (1996: 250) argues, “feel compelled to cloak (their) wares in historical authenticity. Material relics are scrutinised, memories retrieved, archives examined, monuments restored, re-enactments performed, and historic sites interpreted with painstaking precision. Heritage apes scholarship with factoids and footnotes.” What Lowenthal fails to consider, as shall be noted later

in this chapter, is that history-mongers can also cloak their wares in the heritage of particular people with a specific ideology.

Other scholarly works have also emphasised the manner in which heritage is derived from history, sometimes through the process of manipulating the past in order to satisfy present agendas. Heritage largely involves “framing the past” and can become “as little more than bogus history” (Johnson 1999: 187). “All that constitutes heritage enjoys the backing of history,” Tejaswi (2011: 1) asserts, “but all history does not pass for the treasure-trove of heritage.” Its artificiality is sometimes the outcome of “intense...production” in which “new types of pasts (are)...staged, by new types of people, for new types of markets and consumers” (Ronström 2005: 1).

In contemporary dispensations, heritage can therefore be “a chimera, an illusion, a result of dressing up many and different old phenomena in new clothes and make them look as one and the same new phenomenon” (Ronström 2005: 7). An important aspect of heritage production is that “it reinforces the commodification of memories, through objectification, anestetisation and historisation; sets up markets where such commodified memories can be displayed, bought and sold... In short, it is not so much that heritage is about power, or has a power-aspect; heritage production is a way to exercise power...” (Ronström 2005: 14). It should be noted, however, that history itself can be charged of the same, given its dependence on memory, either written or otherwise. In other words, history without memory may not amount to anything substantial and worth sustaining.

What emanates from this discussion is that both history and heritage are approaches for the study of the past. They are complementary and overlapping in the sense that they can derive content about the past from each other. In addition, both are vulnerable to manipulation by various constituencies in order to address contemporary agendas. Again, they both depend on memory although heritage seems to have more emotional attachment to materiality than history. As discussed later on in this chapter, the discord between history and heritage is conspicuously evident between the historical narratives of Zimbabwe’s liberation

struggle and the image of the National Heroes Acre as a national heritage monument.

Secularisation of history, heritage and heroism in Zimbabwe

According to Ranger (May 2004: 234), “history is at the centre of politics in Zimbabwe far more than in any other Southern African country.” The propagation of liberation war narratives and the selection of national heroes in Zimbabwe are highly politicised. There has been a tendency to draw most of the national heroes and heroines from the political elite, high-ranking security personnel and senior war veterans. The ruling ZANU-PF party has always monopolised the process. Speaking at the burial of Kumbirai Kangai at the National Heroes Acre in early September 2013, Mugabe proclaimed: “We told them (opposition parties) that there are many places they can choose to bury their own heroes. This is ours...We chose it and paid for it” (Sibanda 2013: 1).

Under the National Heroes Act (Chapter 10: 16), the President has the prerogative to declare a person a national hero (*Newsday*, 12 October 2010). The conferment of national hero status is recommended by the ZANU-PF Politburo and approved by President Mugabe. This is in spite of the fact that by 1977, when the liberation struggle was nearing an end, Mugabe, the Commander-in-Chief of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), had not known how to operate a gun and did not even have a military uniform (Tekere 2007). The process was therefore terribly flawed from the onset by mythologizing ZANU-PF and ritualising Mugabe (Chitando 2005) as the sole determinant of national heroism in Zimbabwe. Enos Nkala, a founding member of ZANU-PF and later an opponent of Mugabe, once described the Heroes Acre as “Mugabe’s shrine” (*Zimbabwe Daily*, 23 July 2009: 1).

Stuart Hall (Winter 1999-2000: 7) advised that national heritage discourses should be inclusive; rather than being elitist, they should accommodate “margins into the centre, the outside into the inside.” Felix Sibanda, an opposition Member of Parliament, reiterated on 3 November 2009 that Zimbabwe needs a non-partisan body to deal with the conferment of national heroes’ status (*Standard*, 5 August

2010). Bungare-Umane (2014: 1) also advised that discourses of national heroism should not be monopolised by one political party:

...we cannot have a national hero without a 'national outlook'. In other words, a hero of a party does not automatically become a hero of a nation unless he/she has also met the prescribed national criteria. The issue of national heroism is a national thing- it is neither private nor confidential. No hero has ever gained the status in secret...the people don't need anybody to tell them who their heroes are. They know their heroes. However, when we embrace a habit of sitting in some secret brook to confer hero status on each other, we lend ourselves to mistakes that are sometimes very embarrassing, or even unforgivable.

A document guiding the National Heroes Act stipulates that persons can be declared national heroes irrespective of whether they were directly involved in combat or not during the liberation struggle. ZANU-PF ignored this principle soon after independence as it sought to propagate an image that as the ruling party, it had played a more significant role in the liberation struggle than other opposition parties such as the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) under Joshua Nkomo. Thus, Jairos Jiri, the philanthropist who dedicated his whole life aiding poor disabled Africans since the colonial period, was not declared a national hero when he died in 1982 (*Newsday*, 12 October 2010; *Standard*, 5 August 2010). He had started philanthropic work in Bulawayo in the 1950s when he registered what was to become one of the biggest welfare organisations in the country with the help of nationalist leaders such as Benjamin Burombo, Joshua Nkomo and Michael Mawema who were actively involved in drafting its constitution. It was for his humanitarian efforts that he was granted the Freedom of the City of Bulawayo in 1963. Later during the year, he was invited to address an International Symposium on Rehabilitation in Uganda's capital, Kampala. On 16 May 1977, the University of Rhodesia awarded him an honorary Masters of Arts Degree in recognition of his philanthropic pursuits (*Newsday*, 17 November 2012). Despite his

national efforts to uplift disadvantaged Africans during the colonial period, Jairos Jiri was not considered for hero status. As Henning Melber (2002: 3) notes, a critical shortcoming of the heritage crusade in Zimbabwe has been “the mystification of liberators” that has given rise to “liberation war credentials” in defining heroism.

ZANU-PF’s egotism in the selection process was clearly manifested during the period 1982-1987 when it unleashed the Fifth Brigade to massacre an estimated 20 000 Ndebele people in Matebeleland Province on allegations of supporting dissidents suspected to be sponsored by the opposition ZAPU party. During this period, the role of ZAPU in the anti-colonial struggle was trivialised. Its leaders were not considered for hero status by the ruling ZANU-PF even though the party and its military wing, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), had played a prominent role in the liberation struggle. When Lookout Masuku, a ZIPRA commander during the struggle, died in 1986 he was not declared a national hero (Brickhill 1995). Lizart Sibanda, another senior ZIPRA official, was buried in Bulawayo after the ZANU-PF politburo took too long to decide on his hero’s status (*Standard*, 5 August 2010). These misrepresentations of Zimbabwe’s liberation war heritage and history, characterised by ZANU-PF egotism, can be likened to what Richard Werbner (1998: 2) termed “the anthropology of memory and the making of political subjectivities.” An authentic liberation war heritage should have been derived from an appreciation that the anti-colonial struggle was “a collective enterprise” with a “national character”; it should have included the histories of various stakeholders such as ZIPRA and ZANLA, and broadened its focus from the provinces of Manicaland and Mashonaland into Matebeleland (Muwati, Mutasa and Bopape 2010: 149).

ZAPU boycotted Heroes’ Day commemorations throughout the mid-1980s in protest against ZANU-PF’s monopolisation of liberation war heritage and history (Kriger 1995). From the late 1980s, ZAPU also initiated a programme to reconstruct its war heritage and history through the ZIPRA War Shrines Committee, succeeded by the Mafela Trust in the 1990s. These developments

clearly illustrate that history and heritage are contested landscapes as various constituencies seek relevance in the present.

Since the Unity Accord of 1987, ZANU-PF increasingly acknowledged ZAPU's liberation war record (Fontein 2009). Lookout Masuku was granted national hero status that had earlier been denied to him (Moyo 2013). Alfred Nikita Mangena, a ZIPRA commander, and Philemon Takurayi Makonese, a ZAPU political leader, who had died in Zambia in 1978 and 1979 respectively, were reburied at the National Heroes' Acre in August 1998 (Machipisa 1998). The two had been deliberately overlooked since independence (Kriger 1995). Joshua Nkomo, the former ZAPU leader, was appointed Vice-President to Mugabe and upon his death in 1999, was buried at the National Heroes Acre (Fontein 2009). The about turn by ZANU-PF in accommodating ZAPU in discourses of national heroism in the aftermath of the Unity Accord demonstrates the commodification of heritage and history as critical resources that can be manipulated, packaged and repackaged to legitimise the political present.

From the year 2000, ZANU-PF instituted a Patriotic History Project supposedly to restore Zimbabwe's liberation war heritage and history that it claimed was under threat from the Western powers and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which had been formed in 1999. What needs to be noted is that the ruling party's legitimacy was increasingly waning owing to the austerity measures it had implemented during the 1990s under the guidance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The situation was aggravated from February 2000 when the government sanctioned the invasion of white-owned commercial farms under the guise of retrieving lands stolen from indigenous Africans during the colonial period. This triggered a multiplicity of crises characterised by international isolation, investor flight, deindustrialisation, spiralling unemployment, hyperinflation, chronic hunger and profound poverty (Bond and Manyanya 2001). Patriotic History became "the core of Mugabeism" as ZANU-PF sought to cling to power at any cost (Ranger, June 2004: 7).

Patriotic history provided "a highly selective and streamlined version of the anti-colonial struggle" (Ranger, June 2004: 8). It was

“narrower than the old nationalist historiography, which celebrated aspiration and modernisation as well as resistance. It resents the ‘disloyal’ questions raised by historians of nationalism. It regards as irrelevant any history which is not political. And it is explicitly antagonistic to academic historiography” (Ranger, May 2004: 217). In December 2002, Mugabe admitted that Zimbabwean history should not include bad things of the past such as ZANU-PF’s massacre of Ndebele people during the 1980s: “Whatever remains were historical differences. These remain as history of our country and we can’t bring ugly history into the present affairs and rewrite that ugly history. No!” (Mhizha 2002: 1).

In its Patriotic History Project from 2000, ZANU PF selfishly declared itself as “the alpha and omega of Zimbabwe’s past, present and future” (Tendi 2009: 7). Zimbabwe’s liberation war heritage, largely propagated through patriotic history, had “propagandistic temptations,” characterised in most cases by “hagiographic biographies” (Moore 2005: 3). Famished Zimbabweans were constantly reminded, and often threatened, to remain loyal to ZANU-PF because it had liberated the country from colonial bondage, and was fighting attempts at recolonization by the West using the MDC as a front. Rigorous attempts were made by ruling party politicians “to privatise the war/history” (Muwati, Mutasa and Bopape 2010: 150). During the parliamentary elections of 2000 and presidential elections of 2002, ZANU-PF presented itself as “the sole representative of the liberation movement and African authenticity, while the MDC had abolished history, proclaiming its irrelevance in an age of globalisation” (Alexander 2006: 114). At its December 2014 congress, ZANU-PF passed a recommendation to “exhort veterans of the liberation struggle to resolutely remain custodians of the founding values, principles and heritage of the liberation struggle” (*Sunday Mail*, 7 December 2014: 1). Thus, patriotic history was “indefensibly narrow” by “dividing the nation up into revolutionaries and sell-outs...” (Ranger, May 2004: 224).

Liberation war history and heritage have been highly secularised and privatised by ZANU-PF since national independence. These approaches to the past have often been fronted by the ruling ZANU-PF as survival arsenal to guarantee its perennialism in

power. Makumbe (2003: 38) rightly noted that when most post-colonial governments run by liberation movements face a legitimacy crisis, they often seek rescue from the past: "...Whenever they are threatened with loss of political power, former liberation movements tend to resuscitate their original achievements as liberators as a license to continued tenure in office." These machinations explain why national heroism, officially epitomised by the National Heroes' Acre, is a fiercely contested terrain in Zimbabwe.

Lost heritage: Missing heroes from the National Heroes Acre

Without demeaning many deserving heroes buried at the National Heroes' Acre such as Herbert Chitepo, Jason Moyo, Josiah Tongogara, George Nyandoro, Joshua Nkomo and Joseph Msika, ZANU-PF's deliberate othering of some prominent personalities of the struggle demonstrates the manner in which Zimbabwe's history and heritage have been politicised and distorted. There have been concerted attempts by the ZANU-PF government to prevent other pasts from articulating themselves (Alexander 2006). As Renan (1990) ironically noted, perhaps forgetting is a critical factor in nation-building. The silencing of certain sections of the past in order to settle agendas in the present has had the overall effect of discrediting national heroism and the National Heroes' Acre.

Ndabaningi Sithole, a founding member of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1963, and a political opponent of Mugabe after independence, was not declared a national hero when he died in 2000 (Fontein 2009). Thus, in March 2001, opposition parliamentarians argued that the Heroes Acre was not a national monument but a ZANU-PF shrine (*Daily News*, 2 March 2001). Canaan Banana, a veteran nationalist and Zimbabwe's first president, was not declared a national hero when he died in November 2003 on grounds that he had been convicted of sodomy charges during the post-independence period (Moyo 2013). What boggles the mind, as the next section demonstrates, is that there are numerous examples of ZANU-PF cronies buried at the National

Heroes Acre who committed heinous crimes during the same period.

Patrick Kombayi, a veteran freedom fighter, was not conferred with hero status when he died on 20 June 2009. Originally a fireman in the National Railways of Rhodesia, he joined ZANU in the 1960s. He went to Lusaka where he was one of the main recruiters of Zimbabwean exiles into the armed struggle. While in Zambia, he became a successful entrepreneur who owned butcheries and retail food outlets which enabled him to sustain ZANU before it began receiving international aid. Kombayi also presided over many important War Council meetings of ZANU in 1971 and 1973. When ZANU shifted its military bases from Zambia to Mozambique in 1975, he joined the training camps where he was responsible for food supplies. After independence, he was active in politics and later defected from ZANU-PF to join the opposition Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in 1989. During run-up to the 1990 elections in which he contested the Gweru Urban Parliamentary Seat against Vice-President Simon Muzenda, he was almost killed by a Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) official, who was also the head of Muzenda's security team. When ZUM became defunct, he joined the MDC upon its formation in 1999 (Moore 2005).

Gibson Sibanda died in September 2010 and was not declared a national hero despite the significant role he played during the struggle as a trade union leader and a freedom fighter. This history was obliterated by ZANU-PF for the major reason that he was a founding member of the opposition MDC in 1999 (Sokwanele, 8 September 2010).

It is quite clear that ZANU-PF excluded from the Heroes' Acre liberation veterans such as Ndabaningi Sithole, Patrick Kombayi and Gibson Sibanda who had exercised their democratic right to disagree, defect and form their own political parties. The same applies to the exclusion of personalities who were not directly involved in combat during the struggle but contributed immensely to the nation's upbringing in various ways such as talent showcasing, entertainment and fighting against poverty. Their absence from the national shrine is a result of ZANU-PF's

vindictive attitude, self-centredness and intolerance to criticism. It now becomes apparent that heritage “not only tolerates but thrives on and even requires historical error” (Lowenthal 1996: 128). “Heritage by its very nature,” as Lowenthal (1996: 250) asserted, “*must* depart from verifiable truth...to embrace heritage *as history*, disguising authority as authenticity, cedes it a credence it neither asks nor deserves.” In the “politics of subtle exclusion” in Zimbabwe, “heroism is ZANU-PF and ZANU-PF is heroism, and there is no room for anyone else” (Sokwanele, 8 September 2010: 1). The privatisation of the conferment of national heroes’ status by ZANU-PF has had the negative effect of illegitimizing the National Heroes’ Acre as a liberation war heritage monument. As Gregory Ashworth and John Tunbridge (1996: 2) aptly observed:

All heritage is someone’s heritage and therefore logically not someone else’s: the original meaning of an inheritance (from which ‘heritage’ derives) implies the existence of disinheritance and by extension any creation of heritage from the past disinherits someone completely or partially, actively or potentially. This disinheritance may be unintentional, temporary, of trivial importance, limited in its effects and concealed; or it may be long-term, widespread, intentional, important and obvious.

Interestingly though, as Fontein (2009) argued, the commendable legacy of the dead is neither demeaned nor obliterated by fabricated narratives and exclusivist imaginations of the past.

Distortion of history and heritage: Gate-crushing into the National Heroes Acre

ZANU-PF’s politics of patronage in the present was illustrated by the conferment of national hero status to some of its cronies who either had no convincing track record during the liberation struggle, or were of dubious personalities in the post-independence period. These gate-crushers into the National Heroes’ Acre

included Border Gezi, Elias Kanengoni, Mernard Muzariri, Cain Nkala, Chenjerai Hunzvi, Elliot Manyika and Solomon Tawengwa.

Border Gezi, the late Minister of Youth; and war veterans Cain Nkala and Chenjerai Hunzvi, who both died in 2001, had earned notoriety for terrorising opposition supporters. In addition, Hunzvi had been accused of looting the War Victims' Compensation Fund during the late 1990s and died before the courts had finalised his corruption case (Moyo 2013; *Southern Eye*, 11 August 2014). Solomon Tawengwa, the former mayor of Harare, who was fired in March 1999 on corruption charges, was also declared a national hero when he died in 2004 (Fontein 2009). President Mugabe declared him a national hero on grounds that he was a ZANU-PF Politburo member who had played a significant role in the struggle. Surprisingly, Mugabe praised Tawengwa as "an honest and straight forward person who stood for the truth even in business" (*Herald*, 28 October 2004: 1).

Elias Kanengoni and Mernard Muzariri were CIO agents who played an active role in the massacre of about 20 000 Ndebele people in Matebeleland Province during the 1980s. In addition, Kanengoni was convicted in 1990 on attempted murder charges for shooting Patrick Kombayi, an opposition party official. He was sentenced to seven years in prison only for him to be pardoned by Mugabe (Moyo 2013; *Southern Eye*, 11 August 2014).

Elliot Manyika was declared a national hero when he died in December 2008 despite his notoriety for unleashing National Youth Service brigands to harass MDC supporters (Moyo 2013). Air Commodore Mike Karakadzai, who headed the crisis-ridden National Railways of Zimbabwe at the time of his death, was buried at the National Heroes Acre in August 2012 (Moyo 2013). Enos Nkala and Kumbirai Kangai, both prominent ZANU leaders during the struggle, were declared national heroes in August 2013 despite their involvement in serious corruption scandals from the late 1980s. Kangai had been implicated in the embezzlement and mismanagement of funds at the state-owned Grain Marketing Board while Nkala had been actively involved in the Matebeleland massacres of the 1980s (Moyo 2013).

The conferment of heroes' status to people who displayed questionable conduct after independence is a mockery of both Zimbabwe's liberation war heritage and history, and the National Heroes' Acre itself. As Fisher (2010) noted, true heroes and heroines should be exemplary and citizens are supposed to emulate, and measure up to, their conduct. Rodney Bungare-Umane (2014: 1) reiterated: "There are some attributes that are not in sync with heroism. A hero can't be greedy, selfish, violent and murderous-unless if these were the collective values of our nation."

While several deceased ZANU-PF loyalists of disreputable conduct after independence increasingly found space at the 'national shrine' during the New Millennium, some ZAPU veterans continued to be side-lined. An example is Akim Ndllovu, a founding member of ZIPRA in 1965, who died in July 2009 (*Zimbabwe Daily*, 23 July 2009). In public discourse, the Heroes' Acre came to be regarded as a burial place of ZANU-PF loyalists, and a platform to mobilise support for the ruling party. In 2009, Maureen Chimpana, an official of the opposition Zimbabwe People's Democratic Party lamented ZANU-PF's egotism and cronyism in the conferment of national heroes' status: "The national heroes' acre is a ZANU-PF heroes' acre; there is nothing national about it. I do not know if national heroes are only found in ZANU-PF" (*Zimbabwe Daily*, 23 July 2009: 1).

The conferment of hero status to some people of dubious personality discredits the National Heroes' Acre to the extent that some prominent veterans of the struggle declined to be laid to rest side by side with them after their deaths. Before his death in March 2006, James Chikerema, a veteran nationalist, indicated to his friends that the last place he would want to be buried at was the National Heroes' Acre: "I have told my sons that if they (ZANU-PF) ever try and take my body to that place they are to open to fire! I have given them guns. They must open fire and stop me being buried next to those crooks and sycophants who destroyed Zimbabwe" (Grundy 2006: 1). True to his word, Chikerema was not declared a national hero after his death. This was despite his notable contributions during the liberation struggle such as the formation of nationalist organisations like the City Youth League

(CYL), Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC), ZAPU and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) (Raath 2006). In early October 2010, the family of the late Welshman Mabhena, a former ZAPU Secretary General, snubbed the national hero status that ZANU-PF had conferred on him. The Mabhena family indicated that the deceased had stated before his death that he did not want to be buried at the National Heroes' Acre together with "thieves and crooks" (*Newsday*, 12 October 2010: 1).

Racial dimensions of national heroism in Zimbabwe

The conferment of national hero status to some Whites, Coloureds and Indians, understandably few though, reflects a multi-racial element of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Lamentably, this history and heritage has been severely contradicted and corroded by ZANU-PF racial tirades since 2000 as it sought to restore its popularity among the blacks by denigrating the white community, particularly the commercial farmers most of whose land was violently seized.

Joseph Culverwell, from the community of people of mixed race, who died on 16 July 1993, was declared a national hero and buried at the National Heroes' Acre. He joined early African nationalist politics after the Second World War and worked with veterans such as George Nyandoro, James Chikerema and Joshua Nkomo. He was involved in the formation of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) in 1957. He joined ZAPU and ZANU during the 1960s. In 1967, he was sentenced to 18 months in prison for his involvement in anti-colonial politics. After his release, he ended up in England where he sourced clothes and medicines for ZANLA combatants. He was one of the delegates at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979 which negotiated Zimbabwean independence. At independence in 1980, he was appointed a Senator and went on to be the leader of the Senate for eight years. Between 1981 and January 1988, he was the Deputy Minister of Education and Culture. He then became a Minister of State in the President's Office Responsible for

Scholarships. In 1992, he was briefly appointed Deputy Minister for Higher Education. He retired later during the year due to ill health (*Herald*, 8 August 2012). It is, however, a misrepresentation of the history and heritage of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle to completely overlook the outstanding contributions of some members of the mixed-race community. Berman Cecil Smith and Foya Thompson, for example, were imprisoned during the struggle for raising funds to sustain the families of detained nationalist leaders and recruiting young boys and girls in urban areas for military training abroad to fight the colonial government (Muzondidya 2005).

Guy Clutton Brock, a British missionary, is the only white person conferred with national heroes' status in Zimbabwe. He arrived in Rhodesia (colonial Zimbabwe) in 1949 and worked for 10 years at St. Faith's Mission farm where he became friends with future ZANU veteran nationalists, Didymus Mutasa and Maurice Nyagumbo. He was involved in the formation of SRANC in 1957 (Clutton Brock 1969). He was detained during the late 1950s for his involvement in African nationalist activities (Fisher 2010). During the 1960s, he helped the Tangwena people in north-eastern Zimbabwe to resist eviction from their land by white settlers (Clutton Brock 1969). He was also actively involved in establishing two multi-racial farming cooperative schemes at Nyafaru in north-eastern Zimbabwe and Cold Comfort near Harare (Fisher 2010). He was deported from Rhodesia in 1971 and when he died in 1995, his ashes were scattered at the National Heroes' Acre (Fisher 2010).

Kantibhai Gordhanbai Patel, an Indian businessman who died in 2011, was declared a national hero and his ashes were interred at the National Heroes' Acre in August 2012 (Chifamba 2012). Born in India, Patel came to Rhodesia in 1961 and began networking with Zimbabweans of Indian origin connected to African nationalist parties such as the National Democratic Party (NDP) and ZAPU. In the 1970s he was instrumental in the formation of the Sarasvati Education Trust that mobilised funds to assist mostly black students, particularly those expelled for nationalist activities, to continue with their university studies outside Rhodesia. After independence, he occupied various senior government positions

such as Senator and Member of Parliament (*Zimbabwe Daily*, 14 September 2011).

The conferment of national heroes' status to Indians, Whites and people of the mixed race illustrates a multi-racial dimension in the anti-colonial struggle and President Mugabe's eulogies during burial ceremonies at the Heroes Acre attest to this. What may be regarded as a monstrous distortion and contradiction of Zimbabwe's liberation war history and heritage was ZANU-PF's demonization of the white community as a whole from 2000 as the ruling party's legitimacy was increasingly being threatened by serious socio-economic hardships and the rising popularity of the opposition MDC. ZANU-PF began to regard the presence of the white community in the country as a threat to sovereignty. Mugabe denigrated the whites for provisioning the MDC and conspiring to undermine the gains of the liberation struggle. In February 2000, Mugabe unleashed war veterans and civilians to grab white commercial farms: "Our party must continue to strike fear in the heart of the white man, who is the real enemy" (Masunungure 2004: 176). In April 2000, Mugabe vilified displaced white farmers who sued the government in the courts as "our enemies, not just political enemies, but definite enemies in wanting to reverse our revolution and our independence" (Alexander 2003: 103). During the same month, two white farmers were murdered by war veterans (Chitiyo 2007). Six white farmers were killed during the period spanning from mid-February to June 2000 (Mamdani 2008). By the year 2010, more than 3000 white farmers had been evicted (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2010).

What confuses young generations who did not witness the liberation struggle are the inconsistencies displayed by the ruling elite in handling its citizens. The conferment of national hero status to some Whites, people of the mixed race and Indians was adequate acknowledgement of their prominent roles in complementing the Blacks in the struggle against colonial rule. ZANU-PF racial tirades and indiscriminate violence against the whites from the year 2000 on grounds that they were conspiring to reverse the gains of independence are, however, tantamounting to deconstructing the

past and rendering the National Heroes' Acre irrelevant as an authentic heritage monument.

Gender and the dynamics of national heroism in Zimbabwe

By August 2010, all women buried at the National Heroes Acre, with the exception of Sabina Mugabe, President Mugabe's sister (July 2010), were spouses of liberation war leaders. They are Sarah (Sally) Mugabe, wife to President Mugabe (January 1992); Johanna Nkomo, wife to Vice-President Joshua Nkomo (June 2003); Julia Zvobgo, wife to the late cabinet minister Eddison Zvobgo (February 2004); Ruth Chinamano, wife to the late ZAPU Vice-President Josiah Chinamano (January 2005); and Sunny Ntombiyelanga Takawira, wife to the late ZANU Vice-President Leopold Takawira (January 2010) (*Standard*, 5 August 2010). Sabina Mugabe played a prominent role during the liberation struggle. During the 1960s, for example, she organised anti-colonial mass protests and was detained several times. It should be noted, however, that she was actively involved in the violent land seizures of commercial white farms from 2000 (*Standard*, 5 August 2010).

The predominance of spouses of the liberation war elite at the Heroes' Acre, despite their significant contribution to the struggle, was enough to raise the eyebrows of many critics. In addition, the burial of Mugabe's wife and sister at the National Heroes' Acre, and the omission of other prominent female veterans of the struggle such as Sheba Tavarwisa and Thenjiwe Lesabe, made some critics to conclude that "the country's sacred place has been urinated on, that it should just be forgotten" (*Standard*, 5 August 2010: 1).

There was controversy in October 2010 over ZANU-PF's failure to declare Pamela Tungamirai a national heroine despite the prominent role she had played during the liberation struggle and the post-independence period (*Newsday*, 12 October 2010). She was the wife of the late national hero, Air Chief Marshal Josiah Tungamirai. She was a war veteran of the anti-colonial struggle; a ZANU-PF Central Committee and Politburo member at the time of her death, having been the ruling party's Member of Parliament for Mabvuku during the period 1995-2000 (*Newsday*, 8 October 2010). It was

allegedly that President Mugabe had unilaterally denied her the status of national heroine for undisclosed reasons (*Newsday*, 12 October 2010).

Thenjiwe Lesabe, a prominent ZIPRA female combatant during the struggle, was not declared a national heroine when she died on 11 February 2011 (Moyo 2013). She joined nationalist politics during the 1950s. She was a local leader of early nationalist political parties in Bulawayo's Makokoba Suburb such as the NDP, ZAPU and the People's Caretaker Council. When she was forced into exile by the colonial government in 1978, she continued to work in ZAPU structures within military training camps abroad. She held various cabinet posts after independence. She abandoned the ZANU-PF-ZAPU Unity Accord in September 2009 to join Dumiso Dabengwa's ZAPU and this was the major reason why the ruling party failed to find space for her at the National Heroes' Acre (New Zimbabwe, 11 February 2011).

Women are conspicuously underrepresented at the National Heroes' Acre, an issue that obviously distorts the history and heritage of Zimbabwe's liberation war. Feminist scholars on Zimbabwe such as Lyons (1997), Nhongo-Simbanegavi (2000), Seidman (1984) and Weiss (1986) have cited female guerrilla experience during the anti-colonial struggle, of fighting alongside men, to advance issues of gender equality.

Conclusion: Towards a consensus on liberation war history, heritage and heroism

This chapter exposed the convergences and divergences between history and heritage as approaches to the past in the context of national heroism in Zimbabwe. It articulated the egocentric and authoritarian manner in which ZANU-PF heritage-mongers selectively illuminated certain sections of the past while quarantining others in discourses of national heroism. As a result, the credibility of the National Heroes Acre as a commemorative site has been fiercely contested.

These contestations can be mediated by broadening discourses of liberation war narratives, heritage and heroism. The secular

perception of national heroism is myopic. There is need to acknowledge other socio-economic contributions some people made in uplifting the lives of the marginalised people during the colonial period. If this is not done, the conferment of heroism will remain controversial.

The elite-propelled or top-down decision-making process in the conferment of national heroes' status subjects the country's liberation war heritage and history to various forms of manipulation and prejudice that inevitably culminate in counter-memorialism and heroism. I conclude with Bowman's (1994) advice that national commemorative complexes such as the National Heroes' Acre should not be turned into fictitious tools of social organisation. If discourses of liberation war heritage and history are not democratised, Zimbabweans will always have a multi-layered and false vision of the past.

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The Rhetoric of Genocide in Africa: Memory and Trauma in Three Selected Literary Works

Moussa Traoré

Introduction

The later part of the twentieth century has been marked by an upsurge of socio-political strife and instabilities on the African continent. Cases in point include the genocide that took place in Rwanda, the civil wars that ravaged Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as several political instabilities that occurred in Togo and other African countries. Concerns generated by the gory effects of conflicts resulting from these situations serve as literary raw materials for many West African writers from the mid 1980s – when the civil war broke out in Liberia – till today. Considering the serious nature of these conflicts as captured the literary works referred to above, this chapter seeks to critically examine the rhetoric on conflict in three selected memoirs. The study examines the use of political rhetoric, with specific emphasis on Language, Memory and Trauma in three of these works: Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's memoir *Coming Back from the Brink in Sierra Leone* (2010), Ismael Beah's *A Long Way Gone: The True Story of a Child Soldier* (2007) and Véronique Tadjo's *The shadow of Imana: Travels in the Heart of Rwanda* (2002). The chapter explores how the three selected authors use language in their accounts to expose the horrendous conflicts that mine the African continent and their socio-political bearing on sustainable development. The chapter is a textual analysis of those three memoirs. The chapter attempts a careful examination of the issue of memory and trauma, using a method which combines literary analysis with language theories. This chapter, therefore, examines the rhetoric of genocide, using the aforementioned three memoirs as primary sources. Adding to that, the chapter demonstrates how social reality is constructed through

textual discourse in those aforementioned works. The two theoretical frameworks underpinning this study are Teun A van Dijk's principle of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and Jonathan *Charteris-Black's theory* of "Metaphor and Political Communication". That said, the present chapter points to ways in which language can be used to create and preserve a pacific and flourishing Africa, devoid of the sorrowful stereotypes which are latent seeds of civil strife.

Socio-political instabilities in Africa at the end of the 20th Century

In Africa, as the twentieth century was coming to an end, tumultuous and sometimes horrendous events began to unfold. The first wave of such turmoils can be traced to the "sommet de la Baule" held on June 20th 1990 , which brought together African heads of States and the then French President François Mitterrand in La Baule Escoublac (France). At this meeting France and most former colonial masters lobbied for the adoption of the concept of democracy by African states basing on the premises that democracy is a "sinequanon for development." As a way of coercing African countries to adopt their unilateral stance, they categorically proclaimed that any country which will not incorporate democracy and multiparty political systems will be considered as an enemy of the West. To exacerbate matters, only those countries who were willing to buy in this postcolonial hegemony will continue receiving "aid" and "loans" from Europe and America (Krosiak, 2004). In other words, countries that had not adopted the envisaged "new" political system would not benefit from any donor support or any loan from institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. As a result, most African countries embraced this nefarious concept in their systems of governance and started to dance to the whims of the West. Consequently, some of the leaders who had been in power for decades sensing the irresistible force of this inevitable movement decided to declare themselves democratic leaders. In most of the instances, the leaders agreed that elections be organized and in the process stood as candidates. Several examples can be

cited at this level: In Ghana, Togo and Burkina Faso just to mention a few, military rulers declared themselves civilians and stood for elections and won with a large majority in most cases. That was not pleasant to politically conscious citizens. For instance, in French speaking Africa, citizens insisted on what was termed “*Conférences Nationales Souveraines*” (National Sovereign Conferences) which they thought would reveal the dictatorship and corruption that had reigned for years before free and fair elections could be organized. That happened in Togo and did not yield any fruitful result and the same applies to Burkina. So the pre-democratic era presidents became the presidents of democratic African countries in most cases and lip service was being paid to democracy-- which can be explained as a system of government in which power is vested in the people, who rule either directly or through freely elected representatives -- the violation of human rights and massive corruption continued and the multinationals like Elf Aquitaine, the French oil company which is now part of Total, Shell, British Petroleum, and also the IMF and the World Bank became the controllers of African economy (Matori, 2003). A striking example is the case of the Ogoni people in Nigeria and their leader activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. Because the Niger Delta population of Nigeria were experiencing only pollution while the oil extraction multinationals were shipping away all the oil and enriching themselves, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) whose leader was the writer, activist and environmentalist Ken Saro- Wiwa was roughly hit by the then Nigerian president Sani Abacha who had Saro-Wiwa hanged in 1995 (Naidoo, 2000).

In countries such as Burkina Faso and Ghana (Yaro, 2008 and 2009) the World Bank was openly “driving” the local economies, through stringent and unproductive measures like the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) applied to education, agriculture, the health sector, etc. (*The Thistle*, 2000). The SAPs were dictating to African countries which areas to invest in and which ones to ignore. The production of cash crops was encouraged and malnutrition settled in since crops like corn, rice and others were neglected in a country like Burkina and the emphasis was laid on cotton

production because the latter was shipped to the former colonial master, France where it will be raw material for the textile industry. Vallianatos (2011) captures this unjust and exploitative policy in the following lines which show that the phenomenon extends to the whole African continent: “about two and a half centuries later, in 2011, Africans are producing, more or less, the cash crops they were forced to cultivate during the time of Bernardin de Saint Pierre: cocoa, coffee, sugar, peanuts, cotton, rubber, tea, palm oil, timber and tobacco. The violence of the old colonial system keeps resurfacing in the bleak faces of malnutrition and hunger.” (*Pambazuka News*, 2011). It was imperialism and neo-colonialism at work and research shows that “pseudo democracy” and its auxiliaries like the SAPs rather did more harm than good to African populations. Oppong (2013) confirms that in the following lines where he extends his analysis of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) to the mining sector in Africa:

In his assessment of the programme, Ismi (2004) reveals that the World Bank and IMF have forced developing countries to create conditions that benefit Western corporations and governments. Reinforcing this assessment, and using figures to do so, Osabu-Kle (2000) reveals that for the period of the programme the share of the world income of the poorest fifth of the world’s population has declined from paltry 2.3% to only 1.4% while the same enjoyed by the richest fifth – who have been making the rules on trade and pretty much everything else – has risen from 75% to 85%. According to McGregor (2005), SAP has proven economically disastrous as all the 54 developing countries that implemented the programme have ended up poorer than they started (p. 28-29).

Minerals like gold, diamond bauxite and others were also sold to foreign companies that extracted them. These foreign companies despite siphoning African precious resources also, paid low salaries to local employees who were most of the time working in hazardous and risky conditions. AngloGold Ashanti in Ghana – although it has tentacles almost all over the world, especially in

developing countries – is an example. AngloGold Ashanti Limited is a global gold mining company which was formed in 2004 by the merger of AngloGold and the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, after the High Court of Ghana approved the merger. AngloGold Ashanti Limited is now a global gold producer with 21 operations on four continents. The company is listed on the New York, Johannesburg, Accra, London and Australian stock exchanges, as well as the Paris and Brussels bourses. Tragically, in August 2008 British charity War on Want published a report accusing AngloGold Ashanti's parent company Anglo-American of profiting from the abuse of people in the developing countries in which the company operates; the report alleges abuses committed by AngloGold Ashanti subsidiaries in Ghana and Mali and other countries like Columbia. War on Want further stated that AngloGold Ashanti was accused in 2008 in Colombia for "murders of trade union and community leaders who opposed the company's activities in the region". The company sadly disclosed itself in 2008 as "unacceptable safety performance" in its platinum mines. Safety measures were taken and in January 2011, and AngloGold Ashanti was named the world's "Most Irresponsible Company" at the *Public Eye Awards*, hosted by the Erklärung von Bern and Greenpeace in Davos, Switzerland. The nominating organization, WACAM (Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining), said the company had a history of "gross human rights violations and environmental problems".

Voices of those Civil Society Organizations like WACAM (in the case of Ghana) and their counterparts in other countries began to rise against the unjust and fierce profit-driven practices of oil and mineral multinationals as the example of the fight against AngloGold Ashanti shows. Agbesinyale *et al.* (2012) discuss the connection between the mining industry and hunger in general and use the case of Anglo-Gold Ashanti as an example to show how the activities of mining multinationals can generate negative repercussions on people's lives: hunger, violation of human rights, etc.

In certain cases, countries became divided and war lords emerged, each of them wanted to control the part of the country

were the treasures and resources lied. In Liberia for instance, several factions sprang and the sitting president Samuel Doe was cruelly murdered by one of such rebel groups, a faction led by Prince Y. Johnson on September 9th, 1990. Charles Taylor ultimately took over as president after several years of civil war. The same thing happened in Sierra Leone where the army refused to respect civilian rule and chaos erupted after president Tejan Kabbah was overthrown after a coup. In his memoir, Kabbah captures the event in these terms with details: “another important development before the 1997 coup was the existence of extra-military forces within the Sierra Leone Army. The most notorious was the so-called Special Task Force (STF). No one briefed me of their existence when I assumed office” (Kabbah, 2010:65). The abundant literature exists on this sinister tableau of woes, misery, bad governance and cruelty of an indescribable level. Some literary works that can substantiate this point are the numerous novels by Ahmadou Kourouma: *Waiting for the Wild Beasts to Vote* (2003), *Allah is not Obligated* (2000) and Tim Butcher’s *Chasing the Devil* (2010). In these books, arms and weapons of all types began to circulate in Africa and civil wars and genocides become synonymous with the continent. Several Hollywood movies like *Blood Diamond* (2006) captured that descent of Africa into years of “hell” because of the scramble over minerals. The Rwandan case is slightly different because it is based on ethnic differences, a distinction and division introduced by the Belgians. While Hutus and Tutsis were a harmonious community where a Hutu (farmers in general) could become a Tutsi (cattle breeders) and vice versa, Western colonization introduced a divide and rule policy between the two groups. The Germans started it and the Belgians brought it to fruition as Antony Sullivan (2006) states:

The Germans arrived in what was to become Rwanda in 1894 and, like all western imperialists, at once began to intensify local divisions to strengthen their own control. They ruled through the Tutsi king and brought formerly independent Hutu areas under the central administration. [...] After World War One Rwanda fell under Belgian control. The Belgians continued to rule through the Tutsi king, though in the 1920s they

deposed a king who obstructed their plans, and chose their own candidate to replace him, ignoring the line of succession. In the 1930s Belgium instituted apartheid-like identity cards, which marked the bearer as Tutsi, Hutu or Twa (pygmy). Their efforts to establish a racial basis for the Hutu-Tutsi division through qualities such as skin colour, nose and head size came to nothing: they fell back on the reality of economic division and defined a Tutsi as owner of ten or more cattle. However the division was now rigidly enforced: it was no longer possible to rise from the status of Hutu to Tutsi (Online source).

Several scholars like Mahmood Mamdani (2001) and Philip Gourevitch (1998) have pondered that orchestration which caused the first genocide in Africa.

Theoretical Framework of the Study

This study will begin with the case of Sierra Leone and will use the memoir of one of the former presidents of that country, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah as a primary source. The theory of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) by Van Dijk, and Jonathan Charteris-Black' Principle of Metaphors and Political Communication will assist in reinforcing the theoretical analysis of this study and it will be appropriate at this level to define and explain Critical Discourse Analysis or CDA and also the theory of Metaphor and Political Communication.

Van Dijk is the main name behind the theory of Critical discourse Analysis (CDA) and he simply defines it in *Discourse and Society* as a theory that "is primarily interested and motivated by pressing social issues, which it hopes to better understand through discourse analysis"(Van Dijk, 1993: 252). He further adds:

Unlike other discourse analysts, critical discourse analysts (should) take an explicit socio-political stance: they spell out their point of view, perspective, principles and aims, both within their discipline and within society at large; their hope is change through critical understanding. It implies a political

critique of those responsible for its perversion in the reproduction of dominance and inequality. (Van Dijk, 1993: 252-253)

He adds that it is a relatively new area of study which is often called “sociopolitical discourse analysis”. CDA focuses on the role of discourse in the reproduction and challenge of dominance, and dominance in this context is the exercise of social power by elites, institutions and groups and the result of such a power relation may be social inequality in general and political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality in particular. Van Dijk adds that social discourse analysts want to know specifically “what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction and communicative events play in these modes of reproduction” (Van Dijk, 1993: 250). So CDA involves a careful analysis of the use of discourse in ‘top-down’ relations of dominance and also ‘bottom-up’ relations of resistance, compliance and acceptance. Van Dijk simplifies the understanding and definition of CDA by referring to it as a theory that “deals primarily with the discourse dimensions of power abuse and the injustice and inequality that results from it” (Van Dijk, 1993:252), although he remains aware of the fact CDA not only involves the macro-micro relations in sociology, but also and even more interestingly, the relation between society, discourse and social cognition.

Jonathan Charteris-Black on the other hand defines “Metaphor and Political Communication” in the following statement:

Metaphors contribute to the design of a leadership style through appealing to followers to share in a particular representation or construal of social reality. Successful and charismatic leaders create metaphors onto which followers project their own meanings and in doing so find a degree of socio-psychological and emotional gratification. (Charteris-Black, 2009: 97)

Charteris -Black in his study of metaphors in this context relies heavily on the Aristotelian view of rhetoric, precisely on the

concepts of the Pathos, Ethos and Logos. He explains that in the study of Metaphor in Political Communication, the speaker establishes an ethical appeal (which works as a rhetorical appeal) to the audience and then Logos (reason by arguments) and pathos (appeal to emotion) subsequently begin to work on the audience.(Charteris-Black, 2009). The whole process ultimately helps the speaker achieve her or his aim of persuasion. He adds that ideology is very important in this theory and writes that it is essential to modern political communication. He finally explains the whole concept in very clear terms:

Metaphor is one of a number of linguistic, cognitive and symbolic resources employed by political leaders for communicating ideology. By establishing a shared view-by arbitrary decisions about what is right and wrong, good and bad-a group engages in a process of self-legitimization through which it aspires to power (Charteris-Black, 2009:100).

From these definitions and explanations, one can easily see that the two theories can be applied to Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's memoir and Ishamael Beah's *A Long Way Gone*, and that "Metaphor and Political Communication" applies perfectly to Véronique Tadjo's *The Shadow of Imana*.

CDA and *Coming from the Brink in Sierra Leone*

There are so many ways in which one can see the Critical Discourse Analysis at work in this memoir. It transpires more in the way in which Ahmad Tejan Kabbah provides information on himself and also the salient points of his career as a political leader in Sierra Leone. The author portrays himself in very enviable terms that connote resilience and achievement and he shows how wrong, destructive and distorted-minded his opponents are. By doing that, Tejan Kabbah intends and succeeds in using this piece of information-about him-against his political opponents and that is in essence the application of CDA. The reader is struck by the mysterious way in which the author describes his own birth. The

reader is told that such a mysterious birth was narrated by the author's mother to his wife. In order to reinforce that idea, the first chapter of the book is titled a "mysterious birth" and the author explains the mystery some few lines later under a subtitle which is "My parentage". The following is an extract from that chapter:

Madam Damayei was the second wife of Pa Abu Bakr Sidique Kabbah. It is reported that she gave birth to her second child in Pendembu, Kailahun District in Eastern Sierra Leone on 16 February 1932, the baby (that's me), entered the world with a clasped left hand containing what was thought to be a piece of paper with an Arabic inscription. That was not all. It was also reported that although the paper was subsequently taken to a mosque where it was read, its contents were never made public (Kabbah, 2010: 1).

As a politician who has rivals and opponents, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah continues his memoir with information that elucidates his crystal clean and admirable beginnings in life. Action and cognition, which are some of the fundamental elements in CDA are seen here. Although the "action" part is not very salient since we do not see the author directly involved in physical confrontation with his political rivals and enemies, cognition is nonetheless obvious here. He influences the mind of people through certain tactics like the mystery surrounding his first days on this earth. He elevates himself to the rank of a super-human being. His education is described as one of the best that one could acquire, and his career as a civil servant is rendered in impressive terms. The author writes about his education in these lines: "despite my parents' strong Muslim background, my father later sent me to St Edward's Secondary School, which was the most prestigious Catholic high school in the country" (Kabbah, 2010:3). He further mentions the importance of such an education: "the liberal education I received at St Edward's, in a mixed society, further gave me a multi-ethnic broad-mindedness" (Kabbah, 2010:3). The self-aggrandizement which is obvious on these pages (although there is certainly some truth in it) can be linked to the "ethos" part of Critical Discourse Analysis. The

author describes himself and his beginnings in very respectable, dignified and honourable ways. The culmination of that process is found in his election as the president of a democratic government, after several years spent as an excellent national and international civil servant in Sierra Leone and abroad:

On 29 March 1996, I was sworn in as president of Sierra Leone. A few minutes before the new chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), Brigadier Julius Maado Bio stepped forward to hand over the staff of Office to me, and all the thoughts and images of the problems I was about to inherit virtually disappeared. There was no doubt in my mind about what it means and what it takes to be addressed as “Mr. President” or “His Excellency the President” (Kabbah, 2010:34-35).

He later shows the reader how sincere he is to himself and the others. In his expression of joy when civil war had ceased and order was established in the country, Tejan Kabbah shows how dear his country is to him and the return of peace and order is presented as the normal order of things. One can read here a combination of the feelings of attachment, love for return to the “normalcy” in a country where war is ending. In his speeches, he distinguishes himself from the rebels and soldiers who perpetuate atrocities:

I am very happy to tell you that I whole heartedly welcome the action taken by the patriotic members of the Sierra Leone Army, the State Security Division (SSD), the Police, the Civil Defence Forces and other true patriots to oust the junta and return our beloved Sierra Leone to sanity, democracy and constitutional order (Kabbah, 2010:90).

Social cognition and the management of discourse access represent one of the crucial social dimensions of dominance in Critical Discourse Analysis. In other words, ‘modern’ power as Van Dijk calls it, or who is allowed to say/ write/hear/read what to whom, where, when and how, are very important (Van Dijk, 1993).

This is reflected in the memoir, when Tejan Kabbah uses a special platform to deliver his speech in order to win the support and admiration of the audience at the ECOWAS summit:

For the people of Sierra Leone this is therefore a decisive summit. They look up to this summit to put an end to their nightmare and to enable them to recover their fundamental human rights. In the darkest period of the Second World War, Winston Churchill spoke of the hinge of fate. Sierra Leone is at a similar pass. Whether the people of Sierra Leone are to be restored to a life worthy of human beings or to be consigned to barbarism a long time to come, largely depend on the outcome of this summit (Kabbah, 2010:75).

His enemies, the rebels and coup makers of the Sierra Leone Army who had overthrown him and forced him into exile in Guinea could not have access to such a platform.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in Ishmael Beah's *A Long Way Gone: the True Story of Child Soldier*

One can say that the title of the book in itself connotes an attempt to distinguish this book from other writings of this type. In other words, by adding the words “true story” to the title, one has the impression that the author, from the very onset, wants to tell the reader that the story which he is about to read is not fiction. That gives a sort of power to the story. Instead of calling his book ‘a memoir’ as Tejan Kabbah did, Ishmael Beah chose to attribute some power to his text by calling it ‘the true story of a child soldier’. One can see in that choice of words a real desire to underline certain features of the book. That expression “a true story” can be seen by the reader as a way to classify this text above other war stories, a forceful way to tell the story of all the children who have fallen and continue to fall victims to an abominable thing: being a child soldier. This title can therefore be seen as a real attack to those who turn innocent children into child soldiers. We are therefore in a situation where the writer takes a position and sides with a certain

camp that he sees as that of the truthful ones. Taking a stance or a position is seen as one of the features of CDA as we pointed out earlier in Van Dijk's definition and explanation of that theory.

A Long Way Gone plainly states the author's position by his portrayals of the atrocities of civil war precisely in Sierra Leone. It goes beyond Tejan Kabbah's analysis of the Civil War in Sierra Leone; it provides a vivid image of the atrocities of that conflict and by doing that, the author captures the discourse of the various fighting camps. Each side uses its means to show that they are right, powerful and invincible. The rebels or soldiers of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) spoke and acted in a way which demonstrates that they are convinced of the right nature of the war they are fighting. Each of their actions and words is loaded with that feeling of "the owner of power", "the one who is on the side of justice and has to fight the enemy" (Kabbah, 2010). For instance, the following example combines words and actions. Little boys who enrolled into the rebel armed forces, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) treat an elderly man--in the book-- in a way which is heart wrenching. The boys speak with authority to the old man, humiliate him in a manner which is beyond description and show both the old man and those around him that they, the RUF have power and are right. They use the power of the written and the spoken word on their adversaries and do not show any sign of remorse. Power abuse, which is one of the basic tenets of CDA is explicit here, and is enacted by the rebels. The narrator uses the following scene to illustrate it:

While the interrogation went on, one of the rebels painted RUF on all the walls of the houses in the village. He was the sloppiest painter I have ever seen. I don't even think he knew his alphabet. Rather, he only knew what R, U, and F looked like. When he was done painting, he walked to the old man and placed his gun to the old man's head.

"Do you have any last words to say?" The old man at this point was unable to speak. His lips trembled, but he couldn't get a word out. The rebel pulled the trigger, and like lightning, I saw the spark of fire that came from the muzzle. I turned my

face to the ground. My knees started trembling and my heartbeat grew faster and louder. When I looked back, the old man was circling around like a dog trying to catch a fly on its tail. He kept screaming, “My head! My brains!” The rebels laughed at him. Finally, he stopped and slowly raised his hands toward his face like a person hesitant to look in a mirror. “I can see! I can hear!” he cried out, and fainted. It turned out that the rebels hadn’t shot him but had fired at close range near his head. They were very amused at the old man’s reaction (Beah, 2007: 33).

The effect of war on human beings is carefully detailed in this work. Innocent populations are turned into “beings without feelings”. Witnessing the atrocities caused by the rebels who display their power and skills on unarmed civilians traumatizes people like the narrator. It also unveils one of the features of CDA: The rebels are convinced that they are doing the right thing and would leave no stone unturned to win the local populations on their side and fight the national or loyal army. The effect of such a conflict and display of power turns children into such “zombies” as the author’s own experience shows. He is a small boy --about 13 years old--who has been forcefully recruited into the Sierra Leone Army. He has been turned into a child soldier and this is a reflection of “counter power”, an important element in CDA. The author and “his people” have suffered so much in the hands of the rebels that he and his close ones join the loyal forces, although against his will:

My tattered *crapes* are soaked with blood, which seems to be running down my army shorts. I feel no physical pain, so I am not sure whether I have been wounded. I can feel the warmth of my AK-47’s barrel on my back; I don’t remember when I last fired it. It feels as if needles have been hammered into my brain and it is hard to know whether it is day or night. The wheelbarrow in front of me contains a dead body wrapped in white bed sheets. I do not know why I am taking this particular body to the cemetery (Beah, 2007: 18).

As the author states in such a situation, selective memory settles in victims or witnesses decide to remember certain things and deny or refuse to remember other things they witnessed. The book describes a scene where a woman falls out of a car when one of the doors of the car opens and blood oozes from her ears. Parents cover their children's eyes (Beah, 2007: 12). The work further states: Truth is denied, pain is denied and death is denied; pain and chock prevent tears from flowing (Beah, 2007: 13). The middle of the book is really the section where counter power, as a reaction to power abuse is plainly exposed. The narrator and many of the young men who had been humiliated by the rebels are now dangerous unstoppable killers in the national Sierra Leone army. They take drugs and confront rebels in return:

We walked for long hours and stopped only to eat sardines and corned beef with *gari*, (some food made with cassava) sniff cocaine, *brown brown* (mixture of gun powder and cocaine) and take some white capsules. The combination of these drugs gave us a lot of energy and made us fierce. The idea of death didn't cross my mind at all and killing had become as easy as drinking water (Beah, 2007: 122).

The author further describes how war-fantasies had become favourite dreams and wishes for him and his friends who were the victims and cowards in the eyes of the ruling rebels, some days before. These children have been turned into "war-machines" and the heroes of the war movies--and their weapons--have now become the focus of the child soldiers' desires and admiration as this conversation among them reveals:

"Sometimes I am going to take a whole village by myself, just like Rambo," Alhaji told me smiling at the new goals he has set for himself.

"I'd like to have some bazookas of my own like the ones in *Commando*. "That would be beautiful," I said, and we laughed" (Beah 2007: 122).

Metaphors and Political Communication in the Works under Study

Metaphors as they have been defined above are used in political discourse for followers (readers in this context) to share a particular representation which is that of the narrator (or the writer in these texts since they are all memoirs). In his article “Metaphor and Political Communication”, Jonathan Charteris-Black uses two examples to help the reader understand such a phenomenon. One example is the former Cuban president referring to the US as a “shark”, and Cuba and other small isles in South America as “sardines”. Charteris-Black sees that example as a politician establishing his ethos. He writes: “an important ethical dimension of metaphor is that it can be employed either as a form of self-evaluation of the speaker or as a form of evaluation of policies, political opponents, or groups in society (Charteris-Black); I will illustrate this with reference to Fidel Castro” whom he quotes: “to understand this problem of America, a book which explains the truculence of the U.S policy in our continent must be read. It is called “The Fable of the Shark and the Sardine”. The Shark is the Yankee empire; the sardines the weak American nations” (Castro, 1960 cited in Charteris, 2009:30). The author explains Castro’s use of such a metaphor and adds that Castro’s preferred animal metaphors are the sharks and the sardine to refer to the USA as a symbol of “greed and rapacity” while Cuba and other small countries are symbols of moral integrity.

Charteris Black further exposes a case where an appeal to pathos can be combined with an appeal to ethos in a political use of metaphor. The audience’s response in such an example indicates the success of this intertextual strategy. In this specific case also, it is up to the “followers” to interpret the metaphor. This second illustration of the use of metaphor in political discourse is also an extract of a speech by Castro:

“If someone was able to write that bit about the shark swallowing the sardine, and a book with that title even appeared in the initial years of the revolution by an author who at that time had certain decorously progressive ideas, today we cannot

talk about the shark and the sardine. Today we can talk about the shark and the fireball, and ask if the shark could swallow the fireball [applause]. Today you can talk about the shark and steel, and ask if the shark could swallow that gigantic ball of steel which is the Cuban revolution today [applause, chanting]” (Castro, 1991 cited in Charteris, 2009:105).

In the same article, the author uses another example where former British Prime minister refers to countries possessing weapons of mass destruction(he was referring specifically to Iraq) as ‘rogue state’(Charteris, 2009:111). So Charteris-Black showed that in the use of metaphor in political discourse, ethos, pathos and logos are used in order to appeal to the emotion and feeling of the audience (reader) and make the speaker (narrator/ author in this case) look right.

In *Coming from the Brink in Sierra Leone*, coincidentally, the author refers to the mutineers and rebels of the RUF as rogues: he writes: “I had at this ECOWAS summit, reiterated, among other things, the calamity that the rogue elements in the Sierra Leone Army together with their RUF cohorts, had brought to the people of Sierra Leone and what the people expected from the summit leaders.” (Kabbah 2010:75) Here, the author certainly wants the audience to agree with him and he appeals to their emotion and sense of judgment, the pathos and the logos in order to show the despicable nature of his opponents.

At the same ECOWAS summit, Tejan Kabbah made a speech in which he was really appealing to the pathos in the reader. The speech is full of passion and emotion and a strong desire to salvage his country from the Augean stable it is plunged into. He goes to the length of quoting giants in world history like Churchill of England and his use of metaphors as the dark moments of World War Two. This is a part of Tejan Kabbah’s ECOWAS speech; it appeals to the ethos, the pathos and the logos. Tejan Kabbah presents himself as a man who thinks well and right (logos), reminds the audience of the suffering that his people have undergone and which might continue if nothing is done (pathos),

and calls for the restoration of decent living human conditions (ethos):

For the people of Sierra Leone this is therefore a decisive summit. They look up to this summit to put an end to their nightmare and to enable them to recover their fundamental human rights. In the darkest period of the Second World War, Winston Churchill spoke of the hinge of fate. Sierra Leone is at a similar pass. Whether the people of Sierra Leone are to be restored to a life worthy of human beings or to be consigned to barbarism a long time to come, depend on the outcome of this summit. (Kabbah, 2010: 75)

The memoir presents a plethora of metaphors in the section devoted to the author's speeches while in exile in Guinea. He was using a radio station to communicate with the people of Sierra Leone, using metaphors that presented the situation in which the coup makers had plunged the country as a "dungeon" (Kabbah 2010:72) and described his trip to the United Nations as "a pilgrimage" on behalf of the people of Sierra Leone.

A Long Way Gone also contains several metaphors which aim at showing the cruelty which human beings are capable of. An illustration appears in a scene when rebels meet the author and his friends fleeing their town because of the imminent rebel attack. Unfortunately they are caught on their way by rebels--who are in a position of power here-- and Gibrilla, one of the author's friends is threatened and compared to an animal: "They cocked their guns, and one of them placed the muzzle of his gun under Gibrilla's chin" and one of the rebels added: "he is scared like a soaked monkey" (Beah, 2007:31). Another metaphor which is central in the same book is "the moon". The author writes: "We must strive to be like the moon" and explains that he had learned that adage from his grandmother who used to advise people to behave like the moon because unlike the sun or the rain that could either be too hot (the sun) or make people feel cold (the rain), the moon was a constant and reliable provider of clarity, light and joy to human beings. The author recalls his grandmother's words in these terms:

Everybody becomes happy and appreciates the moon in their own special way. Children watch their shadows and play in its light, people gather at the square to tell stories and dance through the night. A lot of happy things happen when the moon shines. These are some of the reasons why we should want to be like the moon (Beah, 2007: 16-17).

The preceding quotation simply shows that the moon is the metaphor for peace and the narrator is using it to remind people of the importance of peace.

The Shadow of Imana also contains numerous metaphors which express the author's feelings during her trip to Rwanda, after the genocide was officially over. The book opens with the author expressing a special attachment to Rwanda. The country is portrayed as a tumour that the narrator/author carries. She writes: "I could no longer keep Rwanda buried inside me" (Tadjo, 2002:3). And she adds that "getting Rwanda out of her" would mean self-medication, curing the abscess: "I needed to lance the abscess, lay bare the wound and bandage it. I am not a doctor, but I could still try to administer first aid to myself" (Tadjo, 2002:3). One might see in this metaphor the suffering that Rwanda went through, the blood that was shed during the genocide causing a disease (an abscess) in the body of the narrator. The narrator/writer might be trying to represent the whole humanity here and accepting that interpretation of the metaphor would mean that humanity has been wounded as a result of the genocide in Rwanda. The author shows her concern for Rwanda by saying that she "had long felt a need to exorcise Rwanda". One can see in this metaphor a real desire to cleanse the country, to help Rwanda recover from the tragedy that befell it. Here again, the moon is used as a metaphor. The narrator tells us that there is still no total recovery, joy and reconciliation in Rwanda and she captures that through the metaphor of the moon which is not fully round, but a perfect "half- circle" (Tadjo, 2002:9). The author nonetheless leaves us with a ray of hope when she portrays Kigali as a volcano shedding itself. This metaphor might symbolize cleansing, exorcizing, as she previously put it and the beginning of a new life of hope and purity, a kind of phoenix, a bird that awakens

or comes back to life, from its ashes. She writes: “just as in some of the Pacific Isles, people return to settle at the foot of an extinct volcano to till the fertile soil, Kigali is shedding its past and donning the raiment of a new existence” (Tadjo, 2002: 10).

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to examine the theme of “rhetoric of genocide”, precisely the themes of memory and trauma in three selected memoirs: Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s *Coming Back from the Brink in Sierra Leone* (2010), Ismael Beah’s *A Long Way Gone: Memoir of a Child Soldier* (2007) and Véronique Tadjo’s *The shadow of Imana: Travels in the Heart of Rwanda* (2000). The theoretical framework that guided the study was Teun A Van Dijk’s principle of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), supported by Jonathan Charteris-Black’s theory of “Metaphor and Political Communication”. The chapter clearly showed that these two theories can effectively be used to study literary texts that deal with themes like memory and trauma. The chapter has also shown that sustainable development is possible in Africa if imperialism and neo-colonialism are eradicated, and flails like tribalism and inter-ethnic hostilities are wiped away. It demonstrated that the conflicts in the novels understudy are real problems that threaten the lives and well-being of many, as CDA poses.

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This book serves as a drive and medium for constructive analysis, critical thinking, and informed change in the broad area of cultural heritage studies. In Africa, how to overturn the gory effects and reverse the wholesale obnoxious and unpardonable losses suffered from the excruciating experience of colonialism in a manner that empowers the present and future generations, remains a burning question. Colonial and liberation war heritage have received insignificant attention. The relevance, nature, and politics at play when it comes to the role of memory and colonial heritage in view of nation-building and sustainability on the continent is yet to receive careful practical and theoretical attention and scrutiny from both heritage scholars and governments. Yet, colonial heritage has vast potentials that if harnessed could reverse the gargantuan losses of colonialism and promote sustainable development in Africa. The book critically reflects on the opportunities, constraints, and challenges of colonial heritage across Africa. It draws empirical evidence from its focus on Zimbabwe, South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, and Mozambique, to advance the thesis that cultural heritage in Africa, and in particular colonial heritage, faces challenges of epic proportions that require urgent attention.

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